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This work is about claims that experts make in various
academic disciplines, and about how features of disciplines
should affect our confidence in the correctness of those
claims. Our field of study is work in the full range of
disciplines, covering mathematics, the natural sciences, the
social sciences and the humanities.
Disciplines differ from one another in several ways. Quan-
tification and mathematical argument are the norm in
some disciplines, but are rare in others. Some disciplines
use experiments, while others rely on sources. And so on.
But disciplines also have things in common. These include
both the aspiration to get things right, and fundamental
principles like respect for evidence and a requirement to
argue rationally. We seek to lay out the differences and the
commonalities in detail, and to assess the effects on our
confidence. We also explore reasons why disciplines have
their features.
The contents and the practice of disciplines are inseparable,
so themes introduced in earlier chapters recur in later ones.
But the broad plan is as follows. There is some scene-setting
in chapters 1 and 2. Then in chapters 3 to 5, the main
focus is on the claims that are made within disciplines. In
chapters 6 to 9, it is on the practice of disciplines.
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Preface
Debts to other authors are recorded in the footnotes. There
is also a great debt to the staff of the British Library, the
University of London Senate House Library and Cambridge
University Library, to those who keep the world wide web
running, and to those who create and maintain online
repositories of academic papers. Finally, thanks are due
to Anna Hughes for combing the text to find unsound
arguments and typographical errors. The author is entirely
responsible for the faults that remain.
We can all help the culture of learning to flourish by
making work freely available. It has been wonderful to see
open access gaining ground in recent years. This work is
published under a Creative Commons licence, as set out on
page ii. It is available at http://www.rbphilo.com/.
Work in epistemology is not normally treated with the
caution that is appropriate when work has commercial
significance, but for the avoidance of doubt, the author






References have been given in the form of chapter and
section numbers when they identify passages precisely
enough. This approach should be increasingly useful with
the rise of the electronic text. Roman numerals have
been converted to Arabic numerals when they merely give
volume, chapter or section numbers, rather than being parts
of titles.
References to Plato include Stephanus numbers, and
references to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason include the
usual A and B page numbers.
Some of the books to which we refer exist in several editions,
and material may appear, disappear or move around from
one edition to the next. If a reference does not appear
to point to the right place, the first step is to check the
bibliography to see which edition to use.
Cross-references within the text are given by section
number. A reference to a general line of argument is to
everything that falls within the section. For example, a
reference to section 3.4.2 is a reference not only to what
comes immediately under the heading so numbered, but
also to what comes under the headings numbered 3.4.2.1,
3.4.2.2 and so on. But when a reference is to some specific
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point, the point will be found in the material that comes
immediately under the heading. Thus if reference were made
to a specific point in the form “section 3.4.2”, the point
would be found before the heading numbered 3.4.2.1.
The PDF file of this work at http://www.rbphilo.com/ is
searchable, so there is no index. However, readers should be
aware that some software will not find a phrase in a PDF
file when the phrase runs over two lines, or a word when it
is hyphenated over two lines.
x
Summary
Chapter 1: Disciplines and Claims
1.1: Our main question
Our main question asks how various features of disciplines
should influence our confidence in the correctness of claims
that receive the assent of expert researchers, and that
thereby come to be accepted. (We shall say “confidence
in claims”, or simply “confidence”, and “researchers”, for
short.)
We need to take it that there is a legitimate notion of
correctness. Researchers aim to make correct claims.
We shall use a fairly liberal notion of expert researchers.
Claims will count as accepted when they enjoy the assent
of the generality of researchers. Unanimity is not required.
A formal process of acceptance is also not required.
We are interested in legitimate influences on our confidence
in claims in general, rather than on our confidence in
individual claims.
We recognize the existence of positive support for claims.
xi
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The notion of features of disciplines has a wide scope.
1.2: The corpus
Each discipline has a corpus, the claims to which the great
majority of researchers assent.
1.3: Norms
The norms of disciplines set out how research should be
conducted. There are several types of norm.
1.4: Differences
Disciplines differ in several respects. The availability of
deductive relationships between propositions, and the
extent to which pervasive claims constrain the making of
other claims, will both be significant.
1.5: A scale of disciplines
We can arrange disciplines on a scale, ranging from
mathematics and the natural sciences at the bottom end,
through the social sciences, up to the humanities.
Chapter 2: A Framework
2.1: Disciplines, topics, accounts
We shall identify disciplines, topics within those disciplines,
and accounts of those topics.
Sub-disciplines, however small, will be regarded as discip-
lines.
Disciplines all have their own norms. Norms can have a
significant favourable effect on our confidence.
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Norms tend to be defined most precisely in mathematics
and the natural sciences, less precisely in the social sciences,
and least precisely in the humanities.
An account is a set of claims, unified by their concern
with some single topic and by relationships to one another
which structure the account. Accounts of topics may be
comprehensive or fragmentary. And they may be more or
less closely tied to specific occasions.
There may be scope to regard a single account as compre-
hensive. Alternatively, and particularly high up the scale of
disciplines, there may need to be several complementary
accounts because no one account could be regarded as
comprehensive. And in any discipline there may be accounts
that conflict with one another.
2.2: Idioms
Disciplines may be conducted in the physical idiom or the
human idiom.
The physical idiom is the only idiom that is used in most of
the natural sciences. It conveys information in terms that
are independent of specifically human ways of conceiving
the world.
Accounts given in the physical idiom would be intelligible
to a wide range of rational beings.
The human idiom is used in the social sciences and the
humanities.
The human idiom is the idiom of the intentional stance. It
is used to express the contents of psycho-social understand-
ings. It is also used when putting such understandings to
work in explaining human conduct.
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A psycho-social understanding comprises concepts and
principles that allow people to explain human conduct by
picking out such things as characteristics, habits of thought,
drives, motives and intentions. The human idiom has the
vocabulary for such things.
It is unlikely that researchers who used the human idiom
could renounce our everyday vocabulary and make use of a
purely technical idiom. And even if they could do so, that
might not be a good move.
Accounts given in the human idiom would only be intelli-
gible to a narrow range of rational beings.
Use of the human idiom might introduce bias into accounts,
but it should be a harmless bias.
A look at historical accounts of human conduct brings out
special considerations that support the use of everyday
psycho-social understandings or modified versions of them.
2.3: Ways to order a scale
Scales of disciplines could be constructed by reference to
various features of disciplines.
The use of different features would produce scales that were
similar, but the similarity would not prove anything.
Scales would be messy, with partial orderings and some
overlaps of disciplines, but that will not affect our argument.
Disciplines stand in relationships of dependence on one




Chapter 3: Relationships between Propositions
3.1: Introduction
Relationships between propositions play important roles
in the processes of making and assenting to claims.
Propositions may stand in deductive or non-deductive
relationships to one another. Arguments for claims may
be built up in reliance on several relationships between
propositions, or they may rely on single relationships.
3.2: Deductive relationships
Deductive relationships can allow claims to be supported,
either by deducing them from other claims or by deducing
consequences of them that are found to be acceptable.
There may be choices of rules of deduction.
The corpus of a discipline often supplies extra premises that
are needed in order to make relationships deductive.
Deductive relationships may be presented with varying
degrees of formality.
3.3: Non-deductive relationships
Non-deductive relationships may be almost as strong as
deductive relationships, or they may be weaker.
The corpus of a discipline can supply background that
makes it possible to argue for the existence of non-deductive
relationships.
The use of non-deductive relationships to conduct ar-





The availability of deductive relationships varies as between
disciplines.
One reason why deductive relationships are less widely
available in higher disciplines is that the objects of study
are complicated.
Another reason is that in higher disciplines, concepts are
often given their content using methods that do not make
content fully determinate.
Concepts may have vague extensions. Vagueness is more
common higher up the scale of disciplines.
Vagueness of extension can limit the availability of de-
ductive and near-deductive relationships, their usefulness
in testing, and the extent to which they can be used to
reach conclusions about objects of study.
3.5: Relationships and assent
Both deductive and non-deductive relationships can be used
to appraise claims.
Our confidence in claims may be influenced both by
the strength of relationships, and by the presentation of
arguments that support the existence of relationships from
premises to conclusions.
Chapter 4: Constraints on Claims
4.1: Pervasive claims
Pervasive claims may constrain the making of other claims.
This can have favourable effects on our confidence.
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There are indicators that claims are pervasive, but there
are no definitive criteria.
Pervasive claims can be justified at least partly by their
fertility.
Determinacy in the content of concepts is important to
the favourable effect of the use of pervasive claims on our
confidence.
4.2: Mathematics
In mathematics, large-scale deductive structures and highly
influential pervasive claims are the norm. There are
favourable effects on our confidence.
Researchers who use mathematics to understand the world
choose the parts of mathematics to use. This stage of choice
both helps to explain the enormous success of mathematics
as a tool to understand the world, and saves mathematics
itself from being beholden to the state of the world.
4.3: The natural sciences
The natural sciences must represent the world.
The world is very complex, and this has significant
consequences. It is impossible in practice to derive the
contents of most natural sciences from fundamental physics,
there are disciplines in which exceptionless laws are not
widely available, and in some disciplines concepts that suffer
from indeterminacy of content and vagueness of extension
must be used. The scope for pervasive claims to have
favourable effects on our confidence is therefore limited.
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4.4: The social sciences and the humanities
The severity of constraints on the making of claims is even
less in the social sciences and the humanities. We must seek
other sources of confidence.
There is scope to develop theoretical versions of some
disciplines, within which deductive relationships may be
readily available and pervasive claims may impose severe
constraints. But researchers must be cautious about apply-
ing the results of such work to the world.
Researchers may use frameworks, whether chronological or
topic-based, to help them organize their disciplines. Such
frameworks can be very helpful. There are risks in their
use, but those risks are not great.
4.5: Types of quantification
Quantification may be strong, linked to the formulation of
unified theories, or weak, merely recording patterns.
Chapter 5: Explanation
5.1: Explanations and claims
Explanations are of primary importance in all disciplines.
Phenomena that are explained may take a wide variety of
forms.
Explanantia will comprise general claims, such as laws and
principles, and claims of particular fact. It is important to
distinguish these two types of claim. Explananda may be
treated as single claims.
When researchers endorse an explanation, they will assent
both to its claim to explain (the claim that it is an
explanation), and to claims that play explanatory roles.
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Claims that play explanatory roles only gain support from
playing those roles if the explanations in which they do so
are better than explanations in which they do not do so.
5.2: Explanation using laws
In some explanations, the general claims in the explanantia
are all laws. We shall use a fairly generous concept of a law.
Laws may be exceptionless laws, laws with exceptions or
statistical laws.
When laws are exceptionless, explanations are likely to
forge strong connections from explanantia to explananda.
It may be possible to show that the correctness of claims
in an explanans is sufficient, and perhaps also necessary,
for the correctness of the claim in the explanandum. And
explanations may very well be contrastive. There are also
likely to be good prospects for testing the laws and for
embedding them in theories.
Where laws have exceptions, the connections from ex-
planantia to explananda are likely to be weaker, and our
confidence in the correctness both of claims to explain and
of claims that play explanatory roles may be diminished.
The degree to which explanations are contrastive may be
reduced, and it may be harder to test the laws. The laws
may sometimes need to be embedded in the corpus in a way
that is looser than the embedding of laws in theories.
The presence of ceteris paribus clauses in laws may
limit support for claims to explain and claims that play
explanatory roles, although it will not always do so.
When several laws are combined in an explanans, there
is an increased risk that unanticipated exceptions to the
predicted combined effect will arise. That weakens the
connection from explanans to explanandum.
xix
Summary
Explanations that use statistical laws can forge reasonably
strong connections from explanantia to explananda, so long
as they are explanations of other statistical laws or of
statistics for large sets of individuals.
Explanations that use statistical laws may stand at some
distance from the mechanisms of the world. But they can
be contrastive.
5.3: Causal explanation
We are here concerned with explanations that make use of
general causal claims.
Causal explanations give a strong impression of getting to
grips with the workings of the world.
Explanations may identify mechanisms. These may range
from mechanisms that are described by identifying elements
that push and pull one another or do something similar,
up to mechanisms that are described by mapping causal
influences in some detail.
It may be more or less possible to identify, or to gesture
at, relationships between identified mechanisms and what
fundamental physics says goes on in the world. This
becomes harder, and eventually impossible, as we go up
the scale of disciplines.
Even if the values of variables are related, there may be no
mechanism to be found. Even some sophisticated analyses
may not distinguish causation from other associations of
values.
The use of general causal claims in explanations can
increase our confidence in claims to explain.
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The identification of mechanisms can increase our confid-
ence both in claims to explain, and in claims that play
explanatory roles. It is particularly helpful to identify
machine mechanisms, and to identify mechanisms which are
such that it is possible at least to gesture at relationships
to what fundamental physics says goes on in the world.
5.4: Explanation using principles
Principles are general claims that do not qualify as laws.
They give guidance as to what is to be expected.
Explanations that use principles are not like explanations
that only use laws. They render explananda unsurprising
and comprehensible by showing how explanantia and
explananda hold together.
They do this by using principles that are drawn from a wide
background, usually an understanding of human nature.
Even conduct that at first sight appears irrational can be
explained, but additional work is then required.
In sociological and historical explanations, principles are
likely to play dominant roles. But laws can still play
essential roles by connecting events.
The holding together of an explanans and an explanandum
needs to amount to more than their consistency. Measures
of coherence can give some idea of how to give substance to
the notion of what is required.
A narrative sets out what happened on a particular occasion




A narrative can explain by fitting events together in a
pattern. Both senses of the word “colligation” are relevant.
Narratives must be faithful to the facts, but this can be a
challenging notion when events have been brought under
organizing concepts.
The giving of explanations that use principles needs to be
controlled. Controls may not be as tight as they can be when
explanations only use laws, but some controls are available.
There are controls over the use of principles.
The creation of narrative explanations can be controlled
by the need to have them endorsed by other researchers.
A claim that a narrative is explanatory can be supported
by showing how principles are put to work to link events.
A narrative can be tested by attempting to add detail, by
attempting to integrate the narrative with other narratives
at different levels of generality, and by using methods of
analysis that are drawn from fields other than the primary
field of the narrative.
We may have some concerns about explanations that use
principles. Researchers might be trapped in a mistaken
mindset. When several complementary explanations are
available, there may be no claim to explain that enjoys
the assent of the generality of researchers. And when there
are conflicting explanations, it may be hard to have much
confidence in claims that enjoy the assent even of the
majority of researchers. We may also be concerned at the
lack of a systematic way to resolve conflicts. And there may
be scope to redescribe explananda in order to facilitate the
giving of explanations, scope that could be misused.
Explanations that use principles can have some contrastive
power, although the fact that phenomena are identified and
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principles are then selected means we must be cautious
about attributions of contrastive power.
Narratives may include causal claims that are one-off
rather than general. Such causal claims can be legitimate,
because of the supervenience of large-scale phenomena on
the microphysical. And while such claims may well be open
to challenge, the making of them is not an undisciplined
activity. But it can be inappropriate to explain the actions
of specified individuals by concentrating exclusively on
external causes.
5.5: Different disciplines
Laws are less readily available in higher disciplines than in
lower disciplines. There are some laws in the social sciences,
but their coverage of fields of study is patchy. Explanations
that only use laws are therefore more common low down
the scale of disciplines.
In disciplines that are concerned with human conduct, it
can be inappropriate to give explanations that only use
laws. Such explanations would not capture our sense of
free decision and action. If explanations use principles, that
sense can be captured.
The availability of laws can be increased by making sim-
plifying assumptions, as for example is done in economics.
Acknowledgement of the complexity of the world can reduce
the availability of laws again. But this effect can sometimes
be avoided, depending on the interests of researchers.
5.6: Erklären and Verstehen
Erklären typically involves showing how the regularities and
the mechanisms of the world give rise to some observed
phenomenon. Verstehen requires a reader to see people
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whose conduct is to be explained as possessing human
points of view, that is, as investing people and events with
meaning and value, as responsive to those investments, and
as having a sense of being self-directed agents.
One mark of Erklären is that an explanation is given in
terms which make irrelevant the human natures of those
who give the explanation and those who grasp it. But the
achievement of Verstehen relies on the human nature of the
reader.
The achievement of the type of Verstehen that interests us
confers access to propositional information which can be
shared with other human beings. Verstehen in our sense
is not merely a feeling of empathy. And there are other
forms of understanding which should be distinguished from
Verstehen.
The distinction between Erklären and Verstehen is related
to the distinction between explanations that only use
laws and explanations that use principles. Possession of
a human point of view is required not only to achieve
Verstehen, but also to make evident the explanatory force
of many explanations that use principles, while it is only
rarely required to make evident the explanatory force of
explanations that only use laws.
5.7: Special types of explanation
Explanations that use case studies allow close attention to
detail. But caution is needed when researchers generalize
from case studies or theorize on the strength of them.
The cases studied may not be representative of the cases
that exist, and they may not adequately represent variation
between those cases. In addition, the interpretation of cases
needs to be controlled. Fortunately, there are norms and
special methods which can lessen such concerns.
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Explanations that make use of results are unproblematic
when the actions of intelligent agents to achieve results are
studied, although there are issues regarding unintended con-
sequences. Such explanations are much more problematic
when unconscious nature is studied.
Some explanations use mathematical models. We may be
concerned that these models may not accurately represent
the world. It is important to take care when interpreting
the results of work with models, and not to assume
without argument that results about the world have been
established. There are however ways in which the necessary
further argument can sometimes be supplied.
Issues about relationships with the world also arise in
connection with simulations. In addition, a special issue
arises in connection with simulations when the individual
steps in them cannot be understood as rational steps.
Chapter 6: Norms and Concepts
6.1: Norms
Norms may govern both the conduct of research and the
appraisal of claims. Norms that govern the appraisal of
claims also influence the conduct of research, because
researchers want to see their claims receive the assent of
other researchers.
The norms of mathematics are special, and are particularly
well-defined and strict.
In other disciplines low down the scale, in which deductive
relationships between propositions and relationships that
are almost as strong are plentiful, norms range from the
very general to the very specific.
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There is a norm that researchers should not make or assent
to claims unless the claims have adequate positive support.
The notion of positive support is perfectly legitimate. The
views of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine may
give us pause in relation to supposedly crucial experiments,
but evidence can still lend very strong support to claims.
Observance of the norms of the natural sciences can increase
our confidence.
Disciplines higher up the scale, in which there are fewer de-
ductive relationships between propositions or relationships
that are almost as strong, also have their norms. But while
norms that relate directly to the collection and the analysis
of evidence may be generally agreed, there is less agreement
on norms that govern arguments for general claims.
One useful norm in such disciplines is that explanations
must comport with psycho-social understandings. Another
useful norm is that tension between accepted claims should
be avoided, or at least kept to a minimum.
6.2: Formative concepts
Formative concepts are the concepts that have a significant
effect on how researchers approach the objects of study in
a discipline.
Researchers sometimes have a choice as to whether to treat
certain concepts as formative.
In the natural sciences, choice tends to be limited. This is
connected with the fact that choices of different formative
concepts will lead to the production of different accounts.
There can be different accounts of a single topic in the
natural sciences which conflict with one another, but that
is undesirable. When it happens, it may be that no claim
with competitors comes to be accepted.
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In the social sciences and the humanities, there is more
likely to be choice. There is wide scope to give a range of
accounts of each topic, and there is more freedom than in
the natural sciences to devise new concepts.
Choice in the social sciences and the humanities is however
not uncontrolled. A set of formative concepts should make it
possible to give accounts of a range of topics, such that those
accounts would form a coherent set. And when a discipline is
concerned with the conduct of individuals, a set of formative
concepts must allow researchers to draw on a psycho-social
understanding.
The availability of choices need not have a serious adverse
effect on our confidence.
6.3: Pluralism
“Pluralism” is an umbrella term for a range of lines of
thought. We concentrate on pluralism in the sense of a
range of approaches within a given discipline, and on the
advantages of pluralism.
A contest between approaches or between claims can be
beneficial, because the challenge of answering the advocates
of other approaches or claims is a route to progress.
A choice of approaches or claims can give rise to an ensemble
of explanations or other accounts. Such an ensemble can
confer greater understanding than a single account.
It is however not at all clear that disagreement is good




Chapter 7: Experiments and Sources
7.1: The distinction
Experiments are set up to yield evidence of some desired
type. Sources were not created in order to yield evidence,
and they must be taken as they are. Data obtained from
surveys resemble data from sources.
7.2: Experiments
Experiments are standardly used low down the scale of
disciplines, and there are norms that govern their conduct.
Sometimes there are questions to ask about the extent to
which experiments can allow claims to be made about the
world outside the context of the experiments.
7.3: Sources
We distinguish the interpretation of individual sources from
the statistical analysis of survey data.
The interpretation of individual sources can be a complex
business. If sources were intended to convey information,
the intentions of their creators must be discerned and
the contexts within which the creators worked must
be understood. If sources were not intended to convey
information, they do not convey a manifest message that
researchers can use as a starting point.
Sources are sometimes interpreted in certain ways in order
to allow explanations to be given. Researchers may add
plausible details that are not directly evidenced by sources,
so as to allow the sources to support satisfactory narratives.
Researchers may also interpret sources under the guidance
of optional formative concepts.
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There are several ways in which the use of sources by
researchers can be scrutinized by others.
The use of surveys is for our purposes closer to the use of
sources than to the use of experiments. The populations
surveyed are not created by researchers, and they may not
have exactly the right characteristics for data derived from
them to answer the researchers’ questions.
Disciplines in which surveys are used have well-developed
methods for the collection and the analysis of survey data.
Data mining can reveal interesting patterns, but there
are special risks. A large body of data is very likely to
reveal some patterns, but they may not be significant. It is
possible for researchers to pursue evidence for a conclusion
that is suggested by a pattern, while they do not notice
a lack of evidence that the pattern is significant. And it
can be difficult to test hypotheses properly. But there are
precautions that can be taken.
Chapter 8: Routes to Accounts
8.1: Introduction
Researchers need to reach accounts and individual claims by
taking routes from evidence or from other starting points.
They may deduce claims, or they may reach explanatory
accounts by taking the good explanation route.
8.2: The deductive route
The deductive route encompasses both deductions and ar-
guments that are almost as strong. The route is conspicuous
in mathematics and the natural sciences.
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Deduction from evidence can give considerable confidence
in conclusions reached, so long as there is confidence that
the evidence does not mislead.
The validity of arguments needs to be checked. The
dialogical conception of deduction can provide reassurance.
Claims that are drawn from the existing corpus of the
relevant discipline will often play an important role in use
of the deductive route. We must ask whether premises that
are drawn from the corpus have adequate support.
8.3: The good explanation route
The good explanation route involves a search for possible
explanations, followed by appraisal of the candidates.
In appraisal, researchers can look for standard virtues
of explanations. Other good signs include consilience,
successful triangulation and multiple derivability.
The identification of single best explanations, or of good
explanations, can support claims within explanantia.
Searches for good explanations must be wide-ranging, but
they must also be guided. Evidence can be recharacterized
in the search for good explanations.
In some disciplines, it is important to identify the meanings
that people who are studied attributed to events, objects,
social structures, social roles, and human character traits
and actions. The identification of attributed meanings
can allow researchers to give explanations that confer
Verstehen.
The identification of attributed meanings requires careful
consideration of both the detailed evidence and the overall
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pictures that emerge of the psyches and the societies of
the people studied. Researchers can obtain guidance from
the hermeneutic tradition in the interpretation of texts.
But there are some differences between the identification of
meanings of texts and the identification of meanings that
were attributed to non-textual items. There is also some
risk of wrongly specifying attributed meanings.
There are various controls over use of the good explanation
route. There is scrutiny of work by other researchers. The
diversity of outlook of researchers is some protection against
researchers being led astray by mistaken decisions as to
how to approach phenomena. The influence of the existing
corpus can provide some protection against going astray
because good explanations have not been considered, or
because explanations have not been ranked appropriately.
And formal epistemology can provide some controls over
processes of reasoning.
Chapter 9: Creators of Accounts
9.1: The complexity of the world
The complexity of the world means that researchers must
work in groups and must rely on testimony. Independent
appraisal of work is vital. New technologies can help
researchers. Epistemic virtues are important.
9.2: Work in groups
Work in groups is in practice essential in many fields. It can
also be argued to be an independently valid way to work,
and not merely a practical development from individual
work.
Groups can help to impose norms. They can also facilitate
the sharing of ideas, although we may sometimes have
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concerns about how consensus is reached when that sharing
exposes disagreement.
Work in a group can help to impose the orthodoxy of
a research community. That can allow great increases in
productivity, but at the risk of neglecting unorthodox work
that should be taken seriously, of losing some beneficial
diversity in debate, and of groupthink.
9.3: Reliance on testimony
Researchers rely on testimony. We must consider both the
content of testimony and the social aspect of its production
and reception.
9.4: Independent appraisal
The independent appraisal of work done is a vital control.
Criticism must be effective. Even when conditions that
should help it to be effective are satisfied, we may have
concerns. Independence is a matter of degree, rhetoric may
influence appraisal, some work is never appraised carefully,
and work that might show apparently interesting results to
be due to chance may not get published.
Traditional peer review both checks that work submitted
for publication meets a standard, and rations the available
places in peer-reviewed journals. The rationing may concern
us both because it may encourage researchers to make their
results seem more exciting than they really are, and because
it may block the peer-reviewed publication of work that
would pose challenges to other work.
There are grounds for concern about the effectiveness of
peer review. Reviewers may not have the time to review
papers carefully, and they may be able to identify authors
even when their names have been removed from papers.
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There are now plenty of opportunities for open comment
on work, in ways that make it easy for researchers to find
comments. This should improve control over the process by
which claims come to be accepted.
The ultimate form of control is to repeat work that
researchers have done, to see whether the same results are
obtained. But this is costly, and it is therefore only done in
a modest proportion of cases.
9.5: New technologies
New technologies are transforming the way research is
conducted.
Citation indices, sophisticated tools for conducting searches,
and the standardization of terminology all help researchers
to find the literature they need.
Specialized wikis can both supply information and help
researchers to navigate the literature, but control over the
quality of their contents is needed.
New technologies facilitate work in large, dispersed and
open groups by making it easy to share material, receive
contributions, and manage the production of statements of
results to which all members may contribute.
Large, dispersed and open groups should be less exposed
than small, geographically concentrated and closed groups
to the risks that potentially productive but unorthodox
work may be met with hostility or neglected, that diversity
in debate may be reduced, and that groupthink may arise.
New technologies also facilitate the sharing of all of the




If researchers exercise epistemic virtues, that will increase
both their effectiveness and our confidence. In addition, it
will help to make it safe for other researchers to make use
of their work.
In work that leads to the making of claims, accuracy
and completeness are particularly important. It is also
important only to make claims when there is sufficient
evidence for them, but not to make this demand so extreme
that the relevant discipline cannot progress.
Imagination must be both disciplined and lively.
When claims are appraised, freedom from prejudice is
important. Some well-established assumptions that are
not recognized as prejudices may hinder progress. But
some entrenched preferences play valuable roles in making
disciplines productive.
Sound judgement in the choice of standards and methods
of appraisal is important. The social sciences and the
humanities use standards that differ from those used in the
natural sciences. But contextualism is not relevant.
There are commercial and other risks to the integrity of





1.1 Our main question
Our field of study is work in the full range of academic
disciplines, from mathematics and physics, through other
natural and social sciences, right up to the humanities,
disciplines such as history and the study of literature.
Both traditional and new disciplines, and all of their sub-
disciplines, fall within our scope. We shall use the word
“discipline” to mean either a large discipline or a smaller
sub-discipline.
Within any academic discipline, individuals will make
claims. Some claims will gain the assent of the generality
of expert researchers. We shall say that such claims are
accepted. Our main question will be this:
∙ How should various general features of disciplines
affect our confidence in the correctness of accepted
claims?
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“General features” will mean features such as the availab-
ility of deductive relationships between propositions, the
precision of concepts and the types of argument used.
They are general in the sense that they are not specific
to particular disciplines.
The confidence in question is our confidence in claims in
general, rather than our confidence in individual claims.
It is the confidence of one who looks at work in a given
discipline from outside that discipline.
We shall speak simply of confidence, or of confidence in
relation to a particular discipline, or of confidence in claims
of some type or other. All such expressions should be taken
to refer to our confidence in the correctness of accepted
claims. We shall speak of researchers assenting to claims,
so as to distinguish assent by individual researchers from
the acceptance that follows when assent is sufficiently
widespread. And we shall speak simply of researchers,
meaning expert researchers.
There are several elements in our main question that
require explanation. We shall now give that explanation.
For expository reasons, we shall cover elements in a different
order from the order in which they appear in the question.
1.1.1 Claims
We shall consider various types of claim. A few claims are
large-scale, for example claims that set out major theories
or laws in the natural sciences, or claims that characterize
whole economies or historical periods. Many claims are
small-scale claims about points of detail. And some claims
fall between these extremes. Many of the most interesting
claims arise in the context of efforts to explain phenomena.
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Our main source of claims to consider is the documents that
give firsthand reports of the results of research – academic
papers in all disciplines and sometimes, particularly in
the social sciences and the humanities, monographs or
more wide-ranging books. Only a modest proportion of the
claims made in such documents eventually find comfortable
homes in textbooks, which give secondhand reports of what
researchers have discovered.
Academic papers in all empirical disciplines spend a lot of
time describing the work done and reporting observations,
or describing source material and reviewing earlier literat-
ure, and comparatively little time setting out conclusions.
In the natural sciences, conclusions are often not preceded
by forthright statements of claim like “We have discovered
that ... ” or “We have shown that ... ”. Indeed, it is common
for a paper to end with a section that is modestly headed
“Discussion”. But specific claims are still made, and our
main question can be asked in relation to them. In the social
sciences and the humanities, it is often more obvious that
claims are being made, whether in papers or in those books
that give firsthand reports. Moving away from empirical
disciplines, we find that in mathematics it is most obvious
of all that claims are being made, because papers supply
proofs of theorems.
1.1.2 Correctness
We shall take it that there is such a thing as correctness,
and that the goal of researchers is to make correct claims
and avoid making incorrect claims. We shall now discuss
both the notion of correctness and the goal of correctness.
In sections 1.1.5.2 and 1.1.5.3 we shall discuss how it may
be possible to have confidence that accepted claims are
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correct given that outside mathematics, it is impossible to
be absolutely certain of anything.
1.1.2.1 The notion of correctness
The notion of correctness is meant to be taken in a
straightforward way. There are some things it is correct
to say about the world, and other things it is incorrect to
say. A claim may be regarded as correct even if researchers
fear that it is only very close to correct, so long as the
feared inaccuracy would not have serious consequences. And
claims of some types may be rendered safe from falling a
little short of correctness by including acknowledgements of
imprecision, as in “The distance is 37.3m to within 1mm”.
We do not intend to say anything that might require us
to take a position on questions of realism or anti-realism,
or on whether social concepts should be seen as mental
constructs. We are interested in the claims that are made
within disciplines, rather than in how those claims might be
read. In the same vein, we shall not make any essential use
of the concepts of truth, of truthlikeness (verisimilitude) or
of knowledge, because we would like to steer clear of the
controversies that are associated with those concepts.
We do however need it to be legitimate to regard claims as
correct or incorrect. This does not mean that there must
be verdicts on all claims. At any given time there may
be many claims which researchers can formulate, but the
status of which they cannot determine. All that matters is
that on the whole researchers can expect that claims would
be either correct or incorrect, and that the status of most
claims could in principle be determined. There may still be
some claims that it is impossible in principle to determine
either to be correct or to be incorrect, given that a discipline
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is set up in a certain way. Claims may for example be
fundamental presuppositions of the discipline, or they may
assign arbitrary values to free parameters.
The legitimacy of regarding claims as correct or as incorrect
is essential because if that were not legitimate, we could not
even try to answer our main question. We must therefore
reject forms of relativism and constructivism that would be
strong enough to deny that legitimacy.
Fortunately, there are good arguments against such strong
positions.1 Even if those arguments did not suffice to hold
such strong positions at bay, we could get further assistance
from the limited nature of our requirement. We only require
that it should be legitimate to regard claims as correct or
as incorrect from the general viewpoint of the discipline
within which the claims are made. That general viewpoint
will include an understanding of the sorts of entity to which
reference may be made, the sorts of properties of entities
that should be recognized, and the sorts of procedure that
should be used to appraise claims. This acceptance of the
general viewpoint of the relevant discipline for the sake of
our argument excuses us from debate with relativists over
whether alternative general viewpoints would be equally
legitimate. A wide range of relativists should be able to put
their concerns about alternative viewpoints to one side and
engage with our argument on its own terms. It is perfectly
reasonable to consider effects of features of disciplines on
our confidence while not questioning the broad outlines of
the relevant disciplines, even if one might wish to question
those broad outlines as a separate exercise.
1 See for example Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Re-
lativism and Constructivism. For some technical arguments against
relativism and against some of its underpinnings see Cappelen and
Hawthorne, Relativism and Monadic Truth.
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Correctness is the correctness of a claim, not the correctness
of the act of making it or of assenting to it. For a claim
to be correct, it must get things right. There might also
be standards of correctness for acts of making claims or
of assenting to them, standards which would lead us to
think that such acts were correct if they were sensible, or
appropriate, or the best that researchers could do in the
circumstances. But we do not intend to be so generous when
considering whether claims are correct.
1.1.2.2 The goal of correctness
It is manifestly the goal of researchers to make and assent
to correct claims, and neither to make nor to assent to
incorrect claims. If we seek to understand what goes on
in academic disciplines, we must not overlook that fact.
It is also perfectly right that this should be the goal of
researchers. A vital source of pressure on them would be
lost if it were not.2
There is a complication to acknowledge here. Thomas
Nickles has argued for the importance of heuristic appraisal
alongside epistemic appraisal.3 Heuristic appraisal leads
researchers to look kindly on claims which appear to have
the potential to lead to useful further work. But having
acknowledged that this form of appraisal may play a role,
we shall not pursue the point. We need not do so because
researchers can distinguish between the thought that a
claim is correct and the thought that it may be useful. There
is however a general point that when we consider whether
researchers act appropriately in considering whether to
2 Compare Price, “Truth as Convenient Friction”, pages 169-170,
on the importance of caring about truth.
3 Nickles, “Heuristic Appraisal: Context of Discovery or Justifica-
tion?”
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assent to claims, we must be aware that their judgement
may be affected by a preference for claims which hold out
the promise of supporting future work. That could reduce
our confidence.
In some disciplines, and particularly in the humanities and
the social sciences, there is scope to debate whether the
goal should be to make claims that could be regarded as
correct. It may be argued that some claims are appropriate
to make because they are supported to a high degree, or
because they improve understanding, even if they clash, or
might easily clash, with other equally worthy claims. We
shall not pursue that line, because it is important to respect
the observed practice of disciplines. In all disciplines,
researchers write in ways which implicitly or explicitly
assert the correctness of their claims. Even if researchers
make contradictory claims, each claim is regarded as correct
by those who make it.
Having said that, we need not have any difficulty with the
simultaneous acceptance of different but compatible claims
about the same phenomenon, or with the simultaneous
endorsement of different but compatible explanations of the
same phenomenon.
1.1.3 Expert researchers
We shall concentrate on the work and the views of
expert researchers. Experts are not always right, but
they make nearly all of the advances in their disciplines.
Outside commentators and the wider public can only rarely
make significant contributions or put experts right. There
are issues connected with the funding of research, the
application of research and the ways in which politicians
obtain and act on expert advice, where it is important that
7
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the wider public should be involved. There is also a strong
case for ensuring that the process of research and its results
are open to public view. That allows people both to see how
research works, and to understand how the claims made are
often less exciting than newspaper headlines would suggest.
But when our interest is in the nature and the practice of
disciplines, and in effects on the extent to which we may
have confidence in accepted claims, we need to concentrate
on what experts say and do.4
We shall be fairly liberal about whom we regard as an
expert researcher. We shall include all the practitioners of
a discipline who by virtue of their skills, understanding and
work might well make worthwhile contributions, regardless
of whether they have any institutional status. This is hardly
a full definition, but we can generally recognize people
who would qualify. We shall use the term “researcher” as
a short form. When we use terms such as “physicists”,
“historians”, or “social scientists” to refer to practitioners
of specific disciplines, it is to be understood that they
have the necessary expertise. We shall use the first person
plural pronoun, “we” and “us”, to pick out the author
and the readers of this work as external commentators on
disciplines.
4 Weingart, “How Robust is ‘Socially Robust Knowledge’?”, shows
how the view that claims made within science would benefit from some
democratization of the process of science is simply muddle-headed. It
may however be perfectly appropriate for researchers to enter into
dialogue with people who are outside their own communities, when
those outsiders have relevant expertise: Rolin, “Scientific Knowledge:
A Stakeholder Theory”, especially pages 70-76.
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1.1.4 Assent and acceptance
Our main question speaks of accepted claims. Unanimous
assent is not required for a claim to come to be accepted.
Indeed, more than a few dissenters can often be tolerated.
We shall not attempt to fix a tolerable percentage. And if a
claim is not accepted, it will not follow that researchers
assent to any alternative claim, such as the claim’s
contradictory. They may simply have no view.
It may be clear that a claim commands enough assent
to have come to be accepted. Widespread assent may
be explicit. Alternatively, and more commonly, there may
be the explicit assent of a few researchers who have a
special interest in the claim or special expertise in its topic,
accompanied by the implicit assent of others who may rely
on the claim, but who lack any special interest or special
expertise. Implicit assent may be inferred from the fact that
initial debate over a claim has died down, or from the fact
that the claim is widely used in further research. But it may
not be clear whether a claim has come to be accepted. The
claim may not have attracted much discussion, or it may
not have been much used.
There will often not be a clearly demarcated stage of
putting a claim on trial. So we shall regard a claim as
accepted if it has survived debate and is no longer regarded
as controversial, or if actual or potential use of the claim by
researchers other than those who made it does or would take
place without any concern as to the claim’s correctness.
Our notion of assent has something in common with the
notion of acceptance that is set out by Mark Kaplan,
although his notion relates primarily to individuals rather
than to communities of researchers. For Kaplan, someone
accepts a claim when she is willing to assert it in the
9
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context of enquiry. As Kaplan says, this does not require
either certainty or the achievement of some particular level
of confidence. We do however expect that researchers will
only explicitly assent to a claim when they have strong
reasons to think that the claim is correct. This sets our
notion of assent apart from Kaplan’s notion of acceptance.
He is prepared to countenance researchers being attracted
to acceptance of a theory by its power, even if they recognize
its improbability.5
We shall take it for granted that assent, and therefore
acceptance, should depend on the state and content of
the evidence that is available or can easily be obtained.
In academic disciplines, evidence is largely made explicit.
Moreover, when claims are debated, there are usually
several participants who between them will be aware of
most of the relevant literature. This means we need not be
concerned with the worry about evidentialism that it may
make the propriety of someone’s believing a proposition
depend too much on the evidence that she may happen
to have or not to have forgotten.6
1.1.4.1 The generality of researchers
Our notion of the generality of researchers needs refinement
in the social sciences and the humanities. In these discip-
lines, it is not uncommon to find large-scale disagreement
5 For all of this paragraph see Kaplan, “Decision Theory and
Epistemology”, pages 451-453. Kaplan writes within an explicitly
Bayesian context. That fact should forestall any objection that his
notion of acceptance should be rejected out of hand because of its
apparent disregard for the need to try hard only to assent to correct
claims.
6 For an outline of such worries see Mittag, “Evidentialism”, pages
172-174.
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between groups of researchers. Disagreements may be of
two types, and it is disagreements of the second type that
require us to refine our notion.
The first type comprises outright disagreements on specific
claims about the primary subject matter of the discipline.
Some researchers assent to claims that others contradict.
Disagreements of this type may well mean that none of the
claims in contention should be regarded as accepted.
The second type arises when researchers differ on the appro-
priate approach to the subject matter of the discipline. For
example, some sociologists see individuals as primary. They
see social phenomena as lacking any form of independent
existence, and as to be explained in terms of the lives
of individuals. Other sociologists see social phenomena
as having some form of independent existence, as having
primary roles in explanation, or both.7 To take another
example, some historians make extensive use of Marxist
notions while others do not use them.8
This second type of disagreement presents a difficulty for
us. When a disagreement of this type arises, there may
still be claims that enjoy general assent and are regarded
as important across the divide. But there are likely to be
other claims that are directly about the objects of study and
that enjoy general assent and are regarded as important by
researchers on one side of the divide, while those on the
other side tolerate them grudgingly and regard them as not
getting to the nub of the matter. (This is not assent versus
contradiction. That can happen, but in that case we could
not regard the relevant claims as accepted in any case. We
7 For such options see Zahle and Collin (eds.), Rethinking the
Individualism/Holism Debate: Essays in the Philosophy of Social
Science, chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.2.
8 For the use of such notions and the impact of their use see
Blackledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History, chapter 1.
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should treat cases of assent versus contradiction as examples
of the first type of disagreement.)
It is claims that are welcomed enthusiastically on one side
and tolerated grudgingly on the other side that give us a
problem, even though there is no outright disagreement at
that level. The reason is that there is likely to be outright
disagreement at the next level up. Those on one side will
assent to claims that certain explanations of phenomena
are respectably strong, while those on the other side will
contradict those claims.
For example, criminologists who take different approaches
may agree that given criminals had certain thoughts before
committing crimes, that they had certain traits, that their
societies had certain structures and that their lives followed
certain courses, but they may go on to explain crime
in terms of individual choices, individual traits, social
structures or social processes, with criminologists who
adopt different approaches regarding different explanations
as primary.9 To take another example, historians with
varying degrees of enthusiasm for Marxist thought (and
also varying in other respects) have given markedly different
accounts of the origins of the French Revolution – although
the debate is driven partly by novel analyses of the evidence,
and not solely by the varying overall stances of historians.10
The difficulty is this. Are we to regard such higher-level
claims about which explanations are strong and worthwhile,
claims that enjoy general assent only on one side of a divide,
as debarred from being regarded as accepted, so that we
cannot even ask our main question?
9 Siegel, Criminology: the Core, chapters 4 to 7.
10 Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution, chapters 1 to 3. Doyle’s
remark (on page 38) that Cobban could accept the research of Lefebvre
and Soboul without accepting their overall approaches makes it clear
that overall stances of historians have had a role to play.
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We need not go so far. Instead, we can regard some claims
as accepted relative to adoption of a certain approach to
the subject matter of the discipline. We can then ask how
our confidence in those claims should be affected by general
features of the discipline, on the assumption that the
approach in question is appropriate. When we discuss how
general features of disciplines should affect our confidence,
we shall take it that any approach that would need to be
assumed in order for it to be possible to regard the claims
as accepted is appropriate. (We shall however only do so
for the sake of argument, in order to examine the effects
of general features. There will be no suggestion that the
approach should in fact be endorsed.)
This generosity must however be limited, in three different
ways. The first limit is that any approach that is to be taken
for granted must not be so specific as to steer researchers
toward particular claims and away from other claims,
from among the claims that would be made legitimate by
adoption of the approach. Approaches that are to be taken
for granted must therefore be general rather than specific.
The second limit is that generosity must not extend to
approaches that are too idiosyncratic. It is reassuring if
an approach has been adopted by a substantial number
of researchers whose backgrounds are diverse. It is also
reassuring if most of those researchers assent to many of
the claims to which those who adopt other approaches
also assent. (They will however not assent to all such
claims, if their approach is significantly different from
other approaches.) If such reassuring signs are unavailable,
the approach in question may be thought so odd that
claims to which only researchers who adopt it assent are
automatically suspect. The third limit is that generosity
should not extend to approaches that involve the uncritical
use of suppositions which are such that researchers from
a wide variety of schools of thought would expect any use
13
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of those suppositions to be subject to critical appraisal.11
Whether an approach oversteps any of these limits to
generosity must be a matter for judgement in each case.
1.1.5 Confidence
1.1.5.1 Having confidence in general
Our main question concerns our confidence in the correct-
ness of accepted claims. We do not ask what features of
a discipline might make us fully confident that all of the
accepted claims within it were correct. That would be too
demanding an aspiration. Nor do we ask what features
might give us confidence that some particular proportion
of accepted claims were correct. Rather, we ask about
the legitimate influence of features on the level of our
confidence in general. The word “should” in our main
question indicates that we are interested in how we ought
to think, rather than in how we may happen to think. But
we shall not spell this out repeatedly. When we remark
that some feature may influence our confidence, this should
be taken to mean that it may legitimately influence our
confidence.
Our confidence may be influenced by features of disciplines,
at whatever level the confidence may happen to be.
Influences will be of interest to us whether we are fully
confident that nearly all accepted claims are correct, have
11 An example would be the uncritical use of assumptions that
are contained within or that underpin rational-choice theory. For
those assumptions and reasons why they need to be examined
critically see Reiss, Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary
Introduction, chapter 3. For a wide-ranging discussion of conceptual
issues surrounding rational-choice theory see Pizzorno, “Rational
Choice”.
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doubts about the correctness of a substantial proportion of
accepted claims, or are at some intermediate position.
The fact that we are concerned with how things are on the
whole is the reason why we talk about levels of confidence
in claims, rather than levels of justification for claims.
Justification is enjoyed by claims individually, but we can
speak of a level of confidence in claims in general.
The use of the imprecise words “on the whole” in the
preceding paragraph is deliberate. While high confidence
would indicate a belief that most accepted claims were
correct, and low confidence would indicate a fear that a
substantial proportion were incorrect, we shall not pretend
that proportions could be determined mathematically.
Fortunately, we shall not need such determinations. But
if we were to give a formula to compute an overall level of
confidence from levels of confidence in individual claims, it
would be some kind of average of those individual levels.
1.1.5.2 The risk of error
Research in academic disciplines is a journey into the
unknown. Researchers have no way to transcend the
evidence which leads them to make or assent to claims,
in order to compare their claims with claims that are
independently certified to be correct. As has been remarked,
the conduct of a piece of research is like an epistemic lottery.
Researchers hope to be rewarded with correct belief, but
even after the event they cannot be quite sure they have
won that prize.12 Given that this is so, how could we, even in
principle, have confidence that accepted claims were indeed
correct?
12 On the lottery image see Fallis, “Attitudes Toward Epistemic
Risk and the Value of Experiments”, section 2.
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A general response is that our confidence does not require
researchers to have certainty. We may have confidence if we
are aware that researchers have substantial positive support
for claims, and that they have no specific reasons to doubt
those claims despite their having searched for reasons for
doubt. A general sceptical worry, not related to specific
reasons for doubt, is not to be allowed to destroy confidence.
A more specific response is that researchers happily
make and assent to claims without their having complete
certainty. Doing so is an essential part of the practice
of academic disciplines. This should not destroy our
confidence. The practice is not a free-for-all, but one in
which norms must be observed.13
One perfectly standard circumstance in which researchers
assent to a claim without certainty arises when they would
have good reason to regard the claim as correct, or as
approximately correct, if they were to take the current body
of well-supported claims to be correct. If for example they
had an existing well-supported theory, and they considered
a new claim that was well-supported by reference to a
combination of that theory and the new evidence which had
prompted the claim, it would be entirely rational for them
to say “If our theory is correct, then this claim is very likely
to be correct or at least approximately correct”. Given the
support for the theory, it would then be rational for them
to assent to the claim. Such a pattern of reasoning is not
often made explicit, because the theory is simply taken for
granted, but it is still a perfectly sensible way to reason.
13 As well as norms appropriate to the relevant discipline, there
are constraints on the natures of the epistemic utility functions that
should govern the practice. See Myrvold, “Epistemic Values and the
Value of Learning”.
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1.1.5.3 The risk of transformation
Beyond the risk of specific errors, there is another risk.
Experience shows that there is always a risk of some far-
reaching transformation, such as the shift from classical to
quantum mechanics, or the shift away from thinking of the
early mediaeval period as a period of uniform decline into a
dark age.14 Following such a transformation, some existing
claims may need to be replaced by new claims, although
the new claims are likely to capture all or most of the
phenomena that the old claims captured, perhaps along
with some additional phenomena. Other existing claims
may survive, but they may come to be seen in a new light.
Given the risk of far-reaching transformations, it might
seem that confidence in accepted claims would always be
unwarranted. But we do not wish to close the discussion so
abruptly. We shall take “confidence” to mean the confidence
that we may have if we disregard unspecified risks of
far-reaching transformations. What may undermine the
confidence we wish to identify is not awareness of such
unspecified risks, but awareness that researchers sometimes
assent to claims without giving due weight to specified
risks, such as the risk of errors in measurement or the
risk that a text which is only available in late copies
may have been corrupted over the centuries. We shall
however allow that confidence may be undermined by
awareness that researchers might assent to claims without
giving due weight to a risk that some specified far-reaching
transformation would shortly be made. We must also allow
that it is a matter of judgement whether a possibility of
change is an unspecified risk that we should disregard for
14 For the movement away from seeing uniform decline into a dark
age, and the ways in which new work has shown that the picture was
more complex and in several respects brighter, see Heather, “Late
Antiquity and the Early Medieval West”.
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the purposes of our argument, or a reasonably well-specified
risk that should diminish our confidence if researchers do
not allow for it. Not all transformations are as dramatic as
the advent of quantum mechanics. Some of them have been
modest enough that we should seriously consider whether
their possibility might have presented well-specified risks.15
1.1.5.4 Positive and negative considerations
If claims in a discipline only come to be accepted when
they enjoy ample positive support, that should increase
our confidence. Positive support may come from a claim’s
being entailed by other strongly supported claims, from its
following from such claims in some way that is weaker than
entailment, from pieces of evidence that speak directly in
favour of the claim, or from the fact that the claim makes
sense of a range of evidence more effectively than alternative
claims would do.
It is important to recognize the existence of positive
support. Within all disciplines, academic books and papers
are replete with evidence in favour of the claims made. Our
recognition of positive support arguably sets us against Karl
Popper and some heirs to his line of thought, but the fact
that academic books and papers set out positive support is
not to be ignored.16 It is also perfectly possible to articulate
15 Some examples of relatively modest transformations can be
found in González (ed.), Conceptual Revolutions: From Cognitive
Science to Medicine.
16 Popper sets his face against the verification of theories, in any
sense of verification that would go beyond their corroboration through
having withstood attempts to falsify them, in The Logic of Scientific
Discovery, chapter 10. Popper’s initial focus of attention was the
natural sciences. Appropriately for those disciplines, he saw actual
falsification as requiring reproducible effects that would refute a
theory: The Logic of Scientific Discovery, chapter 4, section 22. The
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a view of the interaction between theories and experimental
data that offers a more positive prospect than the view
that the main business of science is to identify incorrect
theories and discard them.17 And the notion of positive
support is lent respectability by the scope to formalize it
within confirmation theory. While scope to formalize does
not demonstrate the worth of a notion conclusively, it does
strongly suggest that the notion is far from vacuous.18 We
shall return to the legitimacy of the notion of positive
support in section 6.1.1.2.
Confidence can be increased by evidence that researchers
check for reasons not to make claims before making them
or assenting to them. Ideally, those who consider whether
to assent to claims should not merely note that no such
reasons have come to light. They should also see whether
there are checks that could be made but have not yet been
made.
1.1.5.5 Support, acceptance and confidence
We shall not always speak explicitly of effects on confidence.
We shall sometimes discuss whether claims should receive
extension of his views beyond the natural sciences required a shift from
falsification to criticism, which he placed under the banner of “critical
rationalism”: Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, chapter 24,
sections 1 to 3. The same use of criticism rather than falsification
is visible in the work of Hans Albert: Albert, Traktat über kritische
Vernunft (Treatise on Critical Reason), particularly chapter 4, section
14 and chapter 7, section 28.
17 Kuipers, Structures in Science: Heuristic Patterns Based on
Cognitive Structures, section 8.2.
18 For an outline of the Bayesian formalization see Hawthorne,
“Bayesian Confirmation Theory”. For an analysis of why it is
productive to take the decisions that confirmation theory recommends
see Huber, “What is the Point of Confirmation?”.
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assent and thereby come to be accepted, or whether
they would be well-supported, given their types and the
circumstances in which they were made. But the chain of
implications is straightforward. If claims are generally well-
supported, we may have confidence that they are by and
large correct. On the other hand, we should not have that
confidence when claims are not generally well-supported,
even though some of the claims may be correct. Rather
than examining the support for claims directly, we may be
guided by the practice of researchers. If we can see that on
the whole they only assent to well-supported claims, then
we may have confidence in accepted claims in general.
We have here made a strong connection between support
and confidence. We must add two points in order to justify
this connection. The first point is that it is a connection in
relation to claims in general, not in relation to each claim
considered individually. We acknowledge that some well-
supported claims will be incorrect. The second point is that
we are using the notion of confidence that has been set
out here. We may have confidence despite general sceptical
worries, and despite awareness of the risk of unspecified
future transformations.
Processes by which claims come to be made
Before claims win assent and come to be accepted, they
must be made, and what happens at this stage can affect
our confidence. If norms that govern the making of claims
require claims to be well-supported, that can be a very
useful source of confidence. Incorrect claims are more
likely than correct claims to lack adequate support. They
misrepresent the world in some way, so there is likely to
be a shortage of evidence in their favour. A requirement
for adequate support will therefore reduce the number of
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incorrect claims that are made. Since some proportion of
incorrect claims will slip through the controls that are
imposed after claims are made, reducing the number that
are made will reduce the number that come to be accepted.
So our confidence will be increased by reasons to think
that few inadequately supported claims are made. The
risk of inadequately supported claims slipping through is
particularly high in relation to claims that do not attract
much discussion but just lie in the literature, and are
regarded as respectable mainly because of the talents of
the authors of the relevant papers and the fact that those
papers were peer-reviewed.
1.1.5.6 Our confidence as outsiders
It may be asked why our main question is couched in
terms of the confidence that we may have as philosophers
standing outside disciplines, rather than our using the more
direct approach of asking whether researchers manage to
make and assent to correct claims and not incorrect ones.
There are two steps back from the direct approach, a step
back from researchers to outsiders and a step back from
correctness to confidence.
We take the step back from researchers to outsiders for
the following reason. Researchers naturally believe that
their disciplines are practised in the right ways, and they
naturally think that accepted claims are correct. If they
did not think these things, they would work in different
ways and they would not assent to the claims in question.
(Some researchers may dispute some accepted claims, but
any given accepted claim will generally be taken to be
correct.) We need an external position from which we are
not committed to the practices or the accepted claims of
whatever discipline is under consideration, in order to ask
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what grounds we may have for thinking that the practices
really are sound and that accepted claims are correct. By
taking the step back from researchers to outsiders, we
make the external nature of our position explicit. We shall
however accept the general natures of disciplines. We shall
not try to think outside the frameworks that are provided
by those general natures.
We take the step back from correctness to confidence
because we take the step back from researchers to outsiders.
Most of the time, researchers are the only people who are
in a position to assess the correctness of claims. All that
outsiders can do is have more or less confidence that the
researchers are doing their jobs well.
Although there are these reasons for setting a rather
indirect question we shall, as we noted in section 1.1.5.5,
sometimes cut short our pursuit of a chain that leads all the
way to our confidence. We shall sometimes only ask whether
claims should receive assent and come to be accepted, or
whether they are well-supported. The rest of the chain
need not be mentioned when the effect on our confidence is
obvious.
The content of our confidence is to be derived from how
researchers in the relevant discipline regard correct claims.
If it is normal in a discipline to regard correct claims
as stating straightforward facts about the world, with
no sense that they primarily give interpretations of the
world, then confidence amounts to confidence that accepted
claims do state facts. If it is normal to regard correct
claims as giving interpretations of the highest quality, then
confidence amounts to confidence that accepted claims do
give interpretations of the highest quality. The same would
apply to any other way in which correct claims might be
regarded. The move from researchers to outsiders does not
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entail a move from a sophisticated view of correctness to a
naive view.
1.1.6 Features of disciplines
The notion of features of disciplines has a wide scope. It
includes features of disciplines as wholes, of explanations
that are given within them, of individual propositions, of
relationships between propositions, of concepts that are
used, of practices and of researchers. Thus although our
focus is on claims, we are not by any means limited to
considering explicit tests of claims.
The scope of our notion of features might seem to be
too wide for the expression “features of disciplines”, and
there is a sense in which this expression is a convenient
piece of shorthand. But it is perfectly appropriate to say
things like “It is a feature of this discipline that there are
many deductive relationships between propositions”, or “It
is a feature of this discipline that new claims are tested
experimentally”.
As our main question indicates, we shall be interested in
general features of disciplines. These are features that may
be exhibited by several disciplines, rather than features that
are limited to one or two disciplines.
In addition to responding directly to our main question, we
shall at various points explore the reasons why disciplines
have certain features. The fruits of these explorations may
not contribute directly to the responses we can make to our
main question, but they should deepen our understanding
of why our responses are what they are.
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1.1.6.1 Assessing the effects of features
Our main question asks about effects of features of discip-
lines on our confidence. As we noted in section 1.1.5.1, this
is confidence in accepted claims in general, not confidence
in specific claims.
Confidence in claims in general looks like a statistical
notion, but we shall not attempt to compute levels of
confidence for disciplines. It would be impossible to make
such computations. We shall only say whether features
increase or decrease confidence.
We shall speak of favourable effects and adverse effects.
A feature has a favourable effect if its presence tends to
increase confidence, and an adverse effect if its presence
tends to decrease confidence.
Finally, we shall not attempt to survey all features of
disciplines that may affect our confidence. A comprehensive
survey would be impractically large. It would also involve a
great deal of overlap between discussions of related features.
1.1.6.2 The use of examples
We shall use examples of features that are drawn from a
wide range of disciplines. The examples illustrate points,
rather than proving them. They show that certain features
exist, but not how widespread those features may be. We
have not conducted systematic surveys, whether within
individual disciplines or across disciplines. Having said that,
examples were generally found quickly by conducting web
searches using obvious phrases. The fact that they were




Most of the examples are rather humdrum, drawn from
small-scale work that has not caused any earthquakes
in disciplines. The examples therefore come from widely
scattered parts of disciplines. They do not give full
pictures of their disciplines. But the choice of humdrum
examples is deliberate. Most academic work is small-scale,
filling in little gaps and making modest advances. If we
concentrated on large-scale work that could indicate the
overall shapes of disciplines, we would misrepresent the
work of researchers. We would also paint a misleading
picture if we concentrated on the rare occasions when new
work transformed disciplines.19 Since our interest is in the
factors that should influence our confidence in the bulk of
the claims that come to be accepted, it is important that
we avoid such pitfalls.
1.2 The corpus
There is a set of claims for each discipline that holds a
special interest for us. This set comprises the claims that
are made within or are otherwise relevant to the discipline,
and to which the great majority of researchers within
the discipline assent. We shall call this set of claims the
discipline’s corpus. The union of all disciplines’ corpora is
the corpus. But when we discuss work within a discipline
we shall simply refer to the corpus, meaning the corpus of
that discipline, so long as there is no scope for ambiguity.
The corpus of a discipline includes not only claims about
the objects of study, but also claims that certain methods
19 Thomas Kuhn remarked on the danger of painting a misleading
picture of scientific work in this way when he commented on
Karl Popper’s work: Kuhn, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of
Research?”, pages 5-7.
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are reliable. Such claims are often based on claims about
the objects of study, as for example when physicists use
claims about how particles interact with the rest of the
world to show that certain methods are good ways to detect
particles.20 However, when claims about methods give rise
to imperatives that dictate how researchers ought to work,
those imperatives are norms. (We shall discuss norms in
section 1.3, and again in sections 2.1.1.2 and 6.1.) For
convenience, we shall regard norms as outside the corpus.
A claim in the corpus must be one to which the great
majority of researchers assent explicitly, or one to which
they would assent if they were asked. If too many
researchers would either dispute a claim or decline to decide
for or against it, it will fall outside the corpus. And the
requirement for the assent of the great majority means that
not every claim that is accepted in the sense we gave in
section 1.1.4 will fall within the corpus.
We may identify the corpus of a discipline well enough. But
the membership of any discipline’s corpus will not be fully
determinable. Fortunately, this will not affect our argument.
All we need is that it will usually be clear whether a given
claim is inside or outside the corpus.
It is important to identify the claims that represent the
consensus of researchers, because those are claims on which
researchers will tend to rely when they advance their
disciplines. Reliance on the consensus of researchers is not
subject to the same objections as reliance on the opinion
of a single researcher who offers his own view, rather than
reporting what researchers generally think.21
20 Grupen, “Physics of Particle Detection”.
21 For those objections see Mizrahi, “Why Arguments from Expert
Opinion are Weak Arguments”. On page 61, Mizrahi explicitly
distinguishes his target from the consensus of researchers.
26
1.2 The corpus
The corpus plays vital roles not only when researchers
draw conclusions by combining new evidence with claims in
the corpus, but also when they make the most of existing
evidence by understanding what might be inferred from it.
This second situation in which the corpus matters has been
highlighted by John Norton’s material theory of induction.
To borrow his example, researchers can reason from the
melting points of some samples of bismuth to the melting
point of bismuth in general, because the relevant corpus
includes the information that the melting points of elements
are usually the same from one sample to another.22 We
may add that the corpus includes a detailed physical and
chemical theory which explains the general uniformity of
melting points of samples of a given element, although it
is arguable that observations of melting points, made in
advance of formulation of the theory, would have sufficed
to make legitimate a claim that elements tended to have
uniform melting points.
The corpus of a discipline is not limited to claims that
have their origins within the discipline. It may very well
include claims that have roles to play within the discipline
but that come from other disciplines. For example, many
claims within physics are relevant in chemistry and biology,
and therefore fall within the corpora of those disciplines,
even though the claims remain the property of physics.
This phenomenon draws our attention to the question of
which parts of a discipline’s corpus are open to change
as a result of work within the discipline. The normal
presumption is that work within a discipline can change
22 Norton, “A Material Theory of Induction”, pages 649-650. For
applications of Norton’s theory see Norton, “History of Science and
the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s
Perihelion”. For some objections see Ducheyne, “Some Worries for
Norton’s Material Theory of Induction”.
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those parts of its corpus that are its property, but not those
parts that belong to other disciplines. Thus chemistry and
biology must, on the whole, take the parts of their corpora
that belong to physics as given. On the other hand, a change
to the corpus of physics may very well have effects in the
corpora of chemistry and biology. The rule is not absolute.
It is for example conceivable that a difficulty in chemistry
would require a change in physics. But such cases are rare.
We must also acknowledge that the ownership of claims is
sometimes shared, whether they are claims inside or outside
the corpora of disciplines. For example, the claim that a
large increase in the money supply is in general inflationary
belongs as much to history as to economic theory.23 But
the scope for shared ownership, or for any indeterminacy of
ownership, will not affect the progress of our argument.
We shall speak of the content of a discipline. This will be
the content of those claims that are within its corpus and
that are its property. We shall speak of claims constituting
parts of the content of a discipline as a short way of saying
that the contents of claims constitute parts of that content.
We shall also refer to the central content of a discipline. This
will be the part of the content that is given by claims which
are significant across much of the discipline, and which give
the discipline its character. The notion of central content
is only loosely defined, but a loose definition will suffice for
our purposes.
23 A paper that uses both the perspective of history and the
perspective of economic theory to analyse the same facts is Munro,
The Monetary Origins of the ‘Price Revolution’: South German Silver




The norms of disciplines set standards of work. There is
a wide range of norms, some of very general application
and some specific to particular disciplines. Here is a non-
exhaustive list of types of norm, given so as to indicate the
breadth and the importance of the notion.
∙ Norms that are based on general epistemic consid-
erations. Examples are a norm of preferring simple
theories because holding that preference tends to
promote efficiency in convergence on correct claims,
and a norm of seeking new evidence rather than
resting content with the current body of evidence and
conclusions.24
∙ Norms of epistemic toleration, requiring researchers
to give serious consideration to claims with which
they disagree and to maintain a dialogue with the
proponents of those claims.25
∙ Norms of argument, including norms that may require
steps in argument to be deductive or to come close
to being deductive. In mathematics, deduction is
required. In physics and chemistry, deduction or
something close to it is an aspiration: it may at least
be possible to show how claims are woven tightly
together by deductive relationships, even when it
is not possible to give a deductive structure that
expresses a whole theory. In the social sciences and
24 For the preference for simplicity see Kelly, “How Simplicity Helps
You Find the Truth Without Pointing At It”. For the norm of seeking
new evidence see Oddie, “Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive
Value”.
25 Straßer, Šešelja and Wieland, “Withstanding Tensions: Scientific
Disagreement and Epistemic Tolerance”, sections 5 to 8.
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the humanities, deduction may find its main role (but
not its only role) in working out relationships between
pieces of evidence and detailed claims, as when a
piece of evidence leads researchers to deduce that
some claim is incorrect. All disciplines also have norms
of clarity and precision in argument, although such
norms are likely to be difficult to codify.
∙ Norms of the range of material that should be
considered. For example, it is important to review the
existing literature so that new research may be well-
directed.26
∙ The norm of taking care to consider the natures of
items of source material, the circumstances in which
they were created and, where relevant, the intentions
of authors, in order not to misinterpret sources. This
is a very general norm, but it can issue in specific
advice for particular types of source.27
∙ Norms of experimental design and control.28
∙ Norms for making statistical inferences and for
testing hypotheses. Different levels of stringency are
required in different disciplines. In particle physics, for
example, there is an exceptionally demanding norm
that a discovery may only be claimed when the 5
sigma level has been achieved. This corresponds to
26 Boote and Beile, “Scholars Before Researchers: On the Centrality
of the Dissertation Literature Review in Research Preparation”, pages
3-4.
27 Examples of specific advice for various types of source can
be found in Dobson and Ziemann (eds.), Reading Primary Sources:
The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century
History.




𝑝 < 3 × 10−7 in a one-tailed test.29 In social research,
the demand may be only 𝑝 < 0.05, although it can be
stricter, for example 𝑝 < 0.01.30 Another norm relates
to the selection of methods when making multiple
comparisons. The norm is to select methods that will
reduce the risk of error, while still allowing conclusions
to be reached. Such a norm would not specify the
precise selection of methods or of levels of stringency
for testing hypotheses, because the area is complex
and there is scope for different views as to what
would be appropriate.31 Having said that, there is
no shortage of detailed guidance on how to make
inferences from data and how to test hypotheses (in
general, not just for multiple comparisons).32
Researchers observe norms with a view to making and
assenting to claims that are correct, and with a view to
not making and not assenting to other claims. Moreover,
the norms do appear to do well at their job, at least in
circumstances that are not peculiar. But even though norms
29 The 5 sigma level has come to public attention as a result of
the search for the Higgs boson. 𝑝 is the probability that observations
at least as extreme as those actually made would be made if the
null hypothesis (in that case the non-existence of a particle of the
relevant type) were correct. For announcements of results see ATLAS
Collaboration, “Observation of a New Particle in the Search for the
Standard Model Higgs Boson with the ATLAS Detector at the LHC”,
section 10; CMS Collaboration, “Observation of a New Boson at a
Mass of 125 GeV with the CMS Experiment at the LHC”, section 8.
30 Bryman, Social Research Methods, page 348.
31 An idea of the complexity of the area and of the scope
for choice may be gained from Howell, Statistical Methods for
Psychology, chapter 12 (section 12.8 discusses making choices);
Dickhaus, Simultaneous Statistical Inference With Applications in the
Life Sciences.
32 To take just one example of a discipline, the extent of available
guidance in psychology can be seen from the chapters in the
two substantial volumes of Little (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Quantitative Methods.
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appear to do a good job, we can still ask what roles norms
play and whether they have any weaknesses. Norms are
among the features of disciplines, the effects of which are
the concern of our main question.
Some of the norms that have substantial effects on how
researchers in a given discipline work, along with some of
the central content of the discipline, may form a research
programme in the sense identified by Larry Laudan. Such a
programme is a way of working that directs researchers and
that is likely to endure for longer than individual theories,
although it may eventually change.33
We shall return to norms later. We shall discuss their nature
in more detail in section 2.1.1.2, and their role in giving
confidence in section 6.1.
1.4 Differences
Disciplines differ from one another in several respects. For
example, they differ in the extents to which:
∙ useful deductive relationships between propositions,
or relationships that are almost as strong, are
available;
∙ certain claims within the corpus impose significant
constraints on what other claims may be made across
the discipline (we shall call such claims “pervasive
claims”);
∙ claims that are made are straightforwardly falsifiable.
33 Laudan, Beyond Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method,
and Evidence, pages 83-85.
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We shall use such differences to construct a scale of
disciplines in section 1.5, and we shall return to the idea
of a scale in section 2.3. Features that differ as between
disciplines will make repeated appearances as our enquiry
progresses. But we shall make some preliminary remarks on
deductive relationships and pervasive claims now, in order
to support the scene-setting that we shall do in section 1.5
and in chapter 2.
1.4.1 Deductive relationships
Relationships between propositions may be deductive or
non-deductive. Relationships can transmit support from
some claims to others, so the availability of different
types of relationship can have a considerable effect on our
confidence.
We shall be concerned with relationships that researchers
find useful. We could enquire into relationships between
members of any pair or larger set of propositions, but
relationships between the members of most sets would be
uninteresting, so we shall not consider random selections
of propositions. We do not limit ourselves to considering
relationships of great significance, but we do limit ourselves
to relationships that might play roles in worthwhile
arguments or claims. We shall take this restriction as read
from now on.
Our notion of deduction will be the broad notion that
one would acquire from reading an introductory textbook
on logic. It will cover, and will not discriminate between,
the various more precise proof-theoretic, model-theoretic,
semantic and epistemic notions that emerge on a more
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refined analysis.34
It is rare for a single proposition or a small set of propos-
itions to entail worthwhile conclusions. The antecedent of
a deduction must usually include a large background set
of propositions, which may amount to a substantial theory.
In practice researchers may refer to deductive relationships
between individual propositions, without mentioning the
background that is needed to make the relationships
deductive, because the background is taken for granted.
When conducting our type of enquiry, we should frequently
remind ourselves of the fact that the background is taken
for granted. But there is no reason why researchers should
do so.
It is important that the object of our attention at
this point is relationships between propositions, and not
the independent status of the propositions themselves.
There is no expectation that any proposition outside pure
mathematics could be established as correct merely by
sitting in an armchair and playing with logic. But it is
perfectly possible to establish that some propositions entail
others. For example, the conservation of energy entails that
perpetual motion machines of the first kind, machines which
do work indefinitely without an external source of energy,
are impossible.
34 For an outline of some of these notions see Shapiro, “Varieties
of Pluralism and Relativism for Logic”. (In listing options on page
531, Shapiro gives a proof-theoretic notion as the second of his
two epistemic notions.) The uses to which we shall see deductive
relationships being put will be mainly uses in working forward from
premises to conclusions, uses that Shapiro associates with a proof-
theoretic approach rather than with a model-theoretic approach (page
533). But that does not require us to narrow our notion of deduction
to a proof-theoretic notion.
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The formulation and manipulation of propositions using the
apparatus of formal logic would make it easy to identify
deductive relationships reliably, but such formulation is
rarely feasible, and the reliable identification of deductive
relationships is harder in its absence. Researchers need to
be aware of the danger of thinking they have identified
deductive relationships through the use of a relatively
informal language, such as the normal language of chemistry
or economics, when they have not in fact done so.
Despite such concerns, we can extend the notion of a
deductive relationship to propositions that are expressed
informally. The extension is reflected in everyday assess-
ments of whether relationships are deductive. It is the
notion of deductive relationship that is used within logical
systems, together with the natural extension of that notion
to relatively informal languages, that we shall have in mind
when we speak of deductive relationships.
We shall not regard all non-deductive relationships as
radically different from deductive relationships. We shall
recognize that some non-deductive relationships are almost
as strong as deductive relationships, while others are much
weaker. A claim that is well-supported provides support
of equal quality for its deductive consequences. It can
also provide a high level of support for consequences that
are not deductive but that follow from it by virtue of
relationships that are almost as strong. We shall say that a
relationship is almost as strong as a deductive relationship if
the antecedent’s holding makes it exceedingly likely that the
consequent will hold. We shall not try to make this notion
more precise, because all we will need for our purposes is
a recognition that some non-deductive relationships can
be almost as good as deductive ones when the task is
to show how some claims support other claims. And we
shall not try to decide between different interpretations of
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the words “exceedingly likely”. We shall take those words
to encompass both the consequent’s holding on the over-
whelming majority of actual or hypothetical occasions on
which the antecedent holds or would hold, and researchers
justifiably attributing a very high subjective probability to
the consequent’s holding when the antecedent is taken to
hold.
We shall explore the significance of deductive and non-
deductive relationships in chapter 3.
1.4.2 Pervasive claims
The list of differences between disciplines in section 1.4
mentions pervasive claims. These are claims within the
corpus of a discipline that impose significant constraints
on what other claims may be made across the discipline.
Examples include:
∙ mathematical axioms;
∙ claims implicitly made by mathematical definitions,
that entities of certain types have certain properties;
∙ physical laws of wide application, such as the principle
of stationary action and the laws of thermodynamics;
∙ in biochemistry, the claim that proteins are made up
of amino acid residues;
∙ in economics, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
theorem (although economists disagree about how
useful this theorem is in the study of real economic
agents).
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Pervasive claims may sit at the foundations of systems of
claims, as axioms do. We shall however allow for pervasive
claims that are not in such foundational positions, but that
simply impose constraints across their disciplines.
We shall consider pervasive claims in chapter 4. When the
making of claims in a discipline is severely constrained by
pervasive claims, that can have a favourable effect on our
confidence. It can do so because it makes the requirement
for new claims to fit in with the corpus a demanding one. In
addition, the presence of pervasive claims can increase our
confidence because their use in several contexts means that
they are likely to have been well-tested. Their use in any
one context can then lend some support to other claims in
that context which are wholly or partly derived from them.
Even if a claim is not derived from a pervasive claim, it may
gain some support from the fact that it comports well with
such a claim.
1.5 A scale of disciplines
The scope for disciplines to differ in the ways that we
indicated in section 1.4 becomes clear as soon as we survey
the range of academic disciplines. When we do so, the idea
of a scale of disciplines naturally arises. The theme of a scale
from lower disciplines to higher ones will recur throughout
this work. Mathematics and physics will be placed at the
low end and the humanities at the high end. “Low” and
“high” are not terms of relative esteem. They are only used
to allow us to distinguish directions. Moreover, the ordering
will be neither total nor entirely determinate.
What follows here is only a preliminary discussion. We shall
be able to say more about the ordering of disciplines on a
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scale in section 2.3. We shall see there that disciplines could
be placed in order on the basis of different types of feature,
perhaps giving rise to slightly different orders. Nonetheless,
we shall mostly speak of the scale. This will be safe for two
reasons. First, the general picture we shall paint will be safe
from variation between scales because all plausible scales
would be much the same. And second, we shall not make
any argument that would depend on the order in which
specific disciplines were placed except when all plausible
scales would place them in the same order.
1.5.1 Mathematics
Mathematics must be placed in a class of its own. On
the one hand it is a pure discipline, an exercise in the
manipulation of symbols that represent abstract structures
and their features. The rules of manipulation and the
validity of the results obtained are entirely independent
of the nature of the physical world. (We shall return to
this independence in section 4.2.3.) On the other hand,
mathematics is an essential part of the languages of many of
the disciplines that are concerned with the physical world.
In physics, it is an overwhelming part of the discipline’s
language. Even in disciplines that lie far up the scale, such
as economics and some types of history, mathematics can
have a significant role to play in characterizing phenomena,
and in deriving and expressing results.
When we consider the different extents to which disciplines
may exhibit the characteristics we have noted, we find
that mathematics is at an extreme. Relationships between
propositions are overwhelmingly deductive, and those
relationships tie the whole discipline together. The role
of pervasive claims is played by axioms, by the implicit
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claims that are made by certain definitions, and by some
theorems.35 These pervasive claims tightly constrain the
options for making other claims. And the claims that are
made are straightforwardly falsifiable, although the method
of falsification is one of pure reasoning rather than an
empirical method.
1.5.2 The natural sciences
We shall take the natural sciences to include physics,
chemistry, biology, zoology and parts of psychology, par-
ticularly the more neurologically oriented parts. This is not
an exhaustive list. Scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines
have proliferated over the past century, and it would be
impractical to list them all. Nor shall we attempt to give a
general definition of the natural sciences, or demarcate them
sharply from other disciplines. Rather, physics, chemistry
and biology are clear examples of natural sciences, and the
presence or absence of family resemblances will suffice to
classify most other disciplines as within or outside the class
of natural sciences. Our argument will not depend on our
being able to give a fully determinable extension to the
concept of a natural science.
When we transfer our attention from mathematics to
the natural sciences, we find a new constraint. Claims
must reflect the nature of the physical world. Empirical
evidence dominates everything. The finest theory must be
discarded if it conflicts with experimental results. While
the large presence of claims of a mathematical nature
means that some of the characteristics of mathematics
35 Choices of definitions can be very significant: Tappenden,
“Mathematical Concepts and Definitions”; Tappenden, “Mathemat-
ical Concepts: Fruitfulness and Naturalness”.
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are exhibited in the natural sciences, the intrusion of the
physical world means that those characteristics cannot be
exhibited in their purest forms. And the extent to which
those characteristics are exhibited diminishes as we move up
the scale from physics through chemistry to the life sciences.
To start with physics, there are plenty of deductive
relationships and relationships that are almost as strong.
But they do not come anywhere close to structuring
the whole discipline, or even substantial parts of it, as
bodies of propositions that are deduced systematically from
modest sets of axioms.36 It is not surprising that Paul
Hoyningen-Huene, when he proposes systematicity as the
mark of scientific knowledge, only expects it to be more
systematic than other kinds of knowledge. He does not
expect it to be perfectly systematic.37 Moreover, physicists
take liberties with the standards of deduction on which
mathematics prides itself.38 All of these facts make it not
wholly surprising that inconsistency can be seen to have a
place in the scientific enterprise which goes beyond that of
merely being a spur to its own elimination.39
36 This lack of wide-ranging deductive structures is noted in Harré,
The Principles of Scientific Thinking, page 10.
37 Hoyningen-Huene, Systematicity: The Nature of Science, section
2.1.2.
38 Cartier, “Mathemagics (A Tribute to L. Euler and R. Feyn-
man)”, sections 1 and 5. On how physicists might refrain from pursing
certain lines of inference and thereby avoid some difficulties that lack
of rigour might cause see Davey, “Is Mathematical Rigor Necessary
in Physics?”. There are mathematicians who argue that there is a
place for a similarly liberal approach within their own discipline,
although on the understanding that any lack of rigour should be
signalled: Jaffe and Quinn, “‘Theoretical Mathematics’: Toward a
Cultural Synthesis of Mathematics and Theoretical Physics”. But
there are also mathematicians who are concerned to emphasize the
central role of proof: Mac Lane, “Despite Physicists, Proof is Essential
in Mathematics”.
39 Meheus (ed.), Inconsistency in Science.
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There are pervasive claims in physics, such as the laws
of thermodynamics, but they tend not to limit options to
the same extent that axioms shape mathematics. There are
also sub-disciplines which are outliers relative to the central
content of physics and which have a degree of independence
from that central content, so that the concepts used and the
consequent shapes of the sub-disciplines are not inevitable
consequences of the central content. The study of friction,
for example, developed over long periods before theoretical
understanding came to be supplied.40
Finally, claims made within physics are often straightfor-
wardly falsifiable.
When we move on to chemistry, we see more of the
same type of development. Deductive relationships and
relationships that are almost as strong matter, but large-
scale deductive structures are not common. Pervasive claims
are less dominant. New sub-disciplines are developed as
the discipline advances, and their natures are not fully
determined by the existing central content. These new sub-
disciplines do not come from nowhere. They develop in
relation to existing problems. They make extensive use of
the existing corpus. And their development may feed back
into that corpus, leading to fresh developments outside the
new sub-disciplines. Even so, it seems that chemists do not
find the natures of their sub-disciplines fully determined by
40 Dowson, History of Tribology, gives a history of work done
over millennia before discussing, in chapter 11, the theoretical
understanding that developed in the twentieth century. It may be
that in a discipline like physics, freedom to develop a sub-discipline
independently of the central content of the discipline is only likely
to be temporary, with a developing central content gradually coming
to constrain the content of the sub-discipline. But at any given time
there may well be examples like that of friction, developing with a
degree of independence from the central content as it exists at that
time.
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the central content of the discipline as it exists at the time.
The study of chemical bonds provides an example. That
study progressed some distance before theories that would
underpin it caught up.41
Despite the accentuation in chemistry of the developments
that may first be observed in physics, chemists resemble
physicists in preferring claims that are precisely quantified,
a feature that helps to make claims straightforwardly
falsifiable.
This course of development of the characteristics of discip-
lines continues into the life sciences.
1.5.3 The social sciences
The social sciences include the great bulk of sociology,
economics and political science, along with some parts of
psychology, geography, anthropology and history. Other
parts of any of these disciplines may be regarded as
humanities. Most parts of history are best regarded as
humanities, while small and diminishing proportions of
economics and psychology may be regarded as humanities.
Yet other parts of some of these disciplines, especially parts
of psychology, may be regarded as natural sciences. As
with the natural sciences, the lack of a fully determinable
extension for the concept of a social science will not matter.
The trends that we see as we work up the scale of the
natural sciences continue into the social sciences. There
are proportionately fewer deductive relationships between
propositions or relationships that are almost as strong, and
the extent to which pervasive claims tightly constrain the
41 Gillespie and Popelier, Chemical Bonding and Molecular Geo-
metry: From Lewis to Electron Densities, chapter 1.
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making of other claims is less than in lower disciplines. In
addition, claims that are straightforwardly falsifiable are
proportionately less common than they are in the natural
sciences.
Economics may serve as an example. Some claims are
pervasive to a remarkable extent. For example, basic
principles of utility and of the sort of decision-making one
expects to see in markets are applied in the comparatively
recent sub-discipline of family economics, even though a
family is in many respects different from a market.42 But
there are areas in which the power of pervasive claims
to constrain the making of other claims is limited. For
example, long-established and highly-developed principles
of microeconomics have so far been unable to adjudicate
between Keynesian and New Classical approaches to
macroeconomics.43
There are two further developments, the beginnings of
which we may see in some of the natural sciences, which
become very marked when we move into the social sciences.
The first development is that while there may still be
plenty of deductive relationships between propositions
and relationships that are almost as strong, relationships
that are significantly weaker may form a significant and
even a preponderant proportion of the total number of
relationships that researchers bother to identify. Moreover,
42 Becker, A Treatise on the Family, is a classic text. The
adequacy of accounts of economic decisions within family life that are
straightforwardly based on the economics of the market is however
contested. See for example Folbre, Valuing Children: Rethinking the
Economics of the Family.
43 For an outline history of the debates and comments on the
prospects for consensus on at least some issues see Snowdon and
Vane, Modern Macroeconomics: Its Origins, Development and Current
State, sections 1.7, 1.8 and 12.3.
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the use of arguments that are constructed using these
weaker relationships may be regarded as a perfectly good
way to support claims, to an extent that would not be
tolerated in physics or chemistry.
It has even been argued that use in the social sciences
of deductive methods and methods of comparable rigour,
such as statistical tests, can weaken research in those
disciplines.44 These arguments are however not general
arguments against the use of all methods of that kind.
They are arguments against the use of methods without
taking account of relevant data, including data that would
show the world to be more complicated than the methods
tend to assume, and arguments against their use in ways
that are insensitive to features of the world which must
be discovered empirically rather than read off from the
methods’ presuppositions.
The second development is that a new vocabulary comes
into use. This is the human vocabulary of motives, reasons
and drives. It is radically different from the detached
vocabulary in which the lower natural sciences are wholly
conducted, and in which the higher natural sciences are
mostly conducted. It is special for a number of reasons.
Its terms lack the crisp definitions that would yield fully
determinable extensions for the corresponding concepts.
The vocabulary is the one that we use in everyday life,
in understanding people around us and in managing our
own lives. And the vocabulary encourages researchers to see
goal-directedness. We shall refer to the way of speaking that
uses this vocabulary as the human idiom, distinguishing it
from the physical idiom that is generally used in the natural
sciences. It does however include the physical idiom as a
part of itself: the physical idiom, in the guise of a part of
44 Kincaid, “Formal Rationality and Its Pernicious Effects on the
Social Sciences”.
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the human idiom, is used extensively in the social sciences
and the humanities. We shall explore the human idiom in
section 2.2.2.
1.5.4 The humanities
The humanities study both relationships between people
and relationships between the ideas that shape people’s
actions and interactions. Relationships between people are
the dominant theme in most of social and political history.
Relationships between ideas are the dominant theme in the
history of ideas, in most of philosophy and in large parts of
aesthetics and literary studies.
When we turn to those parts of jurisprudence and political
science that are not better regarded as social sciences,
we see how both themes can be equally important. A
researcher who asks what would be the social effects of
instituting certain legal or political relationships among
people considers relationships between people. One who
asks how legal and political ideas are related to one another
and to other ideas, whether historically or independently of
their history, considers relationships between ideas. In these
and other disciplines, it may be impossible to state that one
of the two themes predominates in a piece of work.
Despite such problematic examples, it is worth distinguish-
ing the two themes because the theme of a piece of work will
influence the extent to which it exhibits some characteristics
that are significant for our purposes.
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1.5.4.1 Features of the humanities
The features of disciplines that become conspicuous when
we move up to the social sciences become even more so as
we move into the humanities.
Deductive relationships between propositions and relation-
ships that are almost as strong are proportionately less
significant than in lower disciplines. But we must not think
that they come close to vanishing, merely because it would
be very unusual for the occurrence of one historical event
to entail the occurrence of another. Deductive relationships
and relationships that are almost as strong may still play
roles not only in moving from specific pieces of evidence
to verdicts on detailed claims, but also in the appraisal
of claims that some events caused others or that given
narratives appropriately represent courses of events. Roles
for strong relationships that go beyond the immediate use of
evidence have also been identified and discussed in relation
to the social sciences, and particularly with reference to
historical accounts that are given in the social sciences.45
We also find that pervasive claims impose only modest
constraints on the making of other claims, and that claims
are often not straightforwardly falsifiable.
The use of relationships between propositions that are sig-
nificantly weaker than deductive relationships is perfectly
respectable in the humanities. It is indeed essential to their
practice. And the weakness of individual relationships is
counterbalanced by the fact that many pieces of evidence
can often be woven together to support claims.
45 Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social
Sciences”.
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When the focus is on relationships between people, the
human idiom is particularly conspicuous. Researchers give
accounts of people’s actions in human terms. They identify
influences on the people studied at least partly by paying at-
tention to how those people perceived their own situations,
and they see those people’s choices in the terms in which
we see our own choices.
When the focus is on relationships between ideas, the role of
the human idiom as a whole, as distinct from those parts of
it that are used to express the ideas in question, may not be
so conspicuous. Instead, researchers work largely in terms of
concepts in their own right, and in terms of the relationships
between those concepts. That is likely to make deductive
relationships between propositions, and relationships that
are almost as strong, proportionately more significant than
when the focus is on relationships between people. In
philosophy for example, deductive arguments are often
given, although ambiguities in the terms used and doubts
about the premises mean that such arguments are not
always secure against all reasonable challenges. And in the
history of ideas researchers may see how one position gave
rise to another through logical development, rather than
only seeing psychological processes in the minds of the
relevant writers.
This is not to say that the human idiom ceases to
matter. Ideas such as those of perception, belief and
political authority, as those ideas are used by philosophers
and historians of ideas, would not make anywhere near
enough sense to conduct the relevant disciplines without
an understanding of human life in human terms. But to the
extent that the human idiom plays only a supporting role
of this nature, its significance may be less conspicuous than
it would otherwise be.
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We also do not deny the need to consider psychological
processes, and the historical context within which ideas
arose and were expressed or within which works of art were
produced, whenever the study in question has a historical
aspect. It would for example be foolish to detach the history
of ideas from the story of the people who had the ideas and
who were subject to contextual influences which were not
exclusively intellectual. When researchers pay attention to
the historical context in this way, the role of the human





2.1 Disciplines, topics, accounts
We shall see academic work as having a certain structure.
There is a range of disciplines, each of which has its
own norms and practices. Within each discipline there is
a range of topics, some of which may overlap with or
encompass others. Accounts say things about individual
topics. Researchers may be happy to give a range of
accounts of a topic, or they may seek a single best account.
Within each account, a number of claims will be made.
Some claims will come to be accepted.
Claims are not limited to claims within accounts. There
are also claims that are made about accounts. Thus if
researchers endorse an account, they will not only assent to
the claims within it, or at least the significant ones. They
will also assent to the claim that it is a good account. And if
researchers consider one account to be superior to another
one, they will assent to that claim too.
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In the remainder of this section we shall say more about
disciplines and topics, and then about accounts.
2.1.1 Disciplines and topics
The discipline very largely determines the concepts that
are used, the types of topic that are identified, the types of
evidence that are identified and the ways in which evidence
may be used.
Within a discipline, researchers will choose topics to study.
A physicist working within the discipline of superfluidity
might study film flow or heat transport. An economist
working within the discipline of optimal taxation might
study the effects of different tax rates on total tax collected,
or he might study the economic distortions created by
different balances between taxes on income and taxes on
consumption. And so on.
Not just any activity of giving accounts of topics qualifies as
a discipline, not even when the topics are closely related and
the accounts display a common approach to those topics.
A discipline must have norms. Those norms must be good
enough to steer researchers away from making or assenting
to incorrect claims. If that standard is not met, we cannot
regard the activity as a discipline.
2.1.1.1 Sub-disciplines
We shall sometimes want to consider sub-disciplines of
large disciplines, rather than whole large disciplines. These
sub-disciplines may be broad, like ecclesiastical history
or molecular biology, or they may be narrow, like the
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study of superfluidity or of optimal taxation. Even the
narrow ones may have vast corpora and substantial research
programmes, but they are still markedly narrower than
other, broad, sub-disciplines.
A sub-discipline may contain sub-sub-disciplines. This will
not however concern us. We shall use the term “discipline”
to refer both to whole disciplines as commonly identified –
physics, chemistry, economics, history and the like – and
to sub-disciplines of any breadth. The term will refer to
any coherent corpus and programme of research, however
broad or narrow it may be. The term will therefore not be
limited to traditional disciplines and sub-disciplines. It will
extend to new disciplines and sub-disciplines, some of which
either lie across the boundaries of established disciplines or
draw on several established disciplines in order to define
new areas of work.1
The division of disciplines into sub-disciplines is not
arbitrary. Sub-disciplines are to be identified by reference
to how researchers themselves think of their work. Reliance
on how researchers identify sub-disciplines is important,
because it allows us to think of the norms of each sub-
discipline as established by reference to the practices of
its researchers. If an indication of actual sub-disciplines
1 For examples of boundary-crossing see Frodeman, Klein and
Mitcham (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Interdisciplinarity, chapters
6 to 9 (chapter 6: Crease, “Physical Sciences”; chapter 7: Calhoun
and Rhoten, “Integrating the Social Sciences: Theoretical Know-
ledge, Methodological Tools, and Practical Applications”; chapter
8: Burggren, Chapman, Keller, Monticino and Torday, “Biological
Sciences”; chapter 9: Klein and Parncutt, “Art and Music Research”).
For examples of new disciplines that draw on ranges of established
disciplines see chapters 15 and 16 (chapter 15: Briggle and Christians,
“Media and Communication”; chapter 16: Thagard, “Cognitive
Science” (a)). For a review of the proliferation of disciplines and sub-
disciplines and of some effects on the process of research see chapter
1: Weingart, “A Short History of Knowledge Formations”.
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is needed, it may be obtained by consulting the titles of
journals and conference proceedings.
Finally, it will not matter that the limits of sub-disciplines
may be vague, or that sometimes a piece of work could be
regarded as falling within either or both of two neighbouring
sub-disciplines. Our arguments will not require us to possess
a complete or precise taxonomy of areas of study.
2.1.1.2 The norms of disciplines
Disciplines are characterized by their norms, as well as by
their subject matters and by the concepts that they define
and use. The norms set standards of work. In so doing,
they govern both the making of claims and the giving
of assent. Claims should only be considered for assent if
those who make them have done work in accordance with
the norms. There are also norms that specifically govern
the review of other researchers’ work, and that therefore
govern the process of consideration for assent. Norms can
have a significant favourable effect on our confidence. We
shall return to the role of norms in giving confidence in
section 6.1.
In mathematics, norms of argument are precise: deduction
is required. In the natural sciences, there is a shared under-
standing of how variables and hypotheses should be defined,
how experiments should be designed and carried out, and
how data should be analysed mathematically.2 There is
2 There is a substantial literature on how to design and conduct
experiments and how to assess the results. Two examples are Ruxton
and Colegrave, Experimental Design for the Life Sciences; Wu and
Hamada, Experiments: Planning, Analysis, and Optimization. The
term “experimental protocol” tends to be used for the rules that must
be followed in order to complete an experiment correctly. But we
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also a norm that experimental designs, descriptions of the
conduct and the results of experiments, and descriptions of
methods of analysis of results should be set out, so that
researchers who consider results obtained by others can
assess the work done. The fact that some have recently felt
the need to set out standards of disclosure more clearly than
hitherto suggests that standards are not always as high as
they should be.3 But on the positive side there are now
several journals that specialize in setting out experimental
procedures in detail, some of which publish videos online
so that readers can watch researchers at work and notice
details that may not have been written down.4
In the social sciences there are also standards which set out
how data should be gathered and analysed. The norms will
however be less precise than norms in the natural sciences,
and there may be rather more scope than in the natural
sciences to debate the norms. Lack of precision and scope to
debate norms will both reduce the extent of the favourable
effect on our confidence. There are plenty of texts that give
researchers guidance on how studies should be designed and
conducted and on pitfalls to avoid, but no one text can be
shall refer to the conduct of experiments because our concern is with
what happens, rather than with what should happen, even though
the distinction will often not matter because results are not usually
reported until experiments have been completed in accordance with
their protocols. This will allow us to refer to the designs of experiments
separately, with no risk of confusion between designs and either desired
conduct or actual conduct. It is worthwhile to avoid confusion in
this area: Sullivan, “The Multiplicity of Experimental Protocols: A
Challenge to Reductionist and Non-Reductionist Models of the Unity
of Neuroscience”, section 2.
3 A review of papers in scientific research journals will show how
the necessary information is set out. For work on making standards
clearer see Nosek et al., “Promoting an Open Research Culture”.
4 Examples include the Journal of Visualized Experiments, http://





Moving on to the humanities, the norms are even less
precise, and are largely implied by practice rather than set
out in manuals. It does not follow that they are more open
to debate than norms in the social sciences, because lack of
precision and lack of explicit statement can make it hard
for a debate to get started. But the lack of precision and
lack of explicit statement themselves reduce the extent of
the favourable effect on our confidence.
Within the humanities and the social sciences, there are
norms that relate directly to the handling of evidence and
norms that relate to the interpretation of evidence.
Norms that relate directly to the handling of evidence
may be open to precise formulation, and this may work
against the tendency to decreasing average precision. For
example, there are some precisely specified methods to
be used in archaeological excavations.6 Methods are not
norms in themselves, but when methods are specified there
is an associated norm that they should be used. To take
5 Some examples of texts are Matthews and Ross, Research
Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences; Yin, Qualitative
Research from Start to Finish; Miles, Huberman and Saldaña,
Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook; Miller and Salkind,
Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement; Bernard,
Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative
Approaches; Friedman and Sunder, Experimental Methods: A Primer
for Economists. For a brisk survey of debates over method in the social
sciences, with ample references to literature, see Poteete, Janssen
and Ostrom, Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons,
and Multiple Methods in Practice, pages 3-11. Examples of texts on
psychology, some parts of which fall within the natural sciences and
some within the social sciences, include Shaughnessy, Zechmeister and
Zechmeister, Research Methods in Psychology; Little (ed.), The Oxford
Handbook of Quantitative Methods (two volumes).
6 Roskams, Excavation.
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another example of a norm, one which needs no technical
specification of method to convey the substance of what it
prescribes and which is so obvious that it is unlikely to be
made explicit at all, a political historian should look at the
surviving private correspondence of leading figures as well
as looking at official documents.
Norms that relate to the interpretation of evidence tend
to be general guides rather than precise rules. For example,
there is a norm that historians should avoid presentism, that
is, various forms of reading their own perspective back into
the past.7 Another example of a norm of interpretation is
that claims in the philosophy of mind should be checked
for compatibility with the latest findings of cognitive
science and neuroscience.8 There is also reason to think
that the social sciences generally, and social and cultural
anthropology in particular, could benefit from making more
use than they have hitherto made of work in cognitive
science.9 There might in due course arise a norm that
social scientists should review their interpretations for
compatibility with the findings of cognitive science, and for
7 Hunt, “Against Presentism”, decries the vice. Fischer, Histori-
ans’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, pages 135-140,
analyses it.
8 This is not to propose that these sciences and philosophy
of mind should be related as masters and slave. But even those
who maintain that neuroscience is in urgent need of philosophical
advice, such as Bennett and Hacker in Philosophical Foundations
of Neuroscience, do not suggest that philosophers of mind should
disregard neuroscience. Reassuringly, there is evidence from papers
in journals that philosophers of mind have in recent decades engaged
more and more with cognitive science (Knobe, “Philosophers Are
Doing Something Different Now: Quantitative Data”), although this
must in part reflect the fact that both the quantity and the quality of
cognitive science research have increased markedly over the relevant
period.
9 Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, particularly
chapters 5 to 8.
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opportunities to enrich their interpretations by reference to
those findings.
Norms are by and large easily distinguished from factual
claims. Norms tell researchers how to work, while factual
claims tell them about the world. But specific norms of
method and factual claims are intertwined in two ways.
The first way is this. The nature of the world determines
which methods are most likely to lead researchers to make
claims that are correct. The nature of the world thereby
implies norms that certain methods should be used. The
usefulness of methods is underwritten partly by facts within
the scope of the discipline in question, and partly by more
general facts. For example, the usefulness of a way to detect
neuronal activity will depend partly on facts about neurons
that are specific to neuroscience, and partly on some more
general facts of physics and chemistry that will affect how
detectors work and what may go wrong.10 One very general
fact, standing in the background in relation to all of the
natural sciences and many aspects of other disciplines, is
that the world is apt to be modelled by the mathematics
that we use. This fact supports the widespread norm that
researchers must make statistical tests of the significance of
the results of experiments.
The second way in which norms and factual claims are
intertwined is a limiting case of the first way. There
are factual claims made within disciplines that directly
imply norms. For example, historians may claim that in
a particular war governments fed false information to
journalists as well as correct information, in order to keep
up morale or deceive the enemy. That would imply a norm
10 A survey of one range of techniques that illustrates the relevance
of a wide range of different facts is Peterka, Takahashi and Yuste,
“Imaging Voltage in Neurons”.
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for historians to the effect that newspaper reports from the
period should be regarded with great suspicion.
2.1.2 Accounts
Having gathered and studied evidence, researchers may give
some account of a topic. An account is a set of claims,
unified by their concern with some single topic and by
relationships to one another which structure the account.
An account need not be comprehensive. Comprehensive
accounts are mainly found in textbooks, which only give
secondhand reports of research. Research papers sometimes
offer only fragmentary answers to the questions that
researchers ask, and include proposals for further work to
fill in the gaps. (This may be seen from a review of the
discussion sections of many papers in the natural sciences.)
But there is still a unity given by the subject matter and
the work done. And when an account offers an explanation
of some phenomenon, rather than merely offering potential
components of an explanation, it makes perfect sense to
appraise the account as a whole, and not merely the claims
within it. (We shall say something about the endorsement
of explanations in section 5.1.2.)
Accounts may be more or less closely tied to specific
occasions. At one extreme, accounts in history are largely
reports of what happened at particular times and places,
and are not expected to have any application to other times
or places. At the other extreme, accounts in physics and
chemistry mostly set out what is expected to happen at all
times and places. Some theoretical accounts in economics
and sociology fall between these two extremes, setting out
what would be expected to happen in situations of certain
broad and perhaps imperfectly specified types. Different
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types of account may be used together, as when one
account sets out some general claims and a second account
applies those claims to a specific time and place. And some
accounts, such as those in pure mathematics, are not about
the spatio-temporal at all.
2.1.2.1 Complementary and conflicting accounts
There may be just one account of each topic. But in
all disciplines there can be several different accounts of
a single topic, with the accounts being complementary
rather than conflicting with one another. (We shall take
complementarity to arise when accounts cover the same
ground in different ways, rather than being fragmentary
accounts that cover non-overlapping parts of their topic.)
Researchers may keep a range of accounts in play for
various reasons. Some accounts may be better than others
at helping researchers to think about topics and tackle
outstanding questions. Some may be more computationally
convenient than others. And sometimes researchers take the
view that no one account could ever be wholly satisfactory,
so that an ensemble of accounts will always be needed.
But there is an important difference between disciplines.
At the low end of the scale of disciplines, there may be
scope to regard a single account as comprehensive. Then
other accounts might be kept in play merely for heuristic
or computational reasons. Higher up the scale it is more
likely that several complementary accounts would always
be needed, because it would not be possible to regard any
one account as comprehensive.
Mathematics is a special case. There may be several deriv-
ations of a result. The derivations are explanatory accounts
in that they show why the result arises. Mathematicians
may prefer some derivations to others because they give
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a better idea of the reasons why it arises. But the world
of mathematics is independent of the physical world, and
all parts of the world of mathematics, including all of
the deductive relationships between propositions, can be
regarded as equally real. This makes it difficult to say that
some derivations represent the world of mathematics better
than others.
In physics and chemistry, it is easy to think that it would be
possible to find a single comprehensive account of a topic.
The precision of concepts and the limited range of things
to say about objects of study might make this possible.
Then there would be no pressure to have a range of accounts
of the same topic, and indeed some pressure to select the
most comprehensive available account. If several accounts
are in use even though a comprehensive account that seems
to represent the word very well has already been found, it
may be simply because some of them have heuristic value, or
offer computational convenience while giving approximate
answers that are good enough for many purposes. For
example, an account of chemical bonds within molecules
can only be considered to represent the world properly
if it takes full account of electron correlations. But that
requires use of the full configuration interaction method,
which is computationally demanding. Other approaches are
therefore often used.11
In natural sciences that are comparatively high up the scale
one can argue for the need for overlapping explanations at
different levels in order to give an adequate representation
of the world, even when accounts already given are by no
11 Details can be found in Piela, Ideas of Quantum Chemistry,
chapters 8 to 11. The alternative approaches are by no means all
unsatisfactory, nor are they all ones that have ceased to be developed.
Density functional theory, which Piela covers in chapter 11, is both
successful and undergoing continued development.
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means fragmentary. An example is given by the homeostasis
of the human body. It falls within the scope of, and
can be explained in terms of, both biochemistry and
systems theory.12 Both types of explanation are valuable,
and a full picture is only given when they are both
provided. But the two types of explanation remain distinct.
Another example is supplied by the study of human
mental processes.13 Moreover, the levels themselves need
not be seen as arbitrary. There is scope to identify levels
worth investigating as “local maxima of regularity and
predictability”, a method that saves identifications from
being artefacts of the immediately relevant theories. (They
may however be artefacts of broader theories of what
constitutes organization.) But the scope to use this method
to identify levels worth investigating diminishes as we go
up the scale of disciplines.14
In the social sciences and the humanities, researchers are
even more likely to conclude that two or more accounts of
the same topic that are far from fragmentary should all
12 Buchman, “The Community of the Self”.
13 Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity
of Neuroscience, chapter 1, sections 3 and 4, and chapter 7. Craver
maintains the need for explanations at different levels alongside,
and not in contradiction to, a view that neuroscience searches
for mechanical explanations. But he does not see a plurality of
explanations as ultimate. Rather, he sees explanations at different
levels as coming together to form a single overall explanation, albeit
without erasing the contributing explanations or hiding their different
levels from view (chapter 7, section 4). For criticism of Craver’s
argument see Sullivan, “The Multiplicity of Experimental Protocols: A
Challenge to Reductionist and Non-Reductionist Models of the Unity
of Neuroscience”, section 4; Johnson, “The Relationship Between
Psychological Capacities and Neurobiological Activities”, section 2.5.
14 Wimsatt, Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piece-
wise Approximations to Reality. See pages 209-211 for the possibility
(the phrase “local maxima of regularity and predictability” is on page
209). See pages 227-240 for limits to the approach.
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be kept in play, not merely for heuristic or computational
reasons but also, and more importantly, because the world
is too complicated, and concepts in use are too imprecise,
to allow any one account to be comprehensive. Several
explanations of a given phenomenon may all need to be
viewed together. To take an example from economics, there
are several different ways to explain economic growth which
place varying degrees of emphasis on factors such as phys-
ical capital, population changes, technology, government
action and culture, and which use different mathematical
models of growth.15 Another example, taken from history,
is the identification of economic and social facts, and also
facts about political structures, power and ideas, in order
to provide contexts within which the European revolutions
of 1848 make sense.16 A third example is given by the fact
that explanations of the Reformation in England can focus
on doctrine or on high politics. Explanations from different
perspectives can fit together to paint a fuller picture.17
Examples like these can raise a terminological point.
Depending on how a topic is defined, accounts might be seen
as accounts of different topics rather than different accounts
of the same topic. But there are perfectly acceptable ways to
identify topics which will lead us to see different accounts of
the same topics. In these examples we may define the topics
exactly as we have done: as homeostasis of the human body,
human mental processes, economic growth, the revolutions
of 1848 and the Reformation in England.
Although the goal remains that of representing the world,
there is an important point of contrast with different
15 Weil, Economic Growth; Aghion and Howitt, The Economics of
Growth.
16 Sperber, The European Revolutions, 1848-1851, chapter 1,
chapter 2 and pages 109-116 and 258-264.
17 Marshall, Reformation England 1480-1642, pages 37-38.
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comprehensive accounts of single topics that co-exist in
physics and chemistry. We should not see co-existing
accounts in the social sciences and the humanities as
approximations to an ideal theory. There is no such ideal
theory to be had, at least not in the foreseeable future. It
would even be dangerous to see them as presenting different
facets of some fully integrated single account that fell short
of being a theory. To return to the example of economic
growth, even the approach that goes under the name of
unified growth theory does not ground all of the factors that
promote economic growth in some single underlying reality
that is specified in any detail. Instead it offers one way to
combine the influences of the separate factors, argues for
some relationships between those influences, and identifies
triggers for growth.18
While researchers in higher disciplines may often make
room for several accounts of the same topic, their commit-
ment to the pursuit of correctness requires them not to rest
content when accounts conflict with one another. A conflict
between accounts creates pressure to resolve that conflict,
even if researchers cannot currently see how to resolve it.
Even if the notion of faultless disagreement is a coherent
one, it cannot, in the context of disciplines that seek to find
out about the world, carry the implication that more than
one party to a disagreement is correct.19
18 Galor, Unified Growth Theory. Galor notes at the start of section
5.3 that several factors interact. We should also note that unified
growth theory does not cover all variations in economic growth. It
concerns long-term phenomena, and in particular the transition from
a long period of relative stagnation to remarkable growth in the last
two centuries, rather than variations in growth rates over periods of
a few years.
19 On difficulties for the notion of faultless disagreement, although
in the context of everyday claims rather than in the context of aca-
demic disciplines, see Buekens, “Faultless Disagreement, Assertions
and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of Taste”. For
62
2.2 Idioms
In section 5.4.3.2, we shall return to the existence of ranges
of accounts. There we shall consider the significance of the
existence of different explanations of phenomena for our
confidence.
2.2 Idioms
One important feature of a discipline is the idiom in which
it is conducted. We shall identify the physical idiom and
the human idiom.
The physical idiom is the idiom of the natural sciences. It is
distinguished by its independence from specifically human
ways of conceiving the world. Language that expresses how
things seem to human beings, or that echoes the way in
which it seems to human beings that they deliberate before
action, is absent from nearly all accounts in the natural
sciences, apart from accounts in psychology. On the other
hand, such language is essential to the humanities and to a
wide range of work in the social sciences. We shall refer to
the idiom that uses such language as the human idiom.
We shall first describe the physical idiom, in order to give
a background against which some contrasting features of
the human idiom will stand out. We shall then describe the
human idiom.
an argument that in some circumstances sustained disagreement does




2.2.1 The physical idiom
Terms that are used in the natural sciences cover an
enormous range, from “electron” in physics, through “hy-
drogenation” in chemistry, up to “food web” in ecology.
The terms may be more or less precisely defined, and the
effects of use of the corresponding concepts on the amount
of microphysical detail of the world that is captured or
overlooked vary hugely. It is essential that there should
be such a wide range of concepts available. Researchers in
the different natural sciences need to have the conceptual
equipment to take steps forward. In particular, they need
to be able to overlook enough microphysical detail of the
world to give a manageable picture at the level of the
discipline concerned, while still identifying salient features
of the world so they can give accounts that are coherent
and explanatory. The higher up the scale of disciplines one
goes, the more complicated are the objects of study and
the more detail must be overlooked. The wide range of
terms in use makes it appropriate to speak of the many
overlapping vocabularies of the physical idiom, rather than
a single vocabulary.
We may ask why we should group all of these different
vocabularies together under the heading of the physical
idiom. One reason might be the existence of scope to reduce
concepts used at higher levels on the scale of disciplines to
complex assemblies of concepts used at the level of physics.
Such a reduction would involve elaborate definitions of
terms used at higher levels, where the definitions were given
in the terms of physics. But it is not at all clear that such
a reduction would be possible. It is certainly not widely




We propose the fact that accounts given in the physical
idiom would be fully intelligible to a wide range of rational
beings with enough intellectual power. (We shall take the
qualification about intellectual power as read from now on.)
The rational beings to consider are not those who happen
to exist. We have no idea what rational beings exist apart
from ourselves. We are to consider the rational beings we
can imagine.
The wide full intelligibility of accounts that are given in the
physical idiom can be expressed as its not being necessary to
appreciate the human way of looking at the world in order to
make sense of those accounts. Aliens should get practically
as much out of accounts as human beings would get out
of them. There is no non-trivial content of an account that
would only be available to human beings and to a narrow
range of other beings who were very like human beings.
The notion of a wide range of rational beings is vague, but
we can give it some substance by contrasting it with the
notion of a narrow range. We can imagine a narrow range
of rational beings who would be quite like us in that they
would have needs, desires, motives and habits of thought
that were analogous to our own. They might make sense of
work done by human beings in the social sciences and the
humanities, work in the human idiom. Then there would be
rational beings in a wider range who lacked such features
and who could only make sense of work done by human
beings in the natural sciences, work in the physical idiom.
We shall not be so rash as to make any claim about all
rational beings, or even about a majority of rational beings.
There might well be rational beings who shared so few
of our ways of thinking about the world that even our
physics would not be fully intelligible to them, or who had
started from a position in which they could have understood
65
2 A Framework
our natural sciences, but who had since developed their
sciences in such a different direction that they would no
longer be able to understand. All we need in order for
our criterion to be usable is that the range of rational
beings who could grasp accounts in the physical idiom
should be a good deal wider than the range who could
grasp accounts in the human idiom. We need a marked
step down from a wide range to a narrow range in order
to distinguish accounts in the two idioms, without being
left with an unacceptably large number of accounts that
the criterion could not identify as being in one idiom rather
than the other. We can find such a marked step down
without any need to consider the full range of beings with
radically different modes of thought that Nicholas Rescher
contemplates.20 And we should also be able to find a marked
step down even if the ranges of rational beings who would
find our chemistry and biology intelligible were narrower
than the range who would find our physics intelligible. The
step down from the natural sciences to the social sciences
and the humanities should still be much more marked than
the step down from physics to biology.
We can appreciate the effect of the criterion of wide full
intelligibility by considering disciplines within which the
criterion is not satisfied. These are disciplines that draw
on specifically human ways of interacting with the world,
disciplines within which we rely on our way of life and on
the deliverances of our particular senses in order to make
sense of things. Consider for example a historical account.
Explanations of why people acted in certain ways make
sense to us because we too act in certain ways for specifically
human reasons. Our actions reflect both what motivates us,
and our propensities to be particularly aware of features of
the world of certain types. We can also see the importance of




the human way of life in much of economics. The discussions
of desires and their satisfaction that underpin discussions of
utility, of the shapes of demand curves and of the allocation
of resources make sense to human beings because human
beings have desires and seek to satisfy them. There is no
reason to think that a wide range of rational beings would
act from what human beings might recognize as motives,
would be particularly aware of features of the world that
human beings found significant, or would have desires in
the sense that human beings had them. We could not expect
more than a narrow range of rational beings to get the point
of accounts within the disciplines of history or economics.
In disciplines that limit themselves to the physical idiom,
it should be possible to find wide ranges of rational beings
who would not suffer a loss of content when they considered
accounts, although as already noted, the maximum width
of ranges might be less for chemistry and biology than
for physics. While many different types of rational being
might respond to the physical world differently from human
beings by virtue of their physiologies, they should all be
able to consider the physical world independently of how
they would react to it and independently of how their own
perceptual apparatus presented it to them.
To give a few examples, electrons, molecules of various sorts,
temperatures and the structures of atmospheric circulation
can all be investigated using instruments that could provide
outputs in forms to suit a wide range of types of sensory
and cerebral apparatus. The instruments might be similar
in the laboratories and field stations of many different types
of rational being. Indeed they might need to be similar, on
account of the nature of the physical world. That would
not limit the scope to present outputs in different ways.
Moreover, forms of presentation by instruments would not
irremediably infect accounts that were given. Accounts
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might reflect forms of presentation, but the information
that was contained in measurements taken and in analyses
of data could be extracted and put in forms that were
intelligible to other rational beings who would have required
different forms of presentation.
We do here leave out of account the risk that different
sensory and cerebral apparatus might lead other rational
beings to have radically different conceptual schemes. It
might do so, but as already noted we do not need to consider
all rational beings. We may safely omit many of them from
consideration and still establish a marked step down in the
range of rational beings who could grasp accounts that were
given in the human idiom. We also put to one side the
question of the extent to which the use of instruments makes
observations dependent on the theory that explains how
the instruments work, as well as putting aside the question
of whether there are other reasons why it would not be
proper to think of the same observations as available to
beings with different theories. Such questions are important,
but we would have to range far beyond the bounds of our
enquiry to address them. And in any case, we do not need
observations to be totally independent of theory.
Certain concepts would need to be shared by rational
beings in order to allow them to understand accounts
given in the physical idiom, but these concepts would not
be tied to specific varieties of apparatus of perception
and thought, so they should be shareable across a wide
range of rational beings. The necessary common ground
might include the concept of spacetime (considered as
a mathematical structure with a metric rather than a
box within which objects were laid out together with a
ticking clock), the concept of separate objects that were
demarcated as the occupants of regions within spacetime,
the concept of change, some notion of the significance of
68
2.2 Idioms
proximity or distance in spacetime as affecting what might
be taken into account in explanations of given changes, and
concepts such as those of energy and entropy.
The need for a concept of causation, such as may be
acquired from the everyday experience of acting and thereby
making some difference in the world, would be more
debatable. There are those who would expect it to be
needed.21 We could expect a wide range of rational beings
to have the experience of acting and thereby affecting the
world, although we could not be at all confident that they
would have a phenomenology of action that was like our
own. There is a risk that the phenomenology would both
be important and be limited to a narrow range of beings,
so that accounts in the physical idiom would not in fact
be widely intelligible. But this risk is small enough that
we need not be greatly concerned that it would render our
criterion of wide intelligibility unusable. And the marked
step down that we need could be available even if we had
to omit many rational beings from the wide range because
of their lack of appropriate phenomenology.
We may take the same attitude to the possibility that
a substantial range of contributions of human minds to
human experience might be necessary in order for accounts
in the physical idiom to be intelligible. Such a range might
be rather like the range that Immanuel Kant identified,
although it might well differ from Kant’s range in detail.22
21 Heidelberger, “Causal and Symbolic Understanding in Historical
Epistemology”, and in particular his reference on page 476 to “our
common causal intuitions”. Heidelberger also sees a concept of
causation as playing a vital role in an understanding of scientific
instruments (page 477). To that extent, a concept of causation might
be needed to underpin the acceptance by rational beings of the
use of scientific instruments to obtain data and to present data in
appropriate forms.
22 For the alleged necessity of the categories to the experience
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It is entirely possible that alien minds could make the same
range of contributions. Moreover, we may disregard the
risk that the ability to make those contributions would
depend on sharing human phenomenology. We have no
reason to think that this risk would be large, and in any case
the need for shared phenomenology would not necessarily
prevent identification of the necessary marked step down,
especially not if the requirement was to share only the
structure of human phenomenology, without the content
that is allegedly given by qualia.
There would also need to be a shared understanding of
the project of the explanation of phenomena. And at a
more basic level, accounts given by human beings in the
physical idiom might only be intelligible to other beings who
shared the alleged intentional nature of human observation
of the world as a form of action, the action of observing
an object which is for that purpose brought under some
particular description, rather than observation’s being the
passive absorption of stimuli.23 These requirements should
however be met by a wide range of beings.
The requirement of wide full intelligibility is not a require-
ment that there should be some absolute conception of the
world, whether a conception that would somehow underpin
representations of the world in other conceptual schemes
or a conception on which rational beings of many types
would converge. It is not even a requirement that a wide
range of rational beings should agree on the best accounts
to give. It is merely a requirement that a wide range of
rational beings should be able to understand the accounts
of objects see Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure
Reason), A93/B126.
23 An argument for the intentional nature of observation is given in




that human beings gave in the physical idiom, in order for
us to judge that those accounts were in that idiom.24
We should give special consideration to mathematics, which
is both a discipline in itself and the source of much of
the vocabulary and many of the methods of the natural
sciences and of some other disciplines. There are grounds
to think that mathematics would be intelligible to a
very wide range of rational beings. The discipline consists
in the manipulation of symbols that represent abstract
structures and their features. The structures need not
have anything to do with any particular form of life. And
the idea of mathematics tailored to the mentality of a
particular species, as opposed to mathematics that would
be intelligible to a wide range of rational beings, would not
make sense.25
24 We may compare Bernard Williams’s thoughts on an absolute
conception of the world: Williams, “Philosophy as a Humanistic
Discipline”, section 3. On the one hand, there is a point in common.
Williams writes of “a kind of representation that might be reached
by any competent investigators of the world” (page 185). He does not
require non-human beings actually to reach any given representation.
And if other rational beings could grasp accounts that human beings
gave in the physical idiom, then it is probable that they would also
have been able to reach those accounts. On the other hand, there is
a point of contrast. Williams writes of an absolute conception as if it
were a conception that had no special connection with any particular
kind of rational being, rather than starting from the conceptions that
human beings have and asking whether other beings could grasp them.
25 We are untroubled by the argument of Lakoff and Núñez,
Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied Mind Brings
Mathematics into Being, that our mathematics depends on our
experience. The arguments of that book do not exclude the possibility
of beings with quite different experience having access to the same
mathematics, nor do they exclude the possibility that all rational
beings would converge on the same mathematics. (Convergence means
that they would converge on the same large collection of structures and
theories. They would, for example, all come to have both Euclidean
and non-Euclidean geometries in their repertoires. It does not mean
that they would all come to agree that some particular geometry was
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We shall treat mathematical expressions as expressions in
the physical idiom when they are used either to conduct
mathematics as a discipline in itself, or to conduct other
disciplines that are themselves conducted in the physical
idiom. We must also allow for the use of mathematical
expressions in disciplines that are conducted in the human
idiom. In that case the mathematical expressions might not
have, to non-human rational beings, the full significance
that they would have to human beings, even though they
would still have some significance simply as pieces of
mathematics.
2.2.2 The human idiom
2.2.2.1 Psycho-social understandings
The human idiom is the idiom of the intentional stance,
the stance that we adopt when we think of ourselves and
others as sensitive, reflective and autonomous beings. It is
the stance that we use both in conducting our lives and in
understanding ourselves and other people.26
Although the intentional stance is a tool for living, our
focus is on understanding rather than on practical life.
The type of understanding of conduct that will concern
us here is based on possession of what we shall call a
the right one.) Indeed, the authors reject radical cultural relativism
(page 362). We may also note that the authors’ claims for the
centrality of metaphors have been challenged, for example in Madden,
“Book Review: Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied
Mind Brings Mathematics into Being”.
26 We take the general notion of the intentional stance from
Dennett, The Intentional Stance, but we shall not concern ourselves
with detailed refinements. Nor shall we be concerned with debates
about the reality of mental states or the importance of their reality.
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psycho-social understanding. This is an understanding that
people have of people and social environments in general,
an understanding of the type that they exhibit in everyday
life when they adopt the intentional stance. It will include
a grasp of character traits, motives, emotions and what it is
like to make decisions, along with an understanding of how
people located in groups think, feel and conduct themselves.
Psycho-social understandings are not only used in everyday
life. They are also used by researchers in the social
sciences and the humanities in order to explain human
conduct. Researchers may modify everyday psycho-social
understandings, but modified versions remain reasonably
close to everyday versions. The human idiom is the idiom
that is used both to express the contents of psycho-social
understandings, and to put such understandings to work in
explaining human conduct.
There are two terminological points to note. The first
point is that the indefinite article in “a psycho-social
understanding” is important. Different people may have
different understandings, and people may modify their own
understandings. (We shall however speak of a single human
idiom, meaning the union of all idioms that are used when
making use of the various psycho-social understandings.
Psycho-social understandings have enough in common to
mean that both the ranges of terms in the corresponding
idioms and the meanings of terms do not vary so greatly as
to make this unification unreasonable.) The second point
is that we choose the term “psycho-social understanding”
in order to recognize that such an understanding relies not
only on a grasp of the psychology of separate individuals,
but also on a grasp of society. We do not intend to refer to




A psycho-social understanding comprises concepts and
principles that allow people to explain the conduct of
individuals and groups, and sometimes to predict that con-
duct. The understanding is used to pick out characteristics,
habits of thought, drives, motives, intentions, propensities
to respond to social contexts in certain ways, and the
like. Principles that are contained within the understanding
then make it possible to give explanations which relate
the conduct observed to features that are picked out. The
identifications and explanations are ones that most people
from the relevant society would regard as sensible.
One might for example rely on the principle that ambition
sometimes leads to the flattery of superiors and the
undermining of rivals in order to explain such conduct on
the part of an individual who had also shown other evidence
of being ambitious. Or one might explain the continuing
loyalty of sports fans to a team that was going through a
bad patch by reference to connections between loyalty and
the sense of identity of individuals.27
A psycho-social understanding is founded on folk psycho-
logy. This is an everyday grasp of the character traits that
people exhibit, the influences under which they act and
their consequent likely responses to different situations.
Folk psychology includes not only specific expectations
but also human beings’ representations of themselves and
other people as self-directed beings who make decisions
freely, and who then act on those decisions unless they
are diverted from doing so by other considerations or
by weakness of the will. But we speak of psycho-social
understandings rather than simply of folk psychology for
two reasons. The first reason is that we want to allow for
27 Connor, The Sociology of Loyalty, pages 108-109.
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refined psycho-social understandings that researchers base
on everyday understandings. Such refined understandings
might be too refined to be in common use among the folk.
The second reason is that we want a constant reminder
that an understanding of society matters, just as much as
an understanding of individuals.
Our focus on understanding rather than on practical
life means that we shall generally think in terms of an
articulable, if sometimes naive and platitudinous, theory
of human motivation and conduct, rather than in terms of
a skill that is exercised by simulating the mental processes
of others or by constructing and using narratives. But this
is not a momentous preference. The differences between the
approaches matter a great deal in some areas of philosophy,
but they need not trouble us.28
It would be tempting to use the term “folk sociology”, but
we shall resist. The term is even less well-defined than
the term “folk psychology”. Moreover, a good deal of the
serious work that has been done so far in relation to folk
28 For an account of the use of an articulable theory in under-
standing others see Malle, How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk
Explanations, Meaning, and Social Interaction. Malle delineates the
content of a folk theory quite narrowly and precisely in section
2.1. We shall not be so narrow or precise in relation to psycho-
social understandings. We shall include everything from the basic
principles that other people have minds and intentions, right up
to detailed expectations of human conduct that may be specific to
individual societies. But such generous additions to Malle’s notion
would not prevent us from fitting our view of the use of a psycho-social
understanding into the framework that is provided by his account
of the use of folk theories in understanding others, even though his
restriction of the content of a folk theory is important to the course
of his own argument.
For simulationism see Goldman, Simulating Minds: The Philosophy,
Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. For the roles of
narratives see Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural
Basis of Understanding Reasons.
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sociology has been concerned with the development of social
awareness in children, rather than with defining the content
of a shared adult understanding.29
Any use of the human idiom, whether in everyday life
or in academic research, will reflect some psycho-social
understanding or other. Academic researchers may use
a psycho-social understanding that is more refined than
understandings used in everyday life. Researchers may
for example use a sophisticated concept of psychological
stress which allows them to make connections with a
number of other aspects of human life that are themselves
characterized in reasonably technical terms.30 But the
process remains one of refinement within the broad project
of understanding human beings as self-directed beings who
are not radically different from the researchers, and of
giving accounts that are accessible to those who rely only
on the psycho-social understandings they use in everyday
life. To take the example just cited, the concept of stress
that is used is recognizable as a refinement of everyday
concepts of stress. As a further illustration, we may note
that analytical sociologists can do a great deal with an
everyday understanding of people that is only formalized
to a limited extent.31
29 For the development of social awareness in children see Banaji
and Gelman (eds.), Navigating the Social World: What Infants,
Children, and Other Species Can Teach Us. For an example of work on
the development in children of the tendency to place people in groups
see Hirschfeld, “On a Folk Theory of Society: Children, Evolution,
and Mental Representations of Social Groups”.
30 Wiklund, Öhman, Bengs and Malmgren-Olsson, “Living Close
to the Edge: Embodied Dimensions of Distress During Emerging
Adulthood”, pages 2-3.
31 See for example the use that is made of the DBO (desires-
beliefs-opportunities) model in Hedström, Dissecting the Social: On
the Principles of Analytical Sociology, chapters 3 and 4. Hedström
and Bearman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology,
chapters 3 to 10 show that the categories used by analytical
76
2.2 Idioms
We have so far taken it for granted that many explanations,
in many disciplines, make use of everyday psycho-social
understandings. We take this to be manifest from published
work. It would be philosophically controversial to claim that
this was how the relevant disciplines should be conducted.
But we do not need to make that claim, because we are
concerned with how disciplines are in fact conducted and
with effects on our confidence. We may also note that at
least some of the controversy would reflect concerns about
the appropriateness of regarding folk psychology as a tool
of theoretical understanding in practical life. Such concerns
may be expressed in general opposition to theory theory, or
they may take the form of a specific claim that in everyday
life people use folk psychology to obtain information that is
of practical use, rather than to map out people’s minds.32
But these concerns should not extend to the use of psycho-
social understandings in academic disciplines, because it is
standard to conduct disciplines in a detached way and to
make many things explicit.
Extension to an understanding of social entities
It is possible to study human society either from a position
of methodological individualism, or from a position of
methodological collectivism (also known as methodological
sociologists, categories such as those of emotions, beliefs, preferences
and norms, are perfectly everyday ones, although they may be
made a little more technical than everyday life would demand. For
an argument that sociology is unlikely to need a general theory
of action see Hedström and Ylikoski, “Analytical Sociology and
Rational-Choice Theory”, sections 2.4.4, 2.6 and 2.7. Such a general
theory might not be expected to correspond closely to an everyday
understanding of human conduct, so if it were not needed, that would
at least suggest the adequacy of an understanding which was not very
different from an everyday one.




holism). Neither position is defined at all precisely but
broadly, individualists think it appropriate to regard
institutions, practices and other social entities as dependent
for their existence and their behaviour on the thoughts and
conduct of individuals, while collectivists think that in order
to understand the human world we must be willing to see
such entities as leading lives of their own, potentially to
the point where they could be seen as steering history and
pulling human beings along with them.33 There is also scope
for intermediate positions, for example a view that there is
causation at the social level while agency remains at the
level of individuals.34
To the extent that researchers considered methodological
individualism to be an adequate approach, the charac-
terization of psycho-social understandings that we have
given would suffice. But to the extent that they considered
methodological collectivism to be required, more would
need to be added. It would not be possible to derive a
sufficiently informative set of principles of the behaviour
of social entities from principles that governed the conduct
of individuals and of groups regarded as assemblies of
individuals. (If that were possible, methodological collect-
ivism would not be required, although it might happen
to be practised.) The required additional principles of the
behaviour of social entities would not be based on everyday
psycho-social understandings. An expanded psycho-social
understanding that researchers used might to that extent
strike non-researchers as odd.
We shall not pursue the point here. But we shall note that
if methodological collectivism were required, the connection
33 For a survey of the debate see the papers in Zahle and Collin
(eds.), Rethinking the Individualism/Holism Debate: Essays in the
Philosophy of Social Science.
34 Tuomela, “Holistic Social Causation and Explanation”.
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between psycho-social understandings used in research and
their everyday equivalents would be weakened.
There are two other options to consider. The first option
is methodological localism. This recognizes the reality of
the social, but also sees that reality as embodied in the
lives and outlooks of individuals.35 Methodological localism
should preserve a reasonably strong connection between
psycho-social understandings used in research and their
everyday counterparts, because of the central role that it
gives to the natures of individuals. The second option is
structural individualism. This emphasizes the importance
of the structures that relate individuals, but it still takes
individuals and their actions to be primary, and it also
allows the use of everyday categories when describing
influences on individuals. Structural individualism is par-
ticularly associated with analytical sociology.36 As we noted
above, the categories that analytical sociologists use to
set out the significant influences on individuals, categories
such as those of emotions, beliefs, preferences and norms,
are also central to everyday psycho-social understandings.
This indicates that the use of structural individualism
should not require any great distancing from those everyday
understandings.
35 Little, “Levels of the Social”. Little introduces the position of
methodological localism on page 346, and “the socially constituted
person” on pages 351-352.
36 Hedström and Bearman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ana-
lytical Sociology. See chapter 1, Hedström and Bearman, “What is
Analytical Sociology All About? An Introductory Essay”, sections 1.2,
1.3 and 1.4, for an outline of structural individualism. See chapters 3
to 10 for categories that analytical sociologists use. For another outline
of structural individualism see Udehn, Methodological Individualism:




There is a complication that may arise when social scientists
use psycho-social understandings that differ from those used
by the people being studied, and in particular when they
classify people using novel kinds. The people being studied
may change their own psycho-social understandings, atti-
tudes and conduct. This may happen when some of the
people being studied become aware of how social scientists
think of them. They may start to think of themselves as
members of the kinds that the social scientists identify, or
they may start to refer to those kinds when they think about
other people. Examples are ethnic kinds and social class
kinds. Once someone sees himself as a member of such a
kind, he may start to modify his attitudes and conduct
in line with what appears to be expected of a member
of that kind. Similarly, someone who sees other people as
members of such a kind may expect them to think and
act in ways that are associated with the relevant kind, may
regard their conduct as explained by their membership, and
may only demand further explanations when their conduct
conflicts with expectations of members or is unrelated to
membership. The new expectations of others may in turn
influence people’s conduct toward those others. The psycho-
social understanding of the social scientists who study the
people in question may then need to be modified in order
to adapt to such changes. That may lead to further changes
in the psycho-social understandings of the people being
studied, and so on.
80
2.2 Idioms
The phenomenon has been noted by Ian Hacking, as a
looping effect of human kinds.37 More general forms of the
complex reciprocal relationship between social sciences and
the societies studied have also been explored by Anthony
Giddens.38
When a looping effect occurs, it may have two contrasting
effects on our confidence. On the one hand we may fear
that the looping effect may make it difficult to regard
claims as representing how the people studied would be,
independently of the academic studies in question. On the
other hand, if the people studied do come to reflect in
themselves some of the ways in which social scientists think
about them, the claims made by the social scientists may
become more accurate than they would otherwise have
been.
Incorporation of the physical idiom
The human idiom includes the physical idiom, or at least
its non-technical parts, as a component. Discussions of
human lives incorporate at least an implicit consideration
of such physical facts as location and what people are
physically capable of doing. The folk physics, chemistry and
biology that are necessary to understand human conduct
are incorporated into any psycho-social understanding. The
principles of folk science are implicit in the corpora of the
natural sciences, or can be extracted from those corpora by
processes of simplification and approximation. For example,
the equations that describe the motions of different bodies
imply the folk physics principle that there are separate
bodies in the world which move independently of one
37 Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds”, pages 369-374.




another and which change course when they strike one
another.
2.2.2.2 Content and use
The human idiom includes terms for all of the following.
∙ Character traits, such as ambition, timidity or an
affectionate nature
∙ Virtues and vices
∙ Impressions, as when a pressure is described as
painful, or a light as dazzling, or a bowl of soup as
comforting
∙ Emotions
∙ Properties of people, whether transient or long-term,
which make circumstances reasons for action; such
properties include needs, desires, and concern for
others or for the future
∙ Processes of deliberation and decision, such as weigh-
ing the evidence and making up one’s mind
∙ The appraisal of actions, as when an action is
described as generous or as shameful
∙ A sense of responsibility for one’s actions
∙ Features of groups, such as cohesion, leadership and
influence
Terms for these things form part of the vocabulary of
everyday life. But they also fall within the vocabularies
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of disciplines high up the scale, most obviously the
humanities but also large parts of the social sciences.
There is a transitional region on the scale of disciplines,
in which researchers only use a modest proportion of the
distinctively human part of the human idiom. Those parts of
economics in which mathematical models of the behaviour
of consumers and producers are put forward can be like
that. The same may be said of abstract conceptualizations
of space in human geography.39
It is not surprising that researchers use everyday vocabu-
lary. It is ready to hand, it is well-understood, and its terms
are embedded in existing psycho-social understandings
which are rich in principles that can be used to explain
what people do. Its use also allows researchers to produce
accounts which, while academic, are ones to which non-
specialists can relate in a straightforward way. That is
something we expect of the humanities, and to a lesser
extent of the social sciences. Even the technical vocabulary
of social psychology is easily glossed in everyday terms.40 It
is important that such glossing should be possible. It creates
connections with everyday conceptions of the ways in which
people think and act, allowing those everyday conceptions
to be a source of meaning for the technical terms. It
also makes it reasonably easy for disciplines that are still
shaped by their long non-technical traditions to make use of
results from disciplines that are distinctly technical, because
the technical disciplines do not use a vocabulary that is
disconnected from non-technical vocabulary. For example,
39 For economics, any textbook of microeconomics will set out
mathematical models of the type to which we refer here. For
abstract conceptualizations of space in human geography and related
disciplines see Crang and Thrift (eds.), Thinking Space; Massey, For
Space.
40 See for example the glossary in Hewstone, Stroebe and Jonas
(eds.), An Introduction to Social Psychology, pages 601-612.
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history can make use of social psychology.41
The human idiom must make it practical to give accounts
of human life, thought and action. It is not merely that the
microscopic physical detail of the world must be overlooked.
The terms that are used must pick out only a modest
number of types of feature of people, so that psycho-social
understandings can easily be grasped and put to use. And
the concepts to which terms refer must fit together in a way
that allows people to give accounts that are explanatory.
For example, the concepts of nervousness and caution fit
together in a way that allows people to explain someone’s
caution in relation to new ventures by reference to her
nervousness about unforeseen consequences, even though
there is no firm rule that nervousness will lead to caution.
Moreover, the concepts need to be ones that make it feasible
to state the important features of specific people or societies
with reasonable brevity. Concepts of standing character
traits are ideal. Concepts of transient psychic or social
phenomena may turn out only to be useful when the phe-
nomena occur systematically (for example, every morning
or every winter, or every time a given person encounters
someone who asserts their superior status), or when they
occur rarely. Frequent and unpredictable occurrences would
require accounts that were moment-to-moment detailed
diaries. Such accounts would be unsatisfactory because they
would lead one to lose sight of the overall structure and
history of a life or a society.
41 See for example the papers collected in Glăveanu and Yamamoto
(eds.), Bridging History and Social Psychology.
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Could researchers use a technical idiom?
It might be thought that researchers could renounce our
everyday vocabulary and use a purely technical idiom that
shared the human idiom’s ability to overlook detail, to
summarize and to reveal structures. The mere possibility
or impossibility of such a move would not have any direct
bearing on our main question, which relates to confidence in
the claims that actually come to be accepted. Nonetheless,
it is interesting to explore the question of possibility. If such
a replacement were possible, that would suggest that any
loss of confidence that arose from use of the non-technical
human idiom would be temporary, and that we could look
forward to a brighter future.
We cannot definitively exclude the possibility of a purely
technical idiom. There are advocates of eliminative ma-
terialism who propose something along those lines as an
ambition and who cite indications that it may be achievable,
although they would have it achieved within the context of
a radical change to our everyday conception of our mental
lives.42
42 Examples are Churchland, “Folk Psychology and the Explana-
tion of Human Behavior”, section 2; Churchland, “The Neural Repres-
entation of the Social World”; Ramsey, Representation Reconsidered;
Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. In addition, new work
may bridge the gap between the vision of our mental life that
neuroscientists have and the vision of it that we have in everyday life.
See for example Landreth, “The Emerging Theory of Motivation”. In
section 9, Landreth considers the relationship between the notion of
desire that features in his technical discussion and the commonsense
understanding of desire. Another example of work that may come to
bridge the gap between neuroscience and our everyday vision is work
on the neurological basis of pleasure. See Berridge and Kringelbach,




There is however no convincing evidence that it would be
possible to move to a purely technical idiom that allowed
satisfactory explanations of conduct to be given, if we
were to require the explanations to be translatable into
the terms of anything like our current everyday conception
of human conduct. That everyday conception involves
both our bodily behaviour and the mental activity that
precedes and accompanies the behaviour, with both the
bodily behaviour and the mental activity being conceived
in everyday terms. An ability to translate would be needed
if disciplines conducted in the human idiom were not to
be replaced by disciplines that were radically different. We
may pick out two obstacles to translation.
One obstacle would be the need to identify features of
human beings, presumably characterized in neurological
terms, that would suffice to give explanations of human
conduct without recharacterizing deliberations and conduct
beyond the possibility of translation. This obstacle echoes
one of the difficulties that Max Weber identified when he
argued against the idea of a study of society and culture
on the model of a physical science. In his view, immersion
in culture is needed in order to render social phenomena
intelligible.43 If that is so, and if grasp of a technical idiom
would not involve immersion, the result of its use would not
be an understanding of social phenomena of the type that
is given by the social sciences.
A second obstacle would arise because an explanation
of conduct in the human idiom that we regarded as
satisfactory would be likely to bring a wide variety of
information to bear. It might mention the agent’s character,
experience to date and goals, the external circumstances,
43 Weber, “Die „Objektivität“ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozial-
politischer Erkenntnis”, pages 172-181, translated as “‘Objectivity’ in
Social Science and Social Policy”, pages 73-81.
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and the intentions that the agent attributed to other agents.
An analysis that linked features of the brain to conduct
would not be easy to extend to take in such a wide range of
information. Apart from anything else, it is not clear that
the attributed intentions of other agents could be captured
adequately without recourse to the everyday human idiom.
Researchers might pick out neurological features of the
brains of the other agents, but the translation between those
features and the intentions that the agent being studied
attributed to the other agents would need to bring the
categories of an everyday psycho-social understanding back
into play, in order to have much hope of capturing the effects
of that agent’s awareness of other agents and their likely
thoughts on his own deliberations.44 For that reason if for
no other, the human idiom would remain in play.
Would it be beneficial to use a technical idiom?
It is not at all clear that it would on balance be beneficial
to move to a technical replacement for the human idiom.
We may start with an obvious loss. Accounts and claims
would no longer be ones to which non-specialists could
relate in any straightforward way. Researchers might regard
that loss as worth suffering in exchange for the benefits of
moving to a technical idiom, the use of which would insulate
44 The argument that it is necessary to see other people in such
everyday terms has been made by Daniel Dennett, who claims that we
need to treat others as rational beings with the usual range of mental
states if we are to identify their beliefs: Dennett, The Intentional
Stance, pages 15-17. The conduct of someone who is being studied will
reflect his predictions of what other people will do, which will in turn
be based largely on his view of what they believe. So if researchers
are to understand the effect of his predictions on his conduct, they
are very likely to need to characterize what goes on in his head in the
terms of the human idiom.
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them from the looseness of everyday speech. But that loss
is not the only reason to doubt that the move would be
beneficial.
Researchers who study human conduct and human societies
must take account of the patterns of thought of the people
studied. Those patterns of thought reflect the concepts
that those people use (or used, if they are historical
figures). Researchers can reflect the patterns of thought
of the people they study in the accounts that they give
by using those same concepts. Such reflection facilitates
the drawing of inferences and the formulation of accounts.
If researchers’ views of the people they study reflect the
patterns of thought of those people, researchers can quickly,
and probably fairly accurately, work out how the people
studied would think about their own situations and what
they would be inclined to do. A move to a technical idiom
would deprive researchers of that advantage.
We can render unsurprising the scope to reflect the patterns
of thought of people who are studied by noting that
the human idiom is, in practical life, not only a tool of
navigation but also a tool of understanding. It is then but a
short step to the academic understanding of human beings.
Our point of departure is the fact that human beings are
self-conscious and socially conscious agents. A self-conscious
agent can both visualize a situation he would like to bring
about and act to bring it about, fully aware that he is
himself the agent. Such an agent may very well seek to
change himself and his environment in order to prosper.
If an agent is also socially conscious, he will be aware
of how other people think and of social structures and
norms. Such awareness will in turn influence the agent’s
thoughts and conduct, perhaps in the direction of fitting
in and doing what is expected or perhaps in some less
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conformist direction. Human beings thus come to take on
what John McDowell has aptly called a second nature, a
nature that brings with it responsiveness both to ethical
demands and to other rational demands that might not be
seen as demands from a non-human point of view.45
Building on what McDowell says, we can say that the second
nature of human beings would have its effects through the
medium of the human idiom. People use the human idiom
to express their situations and goals, their reasons and
passions, their normative positions, and the factors that
lead them to choose specific actions. Moreover, the idiom’s
terms and expressions capture a good deal of the content of
the second nature of human beings. Those who speak the
idiom fluently, as a language in which they think, thereby
have access to the practical understanding that they need in
order to navigate the social world. Use of the human idiom
as a tool of the academic understanding of human beings is
a very near neighbour of that practical use. (Note that it is
the idiom that is a tool at this point, rather than a psycho-
social understanding itself. We do not need to claim that
theory theory, rather than simulationism, gives the correct
account of what goes on in practical life. We only need to
note that we sometimes talk to ourselves.)
Bernard Williams makes the related point that people and
their conduct cannot be fully understood when people are
considered purely individualistically. They must be seen in
their cultural contexts.46 Building on what Williams says,
much of a cultural context is expressed by those who are
embedded within it, and they express their cultural context
in the human idiom. They will use that idiom to describe
ways of life and habits of thought, and to indicate the
bounds of acceptability and the degrees of desirability of
45 McDowell, Mind and World, page 84.
46 Williams, “Making Sense of Humanity”, pages 85-88.
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alternative ways of life and habits of thought. They will
also use the human idiom to describe the roles of various
artefacts and to attribute value to them. Researchers
who study a culture, whether in order to understand the
individuals within it or for any other reason, find that it
can only be described satisfactorily by using the terms of
the human idiom. That is the high road to understanding
not only the culture in general, but also the preferences
of individuals within it. Those preferences need to be
understood if the conduct of those individuals is to be
explained. A move to a technical replacement for the human
idiom would therefore make research very difficult, and
perhaps impossible.
2.2.2.3 A narrow range of rational beings
Accounts in the human idiom would only be intelligible to a
narrow range of rational beings, comprising human beings
and others who were similar to them.
The reason is that many of the concepts that are used
when giving accounts in the human idiom derive their
content from experience of human life. There might be
other routes by which such concepts could come to make
sense to rational beings with significantly different ways
of life, but we have no reason to think that other routes
would be available. There is no reason to think that
rational beings with significantly different ways of life could
have anything like a human grasp of our concepts of
sensations, feelings, motives and personal responsibility. (It
is more likely that they could grasp concepts of reasons
for action and of decision-making, because many types
of rational being would need to work out what to do
in various circumstances.) We shall now consider three
different reasons why human experience might be vital to
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acquisition of the concepts that we use, rather than its
merely being the route by which we happen to have acquired
those concepts.
One reason is physiological. Human beings sense the world
and process information about it in certain ways, on account
of the natures of their sensory organs and their brains.
Other beings would be built differently. It might be possible
to recover the same information from their sensations as
from human sensations. One might for example recover the
information that a being was standing in front of a tree,
the leaves of which were a certain shade of green (defined
in terms of wavelengths of light, not in terms of sensations
produced by green things). But that would not be the
same as recovering the sensations that human beings had.
This point stands whether or not there are qualia: affective
responses would still be denied to other beings.
A second reason has environmental origins, although its
current expression is physiological. It is also a reason that
can only be put forward tentatively, given that evolutionary
psychology is still developing and that the status of some
work in the field is controversial.47 Despite the controversy,
the reason is still worth considering here.
This tentative second reason is as follows. In the past,
human beings had to pay attention to certain needs, such
as needs to obtain food, find shelter, and avoid the physical
dangers that arose in their environment. If they had not
paid attention to those needs, they would have become
47 The pace of development means that reports on the content and
the status of evolutionary psychology can quickly look dated. Some
classic criticisms can be found in Buller, “Evolutionary Psychology:
The Emperor’s New Paradigm”; Wallace, Getting Darwin Wrong:
Why Evolutionary Psychology Won’t Work. A response to a wide range
of criticisms can be found in Confer et al., “Evolutionary Psychology:
Controversies, Questions, Prospects, and Limitations”.
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extinct. The mechanism to ensure that human beings paid
attention to those needs was, roughly, some drives that
gave imperatives to act. In the safer times of today, the
legacy of those drives is direct recognition that certain
circumstances give reasons for certain actions. A drive to
keep one’s kin out of danger may lead to direct recognition
that when someone is in danger, there is reason to save
them. A drive to ensure security of food supply may lead to
direct recognition that if an alternative job is better paid,
there is at least some reason to change jobs. And so on.
The contents of concepts such as those of care, courage and
security are directly accessible. The corresponding terms
get their meanings from life, rather than from dictionaries.
Other rational beings who had evolved in different envir-
onments with different pressures might also have developed
tendencies that led them to see certain circumstances as
reasons for certain actions, but those tendencies would
have differed from human ones. Those other rational beings
might then fail to see directly that some circumstances
were reasons for actions which human beings would see
as obviously appropriate. Their environments might for
example have given them no reason to develop any concern
about the future. Then they would not directly grasp the
point of accumulating supplies in order to ensure that
one had enough for periods of shortage. The concept
of acquisitiveness might then mean little to them. If an
account of the history of some human society made use
of the concept of acquisitiveness, that account would in
turn mean little to them.48 They could be told that human
48 An example of such an account, one in which the role of acquisit-
iveness developed as circumstances changed, is given in Durrenberger
and Gillogly, “Greed in a ‘Tribal’ Economy? Acquisitiveness and
Reciprocity in Lisu Society”. The point that matters here is that the
account given in that paper makes perfect sense to human readers,
but might make little or no sense to other rational beings.
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beings thought in this way, so that a certain correlation
between given circumstances and given behaviour was
to be expected, but that would only give a detached
understanding of the concept of acquisitiveness, and an
etiolated grasp of accounts in which the concept played
a role. Human beings would have a far more substantial
grasp, because they would see straightaway how certain
circumstances made acquisitive behaviour appropriate in
the eyes of the acquirers.
A third reason is social. Human beings interact with other
human beings. They have developed their psycho-social
understandings and the human idiom in ways which allow
them to meet that challenge. They use concepts such as
those of joy and sadness, ambition and lassitude, openness
and deviousness. Such concepts allow them to describe and
think about human character and conduct in ways that
help them to work and play together, and to navigate
round difficult people. Other rational beings living in
other circumstances, such as circumstances in which there
was minimal interaction or collaboration, would not have
derived the same benefit from developing similar concepts,
so there is a reasonable prospect that they would not have
developed them. Then they would have only a detached
understanding of the human concepts, and an etiolated
grasp of accounts that were given using them.
We have some evidence from within humanity of the
possibility of only being able to have an etiolated grasp
of accounts. One illustration is the experience of an
anthropologist from the United States trying to explain the
story of Hamlet to the Tiv tribe in West Africa. All sorts
of things, including Hamlet’s right to avenge the murder
of his father and the presumed suicide of Ophelia, simply
made no sense in a different culture.49 To the extent that
49 Bohannan, “Shakespeare in the Bush”.
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the Tiv tried to grasp European literary culture, they found
themselves unable to have more than an etiolated grasp.
There is also the point that several evaluative terms are
only properly understood by people who have the interests
that support use of the corresponding concepts as guides
to action, or who at least see those interests as interests.
Otherwise one would not grasp how to apply the concepts in
novel situations.50 It is therefore not surprising that emic as
well as etic approaches find favour among anthropologists.51
But we should not overstate the point. An etic approach
need not place an anthropologist in as poor a position
as a non-human rational being. One can be more or less
etic. If an anthropologist analyses a culture using concepts
which, while not reflecting the specific ways of thought of
the members of the culture, are nonetheless closely tied to
the nature of human life in general, the anthropologist is
likely to enjoy a considerably better grasp of the culture
than the grasp that would be available to a non-human
rational being.
The reasons we have given here why accounts in the human
idiom would not be intelligible to a wide range of rational
beings are deeply rooted in the conceptual structures of
human life. So we should not expect there to be the kind
of scope simply to change the presentation of results to suit
different sensory and cerebral apparatus that we discussed
in relation to accounts in the physical idiom in section 2.2.1.
50 Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, pages 141-142.
51 For these approaches see Barnard, “Emic and Etic”; Berry,
Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis and Sam, Cross-Cultural Psycho-
logy: Research and Applications, pages 23-24 (of the third edition;
pages 291-292 in the second edition). Broadly, emic approaches try
to reflect the ways of thought of the people studied while etic
approaches prefer the point of view of the anthropologist, whose
selection of significant features may well reflect her desire to identify




Use of the human idiom may lead researchers to formulate
accounts of human conduct and human societies which
incorporate a bias that would not arise if they used a
more neutral idiom. The fact that accounts given in the
human idiom would only be intelligible to a narrow range
of rational beings encourages us to have this worry. Will
claims come to be accepted because they meet standards
which are formulated on the assumption that the human
idiom should be used, when the bias in the accounts means
that the claims should not really come to be accepted?
We have good reason to think that bias is incorporated,
because the human idiom is grounded in the practicalities
of human life. Human beings have certain perceptual and
intellectual apparatus, along with certain physical and so-
cial needs, so they think and act in certain ways. In practical
life, they must rely on their perceptual and intellectual
apparatus to navigate the world and meet their needs. Any
psycho-social understanding will reflect those constraints
and that task. A psycho-social understanding will not
have been developed to be a tool of disinterested enquiry.
When researchers use the human idiom to give accounts
of human lives and societies, they at least incorporate the
bias of psycho-social understandings generally, which is a
systematic bias because all such understandings have been
developed to meet the needs of human life rather than life
in general. At worst, they may incorporate the bias of a
specific psycho-social understanding.
The risk that incorrect claims will come to be accepted is
however limited, because the claims that researchers make
in disciplines that use the human idiom are themselves
expressed in that idiom. The claims manifestly characterize
human beings in human terms, so any bias that follows
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from such a characterization is implicitly acknowledged.
Researchers do not pretend to give a view of humanity
from some non-human standpoint, let alone from any
hypothetical wholly independent standpoint, and it would
be inappropriate to apply the standards which would apply
if that were pretended. By contrast, claims that are made
in the natural sciences are not supposed to be made from
a specifically human standpoint. To the limited extent
that habits of thought imported from everyday life are
used, the risk that work will be biased in ways that may
lead to significant error is greater than when the human
idiom dominates and that domination is recognized. In
evolutionary biology for example, the everyday belief that
human beings are quite different from other animals can
bias work on human evolution.52
We do however still need to ask whether use of a psycho-
social understanding that researchers carry over from
everyday life to academic disciplines, perhaps with some
modifications, is an appropriate route to claims that are
expressed in the human idiom. Are everyday psycho-social
understandings good at the job they do in everyday life?
There is reason to think they are good at that job. Everyday
psycho-social understandings have evolved to work. If they
systematically screened out important considerations, they
would not work as well as they actually do. Then the
failures of human beings when they interacted with other
people and with their environment would be a good deal
more numerous than they actually are. This suggests
that when academic research is guided by psycho-social
understandings, important considerations will tend to get
noticed.
52 De Cruz and de Smedt, “The Role of Intuitive Ontologies in




This is not to say that human beings never overlook
important considerations in their practical lives. It is
obvious that they sometimes do. Sometimes their failures
are very serious, for example when diplomacy fails and war
ensues. But we can at least take it that everyday psycho-
social understandings do their everyday job reasonably well,
and that they therefore provide satisfactory guidance when
researchers construct accounts in the human idiom.
We must also recognize the scope to introduce bias by using
researchers’ own everyday psycho-social understandings,
when the psycho-social understandings of people who are
studied are or were different. But that risk of bias can
be addressed within the range of human psycho-social
understandings, by making appropriate modifications to
researchers’ own understandings.
2.2.2.5 Historical accounts
We may add two considerations that come to the fore
when researchers give historical accounts of human conduct.
These considerations support the use of everyday psycho-
social understandings or modified versions of them.
The first consideration is that everyday understandings
contain within themselves the germ of historical thought.
Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger both explored
consequences of the fact that human beings live in time
and understand their lives within a temporal framework.53
This central role of time permeates every psycho-social
understanding. People are seen as reacting to things that
happened in the past, as planning for events that lie in the
53 Dilthey, “Die Kategorien des Lebens” (“The Categories of Life”);
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Being and Time), sections 61 to 83.
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near or the distant future, and as having a sense of the
course of their lives laid out in time.
The second consideration is this. In the course of his work on
historical understanding, Dilthey claimed that the human
sciences rested on the relationship between experience,
expression and understanding, and that the development
of the human sciences required a deepening of experience.54
Such claims would suggest, although they would not prove,
that the human sciences had to be conducted in terms
that resembled the terms of some everyday psycho-social
understanding. If they were not so conducted, they would
lose touch with human experience. Then it would be
pointless to debate whether researchers could do better by
standing back and making a choice from a wider range
of possible approaches. They might do better if they also
radically changed the natures of their disciplines, but that
would be beside the point so long as they wished to conduct
their existing disciplines.
Even if researchers could conduct the human sciences on
the basis of principles that were not derived from everyday
psycho-social understandings, we could not imagine their
discarding certain key features of everyday experience, such
as people’s reference to the past, identified as such, in order
to steer a course into the future, also identified as such,
or people’s association of individual streams of conscious
thought with individual human bodies.
Unimaginability does not demonstrate impossibility, but
it should stop us assuming that there are alternatives to
54 Dilthey, “Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswis-
senschaften”, page 131 (“The Formation of the Historical World in the
Human Sciences”, page 153). It would be difficult to work out exactly
which parts of our current range of humanities and social sciences
Dilthey would have included in his conception of the human sciences,
but it would have been a large proportion.
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the retention of such key elements of everyday psycho-
social understandings. Moreover, some key aspects of those
understandings do reflect features of the world that can
be set out in non-human terms. The ideas of reflection
on the past and of planning for the future depend on
notions of information, time and causation. The idea of
individual streams of consciousness being associated with
individual bodies, and the idea that different people, whose
bodies have been differently placed, will have different
pieces of information at their disposal, are both directly
connected to the physiology of human bodies, with many
direct connections between each person’s sensory organs
and her brain, and within each brain, but no direct neuronal
connections from one body to another.
2.3 Ways to order a scale
We introduced the idea of a scale of disciplines in
section 1.5. The idea is not new. For example, Auguste
Comte discussed a scale from studies of the simplest and
most general phenomena to studies of the most complicated
and most particular ones.55 We shall now look at this idea
in more detail. We shall as usual use the word “discipline”
to refer both to large disciplines and to sub-disciplines that
may be identified within them.
We have a general sense of a scale running up from
mathematics to physics and the other natural sciences,
then the social sciences, then the humanities. We shall here
consider features by reference to which disciplines might be
55 Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, tome 1, leçon 2, and in
particular pages 86-87, translated as Comte, The Essential Comte:




placed in order, the extent to which reference to different
features would yield the same order, the tidiness of any
given scale, and the possibility of constructing a scale by
reference to relationships of dependence.
2.3.1 Features that could be used
We might order disciplines by reference to one or more
of the features that were mentioned in section 1.4, or by
reference to the significance of the human idiom. An order
from disciplines low on the scale to those high on the scale
might be an order:
∙ from disciplines in which useful deductive relation-
ships between propositions, or relationships that were
almost as strong, were widely available, up to those
in which such relationships were rare;
∙ from disciplines in which pervasive claims played
significant roles in constraining what other claims
could be made, up to those in which they did not
play such roles to any significant extent;
∙ from disciplines in which claims were typically straight-
forwardly falsifiable, up to those in which this was not
common; or
∙ from disciplines in which the human idiom was not
used at all, up to those in which it was the primary
idiom.
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2.3.2 Would the use of different features
yield the same order?
The features we have suggested would yield similar orders.
It is in mathematics and the natural sciences that we are
most likely to find deductions, significant constraints im-
posed by pervasive claims, and straightforwardly falsifiable
claims. These are also the disciplines in which the human
idiom is not used, except in certain types of psychology.
The humanities are likely to lie at the other ends of scales
constructed by reference to any of these features, with the
social sciences in the middle. All of the orders would be
rough, and the details of any one order would be debatable,
but the general trends would still be clear.
It is not surprising that similar orders should be found.
The features were suggested by some conspicuous contrasts
between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the
humanities, against the background of a pre-existing sense
that there was a scale of disciplines. So the fact that similar
orders would arise by reference to any one of a range of
different features does not prove anything. The features
were chosen with an eye to the order we already had in
mind.
It is more interesting to note that there are relationships
between the chosen features which make it unsurprising
that it is easy to identify different features which give rise to
similar orders. If deductive relationships and relationships
that are almost as strong are plentiful, that helps some
claims to be pervasive by giving them the reach they need to
constrain the making of other claims across the discipline. It
also facilitates the deduction or near-deduction of empirical




We could not expect orders of disciplines that were
constructed by reference to different features to match
perfectly, even if we were always able to settle the details of
individual orders. There might also be occasions when we
could only establish partial orders of disciplines by reference
to given features. Fortunately, we shall not need a definitive
order of all disciplines and sub-disciplines. We shall not even
need to suppose that any fully detailed order exists. We
shall only need a reasonable sense of the order of disciplines.
And as we noted in section 1.5, it will be safe for us to
speak of the scale, even given the limitations of any order
that might be written out.
2.3.3 The tidiness of any given scale
Although total orders are not necessary, it is interesting
to note the reasons why total orders that we would find
wholly satisfactory may be unavailable, and the extent to
which obstacles to finding satisfactory total orders might
be removed by concentrating on small sub-disciplines.
If we arrange traditional disciplines in their entireties on
a scale and then look at their detailed contents, we will
find overlaps. For example, within the natural sciences
physics must come below chemistry, but quantum chemistry
should come lower on the scale than geophysics. Within
the social sciences, economics must come near the bottom
of the range because of its substantial mathematical
content, and political science somewhat further up, but the
mathematical study of voting systems should come lower
on the scale than behavioural economics.
Within the humanities, and to some extent in the social
sciences, we may not be able to set out a scale that is
indisputably reasonable even when we ignore the detailed
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contents of disciplines. Should history be placed higher or
lower on the scale than literary studies? Where should
sociology be placed relative to the other social sciences?
How should geography be placed given its hugely varied
forms, both traditional forms such as physical and human
geography, and novel forms in which topics include concepts
of space?
A partial solution both to the problem of overlaps, and to
the problem of the lack of a clear idea of how to order
disciplines, would be to replace disciplines as traditionally
identified with a much more refined set of sub-disciplines,
perhaps the smallest ones that were routinely identified as
coherent fields of study.
A focus on small sub-disciplines would reduce the signi-
ficance of overlaps. For example, those parts of chemistry
that one might wish to put lower on a scale than some
parts of physics would be separately identified and would
be appropriately located below the relevant parts of physics,
which would also be separately identified. If we did not then
identify the set of sub-disciplines that together constituted
physics, nor the set that together constituted chemistry, we
would not perceive the overlap that we would perceive if
we drew up a scale of large disciplines. Likewise, the more
mathematical parts of political science could be identified
separately and located below some of the less mathematical
parts of economics. Overlaps would not be eliminated
entirely, and they would probably increase in number. But
their significance would diminish even if there were more of
them, because they would arise in relation to comparatively
small parts of the totality of academic work. And we would
not have lost any information in order to achieve this,
because a description of the traditional disciplines and their




A focus on small sub-disciplines could also help where
there were no obvious locations on a scale for disciplines as
traditionally identified. Sociology and geography could be
broken up into their many and varied parts. Many pieces
of work in economic history are rich in numerical data
and quantitative analysis. This would argue for placing
economic history near the bottom of the segment of the
scale that covered the humanities. Some other types of
history, such as the history of costume, are not generally
quantitative, and there would be a case for placing those
types of history above computational varieties of literary
studies.56 But even if the focus were narrowed to small sub-
disciplines, many sub-disciplines would be found to include
some pieces of work that fitted uncomfortably into the
places on the scale that were assigned to the sub-disciplines
as wholes. For example, there are pieces of work in economic
history that are not rich in numerical data or quantitative
analysis.
2.3.4 Relationships of dependence
We could order disciplines by relationships of dependence.
Discipline D would be placed higher on the scale than
discipline E if D made extensive use of results from E,
without the dependence being nearly as great in the
opposite direction. Thus chemistry makes great use of
results in physics, and biology makes great use of results in
chemistry, without there being, in either case, dependence
in the opposite direction that is remotely as significant.
Further up the scale, some historical studies make great
56The typical nature of work in the disciplines mentioned may be
seen by browsing journals such as The Economic History Review,
Costume, and Digital Scholarship in the Humanities (formerly
Literary and Linguistic Computing).
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use of results in economics. As with the features that have
been considered so far, the identification of narrow sub-
disciplines would be likely to make it easier to give a tidy
set of relationships of dependence, although the obstacle
to a tidy scale that the identification of sub-disciplines
might avoid would be circuits rather than overlaps: parts
of substantial discipline X might depend on parts of
substantial discipline Y, while other parts of Y depended
on other parts of X.
Where disciplines are adjacent, relationships of dependence
are clearly visible. Where they are far apart, relationships
may be obscured by substantial differences in the concep-
tual schemes that are used by the disciplines. But they
are still present. If the laws of physics that cover the
conservation and the transformation of energy had been
different, the history of economic development would have
been different. If laws of chemistry had been different,
making different pigments durable, the history of art would
have been different. And it is plausible, but not certain, that
if human brains had been different in ways that affected
dispositions to act on desires, to cooperate and to compete,
economics would have been different.57
57 This last claim is only plausible. It cannot be regarded as
established, and this is a useful reminder that we must be cautious
when we seek relationships of dependence. There are two reasons why
the claim is only plausible. The first reason is that neuroeconomics
is an incompletely developed, although rapidly developing, field, and
that both its relevance to economics and some of its specific claims
are controversial. The second reason is that even if the efficacy of
certain ways of analysing economic behaviour can be explained by
facts about human brains, it does not follow that if human brains had
been different, economics would have been different. Different types of
brain might have led to forms of economic behaviour that were apt to
be analysed in the same ways, perhaps because the real constraints on
economic behaviour were supplied by the nature of the outside world
and the consequences of that nature for the efficacy of different ways
to obtain resources and render them useful.
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A scale constructed by reference to relationships of de-
pendence would not be quite like a scale constructed by
reference to one of the other features we have considered
– the availability of deductive relationships, the influence
of pervasive claims and so on. Those features are intrinsic
features of individual disciplines, even if they are most
easily seen when we compare one discipline with another.
Relationships of dependence are not intrinsic to individual
disciplines, but can only exist between two or more
disciplines.
Some relationships of dependence will be of interest to us,
but we shall not use such relationships to construct a scale.
We have plenty of other resources with which to do so.
For a survey of neuroeconomics see Glimcher and Fehr (eds.),
Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. For a line of
sceptical thought about the relevance of neuroeconomics to economics
as a whole, a line which is not expressly about whether different types
of brain would have required different analyses of economic behaviour
but which is relevant to that question because it challenges the
notion that new insights about the brain could overthrow established
economic theories or displace established economic methods, see Gul
and Pesendorfer, “The Case for Mindless Economics”. For debate over
views expressed in that paper and for related issues see the remainder
of the volume in which the paper appears: Caplin and Schotter (eds.),






Relationships between propositions play important roles
in the processes of making and assenting to claims.
Researchers may consider what direct support a claim
receives from the evidence and the corpus. Is it for example
entailed by a combination of the evidence and contents of
the corpus? They may also consider what follows from a
claim, in order to see whether the propositions that follow
are consistent with the evidence and the corpus. In this
chapter, we shall explore types of relationship and the
implications for these roles.
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3.1.1 Terminology
Propositions are the objects of assertion and denial. The
corpus of each discipline comprises propositions. Claims are
propositions, and pieces of evidence will be taken to be in
the form of propositions. Pieces of evidence that are in non-
propositional form will be taken to have been converted into
propositions that set out their relevant features.1
Propositions p and q may stand in a deductive relationship,
with p as premise and q as conclusion. If they do, we shall
say that p entails q. Our starting point for the sense of the
word “deduction” is the sense that logicians would give it,
but we extend the sense in the natural way that is reflected
in our everyday assessments of whether relationships are
deductive.
Propositions may also stand in a non-deductive relation-
ship, leaving open the possibility of the antecedent’s holding
while the consequent does not hold. A relationship would
1 The idea of the conversion of all pieces of evidence into
propositional form raises philosophical questions. How for example
should an artefact or the sensory impressions received by an observer
be described, given that there will be many possible descriptions? How
could a description avoid being at the same time an interpretation,
which would be likely to affect the significance of the piece of evidence?
At the most fundamental level of philosophical concern, what is the
nature of the mechanism that relates what human beings sense to what
they say? Two essential starting points for the modern discussion of
this question, the work of Willard Van Orman Quine and of Donald
Davidson, are explored in Dellantonio, “Sinneswahrnehmung und
Überzeugungen. Die Frage nach dem empirischen Fundament”. But
while we note these concerns, we shall not let them detain us. Where
enough of a framework is provided by the practice of a discipline, the
concepts it uses and the immediate questions that researchers seek
to answer, the general ways in which pieces of evidence should be
converted into propositional form will be clear enough, even though
there may be disputes over specific conversions.
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however be of little interest if the correctness of the
antecedent were not at least likely to be accompanied by
the correctness of the consequent.
In order to make the direction of a relationship clear, we
shall sometimes speak of a relationship from p to q. For
deductive relationships, this will mean that p entails q
rather than the reverse (although q might also happen to
entail p). We shall extend this terminology of direction to
non-deductive relationships.
3.1.2 Relationships and arguments
Sometimes a claim will be supported by an argument
that uses just one or two relationships, as when a piece
of evidence shows that some claim is very likely to be
correct, or when there is a deductive relationship from the
conjunction of some already accepted claims to the claim
that is to be supported. More commonly, an argument in
support of a claim will be built up in reliance on several
relationships between propositions, which will all have their
places in the structure of the argument. Support will only
be adequate if a large proportion of the relationships are at
least reasonably strong.
We shall concentrate on individual relationships between
propositions, rather than on the structures of whole
arguments. Those structures must of course be examined
when considering whether arguments provide adequate
support for claims, but the acceptability of any given
structure will be determined by ordinary standards of
logical argument – including, in most disciplines, standards
of informal argument – and by the nature of the discipline’s
subject matter.
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This approach does require us to take a particular view of
arguments to support claims. We need to see arguments
as built up from propositions that are connected to one
another. This is a bottom-up view. It may not reflect how
researchers formulate their arguments. They may work in
a top-down way. They may first formulate very sketchy
arguments that start with evidence and contents of the
corpus and end with new claims. Then they may fill in
the details, perhaps modifying the new claims as they
go along. But once arguments are complete, they can
be analysed to expose the component propositions, the
relationships between them, and the structures used –
although in some disciplines, and particularly those high
up the scale, analysis may require considerable re-writing
of published arguments and some arguments will not have
unique analyses. Given that our interest is in whether claims
are well-supported, it is perfectly proper to concentrate on
arguments as completed, and not to be concerned that they
may have been formulated in ways that our approach would
not reflect.
We shall now make some remarks about deductive and
non-deductive relationships between propositions. We shall
then consider the availability of deductive relationships in
different disciplines. As part of our enquiry into availability,
we shall discuss the extent to which concepts that are
used in different disciplines tend to exhibit indeterminacy
of content and vagueness of extension. Finally we shall
discuss how the availability of relationships can affect the
consideration of whether to assent to claims, and the




Deductive relationships can play vital roles in giving
support to claims. They may give positive support by
creating links from other claims to the claims in question.
They may also give support by showing the absence of
reasons not to assent to claims, when consequences of the
claims in question are deduced and no consequences are
found to clash with the evidence or with the corpus.
The notion of a deductive relationship may seem to be
straightforward. Progress from one set of propositions to
another proposition is deductive if and only if it is made
in accordance with an accepted set of rules of deduction.
And we may regard the initial set of propositions as a
single proposition, the conjunction of all members of the
set. But there are some complications to note. We shall
start by noting the scope for there to be a choice of
rules of deduction. Then we shall consider the key role
of the relevant discipline’s corpus in allowing deductive
relationships to be established. Finally, we shall consider
different methods of presentation of deductive relationships.
3.2.1 Choice in rules of deduction
In the view of logicians, a conclusion follows deductively
from a set of premises if one can start by writing down
the premises in a sequence of lines, and then continue the
sequence until the conclusion appears on a line. The rules
of deduction must permit each line to be written, given all
the lines that precede it. Those rules have to be chosen.
The leading example of choice is this. Intuitionistic logic
does not allow use of the law of excluded middle to give
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non-constructive proofs, whereas classical logic does allow
this. The significance of the choice is that some formulae
will qualify as theorems in mathematics that is based
on classical logic, but not in mathematics that is based
on intuitionistic logic. The choice may have consequences
for what can be done in disciplines that are heavily
mathematical, in particular in quantum mechanics.2
In practice researchers follow the norms of their disciplines,
for the good reason that the adoption of those norms
has led to successful disciplines. The standard practice
in mathematics is to use classical logic. Alternatives are
generally pursued for their philosophical interest, rather
than because researchers fear that classical logic might lead
them astray.3
The need to rely on norms reminds us that researchers
are not given an indisputable answer to the question of
which rules of deduction they should adopt. So there is
no absolute fact of the matter, independent of practice,
as to precisely which relationships are deductive. But this
point should not concern us greatly. The choice between
classical and intuitionistic logic is the one really significant
choice. And it is not a choice that is likely to have much
significance outside mathematics and some types of physics
and chemistry.
2 An example of the use of an intuitionistic approach in quantum
mechanics, with an argument that there are good reasons to prefer
intuitionism, is provided by Caspers, Heunen, Landsman and Spitters,
“Intuitionistic Quantum Logic of an n-level System”.
3 We should however note that if we range more widely than
choices of rules of deduction, the philosophical interest of enquiries
into alternative conceptions of logical consequence can be substantial.
See Shapiro, “Varieties of Pluralism and Relativism for Logic”, section
2. For the interest of intuitionism and of placing restrictions on use of
the law of excluded middle, see section 6.
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Choices of rules of deduction are to be distinguished from
the choices of axioms that mathematicians sometimes have
to make, although choices of axioms can equally well have
great influence on what can be established deductively.
3.2.2 The role of the corpus
The corpus of a discipline plays a vital role in supporting
deductive relationships. It is rare for a small set of premises
in isolation to lead deductively to a worthwhile conclusion.
Most deductive relationships that are worthy of attention
will draw on the corpus to supply extra premises. When a
relationship from p to q may only be regarded as deductive
with support from the corpus, the relationship is really from
the conjunction of p and the required members of the corpus
to q.
Our confidence in claims that have come to be accepted
because they are the conclusions of deductive arguments
must therefore be influenced both by the degree of our
confidence that the explicit premises are correct, and by the
degree of our confidence that claims in the corpus which are
implicitly used as premises are correct.
3.2.3 The presentation of deductions
Deductions may be presented in several different ways. We
shall note some possibilities here. We shall say more about
the presentation of both deductions and non-deductive
arguments, and about the significance of presentation for
our confidence, in section 3.5.2.2.
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The most formal option is presentation in a way that is
governed by explicit rules as to what may be written. A
completely formal proof is a sequence of lines in which the
presence of each line is authorized by rules that govern what
may be written, given the contents of earlier lines. Examples
of rules are modus ponens and rules of instantiation that
may be applied to quantified formulae.
The next most formal option is presentation of a proof
in a way that omits some formal manoeuvres because
researchers can still follow the argument, and will still
accept that it is of the highest quality. For example, the
writers of mathematical proofs need not justify every line
that they write in the way that would be demanded by
formal rules of proof. They need not set out every step in
the reasoning in detail.4
Finally there are presentations that do not rely wholly
on sequences of lines of words and symbols, but that use
diagrams or other devices to convey points that researchers
can then grasp.
The distinction between the first two forms of presentation
is not very significant for our purposes. Proofs are not put
in doubt merely because they move faster than a strict
code of proof would allow. The important distinction is
between these two forms and the third form. And what
matters is not the outward forms of presentation, whether
as lines of words and symbols or as diagrams. The important
distinction is between types of presentation which make it
4 For an exploration of informal proof see Leitgeb, “On Formal
and Informal Provability”. Leitgeb’s discussion makes it clear that
we should not assume that the process of turning an informal proof
into a completely formal proof would be easy, or even psychologically
possible, even for a highly skilled mathematician. For how a proof that
has gaps of certain types can still justify belief in its conclusion see
Fallis, “Intentional Gaps in Mathematical Proofs”.
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easy for researchers to be reassured that no inadequacies
would come to light if they tried to formalize the proofs
in full, and types of presentation which make it harder to
gain that reassurance. It just so happens that with some
exceptions, it is easier to gain that reassurance with proofs
that are written out in words and symbols than with proofs
that are given by using diagrams.5
We should also note that when computers are used to
construct proofs or check them, that raises special issues.
Arguments may be fully formalizable in principle, and
may even be fully formalized within the computers, but
it may be hard or impossible for human mathematicians
to grasp the details in a synoptic view. Our confidence in
the conclusions of proofs that computers construct or check
depends on our confidence that mathematicians have taken
enough care when developing the relevant programs. But
mathematicians need not be debarred from having an a
priori warrant for believing the results that are produced
by theorem-proving computer programs.6
5 Alama and Kahle, “Checking Proofs”, explores ways in which
reassurance may be gained. The paper emphasizes the importance of
arguments being formalizable in principle. For an example of rigorous
deduction using diagrams, together with the option of reconstructing
diagrammatic proofs as traditional logical proofs, see Urbas, Jamnik,
Stapleton and Flower, “Speedith: A Diagrammatic Reasoner for
Spider Diagrams”.
6 Alama and Kahle, “Checking Proofs”, sets out roles for computer
programs that construct and check proofs. Burge, “Computer Proof,
Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds”, argues that mathematicians
may have an a priori warrant for belief in the results that are produced,
although the grounds for belief may be defeasible. This conclusion
appears on page 332.
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3.3 Non-deductive relationships
Many relationships between propositions are non-deductive.
We shall first explore the different degrees of strength that
such relationships may have, and then consider the role of
the corpus. Then we shall consider the legitimacy of using
non-deductive relationships.
3.3.1 Degrees of strength
Some non-deductive relationships are strong enough that
correctness of the antecedent would make correctness
of the consequent very likely. To return to the Higgs
boson example that we mentioned in section 1.3, there is
such a relationship from the observations actually made
to the existence of the Higgs boson (although in such
cases, one should not read 𝑝 as the probability that the
relationship would fail). Other non-deductive relationships
are considerably weaker. There may be appreciable scope
for the antecedent to be correct while the consequent is
incorrect. Then researchers should only say that correctness
of the antecedent would make correctness of the consequent
likely. For example, there is a relationship of this nature
from the antecedent that someone writing about a historical
event well before their time used words similar to those
used in an account dating from the time of the event, to
the consequent that the later writer had read the earlier
account.7
7 The example comes from Watson and Cameron, Cool Britannia:
Snowier Times in 1580-1930 than Since, page 51. It concerns an
account published in 1790 of snowfall in January 1634.
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3.3.2 The role of the corpus
The corpus plays a role in relation to non-deductive
relationships comparable to the role that it plays in relation
to deductive ones. It provides enough background to allow
the existence of relationships to be claimed and defended.
3.3.3 Using non-deductive relationships
Given the obvious weaknesses of non-deductive relation-
ships as compared to deductive ones when deciding whether
to assent to claims, it might be thought regrettable that
researchers should rely on them. This is an appropriate
point at which to respond to that thought.
In some disciplines, researchers have to make extensive
use of non-deductive relationships. There are not enough
deductive relationships to allow them to go very far. If
researchers limited themselves to deductions alone, and
refused to make use of non-deductive relationships, many
of the disciplines that are comparatively high up the scale
would be very sparse. The justification for using a mixture
of deductive and weaker relationships is that disciplines
built in that way are successful. The social sciences and
the humanities greatly improve researchers’ understanding
of people and the world. Allowing the use of non-deductive
relationships greatly expands the intellectual potential of
humanity. There is an increased risk of taking a wrong turn,
but that must be accepted in order to make progress at a
decent pace.
It is therefore an intellectual virtue of researchers that they
can use non-deductive relationships to conduct extended
arguments. Doing so is not like conducting deductive
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arguments and making mistakes. It is an ability to reason in
a variety of forms, not all of which amount to step-by-step
progress from premises to conclusions, while recognizing
the danger of error and controlling that danger by using
good sense and insisting on corroboration for claims.
Researchers are well aware of when a claim is adequately
supported. They can work in accordance with disciplinary
norms, such as norms that concern how evidence must
be interrogated. And they can apply general standards of
argument, standards that must be observed if arguments
are to be regarded as rational.8
Researchers can also consider whether the conclusions
of an argument fit with their existing understanding.
They may draw on detailed information contained within
their discipline. Particularly in the social sciences and
the humanities, they may also draw on more general
resources such as awareness of how human beings and
human institutions generally behave.
The existence of these controls, both over standards of
argument and over conclusions, means that while our
confidence may be diminished by our awareness that
much depends on the use of non-deductive relationships,
the diminution need not be great. The success of non-
deductive reasoning is reassurance enough. We may gain
further reassurance from the fact that some non-deductive
8 Such standards are discussed in Johnson, Manifest Rationality:
A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, particularly chapter 6 on the nature
of argument, chapter 7 on standards of argument and chapter 8
on the process of criticism. Johnson is concerned with arguments
that exemplify not only processes of inference, which he calls the
“illative core”, but also responsiveness to criticism, which he calls the
“dialectical tier”. An academic paper might contain only an illative
core, a network of inferences. Nonetheless, researchers could apply
considerations such as those set out by Johnson in order to consider
whether the paper’s argument was satisfactory.
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reasoning can be brought within a rigorous formal structure
by using adaptive logic.9
3.4 Availability
In this section, we shall consider the availability of deductive
relationships between propositions in different disciplines.
Deductive relationships are on the whole more readily
available in disciplines that are relatively low down the
scale.
We shall consider two main reasons why the availability
of deductive relationships varies as between disciplines.
The first reason is that the complications of the objects
of study make it harder in higher disciplines to make use
of exceptionless laws of nature as supports for deductive
relationships which are at a level appropriate to the
discipline. The second reason is that the ways in which
content is given to concepts differ as between lower and
higher disciplines. The ways to give content that are used in
higher disciplines do not tend to facilitate the identification
of deductive relationships.
9 The use of adaptive logic is set out in Straßer, Adaptive Logics
for Defeasible Reasoning: Applications in Argumentation, Normative
Reasoning and Default Reasoning. The main idea is explained in
chapters 1 and 2. There is no guarantee that all respectable reasoning
that was non-deductive could be brought within the scope of
this project. Straßer’s approach is designed for reasoning in which
usual conclusions sometimes fail to follow from premises because of
abnormalities that are at least in principle specifiable – for example
the possible abnormality of Tweety’s being a penguin which prevents
“Tweety flies” from following from “Birds fly” and “Tweety is a
bird” (page 3). Reasoning in which failures of conclusions to follow
deductively did not reflect specifiable abnormalities would be likely to
require a different approach.
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We shall then move on to a third and less significant
reason, vagueness in the extensions of concepts. Vagueness
of extension can make it hard both to establish deductive
relationships, and to make full use of such deductive
relationships as there are. It is a greater problem in higher
disciplines than in lower disciplines.
We shall speak of concepts rather than terms. We shall
regard concepts as having contents, corresponding to the
meanings of the corresponding terms. The content of a
concept is what one might reasonably conclude about an
object if one were told that the concept applied to it. To
be a bit more specific, the content would often need to be a
function from various bodies of information about an object
to various sets of conclusions about the object, since what
one would conclude might well depend on other information
one had about the object. (A more precise specification of
the notion of content, replacing “what one might reasonably
conclude” with something more specific, might be needed
for some purposes, but not for ours. Indeed, it is not
clear that a more precise specification could be given in
the current context without making the notion of content
unsatisfactory in some other respect.)
The preference for speaking of concepts rather than terms
reflects our concern with the contents of claims that are
made, rather than with the language in which claims
happen to be expressed. There would be a case to be
made for speaking of terms, based on the fact that our
concern is with relationships between propositions, since
propositions must be expressed in some language or other,
and relationships must be established by considering what
has been stated in the chosen language. But given our
purposes, nothing hinges on the choice. And those who
would prefer a discussion that referred to terms would be
able to re-cast what follows to suit them, at least if they
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assumed a one-to-one correspondence between concepts and
terms in some specified language.
3.4.1 Complications
The world as viewed by physics comprises objects that
are individually very simple. There are few things to
say about a particle, or a field, or a macroscopic object
considered as a rigid body that has a centre of mass and
is subject to forces. The mathematical characterizations
of such objects and their behaviour may be sophisticated,
and decidedly non-intuitive to most people, but nonetheless
all the relevant properties of objects can be set down
together. As we move up to chemistry, we find that the
complications of molecules make such comprehensiveness
harder to achieve. If we turn to geology we find that
while the features of interest, whether strata or stresses,
may be simply defined, those features only appear in
very large assemblies of molecules. Geological concepts
must be used, and descriptions that are given using those
concepts do not capture the full physical detail of the
world. Moving on to biology, we find that even individual
cells are enormously complicated. Specifically biological
concepts must be used, and descriptions that are given
using those concepts overlook a great deal of physical detail.
Finally, the world as viewed by the social sciences and
the humanities comprises immensely complicated objects,
in particular human beings. The objects of study can only
be made tractable by speaking in the human idiom and
using the corresponding concepts, the application or non-
application of which to objects discloses very little of the
physical detail of the world. (Some physical detail may
be disclosed, as when a description of a person sets out
a compound of physical characteristics, physical situation
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and mental state, but the disclosure of physical detail is not
the main business of characterizations that are given in the
human idiom.)
The notion of complication must be interpreted broadly. It
is not limited to the presence of many particles in the world
in many patterns. It also covers the presence of intricate
feedback loops, for example the loops in ecological systems,
or the loops in human beings when they reflect on how
others see them and modify their own conduct accordingly.
We shall now explore why complication should reduce the
availability of deductive relationships. Exceptionless laws
of nature are mostly only available at low levels, and they
cannot be used to support deductive relationships at a
level appropriate to a high-level discipline (for example,
relationships between propositions that are set out in the
terms of biology or economics rather than in the terms
of physics – in this section, “high-level discipline” will
mean any discipline higher than physics or chemistry). It is
support that matters. If there were in fact some deductive
relationship, but researchers could not support its existence,
it would not be available for them to use in their work.
An alternative to relying on low-level laws to support high-
level deductive relationships would be to find exceptionless
high-level laws. In section 3.4.1.2, we shall discuss why that
alternative is for the most part unavailable.
3.4.1.1 Manageable accounts and laws
The accounts that disciplines give need to be manageable.
When the objects of study are as complicated as geological
formations or cells of organisms, the detail that would be
given by a particle-by-particle account, or even a molecule-
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by-molecule account, must be overlooked. If the objects
of study are human beings or societies, much more detail
must be overlooked. It is therefore necessary to move on
to new concepts that are appropriate to geology, biology,
psychology, sociology or whatever the discipline may be.
This move means that researchers lose the ability to use ex-
ceptionless low-level laws to support deductive relationships
at levels that would be appropriate to their disciplines (for
example, deductive relationships between propositions that
attributed biological or psychological states to entities).
Low-level laws could only be used to support deductive
relationships between propositions in high-level disciplines
if the antecedent and consequent propositions could be
translated into propositions that used the concepts of low-
level disciplines, propositions of the types that were linked
by the low-level laws. Schemes of translation of the required
type, comprising substantial sets of rules of translation,
would at the very least be impractical.
We need to clarify what is being argued here. It is that there
is, at least in practice and perhaps in principle, a conceptual
gulf between high-level disciplines and low-level disciplines.
It is the conceptual gulf that matters here, because our
concern is with the unusability of exceptionless laws of
nature to support deductive relationships in high-level
disciplines. If the conceptual gulf could be bridged, there
would be the further obstacle that even when researchers
saw clearly that some concept of a high-level discipline
applied to some object of study, that would not give them
the access to physical detail they would need in order to
make low-level laws usable. But we do not get that far.
And the consequences of loss of detail are more interestingly
explored by asking why it is very hard to formulate
exceptionless laws within high-level disciplines themselves.
We shall consider that question in section 3.4.1.2.
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It is manifest that schemes of translation of the required
type, allowing moves from the concepts of high-level discip-
lines to the concepts of low-level disciplines, would not be
available. Occasional rules of translation might be available,
but reasonably comprehensive schemes of translation would
be needed if researchers in high-level disciplines were to
make use of exceptionless laws in low-level disciplines to
support deductive relationships. When high-level disciplines
describe the circumstances and conduct of people in human
terms, we may expect there to be obstacles in principle,
and not merely in practice, to comprehensive schemes. One
such obstacle is this. Descriptions of people’s circumstances
and conduct in human terms seem to be prime in Timothy
Williamson’s sense: not decomposable into the conditions of
individuals’ minds and of their environments at particular
moments.10 But decomposition would appear to be an
essential first step in the formulation of a scheme of
translation.
We have put the point in terms of concepts and their
translation, but there is an obvious connection with the
wider debate about scope for reduction. It is clear that a
full reduction of disciplines that investigated complicated
objects to physics would be impractical, whether or not
such a reduction might theoretically be possible.11 Even
when reduction appears to receive direct support from
experimental results, we need to be cautious about drawing
general conclusions. It is important to consider the designs
and protocols of the experiments.12
10 Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, chapter 3.
11 Recent discussions of views on the nature and the possibility
of reduction can be found in Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg and Hartmann,
“Who’s Afraid of Nagelian Reduction?”; Endicott, “Reinforcing the
Three ‘R’s: Reduction, Reception, and Replacement”.
12 Sullivan, “The Multiplicity of Experimental Protocols: A Chal-




One trend in recent decades has been to seek not perfect
reductions, but reductions of high-level theories to low-
level theories which can in turn be used to build back
up to approximations to the high-level theories, rather
than to exact reproductions of those high-level theories.
This allowance for approximation certainly improves the
prospects for reduction when a high-level theory is given
within a discipline that is reasonably low on the scale, for
example in chemistry. But higher up the scale, the allowance
is not likely to be much help. Moreover, when we move
up to psychology of all but the most neuronal sort, or to
the social sciences, researchers very often do not even have
theories that would be well-defined enough to allow any
project of reduction of theories to begin. There may still
be scope to identify underlying physical mechanisms which
in fact allow functions that are characterized in high-level
terms to be performed.13 But even though that may be
possible, such case-by-case (token) reductions would hardly
be enough to support a general programme of reduction
that could even come close to being a reduction of theories.
And any weakening of the notion of reduction to the
mere identification of physical mechanisms that performed
defined functions would be a significant weakening.14
Finally, while the most obvious barriers to reduction arise
when one considers disciplines that are reasonably high
up the scale, barriers can arise as low down the scale as
chemistry. An example is given by attempts to use quantum
mechanics to explain some properties of molecules.15
13 Endicott, “Reinforcing the Three ‘R’s: Reduction, Reception,
and Replacement”, section 9.
14 For a discussion of functions and reduction in the context of
biology see Weber, “Life in a Physical World: The Place of the Life
Sciences”.
15 Hendry, “Philosophy of Chemistry”, sections 3 and 4.
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None of what we have said should make us think that laws
of nature become irrelevant as we move up the scale of
disciplines. All laws of nature still apply even in relation to
large and complicated objects, accounts of which must be
given using the concepts of high-level disciplines. Moreover,
researchers can still make use of some laws of nature in their
accounts without going via analyses in terms of simpler
objects. They can for example analyse the performance
of a high-jumper by using Newtonian mechanics and by
noting the scope for an athlete to curve her body so
that her centre of gravity passes under a bar that she
clears.16 And when the objects of study are human beings,
certain ways to think about aspects of the world may be
particularly helpful in suggesting how connections might be
made between on the one hand conceptions of people and
societies in human terms, and on the other hand biological
or neurological conceptions. Such connections might make
it possible to see, at least in principle, how laws of nature
were all that ultimately mattered, even though it would
remain impossible to say in particular cases precisely how
they were all that mattered (as distinct from having some
general conception of how they were all that mattered).
Dan Sperber’s idea of an epidemiology of representations
as a way of connecting cultural phenomena with what goes
on in the brains of individuals would be an example of such
thought about an aspect of the world.17
3.4.1.2 Exceptionless high-level laws
We shall now consider why researchers in high-level discip-
lines cannot as a rule identify and use exceptionless laws
16 Barrow, Mathletics: A Scientist Explains 100 Amazing Things
About Sport, chapter 10.
17 Sperber, Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach.
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at high levels to support deductive relationships between
propositions, as an alternative to using exceptionless laws
taken from low-level disciplines.
The difficulty lies in the multiple realizability that is con-
sequent on overlooking microphysical detail. Researchers
in a high-level discipline will describe a situation using
propositions that could be made correct by any one of
a variety of situations as characterized in microphysical
terms. If they made deductions from those propositions
by combining them with laws that had been formulated
within their own discipline, the deductions might fail to
hold because the actual situation might be an exceptional
one. There would be cases in which the microphysical
characterization of a situation would bring it within the
scope of the antecedent of a high-level law, while the
working out of the laws of physics would lead to a situation
with a microphysical characterization that would take it
outside the scope of the consequent of the law.18 There
would be a risk of this happening even as low down the
scale as chemistry and some types of physics, which we are
not treating as high-level disciplines, but the risk would be
much greater from biology upward.
Noting the exceptions might not require a microphysical
description of the situation. It might suffice to add provisos
based on a range of special features of situations, where
those features could be picked out using concepts that were
appropriate to the relevant high-level discipline. But this
remedy would be likely to be an impractical one, because
it would require the addition of an unmanageable amount
of detail to the characterizations of actual situations. An
example of the difficulty of taking account of exceptional
18 Papineau, “Physicalism and the Human Sciences”, queries the
extent to which multiple realizability is the problem that it is made
out to be. But he does not establish that it is not a problem.
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situations is supplied by the transport of molecules within
cells. Their diffusion does not obey the obvious models, but
factors drawn from a wide range may need to be mentioned
in order to explain what happens in particular cases.19
The difficulty of taking account of exceptional situations
would be even greater than consideration of the immediate
objects of study might suggest. Differences between situ-
ations might lie either within those objects or in their envir-
onments. When we consider redescription in microphysical
terms, it is important to take environmental differences into
account for two reasons. The obvious reason is that envir-
onments influence the behaviour of objects within them.
The less obvious reason is that environmental differences
need to be noted in order to maintain straightforward
one-many relationships of multiple realizability, and not to
be faced with many-many relationships in which identical
low-level characterizations of objects in isolation might
correspond to different high-level characterizations because
of environmental differences that were taken into account
when giving high-level characterizations.20 It would be
just as important to take environments into account when
exceptions were to be handled not by using microphysical
descriptions, but by using concepts appropriate to the
relevant high-level discipline to pick out special features of
situations.
Even if researchers did not actually find exceptions to
high-level laws, they would be aware that exceptions
could arise. The researchers therefore could not regard the
laws as giving them deductive routes from descriptions of
19 Höfling and Franosch, “Anomalous Transport in the Crowded
World of Biological Cells”.
20 The way in which many-many relationships could arise is
explained in Khalidi, Natural Categories and Human Kinds: Classi-
fication in the Natural and Social Sciences, pages 119-120.
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antecedent situations that were stated using the concepts of
their own discipline to descriptions of consequent situations
that were stated in the same terms.
That much indicates why researchers cannot usually write
exceptionless high-level laws from scratch. But why can the
exceptionless nature of laws at the microphysical level not
be transmitted up to laws at higher levels?
When researchers give accounts of large and complicated
objects, the laws they can state, laws that relate to those
objects as described in the relevant disciplines rather
than as described in microphysical terms, often reflect the
confluence of various exceptionless laws, or of laws subject
to exceptions where those exception-prone laws themselves
reflect confluences of various exceptionless laws. A law that
items of pottery break when dropped onto concrete from a
height of one metre reflects the confluence of a law about
acceleration due to gravity, laws about the dissipation of
kinetic energy through bodies on impact, and laws that
govern changes to chemical bonds when clay is fired. Laws
concerned with changes to chemical bonds are subject
to exceptions when the proportions of ingredients vary,
or when the firing temperature is higher or lower than
normal, but they will be underpinned by general laws of
chemistry that are exceptionless or very nearly so. To take
an example from economics, a law that the utility to a
given consumer of each extra unit of a given product would
diminish, either from the first unit onward or beyond some
level of consumption that was itself accessible in practice,
would be underpinned by laws of human physiology and
psychology that were themselves prone to exceptions. Those
laws would in turn reflect confluences of various exception-
prone laws of biochemistry and neuroscience. Researchers
might ultimately trace a way back to exceptionless laws,
but only through a very complex and tangled web.
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A complete tracing back to exceptionless laws would nearly
always be impractical. There is also scope to debate whether
exception-prone laws supervene solely on exceptionless or
near-exceptionless laws. But we can still say that such
a tangled web of support is a significant source of the
exception-prone laws that researchers can state when they
give accounts of large and complicated objects. It is
not plausible that exception-prone laws would be reliable
enough to be of any interest in the absence of a body of
laws that were exceptionless or very nearly so. Having said
that, it would not be necessary to be aware of the details
of those exceptionless or near-exceptionless laws.
This dependence on a complex web would make it very
difficult for researchers in high-level disciplines to formulate
laws with exclusions for special cases to the extent that the
exclusions would render the laws even close to exceptionless.
The complexity of the web would make it very difficult
to work out in advance what exceptions would arise.
Exceptions arise when laws interact in odd ways, or when
some inhibitor comes into play in a way that may be very
hard to anticipate.21 Even if researchers could give laws with
exclusions that would render the laws close to exceptionless,
they might well find that the laws were impractically
21 We may compare this with the view that some failures of
laws in the higher sciences should be attributed to failures of
the combinatorial laws that determine the resultant of a number
of individual causal influences: Rupert, “Ceteris Paribus Laws,
Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties”. We
shall consider a closely related issue in section 5.2.3.6.
Another important point of comparison is the work of Luke Fenton-
Glynn on minutis rectis laws, laws that only hold so long as the
microscopic dispositions of particles are not exceptional: Fenton-
Glynn, “Ceteris Paribus Laws and Minutis Rectis Laws”, section
3. Fenton-Glynn does however apply this notion to laws that are
right down in physics, and in particular to laws of thermodynamics,




cumbersome. And even if that obstacle could be overcome,
there would be the further difficulty of detecting when
an instant case was one to which an exclusion applied,
especially if detection required attention to large quantities
of fine detail.
Consequences
Laws with exceptions do not have as much power as ex-
ceptionless laws to support deductive relationships between
propositions that describe specific situations.
Laws that are subject to exceptions may still be able to
support some deductive relationships. It may for example
be clear that whenever one law applies another one will
apply, supporting a deduction from the applicability of
the first law to the applicability of the second law. That
is, it may be clear that all exceptions to the second
law are also exceptions to the first law, even though
it may not be possible to identify exceptions to either
law in advance, whether identification means defining the
exceptions in general terms or recognizing instances that
would be exceptions.
Moreover, laws that are subject to exceptions may be able
to support near-deductive relationships between proposi-
tions that describe specific situations. Researchers are not
frustrated by exceptions at every turn, and disciplines do
not collapse into the chaos that would follow if researchers
were unable to make any reasonably reliable general claims.
If we consider how information is lost as we move up the
scale of disciplines, we can see why reasonably reliable
general claims can be made and why we should not expect
a collapse.
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In a discipline that is not near the bottom of the scale,
initial situations are characterized in ways that overlook
detailed physical information. The conditions of application
of laws within the discipline are themselves set out in the
same kind of way, with detailed information overlooked.
The consequences to which laws point will also be set
out in this way. Then a law will only lead researchers to
expect something that does not transpire if exceptional
circumstances, not noted in the description of the initial
situation, create an actual consequence that is described
differently from the predicted one when both the actual and
the predicted consequences are described in the discipline’s
usual high-level terms, overlooking detailed information.
When actual and predicted consequences are described in
the same way in high-level terms, that will not count as an
exception to the law.22
Very low down the scale, detail is not overlooked or is only
overlooked to a very modest extent. Initial situations and
expected consequences are simple enough to be described
in ways that capture all or most of the information about
them. The conditions for the application of laws can also
be given comprehensively. The comprehensive specification
of consequences might be expected to increase the risk of
exceptions to laws, but the comprehensive specification of
initial situations and conditions for the application of laws
ensures that this is not so.
The risk of exceptions would not quite reach zero, even in
fundamental physics, but that would be because current
theories might be in some way incorrect. That risk arises at
22 Compare Woodward, “Causation with a Human Face”, section
4.5. As Woodward points out, coarse-grained specifications, both of
causes and of their effects, make it possible to establish relationships
between causes and effects that are more stable than the relationships




any level. It is distinct from the risk of exceptions to laws
that arises from the loss of information. It is however related
to that risk, because one way for a theory to be incorrect is
for it to fail to recognize the salience of information that is
disregarded under the terms of the theory.
The remarks made here are independent of whether laws
express the consequences of situations for individual objects
or the consequences for population statistics. Consequences
may be expressed in statistical terms in fundamental
physics for deep theoretical reasons. They may also be
expressed in statistical terms in other disciplines, albeit for
rather different reasons. For example, the Hardy-Weinberg
law on the constancy of allele and genotype frequencies
down the generations in the absence of disturbances is a
law about proportions in successive generations, not about
the genetic make-up of any given individual. Statistical
consequences may be fitted into the conception of the effects
of multiple realizability that has been set out here, just like
consequences that are not expressed statistically. But one
special feature of statistical consequences is that researchers
cannot be quite sure whether they have arisen, whether
in normal or in exceptional circumstances. The reason
is that observed data from a sequence of measurements
might have arisen because the elements in the sample
happened to be unrepresentative of the population, or
because a population at the time of measurement happened
to be unrepresentative of the population at most times.
Researchers may however be able to exclude beyond
reasonable doubt the possibility of a sample, or a population
at a particular time, being unrepresentative. They may
therefore be able to say beyond reasonable doubt whether
an expected statistical consequence has arisen.
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3.4.2 Ways to give content
We shall now turn to ways in which the contents of concepts
may be given. As we said in section 3.4, the content of
a concept is what one might reasonably conclude about
an object if one were told that the concept applied to it,
making adjustments to what one might conclude for other
information about the object. The content of a concept may
be more or less determinate.
In disciplines that are low down the scale, the content may
well be fully determinate. (We shall use the expression
“fully determinate content” for content that either exhibits
no indeterminacy at all, or comes very close to that
ideal.) It will be clear what may be concluded about an
object on the basis of the information that a concept
applies to it, together with other information. For example,
there may be some truth function of conditions like a
disjunction of conjunctions of conditions, such that the
concept applies if and only if all the conjuncts of a disjunct
hold.23 And additional information might determine which
disjunct held, allowing more to be concluded than merely
that some disjunct or other held. Moreover, it might be
clear that within the scope of the relevant discipline,
nothing more was to be concluded about an object than
what followed from the precisely defined contents of the
concepts that applied. Clarity about what followed from the
application of concepts, and clarity that nothing more was
to be concluded, would combine to give fully determinate
contents to the concepts involved.
Higher up the scale, indeterminacy of content is more likely.
Concepts generally do not have their contents specified
precisely, and even when more information is supplied it
23 The model here is the inus conditions in Mackie, The Cement of
the Universe: A Study of Causation, chapter 3.
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may be unclear how much may reasonably be concluded
about an object on the basis that a concept applies to it.
What, for example, might reasonably be concluded about a
political party on the strength of the information that it was
right-wing, even when a fair amount of information about
the politics of the party’s country was also supplied? It is
no response to say that researchers should limit themselves
to the minimal core content that could safely be inferred.
That would leave many concepts with minuscule contents.
It would then be very hard to make progress in the relevant
disciplines. What may reasonably be concluded needs to
be more than what could be concluded with complete
confidence. Turning to the upper bound on what may be
concluded, there is unlikely to be any well-defined point at
which it becomes clear that nothing more should be added.
So indeterminacy will arise at both ends. There will be a
lack of clarity about what follows from the application of
concepts, and a lack of clarity as to the limit on what may
be concluded.
If the contents of concepts used within a discipline are
generally fully determinate, then it will usually be clear
what to conclude about an object when told that a concept
applies to it. That will in turn facilitate the establishment of
deductive relationships between propositions. At the most
basic level, it may be established that if one concept F
applies to an object, then it will have properties that suffice
for some other concept G to apply to it. Then for any value
of x, there will be a deductive relationship from “x is F”
to “x is G”. If on the other hand it is not clear what to
conclude about an object when told that a concept applies
to it, it will be harder to establish deductive relationships
in that way.
This is however a point about isolable relationships between
specified propositions, rather than about the strength of
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extended arguments. Indeterminacy in the contents of
concepts need not be fatal to the prospects for extended
arguments that create very strong links from premises to
conclusions, because multiple connections in a complex
argument can mean that whenever indeterminacy of con-
tent might create a weakness, strength elsewhere in the
argument would make up for the weakness.
Since we wish to identify obstacles to the establishment
of deductive relationships, we are equally concerned both
with indeterminacy that results from the lack of full and
precise specification of content, and with indeterminacy
that results from disagreement among researchers as to
what the content should be. Such disagreement is just as
much an obstacle as incomplete or imprecise specification,
even if each researcher is wholly convinced of the merits of
her preferred specification of the content, because it may
prevent agreement as to which deductive relationships may
be used.
The determinacy of a concept’s content can depend heavily
on the way in which the content is given. We shall now
consider different ways in which content may be given,
the extent of their use in different disciplines, and the
effects on determinacy of content. We shall work our way
from methods that may well allow significant indeterminacy
to methods that are likely to yield full determinacy. In
so doing, we shall work our way from methods that are
conspicuous in higher disciplines to methods that are
conspicuous in lower disciplines.
3.4.2.1 Giving examples
Researchers may give examples from a concept’s extension,
then add an explanation of why the examples have
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been grouped together and why other objects have been
excluded. In identifying the qualities that explain the
grouping and the exclusions, researchers give content to
the concept. It is important to indicate some qualities,
unless they would be obvious to any reader. If examples
were merely listed, with no mention of qualities, that would
barely give any content at all.
This method is not to be despised. Sometimes, it is the only
way for researchers to indicate what they mean. A historian,
for example, could not give a generally acceptable statement
of the content of the concept of revolution in any other way.
But this is clearly no way to make the content of the concept
determinate.24
There is a way to use examples to give content with
precision. This is to construct artificial examples that
emphasize certain features and are shorn of the messy
details found in real examples. This approach merges
into Max Weber’s method of the use of ideal types.25
But claims reached as conclusions of arguments that use
concepts which have been given content by using artificial
examples are only respectable if there is an additional stage
of checking that the artificial examples bear appropriate
relationships to the world. If the examples are constructed
well, they may bring out the essence of the world. If they
are constructed badly, their use may lead researchers to a
distorted picture of the world.
24 For the fortunes of the concept of revolution see Koselleck,
“Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution”. Kroeber,
“Theory and History of Revolution”, considers how to define the
term “revolution” (on pages 24-25), and the scope for theorizing
about revolutions. There are further thoughts on definition in Pincus,
“Rethinking Revolutions: a Neo-Tocquevillian Perspective”, section 1.
25 For a survey of Weber’s various comments on ideal types and the
implications of his comments see Bruun, Science, Values and Politics
in Max Weber’s Methodology, chapter 4.
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Finally, we have spoken of examples, but even if the entire
extension of a concept were catalogued, that might not yield
a fully determinate content. It might not be clear what
properties would jointly yield a condition of membership
that would be satisfied by all and only the members of the
extension.
3.4.2.2 The history of use
Concepts may be given content by the history of their
use, covering both how they were first used and how
their uses have evolved. The contents of some concepts,
particularly those that relate to human emotional, ethical
and political life, can only be grasped if one understands the
history of the concepts. One cannot for example properly
grasp the content of the concept of sovereignty without a
grasp of that concept’s history.26 There has indeed been
for several decades a substantial programme of work to
set out the histories of concepts, and to draw from those
histories not only what concerns us here, the contents
of concepts, but also some wider historical lessons. This
work has been carried on under the general heading of
conceptual history, although the corresponding German
term, Begriffsgeschichte, is also used in English because
German historians have been leading practitioners.27
The history of use of a concept is not likely to be the only
source of its content. There will normally be a dictionary
definition that will give a starting point. But often in
26 See Jackson, Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, for the use of
history in understanding this concept.
27 For guides to this area of work see Richter, The History of
Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction; Hampsher-




the humanities, and sometimes in the social sciences, a
dictionary definition is inadequate to capture the full
content of a concept. The history of use may then make
a substantial contribution.
It may do so by showing how different elements have been
incorporated in or ejected from the content of the concept
over the years. The evidence will be found in the arguments
that use the concept and that have been accepted or
rejected in the past. The history of use may also make a
contribution to the content of a concept by giving examples
of objects that have been taken to fall within its extension.
When researchers use examples as a way to give content,
they need not confine themselves to examples that they
would themselves regard as members of the extension. They
can also draw on the past.
Giving content by reference to the history of a concept’s
use is only sensible if the aim is to establish the content of
the concept at some reasonably specific time – either the
present, in order to use the concept in current argument, or
some point in the past at which the concept had a role to
play, in order to understand what was going on at that time.
But even given this restriction to determining the content
of a concept at some specified time, the history of use is
not likely to be enough to allow the concept’s content to
be made fully determinate. Different people will have used
a concept in different ways and for different purposes, even
at the same time in the past. And if one takes account of a
substantial period of history leading up to a time for which
content is to be given, there may well have been a wide
variety of uses of the concept as the intellectual and social
context changed. There may even have been significant
discontinuities, for example when rhetorical attempts to
change the extensions of evaluative concepts have both
succeeded and changed the ways in which the concepts have
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been used.28 When an event that created a discontinuity
occurred, it may not be appropriate simply to add the
history of use before the event to the history of use after it
when seeking to establish the content of the concept at some
time after the event. But there will be no single correct way
to make allowance for the discontinuity. That will make
it harder than it would otherwise have been to make the
content of the concept determinate.
3.4.2.3 Use in a pattern of thought
Concepts may be given content by their use in patterns
of thought within the current practice of a discipline. The
diversity of uses that are made of a concept, and the
different ways of thinking about topics that are likely to be
found in a living discipline that is any distance up the scale,
mean that this method is unlikely to yield fully determinate
content for any given concept except in disciplines that are
very low down the scale. We shall take one example from
biology and one from the social sciences.
The concept of a gene is not as well-defined as popular
discourse might suggest. One lay definition would be that
a gene was a stretch of DNA that was related to some
heritable characteristic. This would not be nearly enough
to specify the content in a way that would meet the needs
of biologists. What counts as a heritable characteristic?
Does everything in a stretch of DNA count as a gene,
or only the parts that perform specific types of function?
Must a gene have independent influence, or can it have its
influence jointly with other genes? And so on. The concept
of a gene is given real substance by its use in a pattern




of thought, the thought of researchers about what goes on
when information encoded in DNA is passed on from parent
to child, when that information is put to work in the life of a
single organism, or when a characteristic spreads through a
population or dies out. Reflection on that pattern of thought
may lead to doubts among researchers as to whether the
concept of a gene is really a useful one at all. But to the
extent that it is retained, its content is given at least partly
by the uses researchers make of it. Formal definitions are
recognized not to suffice.29
To take an example from the social sciences, the concept of
path dependence is closely tied to its roles in thought about
economic, social and political change. But there is plenty
of disagreement, both about the conditions for application
of the concept and about what should be concluded when
it applies.30 The extent of disagreement shows that the
content of the concept has not been made fully determinate.
It should not be supposed that there are no advantages
to giving the contents of concepts by giving examples,
considering the history of their use or identifying their
29 For a history of the concept of a gene and a survey of
debates see Rheinberger and Müller-Wille, “Gene Concepts”. For a
survey of philosophical issues see Griffiths and Stotz, Genetics and
Philosophy: An Introduction. For deficiencies of formal definitions see
Axelson-Fisk, Comparative Gene Finding: Models, Algorithms and
Implementation, section 1.5. For complexities of the subject matter
that impede the giving of formal definitions see Pearson, “What is a
Gene?”. For three concepts of a gene, two of which (the instrumental
and the nominal) would imply that the content of the relevant
concept would have strong connections with the patterns of thought of
researchers, see Griffiths and Stotz, “Genes in the Postgenomic Era”.
Different concepts of genes are taken up again in Griffiths and Stotz,
Genetics and Philosophy: An Introduction, with the instrumental
concept discussed under the name of the Mendelian gene.
30 Mahoney and Schensul, “Historical Context and Path Depend-
ence”.
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uses in patterns of thought. The scope to emphasize
different examples, different elements in the histories
of concepts or different strands in patterns of thought
allows researchers to experiment with the contents of the
concepts they use. Even within the natural sciences there
are occasions when conscious decisions not to give the
contents of concepts by imposing precise definitions, but
to allow classifications and relationships between classes
to evolve by reference to samples and the general pattern
of thought in the discipline, can facilitate progress. The
classification of protein structures provides an example. As
more information about structures was discovered, it was
found that a rigid treelike map of structures was no longer
helpful. A more flexible network of protein structures, in
which evolutionary relationships were represented as well
as structural ones, and in which examples played a key role
in giving the contents of the concepts that corresponded
to different classes, was introduced in the expectation that
this would aid research.31
3.4.2.4 Formal definition
In disciplines that are low down the scale, researchers
introduce some concepts simply by defining the correspond-
ing terms. The definitions use terms for existing concepts,
where those concepts already have fully determinate con-
tents. The definitions are then taken to give the entire
contents, or at least the entire central contents, of concepts.
31 Andreeva, Howorth, Chothia, Kulesha and Murzin, “SCOP2
Prototype: A New Approach to Protein Structure Mining”. The
flexibility of the approach and how that flexibility was achieved are




This is standard practice in mathematics. For example, a
group is a set with a binary operation on its members, where
the set and the operation together satisfy certain conditions.
The method is also available in physics and chemistry. For
example, in physics, the electrical resistance of an object
is defined as the voltage across it divided by the current
flowing through it. In chemistry, a great many technical
terms are given precise definitions.32
This approach to giving content is practical low down the
scale, because tightly-knit theories and clusters of theories
are the norm. The resources that are supplied by some basic
concepts suffice to give full and useful contents to other
concepts. Moreover, the close connections that are forged
between concepts, mediated by accepted theories, would
make it hard for researchers to adopt alternative contents of
concepts. We can therefore expect little disagreement over
content.
The use of formal definitions does not however exclude
changes of content as disciplines develop. If theories are
replaced by other theories or are developed in new ways,
concepts that survive such changes may well come to have
significantly different contents. To take an extreme example,
the physicist’s concepts of space and time were transformed
out of all recognition by relativity theory, even though the
corresponding concepts in everyday life did not change at
all. To take another and less extreme example, the discovery
of quasicrystals changed the content of the concept of a
crystal.33
32 International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, IUPAC
Compendium of Chemical Terminology - The Gold Book.
33 Lidin, The Discovery of Quasicrystals: Scientific Background on
the Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2011, page 2.
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3.4.3 Vagueness of extension
Concepts have extensions as well as contents. These
extensions may be vague. Three consequences are relevant
here. The first consequence is that it may be harder than
it would otherwise be to find deductive relationships. We
shall note this consequence, but we shall not dwell on it
because it is not likely to have a significant impact. The
second consequence is that it may be more difficult than it
would otherwise be to test claimed deductive relationships.
The third consequence is that it may be more difficult than
it would otherwise be to make full use of such deductive
relationships as there are.
We shall say a little about the notion of extension before
introducing the notion of vagueness of extension. We shall
then consider the prevalence of vagueness of extension and
the reasons why it arises, noting that it is more likely to
arise in disciplines high up the scale than in disciplines low
down the scale. Finally, we shall consider some consequences
of the use of concepts with vague extensions.
3.4.3.1 Extension
Candidates to fall within the extension of a concept will be
objects that are of interest to researchers. They will include
objects that have in fact existed, will in fact exist or exist
timelessly, together with hypothetical objects. For example,
economists might discuss a hypothetical industry that was
dominated by eight firms. That hypothetical industry would
be a candidate for membership of the extension of the
concept of an oligopoly. The relevant set of hypothetical
objects for a discipline may be ill-defined, and it may shift as
a discipline develops, but that will not affect our argument.
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The term “object” will have a broad sense. It will cover
anything that can be picked out, including properties of
other objects, transient events and abstract objects. It may
for example be a physical object, an event, a historical
development, a rate of change in some circumstance, or a
mathematical abstraction such as the topological invariance
of some given property. Or it may be a set of objects, or the
members of a set considered collectively.34
3.4.3.2 Vagueness
Some concepts do not have fully determinable extensions.
A concept will fall into this category if, given its current
content, there are some candidates for membership of
the extension such that researchers could not agree as to
whether those candidates fell within the extension, even
if they were to acquire all of the information about the
candidates that would normally be available. We shall
say that a concept has a vague extension when the
indeterminability is not trivial.
Concepts with vague extensions may perfectly well pick out
natural kinds, at least if we agree with Muhammad Ali
Khalidi that natural kinds should be regarded as epistemic
kinds, the kinds that researchers pick out in the course of
their work.35 A view of natural kinds as epistemic kinds
34 There are important questions about the logic of concepts that
apply to several objects together but not to those objects singly, such
as the concept of a football team. Those questions are addressed under
the heading of plural logic. But the ways in which those questions may
be answered will not affect our argument. For a full treatment of plural
logic see Oliver and Smiley, Plural Logic.
35 Khalidi, Natural Categories and Human Kinds: Classification
in the Natural and Social Sciences, page 43 for epistemic kinds and
section 2.4 for what Khalidi calls “fuzzy kinds”.
145
3 Relationships between Propositions
would comport with our focus on objects and concepts that
are of interest to researchers.
There are three reasons why we speak of determinable
extension rather than determinate extension. The first
reason is that we do not want to regard a concept as having
a vague extension merely because researchers have not yet
surveyed all the objects or all the types of object to which it
might apply, so that they cannot yet catalogue its extension.
Even if no catalogue could ever be regarded as definitive,
because new objects might come into existence, researchers
might be able to conclude, on the basis of the content of
the relevant concept and their experience to date, that
there would be very few borderline cases. Then they could
conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the concept did
not have a vague extension. The second reason to speak of
determinable extension is that we want to allow researchers
the benefit of additional information about specific objects
that they do not currently have, but that they could acquire
through the normal practice of their discipline. The third
reason is that we are concerned with what researchers
could discover. If an extension were fully determinate but
researchers could not determine it, unavailable information
as to the extension would be useless. The consequences for
our confidence would then be the same as if there were no
such unavailable information.
We restrict ourselves to the current definitions of the terms
that correspond to the relevant concepts. A concept’s lack
of a fully determinable extension is not to be denied by
a claim that definitions could be amended in a way that
would remove the indeterminability.
The additional information about candidates is limited
to what would normally be available. Concepts lack fully
determinable extensions if they suffer that lack given the
146
3.4 Availability
current practice of the relevant discipline, or perhaps that
practice together with the benefit of modest improvements
that are likely to be made in the reasonably near future. We
impose this restriction because our interest will be in the
effects of the lack of fully determinable extensions on the
confidence we should have now. We are not to look forward
to some ideal future.
Our interest is in concepts that suffer from modest
indeterminability of extension, rather than in concepts with
hopelessly indeterminable extensions. We should expect
agreement within a discipline on the central cases that
fall within a concept’s extension, and on the central
cases that fall outside its extension. Without that much
agreement, a concept is likely to be practically useless. The
requirement for agreement on central cases is different from
a requirement that for most objects that are of the right
general nature to be candidates, it should be determinable
whether they fall within or outside the extension. A failure
to agree in relation to the majority of objects while there
was agreement on central cases might not render a concept
useless, although it would severely restrict the extent to
which the concept could be used.
Certain deficiencies in the ways in which contents of
concepts are given may lead to vagueness of extension.
We recall that the content of a concept is what one might
reasonably conclude about an object if one were told that
the concept applied to it. If content is given both very
fully and with great precision, that will reduce or eliminate
vagueness of extension. But a deficiency in either respect
can lead to vagueness. We shall now consider the effects of
these two deficiencies in turn. (Both deficiencies may also
lead to indeterminacy of content, but that is not our concern
here.)
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Suppose that the content of a concept is not given fully,
in the sense that the content does not touch on all
points that researchers might reasonably regard as relevant
to the question of whether an object fell within the
concept’s extension. (This sense of fullness is chosen for
our immediate purposes.) For example, political scientists
might give the content of the concept of a democracy in
terms of voting rights and fairness of elections, thereby
allowing specification with precision. But when faced with
a particular country, they might also want to consider
the extent to which special interest groups had strong
influence over government policy, because such influence
would work against every citizen’s having an equal say.36
Then even though the official content was stated precisely,
vagueness of extension might follow. It might not be enough
to amend the content of the concept of a democracy to
include a maximum level of influence of special interest
groups, because such influences would be so hard to measure
that judgement would sometimes be needed to determine
whether a given polity qualified as a democracy, so that
vagueness of extension would persist. It would also be
no answer to say that the problem here identified could
not arise, because membership of extension should depend
only on expressed content. To pursue the example of
democracies, political scientists have in mind certain work
for the concept to do. It should group together polities
in which public opinion plays a decisive role, but not
necessarily from day to day. There is therefore an implicit
content of whatever will allow the work to be done. The
problem then arises when it is difficult to give full and
precise explicit content to match.
36 We here pick out just a few considerations. In practice, many
considerations can be used together. See for example the 60 factors
listed in The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2014:
Democracy and its Discontents, pages 40-49, and the procedure for
translating scores into types of polity on pages 37-38.
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Now suppose that content is given fully, but not in such a
way as to yield a mechanical procedure that would always
determine whether the concept applied to a given object.
The classic example is that of a bald person. Attributions
of baldness depend entirely on the quantity of hair on a
person’s head. But baldness does not require there to be
no hair. Someone may have a few strands of hair and
still be bald. How many strands would be too many is
however left unstated. So while the content of the concept of
baldness covers everything that is relevant to determining
membership, and in that sense is given fully, the content is
not given with great precision.
Lack of precision is less significant than lack of fullness as
a source of vagueness of extension in academic disciplines.
Lack of precision has however been the more conspicuous
topic in philosophical discussions as to whether vagueness
of extension should be located in the nature of the world,
so that objects can be within a concept’s extension to some
degree, in the nature of researchers’ access to the world,
so that all objects are decisively in or decisively out but
researchers cannot always tell which, or in the nature of the
languages that are used.37 That question need not detain us.
We also need not be detained by questions as to the proper
theory of vague language and the appropriate underlying
logic.38 What will matter for our purposes is that there are
some candidates, such that researchers cannot determine
whether they are in or out.
37 For examples of some of the main views in play see Schiffer,
“Vague Properties”; Kölbel, “Vagueness as Semantic”; Williamson,
Vagueness. Smith, Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, chapter 2, surveys
a range of options and pays particular attention to their logical
implications.
38 An important recent contribution to the discussion is Raffman,
Unruly Words: A Study of Vague Language. Raffman gives a survey
of previous work in section 1.1.
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As we noted above, we shall only use the term “concept with
a vague extension” when indeterminability of extension is
not trivial. What counts as non-trivial will vary from one
context to another. It is partly a matter of the proportion
of objects that lie in the area of uncertainty, and partly a
matter of the extent of effects on the discipline, including
effects on the extent to which deductive relationships
between propositions can be used. The concept of a concept
with a vague extension is itself a concept with a vague
extension.
3.4.3.3 The prevalence and sources of vagueness
Concepts in everyday life
We shall start by considering the use of concepts with
vague extensions in everyday life. Our concern is with
academic disciplines, within which researchers have some
freedom to use concepts that are not in everyday use. But
a consideration of everyday concepts will serve as a useful
introduction, particularly since everyday concepts are used
in the social sciences and the humanities.
Human beings regularly use concepts with vague extensions
in everyday life, particularly the concepts that characterize
people. It can be hard to decide whether to describe
someone as kindly, as empathetic or as excitable, even
though there are plenty of people who definitely fall within
the extensions of those concepts and plenty of others who
definitely fall outside their extensions. Evaluative concepts
can also have vague extensions. For example, it is not
always easy to decide whether a novel should be regarded as
profound. We can observe the same phenomenon in relation
to some non-evaluative concepts that apply to inanimate
objects. It is not always clear whether an object qualifies as
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a work of art, in the sense that does not imply special praise.
Most paintings clearly qualify. Many everyday artefacts
clearly do not qualify. But there are also assemblies of
everyday artefacts that are placed in art galleries, and
people can debate their status as art and learn from such
debate without expecting to reach agreement. Concepts
that apply to the natural world can also exhibit vagueness of
extension. There are plants such that it is unclear whether
they are trees or shrubs: lilac plants are an example.
It is no surprise that concepts used in everyday life have
vague extensions. Complete definitions of the corresponding
terms have never been set out. Even if a dictionary did
try to be prescriptive rather than merely recording usage,
definitions would have to be brief in order for it to be
practical to use the dictionary. Then they would be too
brief to eliminate vagueness.
Another reason why we may expect vagueness of extension
arises out of the use of concepts in order to navigate the
world. Consider for example the basis on which people
make sense of the characters and the conduct of other
people – the psycho-social understandings that people
use. Such understandings use modest sets of concepts,
such as the concepts of ambition, affection, desire, wishful
thinking, calculation and decision. These concepts are used
to construct explanations of the things that people do: “He
works long hours because he is ambitious and he thinks his
boss will be impressed if he gets a lot done”; “She goes for
a run every day, even in bad weather, because she wants
to get fit but has decided that she cannot afford to join a
gym”; and so on.
A psycho-social understanding is only usable so long as it is
based on a modest number of straightforward concepts, and
so long as the concepts cohere well enough to allow them
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to be combined to produce explanations of conduct. The
limit on the number of concepts means that concepts need
to be stretched to make them useful in a wide variety of
situations, and it is not practical to make clear in advance
quite how far they should be stretched. There would also
be a considerable risk that precise definitions would unduly
limit the applicability of concepts. Some situations in which
the concepts would be needed would fall just outside the
boundaries that were set by the definitions.
Concepts in academic disciplines
We should not expect to find concepts with vague exten-
sions in mathematics or fundamental physics. Concepts
are embedded in elaborate theories, and the contents of
concepts are given in full and with great precision. The
types of object that might or might not fall within the
extensions of concepts are also limited, being confined to
mathematical objects or to fundamental particles, forces
and the like. The scope for a concept to be confronted
with strange beasts that might fall in some grey area at
the boundary of its extension is therefore very limited.
As we move up through the natural sciences, concepts with
vague extensions start to be used, even if vagueness is not
welcomed. For example, it can be hard to say exactly what
should count as an example of a given structural motif in
protein molecules.39 Moving up to whole organisms, there
are problems with species. For example, biologists might
decide that species were to be defined as interbreeding
populations that were reproductively isolated from other
populations, and they might do so with a view to ending
up with a biologically significant classification of organisms.
39 Johansson, Zoete, Michielin and Guex, “Defining and Searching
for Structural Motifs Using DeepView/Swiss-PdbViewer”, pages 2-3.
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They might then find that the information they could use
in order to fit organisms into such a scheme did not suffice
to determine exactly which organisms belonged together
in a species. Then to the extent that they had formulated
concepts of given species, those concepts would be liable
to have vague extensions. Indeed, such difficulties have led
to criticism of the idea that the concept of a species should
automatically be given a distinctive status in the taxonomic
enterprise.40
As we move into the social sciences, vagueness of extension
becomes obvious. For example, in economics, should a
given increase in unemployment be classified as cyclical
or structural? Some unemployment is clearly cyclical and
some is clearly structural, but sometimes there is no clear
40 For a survey of the whole area see Kunz, Do Species Exist?
Principles of Taxonomic Classification. For an account of how, in a
modest proportion of cases, the natures of organisms make it hard to
use standard methods of classification see Diamond, “Horrible Plant
Species”. Such difficulties do not suffice to show that the concept of
a species should be abandoned, or that species should be regarded
as arbitrary constructs. Rieseberg, Wood and Baack, “The Nature of
Plant Species”, emphasizes that in many cases such difficulties do not
block the path to a biologically significant classification. (It should also
be noted that there are differences between the issues that arise for
plant species and animal species.) Nonetheless, there are grounds to
wonder whether classification by species is the best that biologists can
do. One view, expressed in the context of a discussion of classification
generally, is that instead of wondering what might count as a species,
biologists should take a step back and ask what properties should be
used to define classes of organisms (Parsons and Wand, “A Question
of Class”, page 1041).
De Queiroz, “Ernst Mayr and the Modern Concept of Species”,
covers the significance of the general notion of biological lineage and
ways in which that notion may be made precise. But our concern
here is with the difficulties that arise once a precise concept of species
in general has been chosen, rather than with the fact that there are
several competing concepts. The difficulties we have noted here could
arise with any precise concept of species in general that could be
expected to yield a biologically significant classification of organisms.
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verdict and only a broad-brush conclusion is possible.41
Researchers may however prefer broad-brush conclusions in
which they can straightforwardly believe to more specific
conclusions in which they could only have something like
Stephen Schiffer’s vagueness-related partial belief.42
Moving on to the humanities, we find the regular use of
concepts that are drawn directly from everyday ways of
characterizing people and their actions. The author of a
biography, for example, tells a human story in human terms.
In deciding how to describe the subject, or episodes in
the subject’s life, the author must use her own judgement.
She cannot rely on rules that would make it possible to
compute, on each occasion, whether a given adjective would
be appropriate.
We should acknowledge that in the social sciences and the
humanities, difficulties in deciding whether an object falls
within the extension of a concept may reflect deficiencies of
data, rather than the nature of the concept. To the extent
that deficiencies of data could be remedied in practice
41 Chen, Kannan, Loungani and Trehan, New Evidence on Cyclical
and Structural Sources of Unemployment, presents a sophisticated
mathematical analysis of examples, but still only presents conclusions
in broad-brush terms, using phrases like “substantial impact” (section
7). The difficulty is not that the definitions of the two types of
unemployment are imprecise in themselves. A precise definition of the
structural unemployment rate is given in section 4.C, and the balance
is treated as cyclical. But the information that is ordinarily available
does not make it possible to determine exactly which increases in
unemployment are structural.
42 Schiffer, The Things We Mean, sections 5.4 to 5.8. Schiffer’s
account starts from sorites paradoxes, but the notion of vagueness-
related partial belief that he develops, which is a recognition that
some propositions are sort-of true and sort-of false rather than an
expression of uncertainty, could be extended to other claims that were
made in reliance on excessive definiteness about the applicability of
concepts with vague extensions.
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(and not merely in theory), there would not be vagueness
of extension as we have defined it. But if that were not
possible, there would be vagueness of extension.
It is no response to say that concepts with vague extensions
should be discarded, and that other concepts should be
used instead. Some of the concepts that show vagueness of
extension are too important to be discarded. Classificatory
concepts, like concepts of structural motifs and of species,
have very useful roles to play in helping researchers to
navigate their domains of work and to write up their results
for other researchers to use. Discussions of economic policy
would be hampered without the identification of different
types of unemployment. Many historical accounts would
not be anything like they actually are, if they did not
explain past events in terms that related pretty directly to
life as human beings experienced it. And certain forms of
sociological work, such as symbolic interactionism, must by
their very nature use concepts that are used in everyday life,
or that are only slightly refined versions of those concepts.
Then the vagueness of extension of everyday concepts
cannot be eliminated.43
Finally we may note that while indeterminacy of content
may well lead to vagueness of extension, it need not do
so. It may be that all candidates for membership of an
extension are such that they clearly fall within it, or clearly
fall outside it.44 Researchers are however only likely to be
able to reach such a comforting conclusion when they are
43 This can be seen by reading academic papers such as those in the
journal Symbolic Interaction. The approach is to understand people’s
conduct by reference to how they themselves ascribe meanings.
44 The point is well made in Smith, An Introduction to Gödel’s
Theorems, page 350. It would however be rare in disciplines other than
mathematics for researchers to be able to use the kind of squeezing
argument that Peter Smith describes on pages 354-355 in order to
make extensions fully determinable.
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confident that they have surveyed all possible varieties of
objects that should be regarded as candidates. The risk that
they may not have detected all varieties is likely to be high
when the objects are concrete. It may be lower when the
objects are abstract, because researchers may be able to
work out that they have a comprehensive list of varieties.
3.4.3.4 Consequences of vagueness of extension
The fact that vagueness of extension is more prevalent in
higher disciplines is one reason why deductive relationships
become less readily available as we go up the scale. Many
such relationships rely on the availability of claims that
all objects that have one property also have some other
property. For example, a claim that all Fs are Gs will
support a deductive relationship from “This object is F”
to “This object is G”. We must first consider whether such
universal claims can gain some support, and then whether
they can gain enough support to justify assent to them.
When claims like the claim that all Fs are Gs can only
be supported by the enumeration of extensions, vagueness
of extension may prevent their gaining any support. But
this need not be a widespread consequence of vagueness of
extension. A study of the contents of concepts can often be
used to support universal claims of this type, so that the
enumeration of extensions is not required.
Vagueness of extension can be a serious obstacle to the
testing of such universal claims, and hence to working out
whether they have enough support to justify assent, even
when the claims gain some support from a study of the
contents of concepts. For example, a claim that all Fs
are Gs can be tested, statistically if not conclusively, by
inspecting a sample of objects that are F. If the extension
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of the concept F is vague, it will be unclear which objects
should be included in the sampling frame. And it is perfectly
possible that objects near the boundary of F’s extension
should differ from objects that fell well within its extension
in respects that would make it important to inspect some of
the objects near the boundary. Then it might be difficult for
a claim that all Fs were Gs to gain enough support to justify
assent. Deductive relationships of the form of a relationship
from “This object is F” to “This object is G” would then
be unavailable, except when the object was such that other
support for such a relationship could be found.
Vagueness of extension may also limit the extent to which
researchers can make use of some types of deductive
relationship to establish facts about objects of study. They
may for example wish to make a deduction from a premise
that some object is F to the conclusion that it is G, but
they may be uncertain whether the object is F because it
falls in the grey area at the boundary of F’s extension.
It is the availability and the use of relationships that are
actually deductive that are most obviously affected by
vagueness of extension. Vagueness can make it difficult
to propose, to test or to use deductive relationships. But
vagueness can have the same effects in the context of rela-
tionships that come close to being deductive. The greater
the vagueness, the harder it may be to propose relationships
by seeing what correlations in the data there are. Vagueness
will make it hard to test claimed relationships because it
will be hard to determine the proportion of exceptions to
the relationship. (To pursue our example, it is only possible
to be confident about the proportion of objects that are F
but not G if one can be clear whether each given object is
F, and it would be dangerous to assume that the proportion
among objects near the boundary of F’s extension would be
the same as the proportion among objects that were well
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within F’s extension.) Finally, the greater the vagueness of
extension, the less scope there will be to use near-deductive
relationships to establish facts about objects of study.
3.5 Relationships and assent
We shall now consider how the availability of relationships
of different types between propositions can support or
hinder the appraisal of claims. We shall first consider
the roles that relationships between propositions play
in allowing claims to be appraised in certain ways. We
shall then see how the strength of relationships and
the presentation of arguments for them may affect our
confidence.
3.5.1 Ways to appraise claims
When researchers consider whether to assent to a claim,
they may consider both which other independently well-
supported claims would support the claim, and what would
follow from the claim. The availability of these ways to
consider claims depends on both the quantity and the
strength of the available relationships between propositions.
A ready availability of deductive relationships will help a
great deal.
We shall first note ways in which the ready availability
of deductive relationships can be helpful. We shall then
consider the extent to which non-deductive relationships
can do the same work.
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3.5.1.1 What deductive relationships can do
The ready availability of deductive relationships would
afford good prospects for identifying propositions that,
individually or in conjunction, would entail a claim that
was under consideration. If there were good reason to think
that those other propositions were correct, there would be
equally good reason to think that the claim was correct.
Relationships that supported the drawing of conclusions
from theories could be useful, just as much as relationships
from statements of particular fact to claims. Relationships
could allow accepted theory to predict that some new
claim would be correct. That would in turn lend support
to the claim. For example, relativity theory entails that
time dilation will occur. So when dilation of the predicted
extent was first observed, there was theoretical support
for the claim that it was a real phenomenon, rather than
the observation’s having resulted from some defect in the
relevant experiments.
The ready availability of deductive relationships would
also afford good prospects for using deductive relationships
to work out what would follow from a claim, and then
seeing whether those consequences held. If any of them
did not hold, then the deductive nature of the relationships
would require rejection of the claim through the operation
of modus tollens. Both deductive relationships that led
from claims to the presence or absence of given evidence,
and relationships that led from claims to theoretical
consequences, could be useful here.
The use of relationships from claims to evidence is obvious.
If a claim implies that the value of a measurable variable
will fall within some given range, and measurements
place it outside that range, the claim must be rejected.
At least, it must be rejected unless investigation of the
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process of measurement discloses errors, or unless there is
some plausible revision of theory that would change the
significance of the measurements.
The use of relationships from claims to theoretical con-
sequences is slightly less obvious. It depends on a considera-
tion of whether the theoretical consequences are acceptable.
For example, the claim made in 1989 that cold fusion had
occurred was inconsistent with accepted theory on how
fusion would work and what its by-products would be, so
the claim of cold fusion had to be treated very sceptically,
for that reason as well as for other reasons.45
3.5.1.2 Using non-deductive relationships
We shall now consider the extent to which non-deductive
relationships between propositions can do the same work
that deductive relationships can do when researchers
consider whether to assent to claims.
Non-deductive relationships could help to identify proposi-
tions, the correctness of which would support the claim that
was under consideration. For example, general principles of
human conduct might set out non-deductive relationships
which would allow particular propositions to be used to
defend a claim that a person’s conduct on some occasion
was motivated in some particular way – and the general
principles might not even be spelt out, if they were obvious
enough. An example is provided by an incident in an
election.46 The claim is that an election judge who was
disposed to allow a disputed ballot did so partly because
45 Scaramuzzi, “Ten Years of Cold Fusion: An Eye-Witness
Account”, section 2.2.
46 Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the Mid-Nineteenth Cen-
tury, page 112.
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of his own political preferences. The supporting particular
proposition is that the judge did have relevant political
preferences.47 The general principle in the background,
too obvious to be worth stating, is that political conduct
is often to be explained by individual preferences rather
than by high-minded devotion to fair play. This principle
provides a non-deductive relationship from the claim that a
specified person had political preferences to the claim that
his preferences led him to attempt to influence an election.
Non-deductive relationships could also indicate some prob-
able consequences of a claim that was under consideration.
If those consequences were found not to hold, researchers
should at least doubt the claim, although they would not
have decisive grounds to reject it. The stronger the non-
deductive relationships in question, the greater the doubt
that should be cast on the claim.
An example of work of this nature is provided by Henry
Farrell’s review of some variations in business behaviour,
with his drawing different consequences from a claim
that the explanation lay largely in political cultures and
from a claim that it lay largely in institutions, and then
coming down in favour of an institutional explanation
by considering the evidence. The relevant relationships
between claims and their consequences for what evidence
should be found are not deductive. They are expressed
using phrases like “we are likely to see”, “would lead one to
predict”, and “one would expect”.48
47 Bensel does not provide direct evidence that the judge in
question was partisan, but is confident that he was. We can extract
the message we need by assuming that direct evidence could have been
supplied.
48 Farrell, The Political Economy of Trust: Institutions, Interests,
and Inter-Firm Cooperation in Italy and Germany, chapter 4. The
quoted phrases come from pages 106-108.
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3.5.2 Relationships and confidence
We shall now consider the effects on our confidence of
the strength of relationships and of the presentation of
arguments that support the existence of relationships.
3.5.2.1 The strength of relationships
When the issue is whether a claim is supported by propos-
itions drawn from the evidence and the discipline’s corpus,
the strength of relationships used in arguments from those
other propositions to the claim is very important. Support
is transmitted perfectly by deductive relationships, but only
imperfectly by weaker relationships. The imperfection rises
with the weakness of the relationship. So if our confidence
is to be increased by awareness that accepted claims are
supported by evidence and by the corpus, we must also
consider whether the relationships that transmit support
are at least reasonably strong.
When the issue is whether the consequences of a claim are
acceptable in the light of the evidence and the discipline’s
corpus, the position is different. It is not essential for
relationships from the claim to its consequences to be
strong. Indeed, it is to a claim’s credit if even the
consequences that only follow from it by virtue of weak
relationships are supported by the evidence and fit with
the corpus.
3.5.2.2 The presentation of arguments
The presentation of arguments that support the existence
of relationships between propositions can affect the signi-
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ficance for our confidence of researchers seeing claims as
ones that are supported by evidence or by the discipline’s
corpus. We shall first consider deductive relationships, and
then move on to non-deductive relationships. Finally, we
shall note the role of diagrams in guiding research.
Deductive relationships
A deductive argument that is put forward to support the
existence of a deductive relationship from the argument’s
premises to its conclusion may be presented as a fully formal
proof, with each line either being an established result
or following from preceding lines in accordance with the
rules of proof. This is the form that may give the greatest
assurance. But it is not usually practical to be so formal.
Briefer proofs, in which some of the connections between
preceding and succeeding lines are obvious to researchers
in the discipline and are not spelt out in full, may be a
little less satisfactory, but they are standardly accepted
even in mathematics, they are the best among the practical
options, and they allow almost as much confidence that
premises and conclusions are indeed related deductively.49
Arguments that use other methods, such as diagrams, which
make it less obvious how to check a deduction mechanically,
are in greater danger of being unsatisfactory.
We should however note that what may be lost as
researchers descend the scale of forms of presentation is not
the security of any deductive relationships between premises
and conclusions that in fact exist. Such relationships are
49 The discussion of the rhetorical structure of mathematics in
Ganesalingam, The Language of Mathematics: A Linguistic and
Philosophical Investigation, section 2.5, does set out the very strong
convention that each sentence should be a logical consequence of what
comes before it (page 32), but that is not the same as requiring the
formality of presentation that textbooks of logic would prescribe.
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perfectly firm, however they are presented. What may be
lost is our confidence that researchers will only identify
relationships as deductive when they really are deductive.
They may be misled into thinking that a diagram or some
similarly informal presentation gives a rigorous proof. The
danger is that a diagram or other informal presentation
may not represent everything that needs to be represented,
or it may not represent its subject matter with complete
accuracy and precision.
We should not say that diagrams and the like can never
establish deductive relationships between premises and
conclusions. It is possible to use diagrams to build logical
systems for which soundness and completeness results are
available, and to give formalized versions of existing dia-
grammatic methods of reasoning.50 There are also cases in
which diagrams have a claim to be parts of official theory.51
Moreover, some types of diagram, such as commutative
diagrams in category theory, keep mathematicians close
enough to the underlying mathematical entities, and do so
in a transparent enough way, that there is little or no reason
to worry. We should however be cautious about diagrams
in general.
This attitude of caution but not exclusion is supported
by some comments in the literature. J. E. Littlewood
thought that there were occasions when a diagram could
be a perfectly adequate proof.52 On the other hand, it is
50 For soundness and completeness results in relation to Venn
diagrams see Shin, The Logical Status of Diagrams, chapters 3 and 4.
For the formalization of diagrams in geometry see Miller, Euclid and
His Twentieth Century Rivals: Diagrams in the Logic of Euclidean
Geometry.
51 Starikova, “Why do Mathematicians Need Different Ways of
Presenting Mathematical Objects? The Case of Cayley Graphs”.
52 His example was a fixed point theorem: Littlewood, Littlewood’s
Miscellany, page 55.
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all too easy to think that a diagram gives an adequate
representation of the objects of study when in fact it
does not do so, for example when unbroken lines on
paper are mistakenly treated as adequately representing all
continuous functions for the purposes of proofs in analysis.53
Finally, while Brendan Larvor has argued that we should
see diagrams as tools to do things which may differ from
the things that the sequential expression of propositions set
out in mathematical symbols can do, rather than as second-
class substitutes for sequences of propositions, it is not at
all clear that his line of argument could be developed to the
point at which diagrammatic proofs of sophisticated results
could be regarded as acceptable alternatives to sequences
of propositions.54
We may conclude that it is possible for arguments to
be presented in ways that will make them appear to be
deductive, leading researchers to take it that there are
deductive relationships between premises and conclusions,
when deductive relationships do not really exist. This may
lead to claims being seen as better-supported than they
really are, so there is a risk that some claims will come
to be accepted when that should not happen. That risk
may affect our confidence adversely. And although we have
conducted our discussion on this point in the context of
mathematics, the risk is not limited to mathematics. It
arises in other disciplines in which diagrams are used in the
course of making arguments that are supposedly deductive
or very nearly so.55
53 Giaquinto, “Epistemology of Visual Thinking in Elementary Real
Analysis”, section 6.
54 Larvor, “What Philosophy of Mathematical Practice Can Teach
Argumentation Theory About Diagrams and Pictures”. Larvor does
not claim that an extension to sophisticated results would be possible,
and he lays down clear conditions for visual argumentation to qualify
as rigorous (in section 13.5).
55 For an example of such use see Shavitt and Bartlett, Many-
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The danger should not however greatly concern us. Re-
searchers have a good sense of when informality may
lead them mistakenly to regard relationships as deductive.
Moreover, if an informal presentation might reasonably be
suspected of being misleading, researchers other than its
author may well criticize it.
Non-deductive relationships
Moving on to non-deductive relationships, there is no direct
analogue of meticulous step-by-step proof, but arguments
that purport to establish relationships between premises
and conclusions can still be set out with more or less
formality. Most notably, visual aids that show how values
of variables fluctuate over time or differ from place to place
are used to move from evidence to conclusions.56
On the one hand, the fact that there is no ideal of a perfect
non-deductive relationship means that although there is
a risk of exaggerating the degree of support for claims
by relying on informal presentations to link evidence and
contents of the corpus to those claims, the size of that
Body Methods in Chemistry and Physics: MBPT and Coupled-Cluster
Theory, chapters 4 onward. We do not suggest that Shavitt and
Bartlett themselves mistakenly regard any non-deductive arguments
as deductive.
56 Examples of papers in which diagrams play conspicuous roles in
establishing conclusions, and not merely in expounding them, abound.
Two examples of recently published papers are Blundell, Crawford
and Jin, “What Can Wages and Employment Tell Us about the UK’s
Productivity Puzzle?”; Silm and Ahas, “The Temporal Variation of
Ethnic Segregation in a City: Evidence from a Mobile Phone Use
Dataset”. There is a survey of the use of visual representations of data
in sociology in Healy and Moody, “Data Visualization in Sociology”.
The authors argue that visual representations are not merely an
optional tool of presentation. They regard their use as central to the
practice of the social sciences (page 124).
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risk is hard to assess. Moreover, it is less clear than with
deductions what might amount to the omission of some
consideration that ought not to be omitted, because in a
web of non-deductive relationships in which considerations
carry a range of weights, instead of being either decisive
or irrelevant, it is easy to argue that some considerations
might as well be omitted despite the fact that they would
carry some small weight.
On the other hand, the fact that relationships are imperfect
anyway means that the risk of going astray through
the use of informal presentations is not a risk of falling
below perfection while still believing that one has attained
perfection. It is a risk of being in a position that is not as
good as one thought, while being aware that claims do not
have perfect support in any case.
Guiding research
There is another role of diagrams that we should consider.
This is their role in guiding research, rather than in making
connections between evidence, the corpus and new claims.57
Since the use of diagrams in this role is a relatively
uncontrolled process, there is a risk that their use may lead
researchers astray, leading them to ask the wrong questions
or to focus on some aspects of the evidence while ignoring
other important aspects. Whether such risks should affect
our confidence will depend on the strictness of the controls
that are imposed when claims are appraised. The stricter
those controls, the more likely it is that any errors will be
discovered.
57 For examples of this role in guiding research see Sheredos,
Burnston, Abrahamsen and Bechtel, “Why Do Biologists Use So
Many Diagrams?”; Wheeldon and Åhlberg, Visualizing Social Science






In this chapter we shall consider the significance for our
confidence of there being pervasive claims that constrain
the making of other claims.
Constraints can affect our confidence favourably, because
they make the test that new claims should fit in with the
existing corpus of the relevant discipline a demanding one.
Then incorrect claims may very well fail the test, although
it is also possible for correct claims to fail it if there are
incorrect claims in the corpus. Pervasive claims can also
have a favourable effect on our confidence even when they
do not impose particularly severe constraints. The use of
pervasive claims in several contexts means that they are
likely to have been well-tested, so that their use in any
one context can lend some support to other claims that are
wholly or partly derived from them. Even if claims are not
derived from pervasive claims, they may gain some support
from the fact that they comport well with pervasive claims.
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We shall start by making some general remarks about
pervasive claims. These remarks will occupy the rest of
this section. Then we shall consider different disciplines in
turn, before ending the chapter with a note on types of
quantification.
4.1.1 The identification of pervasive claims
We introduced pervasive claims in section 1.4.2. We shall
now recapitulate and elaborate on what we said there.
Pervasive claims are claims within the corpus of a discipline
that impose significant constraints on what other claims
may be made, across the discipline. (As usual, the discipline
in question may be a sub-discipline of a larger discipline.)
They may do so most easily by transmitting their influence
through deductive relationships between propositions, but
they can also transmit their influence through weaker rela-
tionships. We gave the following examples in section 1.4.2:
∙ mathematical axioms;
∙ claims implicitly made by mathematical definitions,
that entities of certain types have certain properties;
∙ physical laws of wide application, such as the principle
of stationary action and the laws of thermodynamics;
∙ in biochemistry, the claim that proteins are made up
of amino acid residues;
∙ in economics, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
theorem (although economists disagree about how




Pervasive claims may sit at the foundations of systems of
claims, like axioms. But there is no requirement that they
should occupy foundational positions.
We should not expect agreement on exactly which claims
should count as pervasive. Claims are more or less pervasive.
The constraints they impose may be more or less severe.
And a claim may be pervasive within a small sub-discipline
but not within a larger discipline that encompasses it.
Nonetheless, the general idea should be clear enough.
One indicator that a claim is pervasive within a discipline
is that if the claim were not accepted, but not generally
denied either, a substantial difference would be made to
the content of the discipline. There might for example be
many other claims that could no longer be seen as enjoying
adequate support, so that they could not properly have
come to be accepted. Another indicator is that if the claim
were generally denied, so that the contradictory claim were
accepted, that too would make a substantial difference to
the content of the discipline.
The latter indicator would identify more claims as pervasive
than the former one. If a claim were neither accepted nor
generally denied, other claims might still enjoy enough
support from other sources to make assent to them
legitimate. But the denial of a claim might very well require
changes to many other claims.
We cannot however rely solely on the latter indicator.
There are disciplines in which many claims are knit tightly
together by deductive relationships – mathematics being
the obvious example. In such a discipline, a change from a
claim to its contradictory could have very widespread effects
through the operation of modus tollens, even if the claim
were a minor one. So reliance on the latter indicator would
make too many claims pervasive. We must also bear in mind
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that the indicators are only indicators. They do not give the
full content of the concept of a pervasive claim.
4.1.2 The status of pervasive claims
It is not always clear how to justify pervasive claims,
especially not the most fundamental ones. If they need to be
accepted in order for other claims to have adequate support,
then the pervasive claims cannot themselves derive enough
independent support from those other claims. And there
may or may not be support available from claims in other
disciplines. (For example, the claim in chemistry that only
exergonic reactions can take place spontaneously without a
supply of energy from outside is supported by the laws of
thermodynamics, which belong to physics.)
Fortunately, uncritical assent even to the most fundamental
pervasive claims of a discipline is not required. They may
need to be accepted in order for the discipline to have its
form and general content, but researchers could still debate
whether they should assent to given pervasive claims.
(Actual debates are rare. We only argue that accepted
pervasive claims can be challenged.)
The price of such a debate would be that researchers would
at the same time have to debate the form and general
content of their discipline. But this price would help to
make debate over the claims worthwhile. If researchers
tentatively assented to pervasive claims on the basis of
some evidential support, and then found that the claims
were very fertile, allowing researchers to make connections
between accounts of different topics or to advance their
discipline, then the researchers could reasonably assent to
the claims. If pervasive claims were to be challenged, they
might be justified not, or not only, by looking down to
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foundations beneath them, by empirical evidence that bore
directly on their correctness or by appeal to any supposed
self-evidence (a notion of doubtful worth in this context,
given that some of the best theories are starkly at variance
with the intuitions of those who have not already been
acculturated to the relevant disciplines), but by looking up
to what could be built on them.1
4.1.3 Concepts and pervasive claims
As we saw in section 3.4.2, concepts can have more or
less determinate content. The lower we go down the scale
of disciplines, the more extensive the use of ways to give
content that tend to make it determinate. This matters in
relation to pervasive claims.
1 This is not to say that looking up is always the best approach. It
corresponds to the extrinsic justification that is standardly contrasted
with intrinsic justification based on self-evidence: Maddy, Defending
the Axioms: On the Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory, page 47.
As Maddy sets out in her context of the axioms of set theory, extrinsic
justification is not without difficulties and inadequacies that are quite
enough to keep intrinsic justification in play (chapter 5, sections 3 and
4). And there is no reason to think that a move to category-theoretic
foundations would change this. (Maddy makes a brief comment on
category theory on page 34, footnote 68. For the role of category
theory in providing foundations see Lawvere and Rosebrugh, Sets for
Mathematics.)
For a discussion of the relationship between the self-evidence of
axioms and an appreciation of what can be done with them see
Shapiro, “We Hold These Truths To Be Self-Evident: But What Do
We Mean By That?”.
Finally, the fact that the references in this note have been to axioms
of mathematics, which happen to be the most obvious pervasive
claims, should not obscure the facts that there are pervasive claims in
other disciplines too and that the question of how to justify them is
a serious one.
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Determinacy of content allows claims to be stable across
contexts. If a content is determinate, researchers can be
sure that there is no ambiguity of content that could lead
to concepts having different contents on different occasions
of use. Claims that make use of concepts with determinate
contents can therefore be regarded as the same claims in
different contexts, and in particular in different parts of a
discipline. If the contents of concepts are indeterminate,
that benefit may be lost. It will then become doubtful
whether claims that appear to be pervasive really are
pervasive claims, or are merely members of sets of closely
related claims.
This matters when we seek to rely on relationships of sup-
port or good fit, rather than constraint, between pervasive
claims and other claims, in order to increase our confidence
in those other claims. If a claim is directly supported
by a pervasive claim, or even if it merely comports well
with a pervasive claim, that will be reassuring because the
pervasive claim will have been tested in several different
contexts. But this benefit can only accrue if it is the same
pervasive claim that has been tested in different contexts.
If subtly different claims have been tested, the apparently
pervasive claim will not have built up a single large balance
of credibility. Instead, different claims will have built up
separate balances. So indeterminacy of content, as a source
of uncertainty about whether an apparently pervasive claim
really is a single claim in all contexts, may diminish the
extent to which apparently pervasive claims can increase
our confidence in such ways.
We should not suppose that indeterminacy of content
always has this consequence. It only presents a risk that
apparently pervasive claims are not the same claims in
all contexts. They might in fact be stable across contexts.
Moreover, variants of a claim might be similar enough to
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make it proper to regard the variants as versions of a single
pervasive claim, so that much of the credibility that each
variant acquired from its use in its own context would
accrue to all variants. That would help all of the variants
to support other claims.
The point does of course apply to the use of non-pervasive
claims too. If a claim substantiated in one context is used to
support another claim in a different context, it is important
to ensure that the former claim is the same claim in both
contexts. But the point is particularly likely to be significant
in relation to pervasive claims.
4.2 Mathematics
Mathematics has special features. We shall now explore
two closely related features: deductive relationships reign
supreme, and pervasive claims tightly constrain the making
of other claims through the medium of large-scale deductive
structures. We shall go on to consider the significance of
these features for our confidence. Finally we shall consider
the relationship of mathematics to the actual world, and
the consequent safety of mathematical claims from the
contingencies of the actual world.
4.2.1 Deductive relationships
The ready availability of deductive relationships in math-
ematics means that it is perfectly possible to require
claims to enjoy deductive support, without limiting the
discipline. And the norms of mathematics do indeed require
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that arguments proceed by way of deduction.2 This is so
even when mathematicians derive claims that are about
probabilities, or claims that almost all (but not quite all)
objects of some type have some property.3
Mathematicians do not continually refer back to axioms in
order to set out proofs with the degree of formality that a
textbook of logic would prescribe.4 But we can still think in
terms of a great structure of results that is founded on a few
axioms, even if we cannot expect absolutely everything to
be captured by such a structure. And reverse mathematics,
the project of establishing the minimal starting points for
various parts of mathematics, shows us that there is scope
to specify minimal foundations with some precision.5
2 This is subject to the qualification that, as we noted in
section 1.5.2, there are some mathematicians who argue that there
is a place for work that does not present rigorous deductions:
Jaffe and Quinn, “‘Theoretical Mathematics’: Toward a Cultural
Synthesis of Mathematics and Theoretical Physics”. But this is on
the understanding that any lack of rigour should be signalled.
3 An example of a claim about probabilities is the claim that
if a random variable is normally distributed, the probability of its
taking a value within one standard deviation either side of the mean
is approximately 0.683. An example of a claim that almost all objects
of a certain type have some property is the claim that almost all graphs
constructed in a certain way are isomorphic to the Rado graph. The
construction is to start with a countably infinite number of nodes and
then draw edges at random, with a fixed probability that is neither 0
nor 1 of an edge being drawn between any given pair of nodes.
4 This can be verified by reading published papers.
5 For an outline of reverse mathematics see Simpson, Subsystems
of Second Order Arithmetic, section 1.9. We must acknowledge that
reverse mathematics as generally practised works with subsystems of
second-order arithmetic, rather than building everything on the single
foundation of set theory, and that this limits its scope to certain
parts of mathematics. The current practice of reverse mathematics
therefore does not in itself show that everything within the scope of
mathematics at some given time could be built up from a base that had
a determinable minimum size, but only that this would be a reasonable
aspiration (subject to agreement that mathematicians could regard
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Such a structure of results would be held together by long
chains of deduction that led up from the foundations. It
would be the ultimate deductive structure. But we also
find that however we arrange mathematical results in a
structure, there are more chains than those that run up from
foundations to particular results. There are also deductive
chains that criss-cross between parts of the structure, and
that come to the fore when such links are used to establish
significant results. The most famous example is perhaps the
connection between elliptic curves and modular forms that
Andrew Wiles used to prove Fermat’s Last Theorem.6
The abundance of deductive relationships makes it easy
for there to be pervasive claims that tightly constrain
the making of other claims, sometimes across the whole
discipline and sometimes in particular sub-disciplines. Some
pervasive claims are made explicitly, and take the form of
axioms for particular fields of mathematics. But many of
them are made implicitly, by defining entities in particular
ways. For example, once different types of group have
everything as built up even if they had not eliminated negation
incompleteness). Having said that, the preference for subsystems of
second-order arithmetic is motivated not by a desire to leave some
work undone, but by the specific nature of the project as it is currently
conceived. The aim is to show which additions to a foundation for a
part of mathematics would allow the development of which additional
parts of mathematics. Set theory is rather too expressive to allow fine
discriminations between the different requirements of different parts
of mathematics.
We must also acknowledge the existence of reasons to doubt
the philosophical credibility of a vision of mathematics as built
up entirely from set theory. Reasons for doubt are set out in
Ganesalingam, The Language of Mathematics: A Linguistic and
Philosophical Investigation, chapter 7.
6 An outline is given in Kleiner, “From Fermat to Wiles: Fermat’s
Last Theorem Becomes a Theorem”. The paper makes the point about
links between different parts of mathematics in section 8, on pages 30
and 31.
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been defined, a great many results about groups of those
types follow. As with axioms, definitions can very often
be justified by the scope they give to establish useful and
interesting results.7
4.2.2 Consequences for our confidence
The ready availability of deductive relationships, the
consequent scope to conduct mathematics under a norm
that arguments must be deductive, and the scope for there
to be large-scale deductive structures that enable pervasive
claims to impose very severe constraints on the making of
other claims, even when those other claims are far distant
from the pervasive claims, can all have favourable effects
on our confidence. We shall now review some of the ways
in which favourable effects may arise.
7 For a discussion of ways in which definitions can be justified see
Werndl, “The Formulation and Justification of Mathematical Defini-
tions Illustrated By Deterministic Chaos”. The proposal we make, that
they are justified by their mathematical fertility, has something in
common with what Werndl calls natural-world-justification, although
our concern is with a definition’s use in developing mathematics
in itself rather than with understanding the physical world. To the
extent that definitions are introduced when the scope to develop an
area of mathematics has already been foreseen, our proposal also
has much in common with what Werndl calls condition-justification,
the use of definitions to capture conditions that are recognized as
mathematically valuable.
There are further discussions to be had about the distinction
between natural and gerrymandered mathematical entities, and about
conclusions as to objectivity that one might draw: Tappenden,
“Mathematical Concepts and Definitions”; Tappenden, “Mathemat-
ical Concepts: Fruitfulness and Naturalness”.
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4.2.2.1 Decisions on whether to assent to claims
One consequence of the fact that deductions are expected
in mathematics is that when a new claim is offered, it is
perfectly clear how mathematicians should appraise it. If it
is a purported theorem, mathematicians can check whether
its proof is acceptable. If it is a claim that some sequence
of formulae constitutes a new proof of some established
result, they can check that sequence. Occasionally they
may come across something that is too radical to be dealt
with by reference to existing theorems or standards of
proof, but that is very rare. Most of the time, there is
no scope for argument over whether to assent to a claim
(although proofs can be long and complex, so it may take a
while before a verdict is reached). This, together with the
fact that the accepted standards have been so successful,
should give us confidence that it is very unlikely that the
generality of mathematicians with the appropriate expertise
would assent to incorrect claims. (It is worth noting that in
mathematics, just as in other disciplines, there is work that
is very specialized. It may be that a claim comes to be
accepted when most of the mathematicians in the relevant
area explicitly assent to it, and most other mathematicians
simply take it that the specialists are competent to make
that decision.)
The ready availability of deductive relationships can also
increase our confidence in another way. That availability
means that any particular claim is likely to have several
consequences. It will have its place in a deductive structure
that surrounds it. If the claim were incorrect, there would
be a reasonable prospect that some such consequence would
also be incorrect and that this would be detected, even if
the incorrectness of the claim were not detected directly.
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This is not to say that mathematicians always avoid
mistakes. Mistakes have been made, and some have gone
undetected for a considerable time.8 It is therefore likely
that some incorrect claims still lurk undetected in the
corpus. But so far as we can tell, incorrect claims form only
a small proportion of the claims that come to be accepted.
4.2.2.2 Precise definitions
Mathematicians give definitions of terms that are both
precise and comprehensive. The definitions convey un-
ambiguous information about the entities to which the
terms refer, and they convey all the information there
is to be had about those entities (apart from deductive
consequences that may or may not have been established
yet). The contents of the corresponding concepts are
therefore fully determinate. The existing corpus gives
considerable assistance in the formulation of definitions
that meet this high standard. Many properties, such as the
properties of continuity and of being a lattice, are already
defined precisely, and these resources can be used when
formulating new definitions. And the fact that deduction is
the norm makes it comparatively easy to formulate precise
and comprehensive definitions, because this fact makes it
clear what must be covered by a definition of a term. The
definition must include enough to ensure that it will always
be clear what can be deduced when the term is used, and
it must not include anything else.
This does not mean that existing definitions are always
perfect. The original definitions on which calculus relied
were not at all rigorous, and they were not replaced by
8 See for example Grünbaum, “An Enduring Error”.
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rigorous definitions until the nineteenth century.9 But such
inadequacies are likely to be eliminated in due course.
The facts that precise definitions are the norm and that the
resources of the existing corpus are exploited mean that it
is easier than it would otherwise be to appraise new claims.
Mathematicians are well aware of what they are appraising,
and it is easy to bring the existing corpus to bear when
making appraisals. This should increase our confidence.
4.2.2.3 Lack of choice
Once mathematicians have formulated appropriate axioms
and definitions for an area of mathematics, they typically
find that they have no choice as to what claims to make.
They ask whether a proposition or its negation holds.
They find that only one can be proven to hold, and
they do not have a choice as to which one. They find
themselves constrained by the pervasive claims that are
made by the axioms and the definitions for the area in
question, and by axioms and definitions for larger regions of
mathematics within which that area sits. As they develop an
area of mathematics, they build up a large-scale deductive
structure into which any new claim must fit.
This lack of choice is beneficial. It gives us confidence that
claims within the mathematical corpus are correct and that
their negations are incorrect. Our confidence is increased
both because the lack of choice is a sign that claims will
only be admitted to the corpus if they fit snugly into it,
and because the lack of choice shows that the personal
preferences of mathematicians cannot influence decisions on
whether to assent to given claims.
9 Lützen, “The Foundation of Analysis in the 19th Century”.
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Sometimes there are choices to be made. Mathematicians
may find that both a proposition and its negation would
individually be consistent with an accepted set of axioms
and with the theory that is built on them. They must then
split the line of development of the relevant area of math-
ematics into two new lines. For example, when geometry
is axiomatized it becomes clear that one can accept the
parallel postulate and develop Euclidean geometry, or reject
it and develop other geometries.
This sort of choice should not however give rise to
any concern. Mathematicians’ personal preferences may
determine which line is explored more thoroughly. But the
need to split a line of development and the precise reason for
that need will have been demonstrated mathematically, so a
decision to make the split cannot be attributed to personal
preference, and the range of sensible ways to make it will
be tightly constrained. Moreover, mathematicians will be
fully aware of the split and the need to reflect its impact
when stating results. For all of these reasons, the occasional
occurrence of choice in the development of some area of
mathematics should not lessen our confidence.
4.2.3 Mathematics and the world
Mathematics is an enormously successful instrument for
understanding the world. It would therefore be easy to think
that mathematics was in some way derived from the world.
That would give rise to a serious concern. We might think
that mathematical claims should not come to be accepted
until they had been tested in the world, and we might
fear that such testing could be inadequate. But in fact, we
should not have that concern. Mathematicians do not need
to subject their claims to empirical tests.
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We shall now set out a conception of the relationship of
mathematics to the world that explains why we should
not have the concern, and why empirical tests are not
needed. We shall start with some notes on the effectiveness
of mathematics. We shall then set out why this effectiveness
is perfectly explicable even if mathematics is not in any
way derived from the world. It is explicable because choices
stand between mathematics and the world. Finally, we shall
note the role of the independence of mathematics from the
nature of the world in supporting our confidence.
4.2.3.1 The effectiveness of mathematics
It is tempting to think that mathematics is in some way
derived from the world because mathematical analyses of
the world are amazingly effective. They help researchers
to model the world and make predictions. The results can
be very impressive indeed.10 The temptation is great even
though there are qualifications of this rosy picture. One
qualification is that not every problem of the sort that
one might expect mathematics to help researchers tackle
is successfully tackled, and that researchers may (perhaps
unconsciously) select the problems that mathematics in
its current state can solve, giving a misleadingly good
impression of the power of mathematics.11 A second
qualification is that simplification may be necessary in order
to make mathematical representation feasible. (We shall
return to this point in section 4.3.2.1.) A third qualification
is that in order to get mathematics to fit the world and
10 The effectiveness of mathematics is most famously discussed
in Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the
Natural Sciences”.
11 For this and other concerns see Abbott, “The Reasonable
Ineffectiveness of Mathematics”.
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allow useful deductions to be made, it may be necessary to
go beyond what rigorous mathematics would allow.12 13
Even though our impression of the power of mathematics
may very well survive consideration of such qualifications,
we should not succumb to the temptation to think that
mathematics is derived from the world. A stage of choice
means we need not think that mathematics need adjust
itself in any way to the world.
4.2.3.2 Choices of parts of mathematics
When researchers wish to use mathematics in disciplines
that give accounts of the world, whether natural sciences
like physics or social sciences like economics, they choose
which parts of mathematics to use. For example, when
studying spacetime, physicists choose mathematical tools
that allow them to incorporate the curvature of spacetime.
Economists may choose certain optimization methods
rather than others. And so on.14 The scope to make choices
helps to explain the effectiveness of mathematics. Research-
ers choose the mathematical tools that are appropriate,
and choose exactly how to use them. Mathematics itself
is rich enough to offer a wide variety of tools from which to
12 Cartier, “Mathemagics (A Tribute to L. Euler and R. Feyn-
man)”, sections 1 and 5, acknowledges that work in physics is
sometimes less than fully rigorous.
13 For arguments that could lead to fairly heavy qualification of the
rosy picture as a whole see Davey, Problems in Applying Mathematics:
On the Inferential and Representational Limits of Mathematics in
Physics.
14 A conception of the process of choice along these lines appears
in Hamming, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics”, page
89. The conception is also noted in Maddy, Defending the Axioms: On




The stage of choice insulates mathematics from the world.
It saves mathematics from being enslaved to contingencies.
Mathematics can develop in its own way, regardless of the
nature of the world. If some part of mathematics does not
appear to reflect the nature of some aspect of the world,
that does not create any pressure to change that part of
mathematics. It creates pressure to select or develop a more
appropriate part of mathematics to model that aspect of the
world.
There may be occasions on which the only way to develop
some appropriate mathematical tools is to do something
radical. One example of an area in which radical approaches
have been proposed is that of quantum mechanics. There
is a case for adopting a logic that differs from the logics
used in most other contexts.16 But there is no reason why
such radical moves should affect our confidence adversely.
Indeed, they are particularly likely to attract critical
scrutiny within the relevant research communities.
4.2.3.3 Mathematics as a free-standing activity
We have proposed a reconciliation of the effectiveness
of mathematics in the world with the independence of
15 An account of the ability of mathematics to provide appropriate
tools to describe and analyse all manner of physical situations, and
an explanation of the origin of that ability in the freedom that
mathematics has had to develop unconstrained by any requirement
to represent the world, are set out in Dieks, “The Flexibility of
Mathematics”.
16 For a discussion of how odd quantum logics can be, and a
conclusion that they are not so different from ordinary logics that
they cannot be called logics, see Pavic̆ić and Megill, “Is Quantum
Logic a Logic?”.
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mathematics from the nature of the world, a reconciliation
that relies on identifying a stage of choice. But we can go
further. The independence of mathematics facilitates the
construction of a discipline with characteristics that allow
us to have an especially high level of confidence in accepted
claims.
We have already noted the characteristics in question. They
are reliance on deductive relationships between proposi-
tions, and the use of precise and comprehensive definitions.
If mathematics were beholden to the world, it would
be hard for mathematicians to identify relationships that
they could be confident were deductive. The world has a
habit of confronting researchers with exceptions to rules. It
would also be hard to formulate precise and comprehensive
definitions of terms, because mathematicians would have to
make an effort to make the boundaries of the extensions of
concepts match boundaries that were to be found in the
messy and imperfectly grasped world. The independence
of mathematics means that such constraints do not apply
to mathematics in itself, although they may be sources of
considerable difficulty when the task is to determine how to
describe some aspect of the world in mathematical terms.
We should however note a special way in which there can
be contact between mathematics and some entities that
are neither physical nor creatures of axioms. We must
distinguish between axioms that characterize freely inven-
ted entities and axioms that attempt to characterize some
entities, like the natural numbers, which are independently
grasped.17 The distinction is significant for our purposes
17 Easwaran, “The Role of Axioms in Mathematics”, section 1. For
the related distinction between algebraic (definitional) and assertory
views of axioms see Shapiro, “We Hold These Truths To Be Self-
Evident: But What Do We Mean By That?”, pages 175-177. There
is another category to note, which Solomon Feferman identifies as
foundational axioms: “Why the Programs for New Axioms Need to
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because it draws attention to the possibility that there
should be some independently grasped entities, and some
axioms that were supposed to characterize those entities
but that turned out not to do so perfectly. At that point,
mathematicians would have a choice. They could change the
axioms, they could keep the axioms unchanged and regard
them as characterizing some other entities, or they could do
both of these and thereby identify two lines of development
that could be pursued in parallel. It is important that they
would have this choice. Even when axioms are designed to
characterize independently grasped entities, the pursuit of
the mathematics that is founded on those axioms is not
beholden to how those entities should turn out to be. In
this way mathematics could avoid being constrained, even
if a Platonist view of mathematical objects were correct. It
does not however follow that all ways in which this freedom
might be exercised in a given case would be useful. Some
paths of development might be unproductive. The same
is true of the more general freedom that comes from the
insulation of mathematics from the world.
We have not by any means given a full explanation of
the effectiveness of mathematics, nor have we drawn any
ontological conclusions from its effectiveness. We have
mentioned Platonism, but we take no position on whether
it is correct. Our confidence in accepted mathematical
claims can be very high whether or not Platonism is
correct. It might be higher if Platonism were incorrect,
because we would then have no fear that mathematicians
be Questioned”, page 403. These are axioms that apply right across
mathematics. The examples Feferman gives are axioms for numbers,
sets and functions. While axioms for these entities do look like
characterizations of entities that are independently grasped, it could
be debated whether the characterization of independently grasped and
ubiquitous entities was the only route to axioms’ having universal
application. While Easwaran refers to Feferman and borrows the name
“foundational axioms”, he does not explore that particular debate.
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were misperceiving independent mathematical objects, but
since the philosophical question remains an open one, and
since the precise form that any correct Platonism would
take is undetermined, it would not currently be fruitful
to bring a discussion of Platonism into a consideration
of our main question. Having said that, our emphasis on
the creative freedom that mathematicians enjoy requires
us to acknowledge that there is a substantive question as
to whether one metaphysic is as good as another as a
background to that freedom. Julian Cole has expressed the
view that it is not.18
4.3 The natural sciences
When we move on from mathematics to the natural
sciences, we find that there is dramatically less scope than
in mathematics to identify deductive relationships that
could be used to derive large parts of disciplines from
foundations alone. The fundamental reason is that contact
with the physical world is built into the natural sciences.
The contents of disciplines must be appropriate to the
world, and observations can falsify theories. The stage of
choice that saves mathematics from having to correspond
to the world is no longer available.
We shall first expand a little on the notion of the need for
claims within the natural sciences to be appropriate to the
world. We shall then set out consequences for the nature of
the natural sciences. Then we shall set out implications for
our confidence.
18 Cole, “Creativity, Freedom, and Authority: A New Perspective
on the Metaphysics of Mathematics”. Cole sets out the problem in
section 1, and his proposed solution in sections 4 and 5.
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4.3.1 Appropriateness to the world
Mathematicians can choose to develop their discipline in
whatever ways they like. They are free to identify new
entities, and to assign properties to those entities as they
wish. They then see what can be deduced about the entities.
In the natural sciences, the concepts used and the claims
made must be appropriate to the world. Researchers cannot
simply choose the concepts and the pervasive claims that
will most easily yield large and elaborate structures of
results, and then deduce whatever results they can. Their
concepts must be ones that help to marshal and make sense
of the data that the world offers. Researchers must therefore
pick concepts that will capture the salient features of the
world. Their choice of concepts may itself affect the salience
of features, but only to a limited extent. It is not permissible
to impose an arbitrary theory and then use it to force
researchers to view the world in a way that would make
the theory appear to work.
The need for claims to be appropriate to the world is
reflected in the fact that even when researchers have
found an elegant and strongly supported mathematical
representation of some phenomenon, they must not simply
assent to the consequences that they can draw out purely
through mathematical manipulation. The representation
might have failed to take account of some factors that would
influence outcomes in the world, or there might be some
other way in which it was not quite as good as it would
appear to be. Researchers should therefore see whether the
consequences that follow from mathematical manipulation
do in fact arise. They thereby test the adequacy of their
mathematical representations to the world.
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The requirement to be appropriate to the world can be a
very strict constraint (subject to whatever scope there may
be for data to leave theories underdetermined, a topic that
we shall discuss in section 6.1.1.2). A theory can exploit
deductive or near-deductive relationships between proposi-
tions to make very specific and quantified predictions, and
if the world does not fulfil those predictions the theory must
be changed. The corresponding benefit is that if a theory
makes predictions and the world does fulfil them, that can
give considerable confidence in the theory.
4.3.2 Consequences
We shall now consider some consequences of the need for
theories to be appropriate to the world. The consequences
we note here centre on the complexity of the world. Theories
must either take account of this complexity directly, or
adapt themselves in order to allow scientists to represent the
world while ignoring some of the complexity. Adaptation is
required as soon as we move any great distance away from
fundamental physics. Simplification is the most obvious
adaptation, and it may require us to re-think the picture of
scientists as simply testing theories by taking observations.
The complexity itself makes it impossible to see natural
sciences that are at some distance from fundamental physics
as built up deductively from fundamental physics. The fact
that simplification is necessary means that in many natural
sciences, exceptionless laws are not available, and that
makes it hard to build up extensive deductive structures.
Lastly, as we go up the scale, we see the adaptation of
bringing high-level concepts into use. The use of those
concepts increases the difficulty of establishing deductive
relationships. One result of all of these consequences is
that deductive structures that would span large parts of
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disciplines are not to be expected. There is correspondingly
little scope for pervasive claims to impose the severest
constraints on the making of claims across large parts of
disciplines.
4.3.2.1 The complexity of the world
The complexity of the world means that simplifications
must be made. For example, computations of how fluids
will flow are normally only practical if a fluid is treated as
a continuum rather than as made up of discrete molecules.
(Even then, computations are very difficult.) Then the
claims that theories make about what should happen in
specific cases are not the claims that would be deduced from
fundamental theories of physics, which would recognize the
existence of the molecules. A theoretical background is by
no means irrelevant at this point. It can tell physicists
that given the sizes of the molecules, the simplification of
assuming a continuum can be a perfectly reasonable one.
It can also indicate when such simplifications are likely to
mislead so that more sophisticated methods are needed, at
the cost of requiring greater computational power.19
We may take another example from biochemistry. The
reactions that take place reflect the basic rules that govern
how atoms and molecules interact, and those rules can be
understood in terms of fundamental physics. But modelling
cannot in practice start from such a fundamental level,
and even when biochemists start at a much higher level,
19 Wijesinghe and Hadjiconstantinou, “Discussion of Hybrid
Atomistic-Continuum Methods for Multiscale Hydrodynamics”, illus-
trates how the merits of different ways to make computations can
be assessed, and how different methods can be combined when that
gives the best compromise between exactitude and computational
practicality.
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simplified models are routinely used. Having said that,
we find that as with fluid flow, a theoretical background
can give an understanding of the extent to which certain
simplifications are acceptable, and of the reasons why they
should be acceptable to that extent but no further.20
One consequence of the need to find ways to make the
conduct of science practical in the face of the complexity
of the world is that doubt is cast on a simple picture of
scientific procedure as the testing of theories by working out
their observational consequences, performing experiments,
and comparing the actual observations with the predicted
ones. Jody Azzouni has argued that the amount of juggling
with simplifications, mathematical shortcuts and the design
of experiments that has to go on in order to make
science practical invalidates that picture.21 Agreement with
Azzouni’s view would reduce our confidence a little bit,
because the juggling might let a claim’s conflict with
evidence go undetected. On the other hand we should note
that testing need not proceed simply by taking each claim
in turn, working out an observational consequence, and
performing an experiment. It is perfectly possible to use a
battery of tests to work on a collection of hypotheses and to
use the results of early tests to improve subsequent rounds
of testing, thereby reducing the rate of error.22
A consequence of the complexity that requires acts of
simplification is that it is impractical to work out, from
the foundations provided by the fundamental theory that
physics supplies, exactly what would happen in particular
circumstances. The problem is not that fundamental theory
20 Chen, Niepel and Sorger, “Classic and Contemporary Ap-
proaches to Modeling Biochemical Reactions”.
21 Azzouni, Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science, part 1,
sections 2 and 3.
22 Pfeiffer, Rand and Dreber, “Decision-Making in Research Tasks
with Sequential Testing”.
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comprises only general laws, without specific conditions.
Even if the initial conditions were fully specified, it would
still not be practical to apply the general laws directly in
order to work out what would happen. So hypothetical
claims of the form “Given these initial conditions, this will
be the exact outcome” cannot be deduced from fundamental
theory. It might theoretically be possible to deduce such
claims, but our concern is with disciplines as they are or
could be practised.
This does not break all connections with fundamental
theory. As our examples illustrate, fundamental theory can
tell researchers a lot about which simplifications work, why
they work, and their limitations. Claims that form parts of
fundamental theory are still pervasive, setting limits to ways
to proceed and sometimes ruling out certain types of claim
(for example, claims that would violate the conservation of
energy). But their power to constrain other claims is not
as great as it would be if there were scope to deduce exact
claims from fundamental theory.
The upshot is that within a discipline in which it is ne-
cessary to make assumptions that amount to substantially
simplifying particle-by-particle descriptions of the world,
the claims made cannot be seen as built up deductively
from fundamental theory. That route to the construction
of large-scale deductive structures is closed. The conditions
for a discipline to be practised might be deduced from that
theory, but no more than a modest fraction of the content
of the discipline could be deduced in that way.
Disciplines do however have their own foundational laws.
Nothing we have said so far would rule out deducing large
parts of the content of each discipline from its own laws,
yielding in each case a deductive structure that would span
much of the relevant discipline. But there are two significant
193
4 Constraints on Claims
obstacles to doing that. The first obstacle is the difficulty of
establishing exceptionless laws. The second obstacle is the
use of concepts that have indeterminate contents and vague
extensions.
4.3.2.2 The lack of exceptionless laws
In disciplines in which the particle-by-particle detail of the
world is overlooked, whether by the making of simplifica-
tions or in any other way, laws are prone to exceptions. We
set out why exceptions are likely to arise in section 3.4.1.2.
The conclusions of deductions that are made by applying
exception-prone laws are unreliable because the laws, which
act as premises, do not hold universally. Given that the
objective of a natural science is to produce a theory that is
appropriate to the actual world, it becomes inappropriate
to deduce a large proportion of claims by using exception-
prone laws. This would be so whether the deduced claims
were ones that directly specified what would be observed in
given circumstances, or claims at some higher theoretical
level.
It might be thought that this would be too harsh a view.
After all, if a law was only prone to exceptions on, say,
1 per cent of occasions, the deductive consequences of
applying it would only rarely be incorrect. Researchers
could recognize and tolerate a low rate of incorrectness. But
to the extent that claims about what would be observed
in given circumstances could be derived from general laws,
they would often need to be derived not from single laws
but from combinations of several laws.23 The potential
23 This can be seen by looking at scientific papers. It is not unusual
to bring a range of theoretical perspectives to bear at once in order to
explain observations. A recent example is Tsai and Hu, “Theoretical
Analysis on the Kinetic Isotope Effects of Bimolecular Nucleophilic
194
4.3 The natural sciences
for there to be an exception to some member or other
of a combination would be considerably greater than the
potential for there to be an exception to any one specified
member. So deduced claims could easily be too unreliable
for it to be worth making them. They might happen to be
correct even when there was an exception to a member of
the relevant combination, but researchers could not rely on
that. It would therefore be a hazardous enterprise to deduce
the bulk of a discipline from foundational laws.
4.3.2.3 Concepts and deductive relationships
As we saw in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.3, concepts that
suffer from indeterminacy of content and vagueness of
extension become more significant as we go up the scale
of disciplines. These developments make it harder than it
would otherwise be to establish and make use of deductive
relationships, as we set out in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.4.
Large-scale deductive structures, including structures that
would be needed to build up large parts of disciplines
from foundational claims, become correspondingly hard to
establish. The scope for claims to be pervasive, and for
claims that are pervasive to impose severe constraints on
the making of other claims, is therefore reduced.
Substitution (SN2) Reactions and Their Temperature Dependence”,
and in particular section 4. The use of several theoretical perspectives
indicates that if derivations of claims about what would be observed
were to be based on general laws, several laws would need to be used
at once.
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4.3.3 Implications for our confidence
If accepted claims are inevitable consequences of funda-
mental laws or of other pervasive claims that have been
very widely tested, that should increase our confidence in
those claims. Such deduction would be the ultimate form
of constraint imposed by pervasive claims on the making
of other claims. But even in the natural sciences it is not
possible to deduce everything from fundamental laws.
The general influence of pervasive claims is also reduced.
The lack of large-scale deductive structures means that the
perfect transmission of influence that would be provided
by deductive relationships between propositions is mostly
only available over short ranges, while non-deductive
relationships only transmit influence in a way that makes
the constraints imposed become less severe with distance.
It follows that specific pervasive claims will tend not to
constrain the making of claims over wide areas with very
great severity. And as we go up the scale of disciplines,
there will be fewer claims that can qualify as pervasive
at all. These facts will limit any favourable effect on our
confidence.
There is also the concern that theories may not run
headlong into experimental evidence without the blow
being open to being softened by a stage of juggling with
simplifications.
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4.4 The social sciences and the
humanities
4.4.1 Trends as we move up the scale
As we move up the scale of disciplines, deductive relation-
ships between propositions become less and less readily
available, as do relationships that are almost as strong.
It therefore becomes harder for pervasive claims, whether
foundational or not, to impose severe constraints on the
making of other claims. The scope for the influence of
pervasive claims to give us confidence in other claims is
therefore diminished.
This does not mean that relationships between propositions
lose their power to give us confidence. Researchers make
substantial use of non-deductive relationships. A dense
network of such relationships can give us considerable
confidence. But the source of confidence would not be the
constraining role of pervasive claims.
We shall now consider theoretical variants of disciplines, in
which pervasive claims can constrain the making of other
claims, and then the use of frameworks to organize claims.
4.4.2 Theoretical variants of disciplines
There is scope for some disciplines to have theoretical
variants, in which some of the complexities of the world
are ignored. There may then be scope to set out deductive
structures that would allow pervasive claims to impose
severe constraints on the making of other claims.
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Economics provides a leading example. Economists may
make assumptions about flows of information, the flexibility
of firms and markets, and feasible rates of change in the
availability of resources. They may then compute both
equilibria and functions that represent the effects of changes
to natural conditions or government policies.
Such theoretical variants are very useful, even though the
worlds they construct are artificially tidy. They give a
starting point for understanding the world. A variant of
a discipline that does seek to represent some part of the
world as accurately as possible may well be built around
a theoretical variant, and may make extensive use of the
insights that the theoretical variant affords. Behavioural
economics provides an example. This discipline focuses on
the ways in which the behaviour of economic agents differs
from what has traditionally been assumed by economists,
but it can still be seen as built on classical economics.24
When researchers use a theoretical variant as a starting
point in the analysis of the world, they must however
always bear in mind the artificial nature of the theoretical
variant. Our confidence in claims about the world can be
increased by indications that the use of theoretical variants
to represent the world has been subjected to rigorous
scrutiny. The absence of such scrutiny would suggest that
researchers had been too ready to assume that the world
was as tidy as their theoretical models.
24 Baddeley, Behavioural Economics and Finance, pages 8-10. As
Baddeley notes, this is not the only view. There are those who see
behavioural economics as striking out in a new direction.
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4.4.3 The use of frameworks
It is very useful to have a way to organize claims. It helps
researchers to survey the currently accepted claims. It also
makes it easy to select contexts in which to place new
claims, and that is a great help in deciding whether to
assent to them. A context will make clear which parts of
the existing corpus should carry particular weight when
deciding whether to assent to a new claim. Researchers
may therefore wish to impose frameworks, in order to allow
claims to be organized.
In mathematics and the natural sciences, the appropriate
framework is often obvious. Even though, in the natural
sciences, there is a shortage of deductive structures that
span large parts of given disciplines, there are enough
relationships of dependence of parts of disciplines on other
parts to make some frameworks of topics much more natural
than others. But in the social sciences and the humanities,
it is necessary to think harder about choices of frameworks
and the consequences of those choices.
Researchers in a historical discipline may use a chrono-
logical framework, with periods demarcated in ways that
may not have been used at the time but that still help to
organize work. In a non-historical discipline (and indeed in
a historical one too), researchers may use a framework of
recognized topics.
We need to consider the influence of the use of such
frameworks on the making and the appraisal of claims. We
shall consider chronological frameworks and frameworks of
topics separately.
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4.4.3.1 Chronological frameworks
It is perfectly normal in a historical discipline to give a
framework by picking out stretches of time. Some stretches
are defined by little more than dates. These may be
highly imprecise dates, as with the division of European
history into ancient, mediaeval and modern periods. Other
stretches are defined by a combination of dates and
significant events or significant features of a period, as with
the English Restoration period.
A framework may also be given by listing significant
people or events. Musicologists might for example give a
chronology of the most significant composers, and use it
to give a framework within which other composers could
be placed. Art historians might do something similar by
giving a chronology of the most significant developments
in painting, creating a framework within which individual
artists or paintings could be placed.
Chronological frameworks have great psychological appeal.
They marshal events, and thereby help people to keep track
of what happened and when. But we must ask whether their
use may encourage researchers to assent to claims more
readily than they should. Researchers might for example
be led by a framework to see patterns that might have
been seen very differently if the framework had not been
adopted. An example, taken from the history of ancient
Egypt, is the supposed oscillation between kingdoms with
power centralized and intermediate periods with power
decentralized in much the same way each time. The usual
framework of kingdoms and intermediate periods has in the
past encouraged historians to see this pattern, but there are
arguments that the pattern is misleadingly tidy.25
25 Van de Mieroop, A History of Ancient Egypt, page 20.
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Researchers can also misread the past by assuming that
some features of a current framework would have had a
marked influence on how the people being studied would
have perceived their own eras. It is for example natural
for those who study English history to pick out the period
from 1485 to 1603 as the Tudor period. The very name
conjures up images of confident monarchs, fashioning a
powerful government at home and dealing ably with threats
from abroad, particularly since the two monarchs who first
come to mind are Henry VIII and Elizabeth I. But there
are arguments that contemporaries did not see themselves
as living in a distinctively Tudor age to anywhere near
the extent that is seen now. Historians could therefore be
led astray if they were to assume, without a study of the
detailed evidence, that there was some special degree of
loyalty to the ruling family.26
Another risk of a framework is that once the start of a
period is seen as a turning point, developments within
that period may be seen as wholly new, with not enough
attention being paid to antecedents. The notion that 1485
was a date of particular significance again provides a
convenient illustration. Historians can come to believe that
striking political developments in the Tudor period were
wholly new, even when they were not.27
Researchers should always be aware of such risks, but
they do not make a case against the use of frameworks.
Researchers simply need to consider whether frameworks
influence their views of the past, and then make appropriate
additional checks on claims before making or assenting to
them. They might for example ask whether they would
regard a claim as adequately supported if they were to use
26 Davies, “Tudor: What’s in a Name?”, page 36.
27 Bernard, “Law, Justice, and Governance: New Views on Medi-
eval Constitutionalism”, page 332.
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a different framework, in which the main events that were
used to structure the chronology differed from the events
actually used.
4.4.3.2 Frameworks of topics
Use of a framework of topics does not give rise to the
same risks as are associated with use of a chronological
framework. It is not based on stretches of time, so its
structure does not directly lead researchers to see changes.
On the other hand, the use of a framework of topics might
lead researchers to assent to claims when they should not
do so, because the framework might lead them to focus on
too narrow a range of considerations. They might confine
their attention to other work on the same topic when it
would be worth taking a broader view. Fortunately, there
are reasons why we should not be greatly concerned at this
possibility.
One reason is that there is substantial debate among
researchers. Researchers will have different perspectives and
will be aware of detailed work on different ranges of topics.
If something from another topic is relevant, there is a
reasonable prospect that someone will notice and will raise
the point.
Another reason is that topics tend to emerge from the
pursuit of lines of enquiry that turn out to be fruitful. To the
extent that topics emerge from experience of what works,
the field of work of the discipline is automatically carved at
the joints.28 A focus on each such topic is then likely to be
a sensible focus.
28 Plato, Phaedrus, 265e.
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A third reason springs from the paucity of far-reaching
chains of deductive or near-deductive relationships between
propositions in the social sciences and the humanities.
This makes it less likely than it would otherwise be that
information from distant parts of the discipline will have
great relevance to accounts of a given topic. Researchers
need not worry greatly that information about some
apparently unrelated topic might render a claim untenable.
4.5 Types of quantification
Quantified accounts are the norm in the natural sciences.
They may also appear in the social sciences and the
humanities. There is a reasonable correlation between
changes in structural features of disciplines as we go up the
scale and the decreasing significance of quantification. This
is therefore a convenient place to consider different types of
quantification.
Quantification is often thought to be particularly reassur-
ing. If claims are expressed in numerical terms, we expect
them to be open to being tested with great severity. But
we must look more closely. We shall set to one side work
in which numbers are written down but are not analysed in
any way. And among pieces of work that do involve analysis
we shall distinguish two types of quantification, a stronger
and a weaker type.
In the natural sciences, accounts often include equations
that relate the values of different variables. Given the values
of some variables, researchers can work out the values
of others. Equations sometimes combine to give a unified
theory. This is the stronger type of quantification. It may
however be weakened somewhat by any significant role
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for free parameters, which may lead to a suspicion that
the appearance of a unified theory is only achieved by
choosing values for parameters which have no independent
justification.29
The weaker type of quantification, common in the social
sciences and in some types of history but also sometimes
used in the natural sciences, is limited to using moving
averages, correlations, analyses of variance and other
descriptive statistics to establish patterns of change in the
values of variables and relationships between the values
of different variables, without a unified theory’s being
constructed.30
When an account displays the stronger type of quanti-
fication, and in addition the equations form a tightly-
knit set and there is no great dependence on values that
have been assigned to free parameters without independent
justification, the likelihood that researchers will reject
incorrect claims will be higher than it would otherwise be.
Researchers can tell beyond reasonable dispute what to test
and what would count as a claim’s failing a test. They can
also identify and assess the support for claims that may
be provided by the state of the theory as a whole and by
neighbouring theories.
29 Smolin, The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory,
The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next, pages 196-197, makes
this criticism of some forerunners of string theory. Smolin argues that
string theory itself can only avoid the problem by adopting the grim
alternative of allowing a large number of possible solutions. But this
debate is by no means over.
30 An example from the natural sciences is Pingali, Shinbrot,
Hammond and Muzzio, “An Observed Correlation Between Flow and
Electrical Properties of Pharmaceutical Blends”. An example from the
social sciences is Brand and Thomas, “Job Displacement among Single
Mothers: Effects on Children’s Outcomes in Young Adulthood”. An
example from economic history is Temin, “Price Behavior in Ancient
Babylon”.
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It should still be reasonably straightforward to appraise
claims when they are made within accounts that display the
stronger type of quantification but the equations are not so
tightly knit, or there is dubious dependence on values of
free parameters. A loosening of the ties between equations
may limit the scope to appraise claims by reference to
the state of the theory as a whole or by reference to
neighbouring theories, and the assignment of values to free
parameters may reduce the extent to which claims can gain
credibility from their being set within a unified theory or
from empirical confirmation, but these aids to decision-
making will not disappear.
Moving on to the weaker type of quantification, there is no
unified theory and links to neighbouring theories are likely
to be very limited. In the humanities, there may not even be
much in the way of neighbouring theories. Researchers can
still check claims that report data, and claims that report
quantified data are particularly easy to check effectively
because numerical discrepancies are less likely than non-
numerical ones to be obscured by ambiguity. The claims
that can be checked straightforwardly may include reports
of trends and other patterns in data. But there may be
considerable scope to argue about how claims that state





5.1 Explanations and claims
5.1.1 Explanations
Accounts may explain the occurrence of given events, or the
existence of given physical objects, or the specific natures
of those events or objects. Alternatively, they may explain
the occurrence or the nature of all events of some given
types, or the existence or the nature of all objects of some
given types. They may also explain not facts about separate
events or objects within given classes, but statistics that are
computed from facts about sets of events or objects. They
may also explain the occurrence of abstract mathematical
patterns. Finally, they may explain the availability of other
explanations, as when some very general laws explain the
existence of some less general laws. We shall consider
explananda of any of these types to be phenomena in
relation to explanations of them.
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Explanations will typically combine a range of propositions
drawn from the corpus with some pieces of evidence.
For example, a prime minister’s concern at the level of
support for the main opposition party might be put forward
as an explanation of her calling an early general election.
Elements of the corpus might include the propositions that
an electoral win would give another few years in power,
and that politicians are highly motivated to retain power
for as long as they can. Pieces of evidence might include the
results of opinion polls, and economic data which indicated
that some unpopular budgetary measures would have to be
taken within a few months.
To take another example, human action on peatlands might
be put forward as an explanation of a decline in water
quality. Elements of the corpus would include propositions
that set out processes which would lead to oxidation in dry
conditions, so that there would be oxidized peat that might
be flushed into the water supply. Evidence would include
the proposition that human action had involved draining
the peatlands.1
We may abstract a general form from such examples. Some
explanans, J, will explain some explanandum, K.
The explanans will usually be a complex of claims. It will
be important for us to divide the claims in the explanans
into two classes. There are general claims such as laws and
principles, and there are claims of particular fact. We shall
also speak as if the general claims are all made explicit,
even though in practice they are often left unstated.
1 Anderson,“Loss of Ecosystem Services Provided by Peat Bogs in
the UK and Finland”, page 4.
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The explanandum may also be a complex of several claims,
but we shall not need to distinguish between the different
claims within it. We shall therefore treat each explanandum
as a single claim, the conjunction or other truth function of
any separate claims within it.
We shall treat both the explanans and the explanandum
as made up of claims, rather than facts or putative facts.
We shall also speak of the strength of a connection from an
explanans to an explanandum. This will mean the strength
of the connection from the conjunction or other appropriate
truth function of all the claims in the explanans to the
claim in the explanandum. As usual, such connections may
be deductive, they may be almost as strong as deductive
connections, or they may be weaker. And we shall speak of
an explanation’s forging such a connection, meaning that
the giving of it sets out the connection.
The natural sciences are the disciplines in which there is
most scope to draw on laws of nature. That option is not
widely available in the social sciences or the humanities.
But explanations in the social sciences and the humanities
can still have great value. Many examples can be found in
a wide range of disciplines. A couple of examples, chosen
pretty much at random, are explanations by archaeologists
of social changes, and an explanation of John Stuart Mill’s
thought by reference to the peculiar blend of his utilitarian
inheritance, the influence of romanticism and the influence
of Harriet Taylor.2
In this chapter, we shall first make a few remarks about
the types of claim that may come to be accepted when
an explanation is endorsed by researchers. We shall then
2 Cherry, Scarre and Shennan (eds.), Explaining Social Change:




discuss the use of different types of law in explanations that
use laws but do not use principles. (Principles are general
claims that do not qualify as laws.) Then we shall explore
two leading types of explanation, causal explanations and
explanations that use principles. Finally we shall discuss
the availability of explanations of different types in different
disciplines, the notions of Erklären and Verstehen, and some
special types of explanation.
We shall use the word “explanation” instead of the phrase
“explanatory account”, because we shall concentrate on
the explanatory work that accounts do. And we shall
concern ourselves only with explanations of phenomena in
the physical world and the human world, although the
phenomena that may be explained will include abstract
patterns. Mathematics as a discipline in its own right is
different. In that discipline, claims simply follow from one
another and their following is explanation enough, although
there are still questions as to which proofs best show why
theorems are correct.
5.1.2 The endorsement of explanations
The path to claims coming to be accepted that will concern
us in this chapter passes through the endorsement of
explanations. When the generality of researchers endorse
an explanation, two consequences will follow.
The first consequence is that the claim that the account
is indeed an explanation will come to be accepted. Such a
claim will have the form “J explains K”. We shall call this
the claim to explain of the explanation. We shall treat it
as a claim about the explanation, not a claim within the
explanation.
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The second consequence is that claims in the explanans
that play explanatory roles will come to be accepted.
This may not happen to all of the claims that play
explanatory roles, and there may well be other reasons
for researchers to assent to the claims, but at least the
claims that do significant explanatory work must gain the
assent of the generality of researchers, otherwise they could
not endorse the explanation. (We shall regard a claim as
playing an explanatory role if it does something to make an
explanation work, in the sense that if it were omitted and
nothing else were added, the explanation would not be as
good.)
5.1.2.1 Claims to explain
We shall read a claim to explain as a claim that there
really is a suitable connection from the explanans to the
explanandum. A claim to explain is not to be read as a
psychological claim, a claim that readers of the relevant
explanation would find it satisfying.
We shall take it that claims to explain are correct
or incorrect, rather than merely being appropriate or
inappropriate. Our decision to treat them as correct or
incorrect is supported by the fact that claims to explain
are put forward as correct by some researchers and are
rejected as incorrect by others.3 But the sense in which a
claim to explain may be correct is different from the sense
in which other claims may be correct. Other claims are
3 Examples of discussions as to whether particular claims to
explain, or claims to explain within specific fields, are correct, are
Lewellen and Nagel, “The Conditional CAPM Does Not Explain
Asset-Pricing Anomalies”; Kraus, “Transparency and Determinacy in




correct if they portray the world in an appropriate way.
Claims to explain are correct if the relevant explanations
forge suitable connections from explanantia to explananda.
The standard of suitability in a discipline will be heavily
influenced by the conception that researchers have of what
their discipline should achieve, and the content of such a
conception must be found in the consensus of the generality
of researchers. But we also reserve the right to look at a
discipline from the outside, and conclude that its standards
for assenting to claims to explain are unacceptably lax.
One way in which disciplines vary concerns the number of
non-conflicting explanations of the same phenomenon that
may exist without undermining claims to explain that are
made on behalf of any of those explanations. Low down
the scale, there is likely to be a strong preference for a
single explanation of each phenomenon, so that even the
presence of two non-conflicting explanations which differed
in ways that were more than merely presentational would
undermine their claims to explain, or at least the claim
to explain of one of them. Higher up the scale, there
is less likely to be such a strong preference, and more
likely to be a recognition that several explanations may
all have their contributions to make, as we remarked in
section 2.1.2.1. Then it may be perfectly appropriate to
make claims to explain on behalf of several explanations of
the same phenomenon at once.
Any requirement to find a single best explanation in order
to support a claim to explain should be distinguished from
a requirement to find a single best explanation in order to
support claims that play explanatory roles – the kind of
requirement that makes inference to the best explanation
a significant form of argument. We shall now turn to how
claims that play explanatory roles may gain support from
playing those roles.
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5.1.2.2 Claims that play explanatory roles
Claims may gain support from their power to explain
phenomena. An example is the claim that there was
inflation in the early Universe. The claim can be used in
conjunction with other parts of physical theory to explain
some otherwise puzzling features of the Universe.4 Another
example is the claim that there is an efficacious connection
between the occurrence of moderate levels of ecological
disturbance and high levels of biodiversity, a claim that
would serve to explain some instances of biodiversity –
although this claim remains contentious and is arguably
in need of refinement before it can be appraised properly.5
This support for claims on the strength of their playing
explanatory roles depends on a view that incorrect claims
would be unlikely to do anything useful in explanations,
and could even disable explanations. But we need to say
more than that.
There is an important condition for claims to gain support
from their playing explanatory roles. Those explanations of
a given phenomenon in which a claim plays an explanatory
role need to be better than the explanations in which the
claim does not do so, both explanations in which it is
explanatorily idle and explanations in which it does not
feature at all.
We would need a notion of a good explanation, a notion of a
type that would allow us to say that some explanations were
better than others, in order to apply this condition. We shall
defer that topic to section 8.3.1, as part of our discussion
4 Lyth and Liddle, The Primordial Density Perturbation: Cosmo-
logy, Inflation and the Origin of Structure, section 18.2.
5 Roxburgh, Shea and Wilson, “The Intermediate Disturbance
Hypothesis: Patch Dynamics and Mechanisms of Species Coexistence”.
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of the route to explanations that involves a search for good
explanations. For the moment we may work with a general
idea that explanations should be of types that would have
application in other contexts, so that they do not look ad
hoc, and should be well-integrated with the existing corpus.
(Not every commonly cited virtue of explanations is highly
relevant to the quest to support claims by reference to their
explanatory roles. The important thing is that there should
be reason to think that the relevant explanations give
good representations of the world. The virtue of simplicity
is therefore likely to be a secondary one, although not
irrelevant.)
The requirement that some explanations be better than
others is deliberately left vague. At the strict extreme, it
could mean that every explanation of a given phenomenon
in which a claim played an explanatory role would need
to be better than the best of the explanations in which
it did not do so. At the relaxed extreme, it could mean
that explanations in which a claim played an explanatory
role needed to be, on the whole, better than explanations
in which it did not do so. And there would be options in
between.
Which versions of the condition are even worth considering
will depend on the nature of a claim for which support is
sought. A claim of particular fact can easily gain support
from playing explanatory roles in several explanations of the
same phenomenon, as well as in explanations of different
phenomena, so relaxed versions as well as strict versions
might be applied. A general claim may well be able to
play roles in explanations of several different phenomena.
It is less likely to be able to play roles in different
explanations of a single phenomenon, because different
explanations are often made different precisely by their
using different general claims. This is not always so. Some
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general claims may crop up in several explanations of the
same phenomenon. But when a general claim can only
feature in one explanation of a given phenomenon, because
its presence in any explanation would force the explanation
to be the same or very nearly the same as that one, it
may well be that the only version of the condition worth
considering is the strictest one, the one that is embodied
in inference to the best explanation. (We must however
limit ourselves to “may well be” at this point. A general
claim in this position might for example gain more support
from playing explanatory roles in the second or third
best explanations of several phenomena than another, and
perhaps conflicting, general claim would gain from playing
an explanatory role in the best explanation of only one of
the phenomena.)
How strict the condition should be made would depend
on the discipline, with greater strictness likely to be
appropriate lower down the scale. We should also note that
the test is to be applied only in relation to phenomena which
have first been chosen in order to garner support for claims.
A claim does not lose credibility by its not improving the
quality of explanations of other phenomena, unless a claim
is so fundamental that it should, if correct, explain a wide
range of phenomena.
The reason for the condition is this. If explanations that
manage without a claim are just as good as those that make
use of it, it is perfectly possible that an explanation that
manages without the claim correctly portrays the workings
of the world (and perhaps that more than one does so,
if there is room for several complementary explanations).
Then the claim cannot be regarded as supported by its
explanatory role. Of course, even when researchers have
not identified good explanations that make no use of a given
claim, it is possible that there are such explanations not yet
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discovered. This is an aspect of the problem of unconceived
alternatives, to which we shall return in section 8.3.3.1. But
at least so long as the alternatives are unconceived, there
is only a risk that they exist. It may then be reasonable to
regard claims that play explanatory roles as supported by
their playing those roles, at least for the time being. If good
alternatives are conceived, such support is not available.
In this chapter, we shall take it that the condition that
explanations in which claims play explanatory roles need to
be better than those in which they do not play such roles is
satisfied. We shall return to the condition in sections 8.3.2,
8.3.3.1 and 8.3.5.3, in the context of the search for good
explanations. At various points in this chapter, we shall set
out some additional conditions for claims to derive support
from their playing explanatory roles.
Denying support to incorrect claims
Suppose that an incorrect claim played an explanatory
role in some explanation. Then there would be another
explanation, available to researchers, from which that claim
was omitted (with or without its contradictory being
included). That alternative might well be just as good,
and quite possibly better. So the condition we have set out
gives some reassurance that incorrect claims will be denied
support. It also gives some reassurance that claims, whether
correct or incorrect, that are irrelevant to explanations
but that happen to be mentioned in them will be denied
support, because the omission of irrelevant claims should
make no difference to the quality of an explanation.
We should however seek more reassurance than this. An
incorrect claim might greatly enhance the apparent quality
of an explanation, by helping to forge a strong connection
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from the explanans to the explanandum. A supposed but
incorrect law of nature could easily do this. And a whole
tissue of incorrect claims could provide an apparently
excellent explanation of some phenomenon. In seeking to
respond to this concern, we must distinguish between
general claims and claims of particular fact.
It would be dangerous to endorse a general claim merely
because it played a role in one explanation or in a few
explanations. On the other hand there are general claims,
such as laws of nature, that are endorsed precisely because
they play roles in explanations of phenomena over and
over again, where those explanations are better than others
which do not use the claims. We can acknowledge that such
success should confer support, while not allowing occasional
success to confer much support.
Turning to claims of particular fact, we may say that if the
general claims in an explanation are well-supported, and
some claim of particular fact allows the explanation to be
given, that claim thereby derives support. The condition
that the general claims need to be well-supported is meant
to guard against a claim of particular fact’s being given
such a useful role because incorrect general claims happen
to allow incorrect claims of particular fact to be used to
complete a picture.
5.2 Explanation using laws
5.2.1 Different types of general claim
Different types of general claim may be used in explanantia.
We shall pick out four significant types: exceptionless laws,
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laws with exceptions, statistical laws and principles. In
sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 we shall discuss the use of
laws of each type in turn, and set out some implications
for our confidence. Our concern here is with explanations
in which all of the general claims in the explanantia are
laws rather than principles. We shall defer the discussion of
explanations that use principles to section 5.4, because the
issues are somewhat different. But to give a taste of what
will come there, principles include general guidance on what
may be expected, such as the principle that concerns about
economic prospects can lead to social unrest. Such pieces of
guidance could not qualify as laws.
When it comes to deciding what should count as a law,
we shall give more weight to the practice of disciplines
than to philosophical considerations about the reliability
of laws and the ability to give theoretical reasons why
they should hold. We shall therefore not engage in disputes
over the lawhood of general claims that some, but not
others, would count as laws.6 We shall indeed be fairly
generous in our concept of a law. We shall not for example
exclude a general claim from being a law merely because it
would not be possible to spell out some conditions deemed
invariant or irrelevant by a ceteris paribus clause, where
those conditions would need to be spelt out as part of the
general claim in order to make it exceptionless.7 Nor shall
we automatically exclude heteronomic regularities.8 And
6 We would not for example have any reason to dispute the view
expressed in Dorato, “Mathematical Biology and the Existence of
Biological Laws”, that various biological claims are perfectly good
laws, even though others, pursuing other arguments, might dispute
that view.
7 Inability to spell out the details of ceteris paribus clauses has
been argued to mean that what appear to be non-strict laws in biology
are not really laws at all: Rosenberg, “How is Biological Explanation
Possible?”, section 2.
8 Compare the arguments in Henderson, Interpretation and
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we need not be concerned that general claims may only
be correct for reasons that are accidental. For example,
we need not look down on general claims that depend
on developments in evolution which might well not have
occurred.9 But it is important that the accidents are in
the past, so that they are no longer open to being undone,
at least not without a course of events that researchers
can be confident is very unlikely to occur. We shall not
count accidental regularities as laws when the regularities
depend on a continuing pattern of accidents that could
easily change, so that the regularities could easily cease to
hold.
We shall also speak of laws as applying even in situations
in which the results are not precisely as the laws would
predict, for example because of disturbing factors that the
laws are perfectly well understood to disregard (such as the
effect of air resistance, disregarded by the normal use of the
law of gravity to compute how long stones dropped near the
surface of the Earth will take to reach the ground). We shall
not equate application with the strict sense of instantiation
that Andreas Hüttemann gives.10
Our division of laws into three classes is rough and ready.
We shall say something about the types of law that would
fall under our three headings as we discuss the different
classes. But we do not need to draw perfectly sharp
boundaries between the classes.
Explanation in the Human Sciences, section 8.3.
9 See the discussion in Lange, “Laws and Theories”.
10 Hüttemann, What’s Wrong With Microphysicalism?, page 18.
For Hüttemann, a law is only instantiated when things happen exactly
as the law says. But as he notes on the same page, failure to be




We do however need a reasonable sense of where to locate
the boundary between laws and principles. Where it is
possible to estimate the proportion of cases in which a
general claim will fail, and that proportion is reasonably
low, the general claim will be a law. But if the proportion
cannot be estimated or is high, we will have a principle.
(The words “reasonably low” may be interpreted by
reference to the attitudes of researchers.) This should give
us a sense of the boundary even though it will leave some
general claims in a grey area, not determining whether they
are laws or principles.
5.2.2 Exceptionless laws
5.2.2.1 The strength of connections
In some explanations in physics and chemistry, the general
claims in the explanantia are all laws that are believed to
be exceptionless. If in addition an explanation is considered
to be good by the standards of the discipline, it is natural
for outsiders to agree that it is good. There are however
several different points to consider.
If the general claims in an explanans are considered to
be exceptionless and researchers regard the explanation
as good, it is unlikely that all of the claims of particular
fact in the explanans could be correct while the claim in
the explanandum was incorrect. It is only unlikely, not
impossible. The laws cited might be incorrect, or they might
have obscure exceptions that had not been noticed. Another
risk is that the claims of particular fact in the explanans
might not quite match the conditions for the laws to apply.
Then it would be possible for both the laws and the claims
of particular fact to be correct, while they did not hang
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together in such a way as to ensure the correctness of the
claim in the explanandum. But leaving such possibilities
aside, we can say that a strong connection will have been
forged from the explanans to the explanandum. This should
increase our confidence in claims to explain made on behalf
of such explanations, because the existence of a strong
connection is an indication (although not a proof) that an
explanation reflects the workings of the world, rather than
tracking some side-effects of those workings. For the same
reason, strong connections should increase our confidence
in claims that do explanatory work. When a claim does
explanatory work and there is reason to think that the
relevant explanation reflects the workings of the world,
those two facts combine to suggest (although not to prove)
that the claim is correct.
We have so far considered how the correctness of all of the
claims in an explanans may suffice for the correctness of
the claim in the explanandum. We should also consider
necessity. What are the prospects for saying that a claim
in an explanandum would only be correct if all of the
claims in the explanans were correct, or alternatively if
all members of some specified subset were correct? (We
assume for the moment that the explanans is a conjunction
of claims. Adjustments could be made to allow for other
truth functions.)
Sufficiency does not guarantee necessity. Even if all of the
general claims in an explanans are exceptionless laws, it is
perfectly possible that the claim in the explanandum would
have been correct while some of the claims in the explanans
were incorrect. We can however say that if the discipline as a
whole is one in which exceptionless laws are the norm, that
should give a reasonable prospect of being able to establish
that the correctness of certain claims in the explanans was
necessary for the correctness of the claim made by the
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explanandum, assuming the correctness of the other claims
in the explanans. It should do so because when features of
the world of the type that a discipline picks out are related
to one another by rigid laws, there is a reasonable prospect
that changes in features mentioned in an explanans would
require changes in features mentioned in an explanandum.
If necessity is established, either for the whole of an
explanans or for selected claims within it, that should be
reassuring. It is, like sufficiency, a sign that an explanation
reflects the workings of the world rather than tracking
some side-effects of those workings. The establishment of
necessity may therefore increase our confidence in claims to
explain. It may also increase our confidence in claims in an
explanans where their correctness appears to be necessary
for the correctness of the claim in the corresponding
explanandum. If their correctness really is necessary and
in addition the claim in the explanandum is correct, then
the claims in the explanans must also be correct.
These benefits of necessity do not depend on necessity’s
showing that a given explanation is the only explanation.
Necessity would not show that, even when combined
with sufficiency, because there might be other ways to
characterize the workings of the world, for example if deeper
laws were identified, or to characterize states of the world
in which all of the claims in the explanans were correct.
But the existence of alternative characterizations would
not put in doubt a claim to explain made on behalf of an
explanation that did not use those alternatives.
There is also a risk that researchers will use laws that are
incorrect, although their incorrectness has not yet been
exposed. But given that our primary concern is with what
confidence we should have in the members of general classes
of claims, rather than with the confidence we may have in
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individual claims, this risk would not debar us from allowing
ourselves a reasonable level of confidence for the time being.
5.2.2.2 Contrastive explanation
An explanation of some phenomenon may show why it
rather than something else occurred. That will make the
explanation contrastive. Alternatively, an explanation may
explain the phenomenon without explaining why it rather
than something else occurred, in which case it will be non-
contrastive.
If all of the general claims in an explanans are exceptionless
laws, the explanation has a reasonable prospect of being
contrastive. In particular, if the correctness of all of the
claims in the explanans would ensure the correctness of the
claim in the explanandum, the explanation is automatically
contrastive because any occurrence inconsistent with the
claim in the explanandum is excluded.
There is reason to think more highly of contrastive
explanations than of non-contrastive ones. If researchers
show why one thing happened rather than another, that
indicates (although it does not demonstrate) that they
have got to grips with the workings of the world. The
indication is stronger than it would have been if they had
only offered a non-contrastive explanation. A given non-
contrastive explanation may happen to be better than a
given contrastive explanation of the same phenomenon, if
for example the non-contrastive one explains more detail or
makes more connections with the existing corpus, but as a
general rule, contrastive explanations are the better type.
The general superiority of contrastive explanations means
that if explanations are contrastive, that fact may in itself
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increase our confidence in the corresponding claims to
explain.
The fact that possession of a contrastive explanation
indicates that researchers have got to grips with the
workings of the world also means that when claims play
explanatory roles, our confidence in those claims may be
increased more by their playing such roles in contrastive
explanations than by their playing such roles in non-
contrastive explanations.
5.2.2.3 Support for general claims
One requirement for confidence in claims to explain, and
in claims of particular fact that play explanatory roles, is
that the general claims in the relevant explanantia should
themselves be well-supported.
Strong support is particularly likely to be available when
the general claims are exceptionless laws. This is because
exceptionless laws are relatively easy to test. If the
conditions in the antecedent of a law can be created, the
result set out by the consequent does not follow, and
possibilities such as experimental error have been ruled out,
the law must be discarded. (On the other hand, conclusive
support for the exceptionless nature of laws is not available,
because there is always the risk that some exception will in
due course be observed.) It can be argued that no law can
be subjected to an absolutely decisive test, because there
may always be some other option than that of discarding
the law. But as we shall note in section 6.1.1.2, there are
reasons to think that such arguments should not trouble us
greatly.
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5.2.2.4 Embedding in theories
Exceptionless laws tend to be relatively easy to embed
in theories, with the elements in each theory knit tightly
together, because the laws set out relationships between
propositions that are deductive or very nearly so.
Explanations that use general claims which are embedded
in theories may well be regarded as more satisfactory than
those that use general claims which are not so embedded.
The reason is this. While the use of general claims that
are not so embedded may answer an immediate question as
to why some phenomenon occurred in given circumstances,
explanation is likely to stop there. If on the other hand
general claims are embedded in a whole theory, researchers
are likely to be able to pursue their enquiries further and ask
why the general claims hold. And the more tightly knit and
wide ranging the theory, the further it is likely to be possible
to pursue explanations. Everyone can recognize this benefit,
not only those who subscribe to a unificationist model of
explanation and who praise tightly-knit and wide-ranging
theories for that reason.11
In a discipline in which embedding in tightly-knit theories
is the norm, a claim to explain can be judged partly by
whether the general claims used can be embedded. If the
11 For that model see Kitcher, “Explanatory Unification and the
Causal Structure of the World”, section 4. The connection between
unification and explanation has however been challenged, for example
in Gijsbers, “Why Unification Is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for
Explanation”, and in Morrison, Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical
Concepts and Mathematical Structures, especially sections 2.5, 4.6,
6.4 and 7.3. It is also important to be aware of the type of unification
that is achieved in any specific case, and whether it implies reduction,
since reduction would look particularly satisfactory. For varieties of




general claims cannot be embedded, that may lead to some
concerns about the claim to explain. It may be feared that
the explanation does not really identify the workings of the
world as they are understood within the relevant discipline.
If on the other hand researchers only assent to claims to
explain when the general claims used can be embedded,
that should increase our confidence in claims to explain. In
disciplines where embedding in tightly-knit theories is not
the norm, it would be unreasonable to subject a claim to
explain to such a test. This does not however mean that
we should lack confidence in claims to explain. Other tests
are available. For example, checks that the concepts used
in the general claims in an explanans are given the same
contents as when they are used elsewhere, without any
subtle modifications, may give reassurance that there has
been no ad hoc adjustment in order to allow an explanation
to be given.
When we turn to general claims to which researchers assent
at least partly because they play explanatory roles, similar
points may be made. In some disciplines, general claims
are expected to be open to being embedded in tightly-knit
theories. A check to see whether claims can be embedded
gives a control over whether researchers should assent to
them. The availability of such a test can increase our
confidence in such claims. But this does not mean we
should lack confidence when the discipline is one in which
embedding is not to be expected, so that the test is not
available. Other checks may be enough to give confidence.
5.2.3 Laws with exceptions
Some laws have exceptions. If exceptions to a law can be
identified they can be listed as conditions under which
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the law does not apply, giving an amended law that
does not have exceptions. But the result of doing so may
be an impractically unwieldy law. There may also be
unpredictable exceptions. We must therefore consider what
to make of explanations in which some of the general claims
in the explanantia are laws with exceptions.
5.2.3.1 The strength of connections
If some of the general claims in an explanans are laws
with exceptions, the explanation will not forge as strong
a connection from the explanans to the explanandum as
it would if all of the general claims were exceptionless
laws. If exceptions occur in circumstances of numerous
types, there is a good prospect that there will be many
ways in which all of the claims in the explanans could be
correct while the claim in the explanandum was incorrect.
If exceptions occur often, there is a good prospect that in a
substantial proportion of actual or hypothetical cases, all of
the claims in the explanans would be correct while the claim
in the explanandum was incorrect. Either shortcoming
would substantially weaken the connection from explanans
to explanandum.
If claims to explain individual occurrences of the phe-
nomenon described in an explanandum gained assent
despite such shortcomings, we would be right to have less
confidence in those claims than we would have had in the
absence of those shortcomings. Having said that, a link
from explanans to explanandum could be strengthened on
a given occasion if the types of circumstance in which the
claims in the explanans could be correct while the claim in
the explanandum was incorrect, the exception-types, were
identified. All that would be needed would be to explain
why the instant case was not an example of an exception-
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type. This could increase confidence in the corresponding
claim to explain on the given occasion, although not more
generally, without any need to improve the quality of the
general claims. Even showing only that the instant case
was not an example of any exception-type, without showing
why, might be enough if exceptions were rare. But an
explanation of why it was not such an example would be
needed if exceptions to the relevant laws were common.
The position is less clear with claims that play explanatory
roles. If a claim was used in a single explanation that
was used to explain several different occurrences of a
phenomenon, that would be a good sign even if the
explanation forged a relatively weak connection from its
explanans to its explanandum. It would also be a good
sign if a claim played explanatory roles in several different
explanations, because the successful use of the claim
in a range of different circumstances would indicate its
correctness. But even then, its correctness would not be
demonstrated.
Finally, connections in the other direction, connections
which would argue that some or all of the claims in an
explanans needed to be correct in order for the claim in
the explanandum to be correct, would not have to be made
harder to establish by the use of laws with exceptions in
the explanans. And such connections could, as outlined in
section 5.2.2.1, increase confidence in claims to explain and
in claims that played explanatory roles.
5.2.3.2 Contrastive explanation
When it is not possible to forge connections that would
make the correctness of all claims in explanantia suffice
for the correctness of the claims in the corresponding
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explananda, explanations cannot be perfectly contrastive
because they cannot show that the claims in the explananda
had to be correct in the circumstances, so that incompatible
claims had to be incorrect. This does not however mean that
the reassurance that can come from the contrastive nature
of explanations would be unavailable. Explanations might
still show it to be very likely that the claims in their ex-
plananda should be correct rather than alternative claims.
That would be some indication that the explanations got
to grips with the workings of the world.
5.2.3.3 Support for general claims
When a general claim has exceptions in a few identifiable
types of circumstance, and the exceptions it has do not
occur often, it should be reasonably easy to subject the
claim to severe tests. All that would be needed would be to
test the general claim several times under each of several
different conditions. But as the types of circumstance and
the frequencies of exceptions increase as we go up the scale
of disciplines, it becomes harder to gain the reassurance
that would come from general claims in explanantia having
been tested severely. Moreover, the reassurance that may
be gained will be limited by the extent to which the types
of circumstance that would give rise to exceptions, and the
frequencies of exceptions, are unknown.
5.2.3.4 Embedding in the corpus
Laws with exceptions are harder to assemble in tightly-knit
theories than exceptionless laws, simply because they do
not set out deductive relationships between antecedents and
consequents. Embedding one such law among exceptionless
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laws might be feasible, but a discipline that makes use
of laws with exceptions typically makes extensive use of
them, so the materials to create tightly-knit theories that
could receive individual laws are not available. But even
when embedding in tightly-knit theories is not possible, laws
with exceptions can still be more or less well-embedded in
the relevant corpus, in the sense that they can have more
or fewer, and stronger or weaker, connections with other
general claims in that corpus.
The instruments of the embedding of general claims in the
relevant corpus are not limited to the direct relationships
between antecedents and consequents that are set out in
laws. Another instrument is the use of relatively thick
concepts, that is, concepts with substantial content. In
physics, a concept like that of electric charge is a thin
one. It means little on its own, and it gets its significance
from its being used in theories. An explanation that merely
cited the electric charge on some body would be hardly
any explanation at all, were it not for those theories. In
physiology, a concept such as that of the basal metabolic
rate is a thick one. Its content allows implicit reference to
an extensive background, so that general claims which use
the concept, such as Kleiber’s law, can be regarded as well-
embedded in the corpus of physiology.12
This kind of embedding in the corpus is not as good a source
of confidence in general claims as embedding in tightly-
knit theories, but it provides some reassurance. Its absence,
12 The way in which content allows contact to be made with an
extensive background is illustrated by Ballesteros, Martínez, Moya
and Luque, “Energy Balance and the Origin of Kleiber’s Law”. The
dangers that may arise from not being able to embed general claims
in tightly-knit theories are illustrated by controversy over the status
of Kleiber’s law: see Hulbert, “A Sceptics View: ‘Kleiber’s Law’ or
the ‘3/4 Rule’ is neither a Law nor a Rule but Rather an Empirical
Approximation”.
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when a general claim seemed to bear little relationship to
the rest of the corpus of the discipline, would certainly be
a cause for concern, casting doubt on the acceptability of
explanations that relied on the general claim in question.
5.2.3.5 Ceteris paribus clauses
Ceteris paribus clauses may be used to secure laws against
exceptions that are unknown, or that are not spelt out
because doing so would render the laws too cumbersome.
Such clauses can be very useful in allowing idealizations
to be constructed. They allow researchers to exclude from
consideration the exceptions that would prevent them
from asserting the existence of deductive relationships or
other strong relationships between propositions. But that
benefit is limited to idealizations. When researchers turn
to the world, they cannot be sure that all other things
will be equal. They have no right to exclude exceptional
circumstances.13
When we consider claims to explain, explanations that use
laws with ceteris paribus clauses have their limitations.
Researchers may be unable to be sure that exceptional
13 The exclusion of exceptional circumstances is not the only thing
that ceteris paribus clauses can do. Building on that function, they can
also play a role in allowing researchers in a given domain to formulate
and use laws that would be parts of an ideal best system of laws if
the ceteris paribus clauses were replaced by detailed specifications
of exceptions. A system of laws with ceteris paribus clauses that
researchers in fact use may then be a reasonable approximation to
an ideal best system: Schrenk, The Metaphysics of Ceteris Paribus
Laws, section 3.3.4. The notion that scientists pursue the best system
in a given domain in the way that the standard best-systems approach
to laws suggests is open to criticism, as for example in Roberts, The
Law-Governed Universe, section 1.3. But we can still see a role for




circumstances which would render some laws inapplicable
do not arise in specific cases. To that extent, they should
hesitate to claim that explanations are good ones in specific
cases. If they do not habitually stop to consider whether
specific cases are ones in which the terms of ceteris paribus
clauses may be violated, the likelihood that incorrect
claims to explain will come to be accepted will be higher
than if they do habitually stop to consider that risk.
Having said that, a claim to explain which only stated
that the explanation usually explained phenomena of the
appropriate general type could be perfectly well-supported.
Such a claim to explain could be supported by reasons
to think that the exceptions to laws which were ruled
out of consideration by ceteris paribus clauses would be
rare. And in specific cases in which researchers were sure
that no relevant law was rendered inapplicable by special
circumstances, the rarity of exceptions could excuse them
from explaining why exceptions had not arisen. (If however
exceptions were reasonably common, researchers would not
be so excused. An explanation of a specific occurrence when
researchers were sure that circumstances did not render any
relevant law inapplicable would then be deficient if it did
not set out why no exception arose in that instance.)
Turning to claims that play explanatory roles, we may say
something similar. When an explanation uses laws with
ceteris paribus clauses, a claim that plays an explanatory
role will only be able to derive support from the apparently
successful use of the explanation on a specific occasion so
long as the explanation as a whole is not rendered idle
by exceptional circumstances. If however there was good
reason to think that such exceptional circumstances were
rare, the claim could derive support from the apparently
successful use of the explanation on many occasions, so that
a good proportion of them would be occasions on which the
explanation was not idle, even if researchers could not tell
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which specific occasions were ones on which the explanation
was not idle.
5.2.3.6 The combination of laws
We should not assume that explanations in which all of the
general claims in the explanantia are laws that are either
exceptionless or close to exceptionless will automatically
forge strong connections from explanantia to explananda.
So we should not simply inspect those general claims,
assume the existence of strong connections, and have the
corresponding confidence in claims to explain.
Explanations may fail to set out strong connections because
when laws are combined, there may not be a single fully
determinate, or close to determinate, resultant law that
would govern concrete situations. Jan Faye has noted that
we should not assume there are higher-order laws that
determine how laws interact.14
Even if there would theoretically be a single determinate
resultant law, it might be prone to exceptions that were of
too many types or too hard to identify for it to be feasible to
catalogue them. This could very well happen if the different
laws involved identified causes and effects of a range of
different types. The scope for variation in a set of facts
of a range of types would be greater than the scope for
variation in the single type of fact with which single laws
often deal. Some odd combination of facts could easily lead
to an outcome that could not have been predicted without
an impractically complex analysis of microphysical detail.
And the risk of this happening would be greater than the
risk of some odd outcome in relation to a single law.
14 Faye, “How Nature Makes Sense”, pages 92-93.
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Some good examples come from engineering, where ma-
chines and other equipment are carefully designed, taking
full account of all relevant laws, but unpredictable failures
still occur because of odd combinations of facts of various
types, such as facts about vibration, temperature and
moisture levels.15 So if some machine did not fail, and the
explanans for that happy fact merely stated that levels of
vibration, temperature, moisture and so on were within the
limits for which the machine had been designed, there would
not be a connection of the greatest possible strength to the
explanandum, the absence of failure. The machine could
have failed despite the correctness of all of the claims in the
explanans. (People do not normally seek explanations when
things do not go wrong, and the example may therefore
seem a strange one. But it would not seem so strange
if it were changed to be about the failure rate among
1,000 machines. If that failure rate were zero, the zero
rate would not be fully explained by the fact that levels
of vibration, temperature, moisture and so on had all been
kept within appropriate limits, because one would expect
odd combinations of facts to have led to a few failures.)
5.2.4 Statistical laws
Some laws are statistical, rather than relating to single occa-
sions of measurement. There may or may not be exceptions
to such laws. Considerations that relate to exceptionless
laws and to laws with exceptions may therefore both be
15 Examples may be found in the journal Case Studies in
Engineering Failure Analysis. Two nice examples from different areas
of engineering are Geary, “Analysis of a Corrosion Under Insulation
Failure in a Carbon Steel Refinery Hydrocarbon Line”; Haghshenas
and Klassen, “Analysis of Cracks Generated in the Spinning-Mandrel
Teeth”.
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relevant. Here we shall concentrate on considerations that
are specific to statistical laws.
Laws may be statistical because of fundamental facts about
the world or about the nature of researchers’ contact with
the world – a view that is appropriate to some laws within
fundamental physics.16
Laws may also be statistical because a discipline describes
the world in a relatively high-level way, overlooking a great
deal of the microphysical detail that would be needed to
say what would happen on specific occasions. An example
is provided by the Gutenberg-Richter law. For a given
region of the Earth, this law sets out a mathematical
relationship between the magnitudes of earthquakes and
their frequency, with low-magnitude earthquakes being
more frequent than high-magnitude ones. The law only
gives a distribution for each region. It does not account
for individual earthquakes.17
16 The words “researchers’ contact with the world” reflect the
fact that the statistical nature of the laws in question can be
attributed to acts of measurement, rather than to states of the
world. In quantum mechanics in particular, states of the world and
measurements of states do not have the straightforward relationships
to one another that they have in classical mechanics: Susskind and
Friedman, Quantum Mechanics: The Theoretical Minimum, page 96.
17 We may add that the law is not quite right for some regions.
While there is scope to identify possible reasons for the discrepancies,
it can be very difficult to determine the actual reasons: Sue, Grasso,
Lahaie and Amitrano, “Mechanical Behavior of Western Alpine
Structures Inferred From Statistical Analysis of Seismicity”. Thus
there would be scope for a higher-level statistical distribution of
numbers of regions as more or less closely compliant with the
law, although the interest of such a distribution would depend on
there being a large enough population of regions. When considering
statistical laws, it is important to distinguish the different levels at
which distributions may arise.
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Finally, researchers may formulate statistical laws because
sample and population statistics, as opposed to information
about individuals, are of interest in their own right.
Statistical laws in either of the first two categories may
very well fall into this category too. Means, variances,
shapes of distributions and statistical relationships between
other statistics may be of considerable importance, but
by their nature they can only be computed for groups of
individuals. An example is provided by Zipf’s law on the
relative frequencies of words in large collections of texts
drawn from given languages.
5.2.4.1 The strength of connections
Statistical laws may very well feature in explanantia. No
special issues need arise when statistical laws are used
to explain other statistical laws. The connections from
explanantia to explananda may be just as strong as when all
the laws involved are exceptionless, because the statistical
laws in the explanantia will act as claims of particular
fact rather than as general claims. But we do need to ask
questions when statistical laws are used as general claims to
explain specific phenomena. There are two types of specific
phenomenon that researchers might seek to explain by using
statistical laws.
The first type is that of some value of a statistic computed
for a large set of individual objects or events falling within a
range of values that the statistical laws identify as likely. (A
range is likely if the probability of an occurrent value’s lying
somewhere within the range is reasonably high. There may
not be any particular value within the range such that there
is a high probability of an occurrent value’s equalling it.) An
explanation that uses statistical laws can show how it is very
likely that a large set’s statistic will lie within a given range.
236
5.2 Explanation using laws
The narrower the range that the laws identify as likely,
and the higher the likelihood, the more ready researchers
will be to assent to the corresponding claim to explain.
Unfortunately, there is a trade-off: higher likelihoods are
associated with wider ranges, and therefore with vaguer
and less interesting explananda. If an explanandum is too
uninteresting, researchers may well be reluctant to assent
to the corresponding claim to explain, not because of
low likelihood but because nothing worthwhile has been
achieved. A claim to explain would give a misleading
impression of achievement.
The second type of phenomenon is that of some value of a
statistic computed for a small set of objects or events, or
some value of a variable for a single object or event, falling
within a range that is identified as likely. One difficulty with
such explanations is that ranges of values with acceptably
high likelihoods will usually be wide. Any explanation is
therefore likely to have an uninteresting explanandum.
We shall confine our attention to explanations where sets
are large enough to make likely ranges of values narrow
enough for the explanations to be interesting, so that
researchers would be inclined to assent to the corresponding
claims to explain.
5.2.4.2 The mechanisms of the world
We may be concerned that when an explanation uses
statistical laws to explain a statistic for a large set of objects
or events, the explanation may not get as close to the
mechanisms of the world as an explanation that relied on
non-statistical laws would do.
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The concern is not a serious one in fundamental physics.
Statistical laws in fundamental physics are well-embedded
in tightly-knit theories, giving reassurance in the way that
we noted for exceptionless laws in section 5.2.2.4. Moving up
a little way to thermodynamics, the discipline of statistical
mechanics serves to embed the laws very firmly in theory.
The concern is more serious in higher disciplines. It might
not seem to be so at first glance. If we return to our
examples, it is perfectly possible to relate not merely the
formula for distributions of earthquake magnitudes but
also variations in the main parameter of the formula to
geological and mechanical facts, and to relate Zipf’s law
to facts about how to save linguistic effort.18 That is, it
is possible to propose mechanisms that may explain the
statistical laws. But despite such reassurance, the concern
is still a serious one. Explanations of statistical laws and
of values of their parameters tend to be at least a little
speculative, a fact that is itself symptomatic of some degree
of distancing from the mechanisms of the world.
Despite this concern, explanations that make use of
statistical laws may be the best ones that researchers can
give. Most disciplines can only be conducted if researchers
overlook the microphysical detail of the world. And when
statistics are of interest in their own right, as they often are,
the study of those statistics makes a distancing from the
individual members of the relevant populations inevitable.
If explanations that use statistical laws are the best ones
that can be given, researchers are likely to assent to
the corresponding claims to explain. Should we then be
18 Amitrano, “Variability in the Power-Law Distributions of
Rupture Events: How and Why Does 𝑏-value Change?”; Ferrer i
Cancho and Solé, “Least Effort and the Origins of Scaling in Human
Language”.
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concerned that claims to explain patterns in sets of specific
occurrences or in large groups of individuals may come to
be accepted when no good explanations have really been
given? We should not be so concerned so long as it is clearly
understood, by all who make and who read the claims,
that the nature of explanation is limited by the fact that
statistical laws have been used. The use of statistical laws
involves a retreat from the level of specific occurrences or
individuals, the level at which mechanisms might operate,
but so long as that retreat is noted, a claim to explain
should not be open to misinterpretation as a claim to have
explained by reference to specific occurrences or individuals.
Moreover, the constraints on what happens in the world
that explain the contents of statistical laws are also the
constraints that limit what may happen in specific cases.
And it is often possible to show how results at the aggregate
level are derived from results in specific cases. A degree of
contact with the mechanisms of the world can therefore be
maintained.
Turning to claims that play explanatory roles, a claim can
draw perfectly good support from its playing such a role,
even when statistical laws are involved. If the claim were
incorrect, its omission from the explanans would be likely
to leave the explanation in at least as good a state. Then
the condition set out in section 5.1.2.2, that explanations in
which a claim plays an explanatory role need to be better
than explanations of the same phenomenon in which it does
not do so, would not be satisfied. The claim would then not
gain support from its explanatory role. But if the condition
were satisfied, the claim could rightly gain support in that
way.
This argument depends on our being able to say that
statistical laws that connect real-world phenomena cannot
be manufactured at will so as to give explanatory roles to
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all sorts of claims. But we can say this. Statistical laws
are testable just like non-statistical laws. There may be
more scope to claim that apparent exceptions are to be
blamed on atypical samples, but if enough testing is done, a
statistical law may come to be established or refuted beyond
reasonable doubt.
This observation as to testability does not only bear on the
question of support for claims that play explanatory roles.
It also helps us to have confidence in claims to explain made
on behalf of explanations that use statistical laws. There is
scope to test those laws, and to the extent that they pass
rigorous tests we may have confidence in their correctness,
supporting our confidence in the worth of explanations that
use them.
5.2.4.3 Contrastive explanation
Explanations that use statistical laws can be contrastive in
the same way as explanations that use laws with exceptions,
by showing high likelihood. This is so even when explananda
set out facts that the explanantia expressly allow could have
turned out differently, albeit with low probabilities of that
happening. This can give reassurance in the same way as
when laws with exceptions are used. If explanations show
how it was very likely that the claims in their explananda
should be correct rather than alternative claims, that is
some indication that the explanations get to grips with the
workings of the world. There are also detailed arguments for
the possibility of specific types of contrastive explanation.19





Causal explanations give a strong impression of getting to
grips with the workings of the world. We shall first identify
the explanations that interest us here as those that are
based on general causal claims. We shall then consider types
of mechanism that may be identified. Then we shall turn to
implications for our confidence.
A consequence of our focus on our main question is that
we shall not be interested in metaphysical questions about
the nature of causation. We shall take the ways in which
researchers talk of causes at face value. We are concerned
with whether they should say what they do say, given their
systems of thought and expression (including their concepts
of causation). We are not interested in whether they should
think in different terms. Thus for example any interest in
the use of techniques like graphical causal models will be
an interest in the rigour that they may help to impose on
causal thinking, rather than in the scope to use them to
support any particular view of causation.20
It follows that we shall be as free in our use of the concept
of causation as researchers in relevant disciplines tend to
be. The concept is used very freely in the social sciences,
and reasonably freely in biology and chemistry, but its role
in physics is debated.21
20 For the use of graphical causal models and other techniques
to support a particular view of causation see Hausman, Causal
Asymmetries. We discuss graphical causal models in section 8.3.5.4.




5.3.1 General causal claims
We are here interested in explanations in which there
are general causal claims within explanantia that combine
with claims of particular fact, and perhaps with additional
general claims that are not themselves causal, to forge
connections to explananda that are at least reasonably
strong. We shall regard the general causal claims as spelt
out, even if they are in practice left implicit. We shall
not be interested in singular claims that some phenomena
caused others where those claims are not backed up
by general causal claims. Such unbacked singular claims
assert links between the phenomena that they relate,
rather than explaining those links. They therefore give rise
to explanations that are essentially narratives. We shall
however say something about the use of causal claims that
are not general in section 5.4.3.5.
Our category of general causal claims cuts across the many
varieties of cause that can be argued to exist and the
different ways in which it can be argued that a causal claim
may be established, so we shall not map out those varieties
and ways.22
5.3.2 Mechanisms
In addition to using general causal claims, an explanation
may identify mechanisms that show how the workings of
the world make the causal claims correct. We shall explore
the concept of a mechanism, and then turn to implications
22 For some of the varieties and ways see Cartwright, Hunting
Causes and Using Them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics,
chapters 1 to 4.
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for our confidence of the use of general causal claims and of
the identification of mechanisms.
If an explanation is to identify a mechanism, it must point
to influences of the occurrence of some phenomena on the
occurrence of others, and the links between phenomena
must be well-attested independently of the particular
explanation. Physical pressure, as when the parts of a
machine push, pull and turn one another, is the obvious
case, but the influence of oxidizing agents, or of evolutionary
pressures such as competition for food, or of newspaper
articles on political opinions, can all qualify.
We here take a generous view of the notion of a mechanism,
because the identification of any mechanisms within the
scope of this generous view should have at least some
favourable effect on our confidence in claims to explain
and claims that play explanatory roles.23 Moreover, there
is no need for a mechanism that is identified in order
to explain the occurrence of phenomena to be well-
attested as a complete mechanism independently of the
particular explanation. It is perfectly acceptable for only
the component mechanisms to be well-attested elsewhere,
while their combination in an overall mechanism is unique
and the course of events thereby explained differs from
any other course of events.24 But our generosity is not
23 This generous view also helps us to set to one side delicate ques-
tions about the different effects on our confidence of the identification
of mechanical models and the identification of mechanisms in the
world. For the distinction, and its importance in a different context,
see Matthewson and Calcott, “Mechanistic Models of Population-
Level Phenomena”.
24 An example is provided by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly,
Dynamics of Contention. In chapter 1 the authors set out their
approach of identifying recurrent component mechanisms that come
together in different ways on different occasions, leading to markedly
different overall courses of events.
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unbounded. We should for example have doubts about
the explanatory worth of the broad-brush descriptions of
mechanisms that are offered by world-systems theory, at
least in part because the links between phenomena are not
well-attested independently of the explanations given.25
A description of a mechanism can identify parts that push,
pull and turn other parts like the pieces of metal in a
machine, or at the other extreme it can simply map causal
influences in detail.26 The mapping of causal influences can
however be a substantial achievement. Not only are causal
maps difficult to establish and useful as guides to further
research. They can also reveal more than one might expect.
For example, they can reveal the role that is played by
organization.27 More generally, they may reveal that the
structure of the relevant part of the world as studied by the
relevant discipline is not such that when mechanisms are
identified, there is a descent to a lower ontological level that
makes reference to higher levels redundant. It may be that
high-level description remains essential to understanding,
as for example when social structures need to be kept in
view in order to understand the actions of individuals, or
when social and psychological accounts need to be given in
order to make full sense of what might be regarded as, at
bottom, the activity of neurons.28
25 See for example the mechanisms supposedly at work in recent
decades that are outlined in Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An
Introduction, chapter 5.
26 For an argument that in some contexts at least, mechanisms can
be identified with causal structures see Steel, Across the Boundaries:
Extrapolation in Biology and Social Science, chapters 2 to 4.
27 For organization’s role in explanation see Kuorikoski and
Ylikoski, “How Organization Explains”. The key factors they identify
in section 5, concerned with the nature of components and the
relations between them, are factors that would be revealed by detailed
causal maps.
28 Ylikoski, “Micro, Macro, and Mechanisms”; Thagard, “Cognitive
Science” (b), pages 602-604.
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There is a scale from mechanisms that are clearly machine-
like to mechanisms that are far from machine-like.29 Daniel
Nicholson draws a distinction in the context of biology
between machine mechanisms and causal mechanisms.
Machine mechanisms set out the workings of assemblies of
parts, while causal mechanisms set out the steps that lead
to the occurrence of given phenomena. Nicholson goes on
to argue against an ontic view of causal mechanisms, and in
favour of an epistemic view.30 Jaakko Kuorikoski draws a
similar distinction in the context of social explanation.31
The distinctions drawn by Nicholson and by Kuorikoski
are not quite the same, partly because the components
of a biological mechanism are likely to be molecules,
while the components of a social mechanism can easily be
institutions. Thus for example the analysis of the money
supply mechanism that Kuorikoski presents looks like one
of Nicholson’s causal mechanisms rather than one of his
machine mechanisms.32 But both authors convey the point
that mechanisms can be more or less machine-like. We may
borrow this thought for our purposes, using Nicholson’s
terminology.
There is little prospect of giving general rules to determine
where a given mechanism should be placed on the scale.
Dropping down a level of abstraction from descriptions
of the phenomena to be explained will often be a sign
29 There are also conceptions of mechanism that encompass
mechanisms right along the scale: Illari and Williamson, “What is
a Mechanism? Thinking About Mechanisms Across the Sciences”.
30 Nicholson, “The Concept of Mechanism in Biology”. The
definitions are on page 153, and the arguments mentioned here are
in sections 5 and 6.
31 Kuorikoski, “Two Concepts of Mechanism: Componential Causal
System and Abstract Form of Interaction”, page 144.
32 Kuorikoski, “Two Concepts of Mechanism: Componential Causal
System and Abstract Form of Interaction”, pages 148-149.
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that a mechanism is machine-like.33 Another sign that a
mechanism is machine-like is that the claims that explain
how the mechanism works are elements of the corpus of
the relevant discipline that are used across a large part of
the discipline. But ultimately, decisions as to the extent to
which a mechanism is machine-like will come down to the
judgement of researchers.
There is a parallel scale that runs in the same direction
as the scale from machine mechanisms to what Nicholson
calls causal mechanisms (that is, mechanisms that are
not machine-like). The first part of this parallel scale,
corresponding to the extreme machine mechanism end of
the other scale, covers mechanisms that show basic forces
of physics at work. Mechanisms of that type are confined
to the bottom end of the scale of natural sciences. The
next part of the scale covers mechanisms the operation
of which can be seen as bearing relationships to what
fundamental physics says goes on in the world, such
that the relationships would if spelt out be intelligible.
(The requirement is only that the relationships would be
intelligible if, hypothetically, they were spelt out. There is
no need for a proper reduction to physics to be practical,
and it would not even matter if such a reduction turned out
to be impossible in principle.) That part of the scale, where
researchers can think in terms of intelligible (if unidentified)
33 A drop in the level of abstraction may be simply a matter
of components in mechanisms being entities that are less abstract
than elements in the phenomena that are to be explained, but
there are other possibilities too. Kuorikoski, “Two Concepts of
Mechanism: Componential Causal System and Abstract Form of
Interaction”, pages 146-147, emphasizes the idea of looking into a
mechanism, identifying component operations, and associating them
with component parts. This may be seen as a form of dropping down
a level because a description of a whole machine that concentrates on
what it does is more abstract than a description of its parts, their
functions and their arrangement.
246
5.3 Causal explanation
relationships to fundamental physics, stretches up into
substantial parts of biology. Beyond that part, there is
a part of the scale that covers mechanisms which are
such that it would not be feasible even to gesture at
intelligible relationships between their operation and what
fundamental physics said went on in the world. These
mechanisms are likely to be causal mechanisms rather than
machine mechanisms. The mechanisms identified in some
parts of biology, most of psychology and practically all of
the social sciences and the humanities are found in this last
part of the scale.
We shall now illustrate trends in the natures of identifiable
mechanisms as we go up the scale of disciplines.
In the natural sciences, it is often perfectly feasible to
gesture at relationships to fundamental physics. It might
be impractical to spell out those relationships, but it is
for example perfectly clear that chemical reactions proceed
as they do because of how particles behave, and that cells
behave as they do because of chemical reactions that take
place within and around them. Moreover, exploration some
way down the path from chemical reactions to particles, or
from cells to chemical reactions, can be a great help in the
search for machine mechanisms.
As we move up the scale, it can remain possible to
identify machine mechanisms. For example, a machine
mechanism might be identified in evolutionary biology if
changes over time in the relative frequencies of alleles in
a population were attributed to a mechanism of individual
organisms moving around, and in consequence mating or
in consequence not mating. It is also feasible to gesture at
relationships between events in the lifespan of an individual
organism and what fundamental physics says goes on in the
world. But larger-scale and longer-term factors that affect
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the evolution of species as wholes, and that are harder either
to relate at all precisely to specified machine mechanisms,
or to relate to fundamental physics even to the extent of
gesturing, may also be cast in the role of causes. These
factors include genetic drift and migration.34 Explanations
that cite such longer-term and larger-scale factors may
gradually shade into accounts that are not primarily causal,
but are primarily functional or narrative. Specifically, there
is lively debate as to whether there are causal processes
at the level of populations.35 But that does not rule such
explanations out of court. We should also note that large-
scale explanations may not take over entirely. In biology it
has been argued that explanatory factors of both local and
large-scale types need to be blended, rather than segregated
for use in separate explanatory exercises. This blending is
proposed both in order to allow better explanations to be
available at any given time, and in order to allow progress
to be made.36 In neuroscience and psychology it has been
argued that a hierarchy of levels of organization and a
hierarchy of levels of explanation need to be distinguished,
making room for several different levels of explanation of
phenomena at a single level of organization.37
34 Losos et al. (eds.), The Princeton Guide to Evolution, section 4,
particularly section 4.1: Hedrick, “Genetic Drift”; section 4.3: Ronce,
“Geographic Variation, Population Structure, and Migration”.
35 Millstein, “Natural Selection and Causal Productivity”; Wang,
“Is Natural Selection a Population-Level Causal Process?”.
36 Laland, Odling-Smee, Hoppitt and Uller, “More on How and
Why: Cause and Effect in Biology Revisited”. The sort of blending
that is discussed in that paper is by no means a simplistic running
together of elements from two or more separate explanations. Rather,
specific forms of connection between explanations at different levels
are identified. For example, the genetically determined behaviour of
individual members of a species may modify the environment. The
modified environment may then favour genetic variations that would
not otherwise have been favoured.




Moving up into the social sciences, all hope of gesturing
at relationships to what fundamental physics says goes
on in the world is lost. In economics for example, we
find factors that are remote from any connection with
what fundamental physics has to say being cast in the
role of causes. For example, fluctuations in non-rational
optimism and pessimism, fluctuations in the money supply,
rational economic expectations, changes in technology
and changes in government regulations have all been
cited as causes of business cycles.38 But it may still be
possible to identify machine mechanisms. For example,
economists might explain an increase in aggregate demand
for investment as caused by improved business sentiment,
and then identify a mechanism in which individual business
owners would review their sales figures, changes in their
costs and newspaper stories about the state of the economy,
and would then decide whether to make new investments.
It is also possible to see some of the mechanisms identified
by analytical sociologists as machine mechanisms, although
it is easier to see them as causal mechanisms.39
One more complication is that mechanisms can be described
in ways that represent what goes on in the world more
or less accurately. Descriptions that do not give accurate
accounts can nonetheless be essential to the practice of
disciplines. For example, organic chemists can describe
reactions by setting out mechanisms that fairly characterize
the dynamics of reactions, or they can misrepresent those
dynamics by analysing reactions into stages at which
38 Knoop, Recessions and Depressions: Understanding Business
Cycles, chapters 4 to 7.
39 Examples can be found in the chapters of Manzo (ed.), Ana-
lytical Sociology: Actions and Networks. Mechanisms are especially
conspicuous in chapter 3: Wikström, “Why Crime Happens: A
Situational Action Theory”; chapter 8: Grossman and Baldassarri,
“The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-
the-Field Experiment in Uganda”.
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intermediate products arise, giving a sequence of snapshots.
These two possibilities have been called the thick and thin
conceptions of mechanism respectively. Thick descriptions
might appear to be more satisfactory, but it is often
impractical to give full descriptions that would conform to
the thick conception, and even if it were practical, doing so
might not benefit the work of chemists.40
Even when the values of variables are evidently related,
there may or may not be a mechanism to be found that
makes a connection between the variables. Two variables
can be correlated without variations in the value of either
being a cause of variations in the value of the other, and a
lack of causal connection may fail to be revealed even by
statistical analyses that are rather more sophisticated than
the computation of correlation coefficients. For example, the
methods of establishing Granger causality and of directed
acyclic graphs can have this shortcoming. (We shall discuss
directed acyclic graphs in section 8.3.5.4.) There is indeed
a notion of “predictive causality” that is clearly understood
to be a merely predictive relationship, one that does not
imply a causal relationship.41 Samantha Kleinberg has
developed a sophisticated method which gives a special role
to intervals of time between events, and which can identify
causal connections with low rates of erroneous identification
or failure to identify.42 But even this method does not
wholly overcome the worry that mathematical relationships
may not be adequate evidence of causal connection. Having
40 Goodwin, “Mechanisms and Chemical Reaction”.
41 Arjas and Eerola, “On Predictive Causality in Longitudinal
Studies”; Elsner, “Granger Causality and Atlantic Hurricanes”, page
480; Diebold, Elements of Forecasting, chapter 11, section 7. There is
a wide-ranging exploration of connections between on the one hand
correlation and other mathematical relationships, and on the other
hand causal inference, in Woodward, “Causal Models in the Social
Sciences”.
42 Kleinberg, Causality, Probability, and Time, chapters 4, 5 and 7.
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said that, it would be bizarre to think that a method with a
high success rate could achieve that success rate in a world
in which there were frequently no mechanisms connecting
the relata which featured in the causal claims that the
method encouraged.
5.3.3 Confidence
If explanations are based on general causal claims, that
indicates that they rely on an understanding of how the
world actually works. That may in itself increase our
confidence in the associated claims to explain. Any increase
in confidence will however depend on our having confidence
in the causal claims.
The identification of mechanisms can increase our confid-
ence both in claims to explain and in claims that play
explanatory roles, for two reasons. The first reason is that
mechanisms show how explanations get to grips with the
world. The second reason is that the identification of a
mechanism that explains why a causal claim should be
correct lends support to the causal claim itself. It does so by
integrating the causal claim with parts of the corpus that
provide explanations of how the parts of the mechanism
work individually and how they combine.
We do however need to take care here. The identification
of mechanisms should only increase our confidence if we
have reason to think that researchers have done enough
work to discriminate between parts of mechanisms and
other elements in the situations in which phenomena occur.
They must not fabricate mechanisms by using whatever
facts about situations happen to be available. We shall not
pursue that line of enquiry, although we may note that




The identification of some types of mechanism should
have a greater favourable effect on our confidence than
the identification of other types. The identification of
machine mechanisms can do more for our confidence
than the identification of causal mechanisms, because the
identification of machine mechanisms is particularly strong
evidence that explanations get to grips with how the world
works. The identification of mechanisms which are such
that it is possible at least to gesture at relationships
to what fundamental physics says goes on in the world
should do more for our confidence than the identification
of mechanisms for which that is not possible, because such
gesturing indicates that explanations are in touch with the
basic physical workings of the world, even if at one or more
removes. That is a strong form of getting to grips with how
the world works.
5.4 Explanation using principles
In disciplines that are high up the scale, the laws that are
available do not on their own suffice to make the connections
that need to be made in order to give satisfactory
explanations. It is therefore necessary to make extensive
use of principles, that is, claims that give general guidance
on what is to be expected (see section 5.2.1). In this
section we shall consider the nature of explanations that use
principles as general claims in their explanantia, controls
over the giving of such explanations, and implications for
our confidence.
43 An example is Baetu, “Filling in the Mechanistic Details: Two-
Variable Experiments as Tests for Constitutive Relevance”.
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5.4.1 How principles explain
Despite the insufficiency of laws to do all the work that
needs to be done by general claims in disciplines that
are high up the scale, explanations are still available. For
example, there are many explanations in history. Laws may
play essential roles, for example when physical and chemical
laws determine how much could be done by the machines
that had been invented at a given time, and thereby help to
explain why the rate of industrial development was limited.
But such laws stand in the background.
We therefore need a new notion of explanation. The
required notion is this. An account can give an explanation
if it renders the explanandum both unsurprising and
comprehensible. This is typically achieved by showing how
the explanans and the explanandum hold together, where
that requires something more than mutual consistency.
Principles do much of the work in showing how they hold
together. The principles may or may not be made explicit.
But they must be ones that are acceptable independently of
their immediate use in the explanation that is being given.
We shall now give two examples to illustrate this way
of working, then consider in turn the distinction between
rendering an explanandum unsurprising and rendering it
comprehensible, roles for laws, the question of what more
than consistency might be required, and explanations of one
particularly important form, the narrative form.
5.4.1.1 Illustrative examples
A historian may explain why people with political power
suddenly made large concessions to others who wanted a
share in that power by noting explicitly that the threat of
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violence was growing, and relying implicitly on the general
principle that people fear violence enough for them to
avoid it when their opponents are likely to win by force
of numbers.44
A criminologist may explain crime by reference to the strain
that arises when goals cannot be achieved by accepted
means.45 In so doing, the criminologist may rely implicitly
on the principle that when people’s desires are frustrated,
they may resort to all manner of means to achieve their
goals.
In both of these examples, the principles at work are
ones that are perfectly acceptable by reference to psycho-
social understandings that are in common use. This close
contact with everyday psycho-social understandings is
not universal. Theories that are hard to connect with
everyday understandings are sometimes used in the social
sciences.46 Explanations that use principles also have roles
in highly technical disciplines, such as cognitive science.47
But reasonably close contact with everyday understandings
is common. The fact that it is common means that reliance
on principles is often inconspicuous. The principles do not
need to be made explicit. But the reliance is no less real for
that.
44 There is an example in Davidson, Voltaire: A Life, page 391. The
example is the agreement of the ruling class in Geneva to share power,
made in March 1768.
45 Barlow and Kauzlarich, Explaining Crime: A Primer in Crim-
inological Theory, pages 58-64.
46 A review of journals like the European Journal of Social Theory
will confirm this.
47 Gurova, “Principles Versus Mechanisms in Cognitive Science”.
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5.4.1.2 Unsurprising and comprehensible
An explanation that uses principles typically takes the
principles from a wide background, and thereby relates the
phenomenon to be explained to that background. The back-
ground is typically, but not necessarily, an understanding
of human nature. The occurrence of the phenomenon is
thus rendered both unsurprising and comprehensible, even
though the explanation does not show that one should
expect comparable circumstances regularly to lead to the
same phenomenon.
We need to distinguish an occurrence’s being rendered
unsurprising from its being rendered comprehensible, in
order to appreciate what it is that such explanations
provide.
An explanation that only uses laws renders an occurrence
unsurprising by showing that it was an inevitable or
probable consequence of circumstances. An explanation
that uses principles renders an occurrence unsurprising in a
different sense. It shows that there was some positive reason
for the phenomenon to occur, although not a reason that
would make the occurrence inevitable and often not one
that would make it highly probable. It also shows that the
circumstances were not such as to make the occurrence very
unlikely.
An explanation that only uses laws renders an occurrence
comprehensible in the same way that it renders it unsurpris-
ing. Researchers set out some laws, and state that this is the
way the world works. If they wish to make comprehensible
the fact that the laws are what they are, they must
look for deeper laws. An explanation that uses principles
renders an occurrence comprehensible in two stages. It
implicitly or explicitly reminds readers that the essential
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participants in the situation, usually human beings, had
particular characteristics, whether characteristics that were
common in their species or characteristics of themselves as
individuals or as members of groups. It then shows that
they found themselves in circumstances which made those
characteristics relevant to what they did.
The two achievements of an explanation that uses prin-
ciples, rendering an occurrence unsurprising and rendering
it comprehensible, rely on the same method. The invocation
of principles makes connections with the natures of the
essential participants.48 If the participants act in accordance
with their natures the occurrence is no surprise, and it is
also comprehensible. But it is still worthwhile to distinguish
the two achievements from each other. Rendering an
occurrence no surprise may be conceived in probabilistic
terms, even when no actual probabilities are to be had.
Researchers can say that an occurrence is no surprise in the
sense that if there were any way to compute a probability of
its occurrence, that probability would not be especially low.
It is a more elaborate achievement to render an occurrence
comprehensible. Doing so requires showing the specific
relevance of the natures of the participants. The difference
between the two achievements can be seen in the contrast
between an observer’s saying “Many people might have
done the same” (no surprise), and her saying “That woman
founded a new movement for social reform because of her
strong belief that existing social arrangements were unjust,
combined with the fact that she was too hungry for rapid
and radical change to work comfortably within established
organizations” (comprehension). The fact that rendering
an occurrence comprehensible involves showing the specific
48 Compare the discussion of the use of principles in the giving
of narratives in Munz, “The Historical Narrative”, pages 857-862.
Munz refers to generalizations rather than principles, and sets out
his understanding of their nature on page 860.
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relevance of the natures of the participants means that
explanations of this type are more powerful than how-
possibly explanations in the natural sciences, explanations
which merely show how some result could have occurred
given the laws of nature and the circumstances.49
Sometimes, conduct does not make sense in the light of
principles that are set out in psycho-social understandings.
We should be concerned at this. Researchers can only
expect to make progress in the disciplines that concern
themselves with human conduct if people generally act
in ways that can be made intelligible. The point was
made by Karl Popper when he considered the role of his
rationality principle, his “principle of acting adequately to
the situation”.50
Fortunately, a good deal can be done to understand the
apparently irrational, whether occasional apparent lapses of
rationality or apparent systematic irrationality. But special
approaches are needed, and it becomes important to reflect
on the effects and the limitations of those approaches.51
It may also be necessary to make an effort to understand
the reasons for the thoughts and actions of people with
apparently irrational beliefs, and to understand how their
beliefs could appear to be perfectly rational when seen from
their point of view.52 Even the initial diagnosis of error in
the thought of the people studied can require considerable
49 For how-possibly explanations, and ways in which they or
developments of them might do more then merely show how results
could have occurred, see Persson, “Three Conceptions of Explaining
How Possibly – and One Reductive Account”.
50 Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and
Rationality, chapter 8, section 12. The quoted words are on page 177.
51 For an introduction to such approaches see Lukes, “The Problem
of Apparently Irrational Beliefs”.




care.53 Beyond the comprehension of apparent error in
thought, further effort may be needed to understand actions
that appear to be irrational even in the light of the agents’
beliefs (whether those beliefs strike researchers as rational
or as irrational).54
5.4.1.3 Roles for laws
Principles of human conduct play the dominant role among
general claims that are put to work in many explanations
in the social sciences and history. Such principles make
the explanations distinctively social or historical. Physical
laws might also play essential roles in making explanations
hold together. Laws might for example limit possibilities,
as with laws that limited the speed of travel given what
had been invented at a certain time. Alternatively, laws
might relate small-scale events to one another and thereby
underpin claims that events should be linked in a chain,
as when the starting of a fire is seen as leading on to
the destruction of wooden houses because of laws that
determine the flammability of wood.55 But the distinctive
nature of the explanations would still reflect the use of
principles.
If we distinguish between dominant and other roles in this
way, we can easily accommodate Wilhelm Windelband’s
point that general laws play essential roles even in non-
53 Lloyd, Being, Humanity, and Understanding: Studies in Ancient
and Modern Societies, chapter 2.
54 For the need to be sensitive to the fact that incoherence may
be real and important, rather than its appearance merely reflecting
a failure of researchers to understand other ways of life, see Gellner,
“Concepts and Society”, sections 15 to 17.
55 This use of laws to make chains hold together is discussed in
Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation, chapter 3. The need for
laws is firmly asserted on page 54.
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generalizable explanations of single events. Such explana-
tions may well need to use laws, although often without the
laws or their roles being made explicit, even while principles
dominate. We might expect to find explanations that did
not use principles in roughly the fields in which Windelband
would have identified nomothetic work, and explanations
that did use principles in roughly the fields in which he
would have identified idiographic work, although the match
would not be exact.56
5.4.1.4 More than consistency
The mere consistency of explanans and explanandum is not
enough to give an explanation. But it is not clear how to
specify what more should be required, and it is unlikely
that any one specification would apply across a wide range
of disciplines.
It is the judgement of researchers that is the most
appropriate guide. But to the extent that we seek a
standard which is independent of judgements that might
be made within specific disciplines, and which could serve
as a common standard across disciplines, we may take
inspiration from measures of coherence that have been
developed in the context of discussions of coherentism as
a rival to foundationalism.
A leading example is provided by Laurence BonJour, who
takes the degree of coherence of a set of propositions to
56 Windelband, “Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft (Straßburger
Rektoratsrede, 1894)”, translated as Windelband, “History and
Natural Science”. See the whole lecture for his views on the
relationship between general laws and explanations of single events.




be increased by a high number of inferential connections
between them, and decreased by division of the set into
subsets that are relatively isolated from one another by
a lack of inferential connections between propositions in
different subsets. There are also mathematical measures of
coherence. The measures that have so far been formulated
have been criticized, but fortunately we need not be wedded
to the details of such proposals. We need only borrow their
general idea and conclude that a notion of coherence that
comes in degrees, rather than being merely a notion of
logical consistency, need not be a vague or insubstantial
notion.57
5.4.1.5 Narrative explanations
A narrative sets out what happened on a particular occasion
and why it happened. (We shall treat interpretations of
events and analyses of why things happened as parts of
narratives, rather than as separate items.) There is however
usually no claim either that the events are likely to be
repeated of their own accord, or that anyone could arrange
for a repetition. Indeed, conceptions of history have shifted
in recent centuries away from those that would see history
in terms of exemplary events that might teach general
57 BonJour’s proposal is set out in BonJour, The Structure of
Empirical Knowledge, section 5.3. For the relationship between
measurements of coherence and the confidence that coherence gives see
Bovens and Hartmann, “Solving the Riddle of Coherence”, sections 1
to 3 and 7. Douven and Meijs, “Measuring Coherence”, discusses some
mathematical measures and gives references to criticisms. It is however
possible to take a strong position against the possibility of defining a
measure of coherence, a higher value of which would reliably indicate
a higher likelihood that the beliefs which cohered were correct: Olsson,
“The Impossibility of Coherence”.
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lessons.58 Researchers are also unable to state laws that
would explain sequences of events. Instead they must rely
on principles to relate events to one another, and to allow
them to see sequences as coherent and individual events as
unsurprising.
We shall work with a generous concept of a narrative.59
A narrative may set out the events that it covers in or
out of chronological order, and it may set out materials in
ways that allow the writer to weave substantial amounts
of analysis into the account, leading the reader to see
patterns and make connections. A historian may for
example assemble small incidents stretching over a whole
country and over more than a century, incidents that
exemplify village politics, the differences between free and
unfree peasants, demands from on high and protests, in
order to give a narrative that allows readers to see the
level and the forms of protest as consequences of the
whole pattern of local life and national events.60 Indeed,
many history books written in recent decades do not have
overall narrative structures in the traditional sense but
treat different themes in different chapters, using traditional
narratives only within those chapters or parts of them.61 To
take an example from a different discipline, a geographer
may assemble details of changes in several European cities
58 Koselleck, “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the
Topos into the Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process”. For
ways in which history can still contain lessons for the present and
the future see Koselleck, “Representation, Event, and Structure”,
especially section 5.
59 It is for example somewhat more generous than the view
that Lawrence Stone took for his purposes: Stone, “The Revival of
Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History”, pages 3-4.
60 Prestwich, Plantagenet England 1225-1360, chapter 17.
61 On the nature of historical narrative and the significance of
the move away from large-scale narrative as a structuring device see
Evans, In Defence of History, chapter 5, section 3.
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to present patterns that make sense when seen as narratives
of gentrification.62 We may even take explanations that are
designated as non-narrative by their authors, for example
because they explore the interplay between recurrent factors
at various times rather than giving chronological accounts,
but that still set out processes of change over time, and
locate them in the grey area at the edge of the vague
extension of our concept of a narrative.63
This does not mean that any account that uses principles
will qualify as a narrative. An account will only qualify
if it is central to the approach taken that the objects of
study were located in a story that at the time unfolded
chronologically, with the absolute impossibility at any time
of changing the past.64 The chronological aspect means
that when a narrative concerns creatures who might have
made predictions and planned accordingly, it is most
unlikely that they would have had, at any given time,
well-grounded certainty as to what would happen next.
Their recognition of this lack of well-grounded certainty,
or the at least occasional confounding of predictions that
they made, may well help to shape the narrative. And
the fact that principles, and not merely laws, are at work
means that a narrative is unlikely to have a sense of
inevitability. The narrative up to a given time is likely to be
compatible with a range of alternative developments after
that time. Indeed, if the course of events narrated seems
to be inevitable, a reader may suspect that the narrative
is not a particularly good explanation of those events. The
62 Smith, The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Re-
vanchist City, chapter 8.
63 One example of such work is D’Errico and Banks, “Identifying
Mechanisms behind Middle Paleolithic and Middle Stone Age Cultural
Trajectories”.
64 Compare the comments on the need to take seriously the
formative role of the unidirectional arrow of time in Munz, “The
Historical Narrative”, pages 852-853.
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impression of inevitability may have been produced by the
careful selection and presentation of facts in order to give
that impression, a principle of selection that would be likely
systematically to distort the picture given.
Our generous concept of a narrative means we need not fear
that Maurice Mandelbaum’s arguments against the idea
that history is all about narrative would, to the extent that
they were correct, mean that our discussion of narrative left
the majority of historical work untouched.65 (In any case,
historical work that did escape our generous concept would
still give explanations that used principles, so it would be
within the scope of our comments on such explanations
in general.) More broadly, our generous concept means
that we need not take any side in recent debates over the
natures, functions and capacities of historical narratives.66
On the other hand, so long as we work with our generous
concept, we cannot base arguments on distinctive features
of narratives in any narrower sense.
A narrative can explain the events that it covers by
fitting them together in a pattern. When researchers have
constructed a successful narrative, the fact that they have
done so suggests that they have selected and described
objects and events in an appropriate way. The relevant
notion of explanation here is the modest one of making
65 Mandelbaum, “A Note on History as Narrative”. Mandelbaum
makes two main points. The first point is that the historian’s objective
is to represent the past accurately, not to tell an interesting story,
although he does not exclude the possibility that an account may turn
out to be an interesting story. The second point is that a great deal
of historical work involves relating events to a standing background,
rather than to other events in a temporal sequence. For an argument
that Mandelbaum’s position needs to be refined see Ely, “Mandelbaum
on Historical Narrative: A Discussion”.




sense of events. This is weaker than showing how events
were inevitable or nearly so. But the modesty of the notion
does not mean that narrative explanations achieve little. A
narrative can set events, and particularly human actions
and their consequences, in a context that makes them
both unsurprising and comprehensible. Such a context may
even be needed simply to see how given actions should be
described.67
We mean to bring both of the two senses of the word
“colligation” under this notion of explaining events by
fitting them together in a pattern. The first sense is that of
the explanation of events by relating them to other events.
The second sense is that of the application of organizing
concepts, such as that of the Reformation, the Industrial
Revolution or globalization, in order to give shape to sets
of events, to demarcate the members of each set from non-
members, and to facilitate higher-level accounts that relate
one set as a whole to another set as a whole (as when the
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation are related).68
A narrative may have particular interest when the pattern
into which events are fitted is one that has been observed
elsewhere, even though there may be no prospect of
formulating a general claim that would come anywhere
near having the status of a law. If narrative explanations
identify such recurrent patterns, that may increase our
confidence both in the corresponding claims to explain and
in claims that play explanatory roles. But there is reason
to be cautious. If there is too large a library of recurrent
67 MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, page 208.
68 For the two senses of colligation and the importance of
distinguishing between them see Roberts, The Logic of Historical
Explanation, pages 16-20. Roberts himself uses the word in the first
sense (pages 16-17). He explores colligation and its explanatory power
in chapters 2, 6 and 7. For some hazards of colligation see McCullagh,
“Colligation”.
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patterns, it may be too easy for researchers to claim that
a given narrative exemplifies some pattern or other. Then
our confidence should not be increased as much as it would
be if it were in general hard to find appropriate patterns.
Narratives must be faithful to the facts in order to explain in
the way that is distinctive of narratives. We must therefore
be wary of narratives that, while not merely fiction,
are nonetheless invented, such as invented genealogies of
concepts. For example, there are accounts of political
obligation that start with the making of hypothetical
contracts in states of nature which never existed. Such
genealogies can be very helpful in deepening understanding
of the concepts involved. But their invented nature means
that they do not explain how the various concepts arose
or were developed, except to the extent that the invented
genealogies themselves played roles in the thought of people
who developed the concepts.69
Fidelity to the facts is a rather challenging notion when
a narrative is constructed by colligation in the sense of
the application of organizing concepts. The application
of any such concept involves a considerable degree of
interpretation. It is a decidedly less neutral act than the
arrangement of events in chronological order. We should
also recognize that in disciplines in which evidence tends
to be sparse, such as archaeology, there is scope to debate
the extent to which worthwhile narratives that do more
than catalogue the evidence can be regarded as describing
how things actually were, and indeed to debate whether
straightforwardly factual description should be the goal.70
69 For some comments on the uses of fictional genealogies see
Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, chapter
2, section 4.




We need to be aware that not all narratives should be
taken at face value, and that our understanding of claims
to explain may need to be modified when explanation
involves either substantial reconceptualization under the
influence of organizing concepts, or the use of imaginative
reconstruction to compensate for the sparseness of evidence.
Finally, explanatory narratives are given in some of the
natural sciences, for example in evolutionary biology. Such
narratives often have an important feature that is normally
absent from narratives in the humanities and the social
sciences. There is a great emphasis on substantiating the
narratives by reference to statistical tests, experiments, and
details such as those that may be supplied by genetics.71
This distinctive way of working means that concerns about
how narratives and other explanations that use principles
can be explanatory, and about how their formulation is
controlled (a topic to which we are about to turn), are less
pressing than they are in the humanities and the social
sciences. There is indeed a view that a majority of the
strands in evolutionary biology make nomological claims
rather than merely historical claims, although the sense of
natural law that is involved has been queried.72
71 A browse through journals such as the Journal of Evolutionary
Biology will confirm this. For a survey of methods that are used to
help reconstruct a family tree of species and to test reconstructions
see Folinsbee, Evans, Fröbisch, Tsuji and Brooks, “Quantitative
Approaches to Phylogenetics”. A recent example of the roles of
experiments and statistical tests is McCairns and Bernatchez,
“Plasticity and Heritability of Morphological Variation Within and
Between Parapatric Stickleback Demes”. A recent example of reference
to genetic detail is Vekemans, Poux, Goubet and Castric, “The
Evolution of Selfing from Outcrossing Ancestors in Brassicaceae:
What Have We Learned from Variation at the S-Locus?”.
72 For the view see Bock, “Multiple Explanations in Darwinian
Evolutionary Theory”. For the query see Pigliucci, “Historical vs.
Nomological Sciences”.
266
5.4 Explanation using principles
5.4.2 Controls
The giving of explanations that used principles could easily
be less tightly controlled than the giving of explanations
that only used laws. Putative laws must on the whole
pass severe tests of correctness that rely on well-established
methods before they can be used to give explanations.
Principles are not expected to have a measurable success
rate and are not easy to isolate and test one by one, so
they might easily be identified and put to work too hastily.
Moreover, the degree to which an explanation that uses
principles is satisfactory is less easily measured than the
degree to which an explanation that only uses laws is
satisfactory. There is no obvious and generally applicable
standard, such as that of showing how the correctness of
the claims in the explanans would increase the probability
of the correctness of the claim in the explanandum by a
certain amount.
Despite these difficulties, the giving of explanations that use
principles can be controlled. We remarked in section 5.4.1.4
that the judgement of researchers has an important role to
play. We shall now consider some more specific controls.
5.4.2.1 Controls over the use of principles
One control over the use of principles is a requirement to be
able to identify the principles on which explanations rely.
Principles may not be made explicit when an explanation
is first given, but they should be identifiable on demand.
Control by a requirement to be able to identify principles
would give an opportunity to rule that explanations were
not acceptable if the principles were found to have been
manufactured ad hoc, simply to allow researchers to for-
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mulate explanations. Principles should be well-established,
either in an everyday psycho-social understanding or within
the relevant discipline or other disciplines.
Everyday psycho-social understandings are fertile sources of
principles. But they will not always be enough. Researchers
may need to add principles that are drawn from a more
technical and less intuitive psychology. Psychohistory has
developed along those lines, although the use in that
discipline of psychoanalytic concepts and principles would
lead some to doubt any claim that the discipline was
scientific.73 To take another example, researchers may add
principles that are derived from observation of how people
have in the past persuaded other people to behave in certain
ways. The success of some propagandists and advertisers
shows that people in appropriate circumstances can be
manipulated. A principle that human beings have this
susceptibility may then be used when researchers explain
actions for which the ground was prepared by persuading
people to make up their minds in particular ways. While
such explanations are not at variance with everyday psycho-
social understandings, they do require thought that is more
sophisticated than could be based on those understandings
alone. To continue our example, the factors that affect
whether propaganda works, and the explanations of results
of its use, can be complex.74
Researchers may also need to amend some current everyday
psycho-social understanding in order to arrive at a set of
principles that will allow them to make sense of a period
of history, or a society, other than their own. To take
73 For some comments on the limitations of psychohistory see
Roberts, The Logic of Historical Explanation, pages 205-213.
74 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. Chapter 4
discusses theories of propaganda’s effectiveness. Chapter 7 presents
examples of its use.
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an example from history, there is an argument that if
historians are to understand how the Roman Empire worked
despite the limits of straightforward coercive force, they
must recognize the significance of the fact that Romans
responded to the demands of honour, both as possessors
of it and by respecting it, in ways in which we would no
longer respond.75 Turning to anthropology, there are plenty
of examples of conduct in unfamiliar societies that can only
make sense if a psycho-social understanding is substantially
amended.76
Finally, the explanatory value of different principles can
be debated by researchers. For example, it might at first
sight seem obvious that fear of punishment would be an
important reason why people would obey the law, to the
extent that it would make sense to give the notion of
deterrence a central role in thought about the criminal
justice system. But in fact there is an alternative way of
looking at compliance, based on people’s perception of the
legitimacy of the law and its enforcers, although there are
also studies which indicate that deterrence does matter.77
Such debates may not yield final verdicts, but they should
at least maintain a reasonable level of discipline over the
use of principles to give explanations.
75 Lendon, Empire of Honour: The Art of Government in the
Roman World.
76 A fine example is Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of
Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, chapter 8. Relationships between the
unamended and the amended psycho-social understandings may be
subtle and complex. See for example Williams, Shame and Necessity,
chapter 4.
77 On the significance of perceptions of legitimacy see Tyler, Why
People Obey the Law; Jackson et al., “Why do People Comply with
the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions”. For an
example of a study that argues for a deterrent effect see Abrams,




5.4.2.2 Controls over narrative explanations
The propriety of assenting to claims to explain in relation
to narratives, and the level of support that claims may
derive from playing explanatory roles in narratives, largely
depend on the extent to which the creation of narratives
is controlled. If it is easy to create narratives that appear
to explain and to get them endorsed by researchers, then
it will be easy to make claims to explain. It will also be
easy to find apparently explanatory roles for claims. Then
claims to explain may come to be accepted when that
should not happen, and other claims will not really derive
much support from playing apparently explanatory roles.
But if there are strict controls over the creation of narrative
explanations, then claims to explain may well be ones that
should come to be accepted, and the fact that a claim finds
an explanatory role within a narrative may well speak in its
favour.
The endorsement of narrative explanations can be con-
trolled by debates over their quality.78 There are also some
more specific things to say. We can identify a way to support
a claim that a narrative is explanatory. We can also identify
tests that are based on the addition of detail, on integration
across levels of generality, and on the use of methods of
analysis that are drawn from fields other than the primary
field of the narrative.
78 Several examples of historians criticizing other historians’
narrative explanations, and of their criticizing interpretations that are
made before formulating explanations, are set out in McCullagh, The
Truth of History, for example on pages 74-75 (liberalism in England
in the first half of the nineteenth century), 114-116 (the English Civil
War), and 149-150 (the interpretation of Locke). For a classic example
of criticism of a whole approach, and by implication of the credentials
of claims that are made by those who use it, see Skinner, “Meaning
and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, sections 1 to 3.
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Supporting a claim that a narrative explains
One way to support a claim that a narrative really does
explain phenomena is to show how principles are put to
work in linking the events that are described. Principles
are often not made explicit. If a narrative concerns human
beings, it is assumed that the reader will understand how
human beings think. But the reader should be able to stop
at any point, consider why a later event makes sense in
the light of earlier events, and see which principles do what
work. Examples of principles that could be noted include
the principle that setbacks tend to make people wary and
cautious, and the principle that when trust in others is
needed, trust will be extended most readily to those who
are already established friends.79 It is however important
to allow for principles on which people in a modern and
sophisticated culture would not act, but on which other
people did act. If the reader of a narrative appreciates
that other people had principles which are now alien, and
such principles are put to work in the narrative, then the
narrative can make perfectly good sense.80
There is an important condition that must be satisfied
if connections between events are to be regarded as
explanatory. This is that the direction of time must be
respected. People who acted at a certain time may be seen
as having taken account of information they had about the
past and of having been influenced by predictions. But if
79 For an example of use of the first principle see the explanation
of Metternich’s caution and desire to keep ways of escape from
difficulties open in Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and its Legacy:
War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon, page 78. Use of the
second principle is exemplified in Opp and Gern, “Dissident Groups,
Personal Networks, and Spontaneous Cooperation: The East German
Revolution of 1989”, pages 673-674.




some unforeseen events later occurred, choices made before
they occurred should not be seen as having been influenced
by the fact that they were impending. Researchers, from
a still later standpoint, can very easily have their view of
events shaped by their awareness of subsequent events, but
they should reject narratives that rely on attributing to
agents a view of events that was not available to those
agents. To take one example, the assassins of Julius Caesar
should not be seen as having wanted to pave the way for
Octavian, because they did not know what was in Caesar’s
testament.81 Researchers should also be cautious about
narratives which rely on a view that agents were well-
informed and clear-thinking, since they may not have been
so at the time.
The addition of detail
One feature of historical narratives is that there is a ready-
made framework within which to organize information. This
is the temporal framework, which exists in the background
even when narratives do not present events in chronological
order. The temporal framework makes it easy to add detail.
Each detail that is an event or a feature of an event has
a time at which it can be located. Each detail that is
a standing condition, such as the character of an agent
or a shortage of fuel, has a span of time over which it
may be relevant. Moreover, there is often a large supply
of detail that could be added. The addition of detail can
both increase the explanatory power of a narrative and put
that power to a test.
81 Suetonius, Divus Iulius, 83 (Suetonius, Lives of the Caesars,
volume 1, pages 140-143). For references to modern controversy about
what was really involved in the procedure of nominating Octavian
as Caesar’s heir see Osgood, Caesar’s Legacy: Civil War and the
Emergence of the Roman Empire, page 31.
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The addition of detail can increase explanatory power
because it allows researchers to make more use of principles
that are already used, and to make use of additional
principles. They can make more and more connections
between events, connections that are not merely ones of
temporal proximity but that also conform to expectations
as to how people, institutions and societies behave. The
extra connections both build up the context of each event
and give additional reasons why its occurrence should not
be surprising.
Such an increase in explanatory power is however not
guaranteed to result from the addition of detail. It is
possible to add details and find that explanations of events
which were already in the narrative are not improved. There
is also a risk that the addition of detail may turn out
to be counter-productive, because what it contributes to
explanatory power is outweighed by its effect in obscuring
relationships that would be seen more easily if the narrative
included less detail.
The addition of detail can test the explanatory power of
a narrative in the following way. A narrative that lacks
detail may explain events that it covers. As detail is added,
the explanation may survive. If so, that is a good sign. On
the other hand, the explanation may unravel. Details may
contradict the characterizations of some objects and events,
or they may show that events were not related in the ways
that the original explanation required.
We may therefore say that if a narrative can comfortably
integrate a lot of extra detail, and in particular if its
explanatory power is maintained or even increased by the
addition of detail, that is an indication of its high quality.




Other levels of generality and other methods
Narratives can sometimes be tested by checking the scope
to integrate them with other narratives at different levels
of generality. Historians expect accounts of the actions
of individuals to fit with accounts of the polities or the
societies within which they acted. And it is sometimes
possible to give detailed consideration to the extent to
which two or more explanatory narratives at different levels
work together. This can for example be done with different
narratives of evolution.82
Narratives can also be tested by checking the extent to
which they survive the application of methods of analysis
that are drawn from fields other than the primary fields
of the narratives. Thus historical narratives should hold
up when actions and events are analysed using methods
of game theory or economic analysis, so long as the
information to allow those methods to be applied is
available.83 At worst, any failures to hold up should be
explicable.
5.4.3 Implications for our confidence
We want to be able to tell how far we should have confidence
in the claims to explain and the claims with explanatory
roles that come to be accepted when explanations that use
principles are endorsed by the generality of researchers.
We shall consider three concerns. Researchers might have
mistaken mindsets, the existence of multiple explanations
82 Calcott, “Why How and Why Aren’t Enough: More Problems
With Mayr’s Proximate-Ultimate Distinction”, pages 775-779.
83 Examples of this kind of work are given in Bates, Greif, Levi,
Rosenthal and Weingast, Analytic Narratives.
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might make it hard to claim that any given explanation
was particularly good, and scope to redescribe explananda
might make it too easy to give explanations.
After discussing these concerns, we shall consider two
features of some explanations that use principles which
may increase our confidence, both in claims to explain and
in claims that play explanatory roles. These two features
are explanations’ having some contrastive power, and their
using causal claims.
5.4.3.1 Mistaken mindsets
Researchers in a given discipline might be trapped in a
mindset that was badly mistaken but that led them to
endorse explanations which happened to conform to their
mindset. While this is a risk, there are three reasons not to
be greatly concerned. The first reason is that if that were
the case, it would be unlikely that disciplines would be as
successful as they are. Success would be perfectly consistent
with there being considerable scope to improve existing
mindsets, but success would be hard to explain if a prevalent
mindset was too mistaken to be improved, and was only fit
to be discarded. The second reason is that it is very likely
that someone would have noticed the problem in connection
with some explanations, and would have pointed out that
the problem extended to a wide range of explanations. The
third reason is that there is not much to be done about this
risk, beyond encouraging researchers to go on being critical.
If anyone occupied an elevated standpoint from which all
mindsets could be appraised, it would be vital to take note
of what they saw. But no such standpoint is available. The
risk that is identified here is an unspecified risk, akin to the
risk of transformation that we noted in section 1.1.5.3.
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Having given these reasons not to be greatly concerned, we
should note that researchers can share a mistaken mindset.
Economic thought provides examples of occasions on which
progress has required a change of mindset.84 The fact that
identifiable instances are inevitably historical should not
lead us to suppose that there will be no further instances.
And sometimes radical changes may take place without
its being obvious that they do amount to breaks with the
past. Mindsets in the social sciences and the humanities are
not straightforwardly contradictory in the way that some
conceptions of the world in physics, such as the classical
conception and the quantum mechanical conception, are
straightforwardly contradictory. It may therefore not be
obvious in the social sciences or the humanities when a new
mindset has consigned an old one to the scrapheap.
5.4.3.2 Multiple explanations
As we noted in section 2.1.2.1, it is a feature of disciplines
relatively high up the scale that there are often several
accounts of the same topic. They may well be explanatory
accounts, giving rise to several explanations of the same
phenomenon. Such explanations need not conflict with one
another. They may simply reflect different approaches. But
even then, suspicions about the quality of explanations may
be legitimate. Even if all of the different explanations on
offer provide interesting perspectives, some of them may be
too weak for their claims to explain to be correct, especially
if there are many explanations. There might easily be three
good explanations of a phenomenon, but is unlikely that
there would be 20.
84 Screpanti and Zamagni, An Outline of the History of Economic
Thought. Section 3.2 on the impact of Ricardo and section 5.1 on
marginalism supply examples that are particularly striking.
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When there are several explanations, there may well be
no claim to explain that gains the assent of the generality
of researchers. Each explanation will have its supporters.
For any given explanation, the strongest claim to explain
that gains general assent may take the form “J has
something to contribute to the explanation of K”, where
different researchers would read “something” in different
ways, ranging from “a little” to “a great deal”.
It may then be difficult to pose our main question in its
standard form. But we can still ask whether we should be
confident that researchers act appropriately when they take
the various explanations seriously.
One source of reassurance is the existence of debate about
the merits of different explanations. When such debates
take place, it is likely that explanations that are not to
be taken seriously will be identified and will drop out of
consideration. Even when there are no debates back and
forth, we may gain reassurance from the explicit testing
of explanations. There is also the prospect of explanations
being combined, or components from different explanations
being used to create new and better explanations.85 But
when there are no debates and tests are not made, we may
reasonably wonder whether researchers act appropriately.
Explanations which would have been found wanting if
challenged might have come to be endorsed by substantial
numbers of researchers without much enquiry.
So far in this section, we have considered situations in which
complementary explanations are on offer. But sometimes
85 An example of quantitative testing of explanations is Bracke and
Fidora, Global Liquidity Glut or Global Savings Glut? A Structural
VAR Approach. An example of qualitative consideration of a range of
explanations, together with a discussion of the scope for combining
elements from explanations (on pages 144-145), is Guo, “Democratic
Transition: A Critical Overview”.
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there is outright conflict. We may see this in examples of
historical revisionism and the debates that they spark, such
as the debate over the significance of the School of Chartres
in the intellectual history of twelfth-century Europe, or
the debate over how to view reconstruction following the
American Civil War.86 (We are of course only interested
in revisionism of the intellectually respectable sort, the
sort that aims to give better accounts than those already
available. Revisionism that aims to obscure or distort
history, for example for political ends, is of no interest to
us at all.)
Such conflicts are to be resolved or left unresolved through
debates in academic books and journals. They may some-
times be resolved by the discovery of new evidence or
the development of new methods for analysing evidence.
Debates are governed by the norms of the relevant
disciplines, but disciplines do not have algorithms that
could be specified in advance, that could work out the
proper results of such debates, and that would have the
decisions they produced gain the assent of the generality of
researchers.
If a particular conflict is unresolved, we may well find it
difficult to have confidence in claims to explain, or in claims
that have come to be accepted primarily because they
play explanatory roles, even when the relevant explanations
are endorsed by a majority of researchers, so long as the
dissenters comprise a substantial minority and are not
manifestly eccentric. But there is a more general concern.
The lack of a fully defined method to resolve conflicts
between explanations, and the fact that some conflicts
go unresolved, may make us wonder about the quality of
explanations in general in any discipline that is afflicted
86 Jeauneau, Rethinking the School of Chartres, chapter 1; Perman,
“Eric Foner’s Reconstruction: A Finished Revolution”.
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with conflicts. There is however no reason to blame the use
of principles to give explanations. Rather, the natures of
the objects of study in disciplines that are relatively high
up the scale, and the natures of the disciplines themselves,
explain both the use of principles and the difficulty of
resolving conflicts, or even of fully defining a method for
their resolution. When researchers study entities such as
human beings, they do not usually have access to laws
that could play dominant roles in explanations, causal
relationships that could be confirmed by experiment, or
situations that differed only in certain identified respects
while being identical in other respects. It is therefore hard
to define methods to resolve conflicts that could actually be
used, and also sometimes hard to resolve specific conflicts
to the satisfaction of the generality of researchers.
5.4.3.3 Scope to redescribe explananda
We must ask whether descriptions of explananda are
adequately controlled. If they are not, it would be all too
easy to redescribe explananda simply in order to make it
easy to give explanations. At least some of the explanations
given would then have little value. If there is a serious risk
here, our confidence in claims to explain and in claims
that gain support from playing explanatory roles may be
diminished.
Redescription can be controlled by debate over how
explananda should be described. The control is not perfect,
but it can be useful. It may however only act over a long
period of time, leading us to worry about misdescription in
explanations that have only recently come into circulation.
An illustration of how descriptions of explananda can be
debated, with consequences for the explanations that are
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offered, is supplied by the Industrial Revolution of the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Britain.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a view of the period as one of
dramatic and wide-ranging change was popular. Then in
the 1980s, new analyses of data showed that economic
growth was slower than that picture would have led one to
expect. The picture of the period changed over subsequent
years, with a corresponding reassessment of possible reasons
for the Revolution. So although descriptions can affect
the range of explanations that are taken to merit serious
consideration, we can derive some reassurance from the fact
that debate over the analysis of evidence can lead to the
revision of descriptions. On the other hand, revisions can
take decades to have their full effects. Most disturbingly,
the views prevalent at any one time may be affected by the
circumstances of the researchers’ own times.87
5.4.3.4 Contrastive power
We shall now turn to features of explanations that
use principles which can have favourable effects on our
confidence. We shall start with contrastive power, and then
move on to the use of causal claims.
87 There is an overview of the historiography, published in 2010, in
Griffin, A Short History of the British Industrial Revolution, chapter 1,
pages 5-12. There is a more detailed account of the debates of recent
decades, published in 1999, in Mokyr (ed.), The British Industrial
Revolution: An Economic Perspective, chapter 1 (the introductory
chapter by Joel Mokyr). For two contrasting views on whether the
new thinking of the 1980s should be adopted see Temin, “Two Views
of the British Industrial Revolution”; Antràs and Voth, “Factor Prices
and Productivity Growth During the British Industrial Revolution”.
For the point that interpretations can be affected by the times of the
researchers see Cannadine, “The Present and the Past in the English
Industrial Revolution 1880-1980”.
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Explanations that use principles are less likely to be
strongly contrastive than explanations that only use laws.
But an explanation that uses principles may still have some
contrastive power. If the explanation leads researchers to
say not merely that some phenomenon makes sense, but
that it makes more sense than some plausible alternative
phenomena would have made, that is a contrast. And when
explanations do have contrastive power, that may have a
favourable effect on our confidence in claims to explain
and claims that play explanatory roles, as we noted in
section 5.2.2.2.
We must be cautious. Explanations that use principles
are normally constructed in order to explain phenomena
that have already been identified.88 Researchers’ choice of
principles to use in a given explanation, and their choice of
facts to mention in the explanation, will be guided by their
desire to explain the relevant phenomenon. If they had had
some alternative phenomenon in mind from the start, they
might have chosen different principles and different facts.
Then the alternative phenomenon might well have seemed
to make more sense than the phenomenon that was in fact
explained. This danger, of researchers thinking that they
have brought some contrast into their explanations when
they have not in fact done so, is the sort of danger that
is to be expected when methods of explanation are not
of a kind that could be used to predict phenomena that
had not so far been observed. The danger therefore extends
in a modest way to researchers who give explanations in
which the general claims are all laws, but who must use
combinations of several laws which may interact with one
another or with particular facts in unpredictable ways, as
we described in section 5.2.3.6.
88 Compare the injunction to construct historical explanations by
working backward from what is to be explained in Roberts, The Logic
of Historical Explanation, page 108.
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5.4.3.5 The use of causal claims
Narratives may fit events into an intelligible pattern by
using causal claims to connect them. The causal claims
in question are usually one-off causal claims, rather than
general claims. (We shall explain below why we do not
use the standard term “singular causal claim”.) We need to
consider both the legitimacy of such one-off causal claims,
and the potential for their use to have favourable effects on
our confidence.
Legitimacy
One might expect that the respectable use of causal claims
to give explanations would be severely restricted outside the
natural sciences, for two reasons.
The first reason is that there would be a serious shortage of
causal claims of the quality that can be found in the natural
sciences. There is a tremendous loss of microphysical detail
when events are described at the human scale, so unforeseen
exceptions to causal claims of supposedly general applic-
ation would be uncomfortably common. Opportunities to
make general causal claims would be further restricted by
the phenomenon of path dependence, which allows the
final results of processes to be influenced quite markedly
by contingent events which may very well be insignificant
in themselves.89 Very similar processes can therefore have
widely differing results, making it difficult to establish any
general claims by grouping similar cases.
89 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”. For some
case studies see Magnusson and Ottosson (eds.), The Evolution of
Path Dependence.
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The second reason why the respectable use of causal claims
might be severely restricted is that in the social sciences
and the humanities, it is difficult to specify conditions for
the invocation of general causal claims without giving rise
to suspicion that researchers could choose when to invoke
them. And if the scope for choice were eliminated, scope
to invoke the causal claims might be severely restricted.
For example, if it were claimed that artificially low interest
rates caused asset bubbles, which asset bubbles could
be explained causally by citing that general claim? In
which situations would interest rates be artificially low, as
distinct from their being naturally low because of investors’
preferences? If that decision were left up to individual
economists, it would be too easy to decide whether to
explain a given asset bubble in that way or in some other
way. If on the other hand a general causal claim were
tightened up so as to block such manoeuvres, it might
become unacceptably difficult to invoke the claim in order
to give worthwhile causal explanations. If for example the
causal claim were that interest rates that stayed more
than 1 per cent below a rate computed in some specified
market-based way for more than 12 months caused asset
bubbles, there would be cases in which the claim could
not be invoked even though there was strong evidence
that artificially low interest rates which did not satisfy the
condition had caused bubbles. There would also be cases in
which the tight conditions were satisfied but bubbles were
not caused because other factors intervened to frustrate
the effects of low interest rates, or in which bubbles arose
for other reasons. This distinction between loose and tight
characterizations in the causal claims themselves is a special
case of a wider distinction. If the judgement of experts is
allowed to influence decisions as to when to invoke general
claims to give explanations, the explanations given may
be suspect. But if that judgement is excluded, worthwhile
explanations may be placed out of reach.
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Fortunately these difficulties afflict specific causal claims,
not the use of causal ways of thinking. It remains legitimate
for researchers to think in terms of causal relationships, even
when phenomena are characterized in the terms of the social
sciences or the humanities. Four propositions come together
to support this claim of legitimacy.
The first proposition is that the physical world is made up
of fields, particles and forces that are subject to laws which
are such as to generate causal laws at some larger scales –
for example, at the scale of molecules and their chemical
behaviour.90 (The point is made in this way because to the
extent that the concept of causation is used in fundamental
physics, it has features in that context which make it look
decidedly strange to anyone not thoroughly familiar with
physics. But we should hesitate to adopt the view that the
concept of causation has no place in physics, because there
is still debate about that view.91)
The second proposition is that everything physical super-
venes on that base of fields, particles and forces, in the
sense that there could be no physical difference without
there being some difference at the level of fields, particles
and forces.
The third proposition is that while there may be behaviour
at the small scale that is as good as random given the ways
of making measurements that are in principle available,
this effective randomness has no significant effect either at
90 The reference to all three of fields, particles and forces involves
some redundancy. But the reference to all three helps clarity, and the
redundancy is harmless in our context.
91 See for example Frisch, “No Place For Causes? Causal Skepticism
in Physics”. Frisch’s example of electromagnetic radiation is not quite
at the most fundamental level of physics, and it is also set within
classical physics, but on the other hand it is not at a great distance
from the fundamentals.
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larger scales which start well below the human scale, or at
everyday temperatures.92
The fourth proposition is that it is legitimate to think in
terms of more kinds of causal claim than the kind that might
be made in physics or chemistry, and to apply different
standards to the making of different kinds of causal claim.93
It is therefore legitimate to talk in terms of causal
relationships between states of the world as characterized
at the human scale. A given (if perhaps not determinately
measurable) state of some part of the world, characterized
in microphysical detail, could be followed by another given
state, also so characterized, in accordance with general
causal claims. The two states might be characterized in the
high-level terms of the social sciences or the humanities,
although the production of such descriptions would be
based on observations in the terms of those disciplines and
not on any computation that started with descriptions in
the terms of physics. Researchers could then say that the
first state caused the second one, even when the states were
characterized in high-level terms. The fact that researchers
would not claim to have established causal laws in high-
level terms would mean that the claim to have identified a
causal relationship between the two states as characterized
in high-level terms would not be defeated by a concern that
would arise out of multiple realizability. (The concern would
be that different initial states in microphysical terms could
92 For completeness, we should note that it has been argued
that quantum effects can matter on large scales and at everyday
temperatures. See Hameroff and Penrose, “Consciousness in the
Universe: A Review of the ‘Orch OR’ Theory”, section 3.1 for the
size of microtubules and section 4.5 for temperatures. This whole line
of work is however somewhat speculative.
93 Kutach, Causation and its Basis in Fundamental Physics,
chapter 1, on types of causal claim and standards; Steward, A
Metaphysics for Freedom, chapter 8, primarily on types of cause.
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have had the same high-level characterization, even though
that would have allowed a state characterized in the same
high-level terms as the identified cause not to be followed by
any state that would have been characterized in the same
high-level terms as the identified effect.)
There is one more condition for it to be legitimate for
researchers to think in terms of causal relationships. This
is that it must be legitimate to abstract events from their
contexts, and to view the extracted events in certain ways
and not others, in order to identify specific causes. Michael
Oakeshott opposed such abstraction and thought that the
only, and yet powerfully explanatory, thing to do in history
was to give as complete a recital of events as could be
given.94 But the practice of researchers in the social sciences
and the humanities says otherwise. Causes do get identified,
and the results of such identifications are considered to be
useful.
Effects on confidence
It is not enough to show that it is legitimate to talk in
terms of causal connections between states of the world.
It would be a further step to identify particular causes of
given phenomena. In order to have a sense of the potential
for the identification of specific causal connections to have
favourable effects on our confidence, we need to understand
the nature of the connections that may be identified in the
social sciences and the humanities.
Researchers may very well claim that some features of
a situation caused some features of some later situation,
where all of the features concerned are characterized in
the terms of their discipline. But they are unlikely to
94 Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, pages 140-143.
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be able to support their identifications of causes in ways
that would make those identifications safe from challenges
that were perfectly reasonable. It is not merely that the
human world is a complicated one. There are specific
difficulties that would stand in the way of substantiating
identifications of causes by reference to patterns in data,
even when researchers only sought to defend the use of their
identifications to make one-off causal claims rather than
general causal claims.95 It would also be difficult to identify
underlying mechanisms without leaving the identifications
exposed to challenges from rival identifications that were in
equally good (or bad) standing. There would for example
not be much hope of seeing off rivals by pointing to laws
of nature. (The limits on what might be achieved that are
set out in this paragraph are the reason why we do not
use the standard term “singular causal claim”. There is a
widespread view that such claims must be backed by causal
laws, or at least by counterfactuals. And while historians,
for example, do sometimes experiment with counterfactuals,
the results of such work would not be sufficiently immune
from challenge to supply the kind of counterfactual backing
that would be required to defend identifications of causes
against all reasonable challenges.96)
This does not mean that the making of one-off causal
claims has nothing to contribute to our confidence in
claims to explain or in claims that play explanatory roles.
The identification of causes in higher disciplines is not an
undisciplined activity. There are methods that can impose
rigour on the identification of causal connections in the
95 For these difficulties see Franzese, “Multicausality, Context-
Conditionality, and Endogeneity”.
96 For a discussion of the status of counterfactual history see
Niall Ferguson’s introduction to Ferguson (ed.), Virtual History:
Alternatives and Counterfactuals. For a view of the importance of
counterfactuals that is tied closely to causal reasoning see Levy,
“Counterfactuals and Case Studies”.
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social sciences, and the sophistication of those methods
has increased over the decades.97 We should however note
that while such methods may impose discipline, they are
not guaranteed to yield conclusions of types that might be
desired.98
In the humanities, lively debates about causes reassure us
that researchers take care before assenting to claims, and
we may in turn have some confidence in claims that have
come to be accepted. The causes of wars, from ancient
wars to recent ones, are particularly hotly debated. While
debate lasts, few explanations would be widely enough
endorsed either to allow the corresponding claims to explain
to qualify as accepted, or to lend much support to claims
that played explanatory roles. But when the dust settles,
the fact that there has been lively debate may give us
reassurance.
It is also important not always to seek causal explanations.
Explanations of the actions of individuals are an area of
particular risk. It is perfectly legitimate to identify causes
97 A recent survey of some methods that impose rigour can be found
in Morgan (ed.), Handbook of Causal Analysis for Social Research.
Chapter 13 of that book, Elwert, “Graphical Causal Models”, covers
a method on which we shall comment in section 8.3.5.4. For a method
of identifying events and then tracing relationships between them by
asking questions about causal dependence that is less sophisticated
mathematically, but that is perhaps easier to use in relation to the
event-rich narratives of human affairs, see Griffin, “Narrative, Event-
Structure Analysis, and Causal Interpretation in Historical Sociology”.
There is also the method of sequence elaboration, which can be used to
discipline the construction of causal chains and the ranking of causes
as more or less significant: Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu, “The Logic
of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences”, pages 128-141.
98 For example, the method of sequence elaboration cannot always
be used to assess the relative importance of different causes. Such
difficulties are acknowledged in Mahoney, Kimball and Koivu, “The
Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences”, page 142.
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of wars or economic fluctuations, and to explain mundane
patterns of social behaviour by reference to reasons (such
as widespread subscription to a religion) that may be
viewed as causes even though the conditions that those
reasons identify do not change over the period of interest,
but merely support continuing patterns. Researchers may
think in causal terms when they think about the roles
of the members of specified groups of people, whether
they think of the members generally or of typical but
unspecified members. The identified causes may include
both changes in prevalent viewpoints, such as a growth in
nationalism, and standing tendencies to behave in certain
ways, such as a tendency to defer to people who occupy
designated positions of authority. And there is no obstacle
in principle to identifying some past experiences or some
general facts about human psychology as causes of such
changes or tendencies, so that an explanation of a war,
fluctuation or pattern of behaviour can be causal all the
way down. But when researchers consider the actions of
specified individuals, explanations of those actions that
concentrated exclusively on external causes would detract
from the picture of individuals as makers of their own
decisions and creators of their own lives. Neuroscientists
might be happy to abandon that picture, but researchers in
the social sciences and the humanities need to retain it. If
they do not retain it they will not see the people they study
as people like themselves, influenced by reasons, preferences
and trivia but then deciding what to do. Explanations need
to cite people’s reasons for acting in ways that make those
reasons appear as reasons, and not solely as causes.99
The identifiable causes of wars, economic fluctuations and
the like may well include actions of specified individuals. So
99 This thought sits within a wider debate about action and social
meaning. For an introduction that takes a particular line see Skinner,
Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method, chapter 7.
289
5 Explanation
the need not to concentrate exclusively on external causes
when explaining such actions means that it is sometimes
appropriate to welcome, and not merely to tolerate, gaps
in networks of causes of large-scale events. Suppose that
large-scale causes of a war which first started to have their
effects decades before the outbreak of war can be identified.
Close analysis shows that in the few days before the
outbreak of war, certain politicians took key decisions.100
Historians may be able to identify reasons why they took
those decisions, such as worries about what their political
opponents in their own countries would say. But if historians
wish to give explanatory roles to those decisions, it may not
be appropriate for them to concentrate solely on external
causes of the decisions. If they concentrate solely on external
causes, the decisions will not appear as free. But if they
do not concentrate solely on external causes, the decisions
can be seen as free even when causes of the difficult
circumstances in which the unfortunate politicians found
themselves are identified. In legal work too, it is normal
not to trace lines of causation through deliberate human
actions. Such actions are seen as creating breaks in causal
chains.101
100 For an example of such a study see Clark, The Sleepwalkers:
How Europe Went to War in 1914. Part 2 sets out developments and
tensions in the decades preceding 1914 and the natures of the decision-
making processes in different countries. Part 3 concentrates on the
period immediately before the outbreak of war and the actions of
individual politicians.




We shall now consider why explanations that only use laws
are standard in some disciplines, while explanations that
use principles are standard in others.
5.5.1 The availability of laws
As we move up the scale of disciplines, it becomes harder to
identify a range of laws that is wide enough to supply the
requirement for general claims in explanations. It therefore
becomes harder to use laws alone. (We discussed the reasons
why exceptionless laws are hard to come by in high-level
disciplines in section 3.4.1. Laws with modest numbers of
exceptions are likely to be in comparatively short supply
for the same reasons.)
There is no single point at which there cease to be enough
laws. And there are general claims that might reasonably
be regarded as laws, even if they were prone to exceptions.
(As we noted in section 5.2.1, we have no precise definition
to tell us what should count as a law. We seek to follow
reasonable practice.) In economics for example, work on
how sharp changes in government spending affect the
relevant economy can yield generalizations that could, if
carefully formulated and applied, approach being laws.102
And it has been argued that there are plenty of useful
generalizations which have at least some of the flavour of
laws in the social sciences more widely.103
102 Ramey, “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s all in the
Timing”.
103 Goertz, “Descriptive-Causal Generalizations: ‘Empirical Laws’
in the Social Sciences?”
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An important move in the search for laws is often to
look at statistics rather than individuals. For example, if
researchers study all of the participants in a workforce, it
may well be possible to obscure the individuals, to measure
statistical variables and to formulate laws, albeit laws that
are prone to exceptions.104 There is also some prospect
of finding recurring patterns in economic history through
the practice of the relatively new discipline of cliometrics,
which applies sophisticated techniques of economic analysis
that were designed for contemporary economies to historical
data. There is even some prospect of finding recurring
patterns in social history and large-scale political history
under the banner of the even newer discipline of cliody-
namics, which seeks relationships between, for example,
population growth, educational levels and levels of social
stability, as well as analysing cultural evolution by using
tools drawn from the study of biological evolution. It is
however not clear that general claims made in cliodynamics
could reasonably be regarded as laws, given that this would
require not only establishing when developments of certain
types were followed by phenomena of certain types, but also
when such developments were not followed by phenomena
of those types.105 Finally, it is possible to explain the
availability of at least some laws at the human level despite
the shadow cast by fears of multiple physical realizability
104 It is for example possible to draw conclusions about relationships
between the ages of members of workforces and the productivity
of those workforces: Malmberg, Lindh and Halvarsson, Productivity
Consequences of Workforce Ageing – Stagnation or a Horndal effect?;
Vandenberghe and Waltenberg, Ageing Workforce, Productivity and
Labour Costs of Belgian Firms.
105 There is considerable activity in both disciplines, as may be
seen from the journals Cliometrica: Journal of Historical Economics
and Econometric History; Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative
History and Cultural Evolution. For some views on the potential of




of given situations as described at the human level.106 But
while examples and arguments may show that laws can be
found and explain why they are available, the distribution
of laws in the social sciences is patchy. There is no reason
to expect to find a coherent and comprehensive body of
laws. Moving up to the humanities, the patchiness of the
distribution of such laws as there are becomes even more
marked.
It is therefore no surprise that explanations that only use
laws should have their most significant roles in disciplines
low down the scale, while explanations that use principles
have their most significant roles in disciplines high up the
scale. But it is not merely that laws are readily available
low down the scale, in quantities that allow them to cover
all or substantial proportions of the fields of study of
the disciplines concerned. It is also relevant that the laws
that are available, in physics and chemistry in particular,
are precisely stated, and that they relate quantities which
are modest in number, well-defined and measurable. This
means that within such a discipline it is possible to give
complete explanations by using modest numbers of laws,
and to do so in a wide range of situations.
As we move up the scale, even within the natural sciences,
the picture changes. Consider for example epigenetics. Even
when researchers confine their attention to processes at
the cellular level, the environmental conditions that trigger
changes can be much harder to define with great precision
than, for example, chemical reaction rates.107 Epigenetics
is by no means in a poor way. A great deal of work has
106 Papineau, “Physicalism and the Human Sciences”.
107 Examples of such conditions are listed in the column headed “In-
ducing conditions” in the table on pages 140-152 of Jablonka and Raz,
“Transgenerational Epigenetic Inheritance: Prevalence, Mechanisms,
and Implications for the Study of Heredity and Evolution”. For that
paper’s restriction to processes at the cellular level see page 133.
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been done, and the prospects for future work are bright.
But we cannot expect to find laws of epigenetics that will
have the same reach within that discipline as the laws that
are used in physics and chemistry have in their disciplines.
Systematic explanation of practically everything within the
scope of a discipline like epigenetics using laws alone may
still be an aspiration, but it is not obvious that it is
achievable. In any of the social sciences or the humanities,
such an aspiration would clearly be unachievable.
5.5.2 Laws and human decisions
The difficulty of giving explanations that only use laws in
disciplines that are relatively high up the scale need not
be a loss. There is sometimes reason for researchers who
study individual human beings in ways that are not purely
biological to prefer explanations that use principles. The
use of principles can make it possible to give accounts that
allow readers to use everyday psycho-social understandings,
perhaps modified to allow for differences in time or culture.
In particular, the use of principles can allow readers to
project onto the people studied their own internal sense
of the process of weighing up options, deciding and acting.
Explanations of people’s decisions and actions that only
used laws would not allow that kind of projection. Such
explanations would treat decisions as the forced outcomes
of the operation of laws, a treatment that would not be true
to human experience. Take for example the statement “He
felt torn between patriotism and family loyalty”. The reader
would herself have a sense of the demands that the concepts
of patriotism and family loyalty can make on someone who
has those concepts. If a discipline represented people merely
as governed by laws, it would not capture that sense of the
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demands that the possession of concepts can make on those
who possess them, because it would fail to give an adequate
representation of someone who felt the pressure of those
demands and had to decide what to do, rather than simply
responding to the demands in the way that a machine
would respond to pressure on parts of its mechanism. The
discipline would therefore not represent the people who
featured in its accounts as possessing the concepts, in a
form of representation that would allow application of an
everyday psycho-social understanding.
We may now consider why explanations that use principles
are not subject to the same handicap. The reason is
straightforward. A principle does not set out what is bound
to happen, or what is bound to happen in normal cases,
or what is bound to happen in a given percentage of
cases. A principle merely sets out how people in general,
or people with certain characters, generally act in certain
types of situation, and implicitly or explicitly indicates some
considerations that will count as reasons within their own
deliberations. The principle leads researchers and readers
not to be surprised if someone, or someone of an appropriate
character, does act in that way. It also makes conduct
of that nature comprehensible. But there is no sense of
constraint, of an agent’s being directed by nature, or even of
an agent’s being influenced by nature in the sense of having
the probability of his acting in a certain way being at a
certain level or being increased by a certain amount. An
explanation of conduct by reference to principles therefore
allows readers to see a free agent who makes decisions,
creates himself and responds to the demands of concepts
that he has adopted. If someone is seen in this way,
an everyday psycho-social understanding, or perhaps a
modified version of one, can be applied to him.
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If however researchers do not bring someone’s conduct
under laws, even laws with exceptions or statistical laws,
but instead refer to principles that make his conduct
comprehensible, how can they be said to have explained
that conduct? The answer is that the principles make
reference to a psycho-social understanding and bring that
understanding to bear. The agent is seen as a human
being, given to human ways that researchers and readers
understand from the inside because they are also human
beings. That is in itself a kind of explanation.
The reasons we have given here why explanations that
only used laws would not suffice in disciplines that gave
accounts of individual human lives are not reasons to think
that the conduct of human beings could never be wholly
or largely predicted on the basis of laws. They are only
reasons to think that a discipline which was dominated by
explanations that only used laws would not be anything like
the social sciences and the humanities as they are currently
practised. But our concern is with claims that come to be
accepted in disciplines as they are practised.
5.5.3 Simplification as a route to laws
We have noted why, in any discipline that is relatively
high up the scale, there are not enough laws to conduct
the discipline as a whole, and why a preference for laws
over principles might be inappropriate. But there is still
a natural urge to found a discipline on laws to the extent
that this would be both possible and appropriate, because
explanations that only use laws give the distinct impression
of being stronger than explanations that use principles.
We shall now consider a way in which laws may be given
a greater role than they would otherwise have. When the
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topic is some type of human conduct, researchers may
manage to identify laws if they concentrate on people’s
desires and make some simplifying assumptions. The result
may be the creation of a theoretical variant of the relevant
discipline, an approach that we discussed in section 4.4.2.
The classic example is supplied by the notion of homo
economicus, a rational being who acts independently of
others to maximize his own utility and whose interactions
with others simply reflect his personal preferences, signals
from the market on prices and signals from the market
on what income can be obtained from which activities. If
economists make this simplifying assumption about human
beings and then explore how such simplified people would
act in order to maximize their utility, it becomes possible
to derive laws that would work very well in a world that
was populated solely by homines economici.108 Likewise,
economists and other social scientists can use game theory
to make predictions about how agents will behave, assuming
that they have specific strategies with regard to payoffs
(such as maximin), and that they will act rationally given
the limited information that the relevant games make
available to them.
Social scientists are however keenly aware that it is only
an unrealistic degree of simplification that allows them
to move into a world in which laws provide reasonably
comprehensive coverage, as opposed to the very patchy
coverage that is available in the real world. Unrealistic
motives must be imputed, or unrealistic abilities to work
out the most effective means to ends must be assumed, or
108 The assumption is a radical simplification, and there is con-
siderable scope to adopt a more sophisticated picture of human
beings than the simplification would allow while still engaging in
contentful and disciplined economic research. See for example Stout,
“Taking Conscience Seriously”; Davis, “Competing Conceptions of the
Individual in Recent Economics”.
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both. Social scientists therefore try not to use unrealistic
simplification in ways that would lead the theories to
collapse as soon as that simplification was challenged.
(Simplicity is however not always placed out of reach.
What matters is not that simplification should not be used,
but that it should not be used in ways that would lead
theories to collapse when they were challenged. Sometimes,
models of the world that result from the use of unrealistic
assumptions can be perfectly useful. We shall return to this
topic in section 5.7.3.2.)
We shall now consider the extent to which refinement of a
simplified picture, acknowledging more of the complexity of
real human beings, reduces the availability of laws.
5.5.3.1 The acknowledgement of complexity
We have taken the simplifying assumptions that economic
theories sometimes make about human motivation and
conduct to exemplify simplification in order to allow the
development and the use of laws. We shall now take
behavioural economics to exemplify modification in order
to recognize the complexity of human beings.
Behavioural economics recognizes that people have imper-
fect information and limited ability to select means to ends.
People may make decisions by using rules that are quick
and easy to use, but that do not always recommend the
best choices. They may over-react or under-react to signals
from the market, creating fluctuations that are wider than
would be necessary merely in order to reallocate resources
in response to changed preferences and availabilities. And
they may act from a range of motives and with a range
of different objectives in mind. The field of behavioural
economics is wide, and it does not have sharp boundaries.
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It includes studies of what happens when economic agents
have ways of reasoning that are not those of homo
economicus, studies of how people behave in organizations,
neuroeconomics, and much else. There is also lively debate
as to whether such work represents a legitimate extension
of the discipline of economics.109
One consequence of modifying the picture that would be
painted by regarding each person as a perfectly rational,
fully informed and efficiently calculating homo economicus
is that events that would be inexplicable on that basis
become perfectly explicable. The result is however not ideal.
The cost of giving a better representation of the world is a
retreat from laws that have, in the imaginary worlds where
they apply, a high degree of reliability, and that between
them give reasonably comprehensive coverage of topics. To
take one recent example, a study of wage behaviour that
took account of behavioural factors considered the results
of many studies and weighed up a number of factors very
carefully, but in the end was far from being able to give a
theory of the origins of wage rigidity of a type that would
allow precise predictions to be made about cases not already
studied.110
There is sometimes a way out of the dilemma that simplified
pictures of the world are too simple, while realistic pictures
make it hard to arrive at laws that have a high degree of
109 General guides include Baddeley, Behavioural Economics and
Finance; Altman (ed.), Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Eco-
nomics: Foundations and Developments; Diamond and Vartiainen
(eds.), Behavioral Economics and its Applications. For examples of
debate see the papers in Caplin and Schotter (eds.), The Foundations
of Positive and Normative Economics: A Handbook.
110 Bewley, “Fairness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity”. The fact that
tools of precise prediction were not made available is no criticism of




reliability. Researchers in the social sciences can sometimes
rule complexities out of consideration quite safely, without
fear that they will thereby misrepresent the world. Safety
is unlikely to spring from an acknowledgement that results
will only be approximately correct. It would be most unwise
to hope for that, when dealing with complex systems that
may approach being chaotic in the sense that is given by
chaos theory. Instead, safety may spring from the nature of
the researchers’ interests. For example, economists may not
need a full theory of the limits on people’s rationality when
their concern is with markets as wholes.111 To give another
example, a mathematical model of a social network that is
inevitably a greatly simplified representation of the world
can still be used to characterize, and to some extent explain,
how such a network changes when there is disruption
such as the disappearance of an important member of the
network.112 As with the focus of economists on markets
as wholes, the conclusions drawn are of types that should
be relatively immune to being undermined by the degree
of simplification. In this case the conclusions are about
stability, information and the reduction of uncertainty,
topics that are well suited to be approached through the
mathematical analysis of networks. But while this sort of
approach may help with the reliability of laws, it is not at
all clear that it would be a route to sets of laws that would
give reasonably comprehensive coverage of topics.
111 Ross, “Psychological versus Economic Models of Bounded
Rationality”.
112 Barrett, Henzi and Lusseau, “Taking Sociality Seriously: The
Structure of Multi-Dimensional Social Networks as a Source of
Information for Individuals”.
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5.6 Erklären and Verstehen
The categorization of explanations as those that only use
laws and those that use principles can be compared to
the long-standing categorization of pieces of work as those
that offer Erklären and those that offer Verstehen. We shall
first say something about Erklären and Verstehen, and then
make the comparison.
5.6.1 The two concepts
The traditional translations of the words “Erklären” and
“Verstehen” are “explanation” and “understanding” re-
spectively, but we shall use the German words. We shall
continue to apply the English word “explanation” more
broadly, to cover accounts that are explanatory in any way.
The concepts of Erklären and Verstehen do not have
contents that are both precise and universally agreed. In
particular, authors tend to allow the content of the concept
of Verstehen to emerge from the uses they make of it.113 We
shall therefore specify contents.
A given explanatory account may offer both Erklären and
Verstehen to varying degrees, or it may offer just one of
the two. An explanation that offers Erklären typically tells
the reader how the regularities and the mechanisms of the
world give rise to some observed phenomenon. It explains
by reference to those regularities and mechanisms, and
the reader understands the phenomenon on that basis. By
contrast, Verstehen amounts to making sense of human
conduct in a way that is broadly empathetic – although




as we shall note below, mere empathy is not enough. The
reader sees directly that the human agents involved acted
in ways that human beings do sometimes act, and that
they did so by virtue of their having goals, values and an
ability to make decisions. A reader achieves Verstehen on
being given enough information to understand some human
conduct by combining that information with a view of the
agents involved as subjects, and not merely as objects. The
reader sees them as possessing human points of view, just
as she possesses one, and that is a crucial commonality.
For our purposes, a reader will see someone as possessing
a human point of view when she sees him as investing
people and events with meaning and value, as motivated
by specific considerations which are of the same general
type as considerations that would motivate her, as making
decisions in response to investments of meaning and value,
and as having a sense of being a self-directed agent rather
than a cog in a machine.
We are not here concerned with whether people in fact
possess human points of view, but whether the reader
sees them as possessing them. (Seeing people studied
as possessing human points of view must of course be
productive, and it will not be productive if the people
studied do not in fact possess human points of view or
something very similar, so their actual nature does matter.
But that is a separate concern.) The need to see people
in that way is the reason why the elements listed echo the
normal human condition. And we specify human points of
view because we are interested in what it would take for a
human reader to achieve Verstehen, rather than in what it
might take for some non-human rational being to do so.
Within the list of elements, the reference to motivating
considerations being of the same general type as those
that would motivate the reader might appear to be rather
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restrictive. But “the same general type” designates a type
that is potentially very broad. We only require that the
motivating considerations be ones that the reader could see
might motivate a human being. They would not need to
be ones that would in fact motivate the reader or people
with whom she would be in sympathy. One could argue for
a stricter requirement, that the reader would need to have
an appreciation of the specific culture of the people studied
which was not as detached as would be the appreciation
of a complete outsider who was nonetheless human, but
we do not need to argue the point. Such a non-detached
appreciation of a culture would automatically imply as
much as we need – the requirement for the reader to see
the people studied as having human points of view.
One mark of Erklären is that an explanation is given in
terms which make irrelevant the human nature of those
who give the explanation and those who grasp it. The
achievement of Verstehen, on the other hand, relies on
the human nature of the reader who achieves it. The
achievement of Verstehen draws on the fact that the reader
both possesses a human point of view and sees those whose
conduct is described as likewise possessing human points
of view. It is this perceived common ground that allows
the reader to make sense of the conduct. And it is the
exploitation of commonality that makes the achievement
of Verstehen a natural and efficient process. Attempts by
non-human readers who were not broadly similar to human
beings to achieve Verstehen of human conduct would fail
because what non-human readers might think was common
ground would not correspond to how the people who were
studied actually saw themselves.114 The dissimilar readers
114 For a remark on the importance of an ethnographer’s being
human and a view that Verstehen will then be achievable despite the
ethnographer’s being an outsider see Manicas, A Realist Philosophy
of Social Science: Explanation and Understanding, pages 64-67. Non-
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would then have to fall back on some more laborious way
to explain human conduct.
Our way of giving the content of the concept of Verstehen
picks out one thread in a complex tradition. We are
interested in the type of Verstehen that depends on the
correctness of the accounts that confer it, the type that is
achieved when someone reads an account and is satisfied
that it shows why things happened as they did. The
achievement of satisfaction must not require the reader to
assent to claims that would clash with the actual corpora
of relevant disciplines or with the reader’s everyday psycho-
social understanding (perhaps modified in ways that the
reader can accept). The end result may feel, to the one who
achieves Verstehen, just as good as the understanding that
she would achieve by being provided with an explanation
that offered Erklären. It is however distinguished by its
reliance on the reader’s possession of a human point of
view from something else that may be given the name
“understanding” in English, and that may either result
from Erklären or amount to Verstehen. This latter type of
understanding is characterized by Lynne Rudder Baker as
involving making sense of that which is understood.115
human beings could be close enough to human beings for them to
possess points of view that were similar enough to human points of
view, but we shall not spell out this possibility each time. We shall
simply take such beings to meet the requirement to possess human
points of view.
115 Baker, “Third-Person Understanding”, page 186. Baker uses this
point in an argument for the recognition as real of things that are not
to be defined in the terms of physics, and some of those things are
artefacts of human institutions. But this does not detract from the
fact that understanding of the nature that she identifies can often
result from Erklären. In similar vein, a notion of understanding that
requires grasping how everything fits together is offered in Kvanvig,
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, chapter
8 (the requirement is stated on pages 192-193). One development of
such a line of thought can be found in the view that understanding
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We have drawn the distinction between Erklären and
Verstehen in terms of what the reader needs, not in terms
of the nature of the results. Erklären will typically confer
access to propositional information which can be shared
with other human beings. The achievement of Verstehen of
the type that interests us will also confer access to shareable
propositional information. It will leave the reader with an
understanding of why things happened in the way they did.
She could articulate this understanding to another human
being by setting out people’s circumstances, characters,
desires, worries and so on, and explaining their conduct in
those terms. We are not interested in Verstehen that would
not enable such articulation, but would only give the reader
a feeling of empathy. Purely empathetic Verstehen is not a
source of claims of the types with which our main question
is concerned.
5.6.2 Laws and principles
One might anticipate a rough match between explanations
that only used laws and those that offered Erklären, and
likewise a rough match between explanations that used
principles and those that gave readers Verstehen. But
that would not get to the nub of the matter. Rather,
the connection between the two categorizations is this. A
distinguishing feature of Verstehen in the sense we have
specified is that its achievement depends on the reader’s
possession of a human point of view. That is not a
distinguishing feature of explanations that use principles,
but it is something that is required in order for many
is achieved when one grasps how a system works without making
exact calculations: de Regt and Dieks, “A Contextual Approach
to Scientific Understanding”, sections 4.1 and 4.2. As with Baker’s
notion, understanding either in Kvanvig’s sense or in de Regt and
Dieks’s sense can either result from Erklären or amount to Verstehen.
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explanations that use principles to be seen as having
explanatory power, while it is only rarely required in order
to see explanations that only use laws as having explanatory
power.
This connection between Verstehen and explanations that
use principles arises as follows. Principles are very often
derived from everyday psycho-social understandings. Their
explanatory power is clearly seen by readers who have
human lives, lives which they lead in ways that can
be made intelligible by reference to such psycho-social
understandings. If readers reflect on how they live, they
can appreciate that a psycho-social understanding reflects
what are, from a human point of view, straightforward
facts about human nature. Examples are the facts that we
often act in accordance with stable characteristics, that we
can be influenced by trivial events long ago, that we feel
the force of desires, worries and responsibilities, and that
our actions result not merely from computations but from
decisions which are viewed by the people who make them
as free, and for which they see themselves as responsible.
Readers can also appreciate that they would themselves
be influenced by many of the considerations that are cited
in explanations of other people’s conduct. They are well
aware that considerations like loyalty, ambition and security
matter.
In this way, accounts that use everyday psychological
concepts make perfect sense to human readers. Such readers
understand the force of reasons, preferences and concerns.
There might in theory be a translation of almost everything
in such accounts into terms that could also be appreciated
by non-human readers, but such translations would be
impossibly cumbersome. It is much more straightforward
to draw on the fact that human readers directly appreciate
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the force of considerations of a number of types.116 And one
aspect of human points of view would be particularly hard
to replace. This is the internal sense of making decisions
freely and with responsibility, the sense of being more than
a cog in a machine, or even a complex assembly of cogs.
Even a sophisticated notion of guidance control would be
inadequate to our internal sense of how we decide and act.117
It might be thought that analyses of human conduct in
terms of the values of different courses of action in a world of
human beings who all had preferences as between outcomes,
and especially game-theoretical analyses, would obviate the
need for possession of a human point of view. Such analyses
can be very sophisticated. They can explain a great deal.118
They can also take account of people’s predispositions
to follow social norms. Herbert Gintis has set out the
importance of such predispositions. There would however
still be something missing. A reader might learn that
people acted in certain ways on account of a predisposition
and their expectations as to payoffs, but that explanation
would not be compelling unless the reader appreciated that
predispositions and expectations as to payoffs could move
people.119
116 Wolfgang Spohn argues for the related view that researchers in
the human sciences must engage in normative discourse in order to do
their empirical work: Spohn, “Normativity is the Key to the Difference
Between the Human and the Natural Sciences”, section 3.
117 For the notion of guidance control see Fischer, “Compatibilism”,
section 8.
118 Examples related to cooperation can be found in Gintis, Bowles,
Boyd and Fehr (eds.), Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The
Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. For examples of the
use of game theory to give historical explanations see Brams, Game
Theory and the Humanities: Bridging Two Worlds, chapter 8.
119 For Gintis’s argument see Gintis, The Bounds of Reason: Game
Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences, chapter
8 (chapter 7 of the 2009 edition). The need for an appropriate
predisposition is spelt out on pages 143 and 153 (pages 133 and 143
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In contrast to principles, the explanatory power of laws can
usually be appreciated without adopting a human point of
view. Laws link phenomena to one another in ways that
could be evident to a wide range of rational beings on the
basis of experience of the external world. (Only the general
idea of how linkages worked, and the contents of a few
elementary laws, would in fact be evident to most of us.
Special skills are commonly required in order to make the
detailed content of many laws comprehensible, but those
skills are not likely to be limited to human beings.)
It is however possible for laws to have explanatory power
that is only visible from a human point of view. Laws
can sometimes be derived from an everyday psycho-social
understanding. Researchers may for example be confident
that when someone has a strong sense of having incurred
some moral obligation, and he has the means to discharge
that obligation without serious inconvenience, he will do so
even if nobody has any way to force him to do so. That
could qualify as a law of human nature. Even though the
proportion of occasions on which the antecedent would fail
to be followed by the consequent could not be given exactly,
it might be clear that it would be below some low level, such
as five per cent. That statistical fact could be clear to a
wide range of rational beings. But the fact that the law was
underpinned by a forceful mechanism of the world would
only be evident from a human point of view, the adoption
of which would disclose how someone with a sense of having
incurred a moral obligation would feel impelled to discharge
it.
of the 2009 edition). Gintis speaks of a normative predisposition, but
that perfectly apt turn of phrase should not lead us to overlook the
need for the reader of an account that refers to such a predisposition
to have had the right kind of life in order to grasp the nature and the
force of normativity.
308
5.7 Special types of explanation
5.7 Special types of explanation
In this section we shall consider three special types of
explanation: those that use case studies, those that make
use of results, and those that use models.
5.7.1 Case studies
Case studies are used in the social sciences. They also
appear in history, often under the name of microhistory,
although not all microhistory should be seen as the use of
case studies.120 We shall reserve the term “case studies” for
studies that analyse what happened in given situations in
some detail with a view to learning lessons, whether about
the cases studied, about similar situations or about ways
in which it is possible for the world to work. We shall
include studies where such goals are not explicit. They are
for example often not explicit in historical studies. We shall
not apply the term “case studies” to illustrative examples
that are only mentioned in passing. We shall also confine
our attention to issues that arise from the use of case studies
generally. We shall not stop to consider issues that only arise
in special contexts, such as the issues that surround the use
of case studies in the history of science to draw conclusions
in the philosophy of science.121
120 For examples from a range of social sciences see Yin, Applications
of Case Study Research. For a discussion of the use of case studies in
one type of economics see Alston, “The ‘Case’ for Case Studies in New
Institutional Economics”. For examples of microhistory and a range of
perspectives on microhistory see Brooks, DeCorse and Walton (eds.),
Small Worlds: Method, Meaning, and Narrative in Microhistory.
121 For an optimistic view of such issues, with references to earlier
literature, see Chang, “Beyond Case-Studies: History as Philosophy”.
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Case studies allow researchers to make use of a great
deal of detail about specific examples, detail that may
be unavailable for other examples or that would be
unmanageable if it were to be assembled for a large number
of examples. We shall now consider ways in which case
studies may play roles in giving explanations, and some
issues that may affect our confidence.
5.7.1.1 Explaining specific cases
An individual case study may show what happened (the ex-
planandum), and exactly how it happened (the explanans),
in the case actually studied. The scope to attend to detail
can make case studies particularly useful in this kind of
work.122 And a detailed account of what happened in a
particular case can bring important regularities to light.123
We may regard this type of work as a form of the use of
narratives to explain.
5.7.1.2 Generalizing and theorizing
Case studies may also be used to draw conclusions about
cases generally from selections of cases that are studied
in detail, either by straightforward generalization, simply
taking it that the cases not studied are like those that have
been studied, or by using case studies to reach theoretical
conclusions that can then be used to explain what happens
in cases generally. Neither generalizing nor theorizing could
sensibly be done on the strength of a single case study, but a
122 Bennett and Elman, “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study
Methods: The Example of Path Dependence”, section 3.
123 Sabean, Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen,
1700-1870, page 12.
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reasonable number of studies taken together could provide
a respectable foundation for such work.
When straightforward generalization is used, the first stage
is to give an account that is selective enough in the details
it includes to allow it to apply to all of the case studies,
while it still includes the details that researchers consider
to have explanatory significance. Then at the stage of
generalization, any claim to explain that is made on behalf
of that account is simply extended to cases not studied.
There is an element of theorizing even in straightforward
generalization, because details in an account are selected
on the basis that they are thought to have explanatory
significance. That selection will be guided by views as to
how some existing understanding of the world should be
applied to the case studies. But it is also possible to use
case studies to substantiate theoretical claims themselves.
Case studies may show how processes work in specific cases.
They may thereby substantiate claims about reasons for the
apparent correctness of wider-ranging hypotheses, such as
the hypothesis that democracies do not go to war against
one another.124 Case studies can also help researchers to
develop and substantiate theories by facilitating the close
and detailed engagement of theory with evidence.125
There are reasons to be cautious about the use of case
studies to generalize or to substantiate theoretical claims.
Although these are different uses, they do have such reasons
in common, so we shall treat the two uses together. We shall
now look at some of the reasons for caution.126
124 Crasnow, “The Role of Case Study Research in Political Science:
Evidence for Causal Claims”, section 4.
125 Rueschemeyer, “Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical
Gains?”, page 318.
126 For a fuller discussion of what case studies can and cannot do




An essential part of both generalization and the substan-
tiation of theoretical claims is to compare a range of case
studies. Careful consideration of similarities and differences
can give researchers confidence in the claims that they
make, or it can lead them to sound cautionary notes. When
the goal is generalization, the comparison may be of a
merely aggregative nature. When it is the substantiation
of theoretical claims, some deeper analysis of points of
similarity and difference and of the reasons for them is
likely to be required. But in either case researchers should
be concerned that the case studies chosen be appropriately
representative, even though there is rarely much hope of
taking a sample that would even approach the statistician’s
usual standard of randomness.127 Two possible concerns are
that too few case studies may have been used, and that the
selection of case studies may have been biased.
The number of case studies matters because a few normal
cases will not represent the whole field. It is important to
give reasonable coverage of the range of cases, including
both normal cases and cases that are for various reasons
abnormal. Any general claims that are made and that
do not explicitly exclude abnormal cases ought to hold
for at least a reasonable proportion of abnormal cases,
if those general claims are not to be misleading. (They
would be misleading even if abnormal cases were rare,
because a failure to exclude abnormal cases would suggest
that peculiarities were irrelevant to the correctness of the
claims.) The difficulty of using enough case studies is
127 For some remarks on the design of studies that involve multiple
cases see Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, pages 56-63.
A comment about not being in the business of taking samples is on
page 57. There are also some remarks on the selection of case studies
in Fearon and Laitin, “Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative
Methods”, section 2.
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accentuated by the fact that in the social sciences and the
humanities, there are many different points of interest about
each case. The ratio of the number of case studies that it
is practical to consider to the number of relevant variables
within each case study is often rather low. The position
need not be hopeless, because work can be done to extract
a wide range of testable implications of hypotheses.128 But
we still ought not to have much confidence in any claims
that should only come to be accepted on the basis of a
large number of case studies, unless many case studies were
in fact considered.
There is also a risk that the selection of cases may be
biased. Researchers may introduce bias by setting some
arbitrary criterion for cases to be of interest, such as that
some variable should be within a range that they regard
as normal. Or their attention may gravitate to cases with
outcomes that they find particularly interesting. Or, and
particularly among historians, they may select the cases for
which good records happen to survive, where that survival
has been a matter of hazard.129
There are methods that can be used to reduce selection
bias. It is possible deliberately to seek out particular types
of case, such as typical cases, cases in which certain variables
take extreme values, and cases that exhibit unusual causal
pathways.130 More generally, there are well-understood
128 King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research, chapter 6; Levy, “Case Studies:
Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference”, page 3. The value of the
methods proposed by King, Keohane and Verba has however been
doubted: George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development
in the Social Sciences, pages 170-178.
129 For a discussion of selection bias see George and Bennett, Case
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, pages 22-25.




norms for the design of case study research, some of
which bear directly on the selection of cases and some
of which bear on other tasks, such as the specification of
variables and the definition of data to be collected.131 If
we have confidence that such norms have been observed,
that can increase our confidence in claims that have
come to be accepted wholly or partly on the strength of
work on case studies. We should however note that social
scientists are more likely than historians both to be self-
conscious observers of such norms, and to engage in the
systematic comparison of case studies in the first place. A
microhistorian is quite likely to select a single case, such as a
single village. This is not to say that microhistorical work is
always suspect, but only that this particular source of norm-
based reassurance is likely to be less readily available than
with social science work, and that microhistorians should
recognize the limitations of their work. They do not always
do so, and some of them have been criticized for making
unsupported generalizations.132
Interpretation
Case studies must be interpreted. It is at this stage
that claims will be made as a result of generalizing or
theorizing. Those claims will be used to give explanations
of the phenomena observed in case studies, and perhaps
of phenomena in cases that have not been studied. Our
primary concern is the confidence we should have in claims
to explain and in claims that play explanatory roles.
We shall look at general norms of analysis, traditional
131 Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, chapter 2;
George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences, chapter 4.
132 Magnússon and Szijártó, What is Microhistory? Theory and
Practice, pages 127-131.
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hypothesis testing, and the formulation and testing of fuzzy-
set claims.
As with the selection of case studies and the conduct of
case study work, there are general norms of the analysis
of results. (As with norms of selection, self-conscious
observance is more common in the social sciences than in
microhistory. The observance of norms of analysis is also
more important in the social sciences, given the types of
interpretive claim that are typically made in them.) Norms
are implicit in descriptions of standard methods of analysis
that are set out in textbooks on case study work, the
norms being that the methods should be used and that any
adjustments to them should be well-justified.133 Some of the
standard methods relate not only to work that compares
several case studies, but also to work on single case studies.
If established methods are used, that should increase our
confidence. Having said that, there are two reasons to limit
the increase in confidence. The first reason is that some
methods are not very precisely defined, so that judgement
is needed to use them. The exercise of judgement could lead
to the best possible results, or it could lead to results which
were not as securely based as the good reputation of the
methods might lead one to expect. The second reason is
that not all methods are above criticism. If a significant
number of researchers consider that a method suffers from
inadequacies, its use should not have as positive an effect
on our confidence as it might otherwise have had.
Turning to traditional hypothesis testing, our confidence
in claims may be increased if they have been tested in
the standard ways. Hypotheses are tested using standard
133 Methods are described in Yin, Case Study Research: Design and
Methods, chapter 5, and in George and Bennett, Case Studies and
Theory Development in the Social Sciences, chapters 6 and 8 to 11.
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statistical techniques, even though case study work is not
necessarily in the business of sampling and is very rarely
in the business of random sampling. Any increase in our
confidence should however be limited by two concerns.
The first concern is precisely that collections of case studies
are not random samples. Traditional methods of hypothesis
testing therefore cannot be used to give the same level of
reassurance as they can give when random samples are
taken. They may play their part among a range of methods
to give reassurance, but they may well be inadequate on
their own.
The second concern is that the small samples that typically
emerge from work on case studies may be too small to
make traditional hypothesis testing much of a source of
reassurance. There are arguments that for certain types of
test, small samples can be perfectly adequate. But such
comforting conclusions rely on judgements, for example
about prior probabilities of hypotheses and about precisely
which hypotheses should be pitched against one another.134
Finally, there is a comparatively new approach that
recognizes the difficulty of reaching precise conclusions in
the social sciences and that introduces what we may call
fuzzy-set claims, after the role that is played by fuzzy set
theory.
The standard context of use is qualitative comparative
analysis, in which properties of different entities are
noted and relationships of set inclusion are identified. For
example, political scientists might start with all of the states
that had become democratic in the period since about
134 Such concerns about the role of judgement may for example be
voiced in response to the argument for the adequacy of small samples
in Dion, “Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study”,
pages 132-139.
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1970. They might identify the set of such states that failed
as democracies, and also the set that had low levels of
economic development, a lot of division of political parties
into different factions, and weak executives. They might
then find that the latter set was a subset of the former
set.135
Fuzzy set theory does not limit researchers to saying that
entities are either in or out of sets. Instead, it allows
them to say that entities are in sets to degrees, ranging
from 1 (simply in) down to 0 (simply out). Its use allows
the formulation of fuzzy-set claims. An example would
be a claim about countries, that those with high values
of membership of the set of countries without strong
unions formed a fuzzy subset of those with high values
of membership of the set of countries with weak class
voting.136
Fuzzy-set claims are not inherently suspect. There are
systematic ways to calibrate scales of membership and to
assign values of membership. There can also be system
in the appraisal of the extent to which evidence supports
or counts against claims.137 But there are still reasons to
be cautious. One reason is that there is scope both to
debate methods of calibration to be used and, in some
cases, to exercise judgement when calibrating.138 Another
135 Qualitative comparative analysis is described in Kogut, “Qualit-
ative Comparative Analysis of Social Science Data”; Rihoux, “Case-
Oriented Configurational Research: Qualitative Comparative Analysis
(QCA), Fuzzy Sets, and Related Techniques”. The example of
democracies comes from Rihoux, page 724.
136 The use of fuzzy set theory is explained in Ragin, Redesigning
Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. The example of unions and
voting comes from pages 39-42.
137 Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond,
chapter 5, covers calibration and the assignment of values. Chapter 3
covers relationships between evidence and claims.
138 Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, notes
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reason is that all of the different measures of the extents
to which fuzzy sets are included within other fuzzy sets
have their deficiencies, so that drawing firm conclusions can
require their supplementation with other methods such as
the inspection of scatterplots.139
5.7.2 Explanations that use results
An explanation of a phenomenon may proceed by identify-
ing its results, usually with an implicit or explicit premise
that the results in question were to be expected or were
desirable, and perhaps with a further premise that the
occurrence of the phenomenon was the most likely or the
most straightforward way to produce the results. Thus the
nature of human lungs may be explained by the result that
oxygen gets into the blood, and some person’s action may
be explained by reference to the fact that it got him a better
job. (The example of lungs reminds us that the existence or
the nature of an object is for our purposes a phenomenon to
be explained, just as much as the occurrence or the nature
of an event.) Explanations that make use of results in order
to explain phenomena may be called functional, or they may
be called teleological. We wish to treat them all together,
so we shall use the relatively neutral distinguishing feature
that results do explanatory work.
We may start with explanations of the actions of people
and of some animals by reference to what those actions
the lack of precise agreed standards for calibration on page 86, and
goes on to describe two different methods of calibration, the direct
method (pages 89-94) and the indirect method (pages 94-97). The
indirect method in particular relies on “qualitative assessments of set
membership” (page 96).
139 Smithson and Verkuilen, Fuzzy Set Theory: Applications in the
Social Sciences, section 5.4.
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were intended to achieve. This form of explanation is
unproblematic, so long as it is reasonable to attribute to the
agents both desires to achieve certain results and the ability
to work out how to achieve them. Researchers must ensure
that attributions of those abilities, and of the relevant
desires and character traits of the agents, are plausible. And
they should ideally check that the attributed desires and
character traits are more plausible than others that could
have been attributed, particularly others that would have
made the actions difficult to explain. But it is likely to be
fairly easy to gain reassurance on those points.
There is however a cautionary note to sound. Researchers
should not assume that consequences of actions were
intended, merely because those consequences might have
been intended. Unintended consequences may be highly
desirable, but they do not explain actions. And it is not
always easy to draw a boundary between the intended
and the unintended. Foreseen but unintended side-effects
of actions might be thought to demand special treatment
at this point, but in fact they can be categorized with
unforeseen consequences under the general heading of
unintended consequences. Foreseen but unintended side-
effects do not themselves explain the actions that led to
them, although their acceptability may explain why agents
did not refrain from those actions.
An important subset of cases of unintended consequences
comprises examples of social institutions or practices that
were not created, or are not sustained, as a result of
any actions intended to create or sustain them. The
institutions or practices may be explained by reference to
their functions, such as the avoidance of conflict or the
facilitation of trade, but can explanations that rely on the
identification of functions be good ones? They can, but only
if they are supported by theories that explain why useful
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functions should get performed without conscious plans to
perform them. Selectionist theories, the essential idea of
which is that what works will survive and spread, are one
possible source of support.140 Even when such support has
been provided, there may be a need for more to explain the
existence of a specific institution or practice rather than
merely the existence of some institution or practice that
performs the relevant function. Such additional explanation
might take the form of an account of historical accidents,
or it might involve showing how the specific institution or
practice struck the best available balance between effort and
satisfactory performance of the function.
Outside the sphere of the actions of intelligent agents,
explanations in which results do explanatory work must
be treated with great caution. Unconscious nature has no
awareness of where it is going. An explanation that makes
use of results is therefore very likely merely to put a gloss
on reality. Any claim that results explained a phenomenon
would be very dubious. It would also be difficult for a claim
to acquire support by virtue of its playing an explanatory
role in such an explanation.
Fortunately, researchers are cautious about explanations by
reference to results outside the sphere of the actions of
intelligent agents. But such explanations are not banished
entirely. The most obvious area in which to look for them
is evolutionary biology, but there is plenty of opposition to
them there, perhaps as a reaction to the fact that the notion
of species being well-adapted to their environments makes
140 Kincaid, “Functional Explanation and Evolutionary Social
Science”. For relationships between such theories and theories
of biological evolution see Haines, “Evolutionary Explanations”.
For a discussion that brings out the complexities of unintended
consequences and their explanation see Aydinonat, The Invisible
Hand in Economics: How Economists Explain Unintended Social
Consequences.
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it all too tempting to formulate explanations by reference
to results.141 More surprisingly, we may find reference to
results in chemistry and even in physics, for example when
a process is described as leading toward some low-energy
state. Such descriptions can be argued to be legitimate, but
they must not be read as claiming any kind of deliberate
conduct in nature.142
5.7.3 Explanations that use models
Many explanations use models in order to make connections
between the phenomena to be explained, the particular
facts that might explain them and the laws, principles and
background facts that are brought into use.
There are two senses of the term “model”. The first sense
is the everyday one of a simplified or tidied-up image of
the objects, processes, or events that are modelled. The
second sense is the logician’s one, models of axiomatized
theories. Models in the latter sense are argued to be
necessary in order to characterize the results of work
in the natural sciences satisfactorily, rather than their
being needed merely in order to accommodate the limited
capabilities of human minds.143
Our concern here is the impact of the use of models on our
confidence, taking the term “model” in the first sense. We
shall not be concerned with the logician’s sense. We shall
141 For advocacy of such explanations see Walsh, “Teleology”. For
criticism of the baleful influence of a focus on results see Reiss, Not
by Design: Retiring Darwin’s Watchmaker.
142Birch, “Robust Processes and Teleological Language”.
143 Some of the issues are set out in French, “The Structure
of Theories” and in Portides, “Models”. Le Bihan, “Defending the
Semantic View: What It Takes” is a recent contribution to the debate.
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also not be concerned with other uses of models, for example
as aids to reasoning or as tools to make computations
practical.144
There are several competing and overlapping conceptions
of models in the natural sciences, in the sense of models
that does concern us here.145 We shall not try to pick
out one conception as right for our purposes, but shall
instead define the models that interest us as those in which
some mathematical entities are used as models because
their behaviour mimics the behaviour of the objects studied
well enough to make the mathematical entities useful in
research.146 It may be possible to compute the behaviour
of the mathematical entities analytically, or it may be
144 Morrison and Morgan, “Models as Mediating Instruments”, sets
out how models can be used as instruments of investigation, helping
researchers to do more than they could do if they focused solely on
theories and data. For some comments on how models can make
computations practical, comments that are made in the context of
particle physics but that are of broader application, see Hartmann,
“Effective Field Theories, Reductionism and Scientific Explanation”,
sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2. For roles that models can play in the
management of data and the development of theories see Laubichler
and Müller, “Models in Theoretical Biology”; Leonelli, “What is
a Model? Combining Theoretical and Material Models to Develop
Intelligible Theories”.
145 For a survey of conceptions see da Costa and French, Science
and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific
Reasoning, chapter 3.
146 Godfrey-Smith, “The Strategy of Model-Based Science”, pages
734-738, argues that models used in biology should be seen as
“imagined concrete things”, rather than purely as mathematical
structures. But Godfrey-Smith allows them to be mathematical
structures too, so agreement with his argument would not conflict
with our approach. Actual concrete objects of the same general
type as the objects modelled can indeed be models, as they are
in synthetic biology: Mukherji and van Oudenaarden, “Synthetic
Biology: Understanding Biological Design from Synthetic Circuits”.
But even then, one of the aspirations is mathematical characterization
of the behaviour of the models.
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necessary to run simulations. We shall include models
that are substantially couched in mathematical terms, even
if they do not quite meet the mathematician’s normal
standard of complete precision.147 The boundary between
what is included and what is excluded is hazy, but it
should be clear enough in practice. We shall for example
not consider models that are essentially analogies drawn
from everyday life, as when the analogy of a multilateral
contract is used to model a welfare state as a social contract
to which all citizens are party.148 Models like that may be
very valuable aids to thought, but they are not good tools to
substantiate claims. At best, they may substantiate claims
that certain worlds are credible possibilities.
5.7.3.1 The use of models
Having constructed a model, researchers may conduct
experiments within it. They may for example see how
changes in the values of some variables lead to changes in
the values of others, and how processes take place within
the model. In this way they will explore the model on
its own terms. If they translate such explorations back to
the situation modelled, they may take themselves to have
explained what goes on in that situation. It is this kind of
147 We would for example include some but not all of the models
that are identified as nonformal in Morton, Methods and Models: A
Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science,
chapter 2.
148 Paz-Fuchs, The Social Contract Revisited: The Modern Welfare
State – Overview and Critical Report. This kind of use of the contract
analogy is to be distinguished from the study of social contracts
themselves by modelling members of populations as participants in
games and then using game theory. Such models do fall within our
scope. For such work see Binmore, Natural Justice, and for a more
technical treatment Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract.
Volume 1: Playing Fair; Volume 2: Just Playing.
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explanatory work that concerns us here. We are interested
in claims to explain and in support for claims that play
explanatory roles, rather than in the predictive success of
models.
There are plenty of mathematical models in the natural
sciences. Some complex situation in the world is modelled
by some mathematically tractable entities, computations
are done on them and the results are compared with
empirical data. If the fit is good, or if it can be made good
by adjusting parameters in the model, the model may be
taken to provide an explanation of some phenomena.149 The
sense of explanation may however sometimes be a modest
one that only involves showing how patterns in different
phenomena are related to one another, and does not involve
engagement with underlying mechanisms.
Turning to the social sciences, models are especially
conspicuous in economics, and as in the natural sciences
they play roles in developing theories as well as in giving
explanations of phenomena.150 But models also feature in
149 An example of this kind of modelling from condensed matter
physics is the Gaussian chain model of polymers: Kawakatsu, Stat-
istical Physics of Polymers: An Introduction, chapter 2. An example
from chemistry is the modelling of complex chemical systems: Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences, Development of Multiscale Models for
Complex Chemical Systems: Scientific Background on the Nobel Prize
in Chemistry 2013. An example from biology is the use of a model
based on game theory to explain the coexistence of different strains
of yeast and the effects of changing the concentration of glucose:
Gore, Youk and van Oudenaarden, “Snowdrift Game Dynamics and
Facultative Cheating in Yeast”. There are several more examples from
biology in Laubichler and Müller (eds.), Modeling Biology: Structures,
Behaviors, Evolution.
150 The range and sophistication of models in use is illustrated
by Florens, Marimoutou and Péguin-Feissolle, Econometric Modeling
and Inference. For a discussion of the use of models in economics
see Sugden, “Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms”. For an
example of the use of models and of how models may be refined
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many research papers elsewhere in the social sciences.151
5.7.3.2 Distance from the world
For the purposes of our main question, an important feature
of models is that many of them are more or less distant from
the world that they represent. They tend to be simpler than
the world that is modelled, while still reflecting relevant
features of the world.152 We shall start by considering
models in the natural sciences, and then move on to the
social sciences.
Distance from the world gives rise to a risk of misrep-
resentation, but that risk is not limited to the use of
models. Even in work that does not use models but deals
directly with the world, the world must be characterized
in some way.153 It is then appropriate to ask whether
the characterization represents the world well enough in
in order to address conflicts between models and data see Zodrow,
“Capital Mobility and Capital Tax Competition”.
Models are also used for forecasting, with varying degrees of success.
Forecasting raises special issues, which are for example covered in
Clements and Hendry (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic
Forecasting. We shall not pursue those issues, because our concern
here is understanding the world rather than making predictions.
Forecasting is not irrelevant to our concerns, because the consistent
predictive success of a model could increase our confidence in claims
about the world that were based on its use, and conversely a lack of
predictive success would reduce that confidence. We can however note
that fact without exploring issues that are specific to forecasting.
151 The journal Mathematical Social Sciences is a good source of
examples.
152 Godfrey-Smith, “The Strategy of Model-Based Science”, page
726.
153 Weisberg, “Who is a Modeler?”, section 4, distinguishes between
modelling and what Weisberg calls abstract direct representation,




relevant respects. But the question arises in a particularly
obvious way when models are used. Models are not to be
read as straightforward descriptions of the world. This is
not a matter of the results the models produce being more
or less quantitatively accurate. Indeed, a loss of quantitative
accuracy may be a cost of making models explanatory.154
Rather, it is a question of the extent to which models
reconceptualize the world in ways that are not tightly
constrained by a requirement to say how the world really is.
And the assumptions that are made in order to construct
a model may create a gap between the model and any
accepted theoretical description of the world there may be.
A model may even be at variance with the best theory that
is accepted at the time when the model is constructed.155
It is the fact that models can be far from accurate descrip-
tions that raises issues for us. We may have confidence in
claims to explain that are based on the use of such models,
but only so long as the claims recognize the limitations of
work with models. It is important not to assume without
further argument that successful models show how the
world really works. It is possible for a model to predict
outcomes correctly even if it does not correctly identify
the stages that the mechanisms of the world follow. And
if researchers do assume that models show how the world
really works, they may reach ontological conclusions that
result from assumptions made when creating the models.156
154 Bokulich, “Explanatory Models Versus Predictive Models: Re-
duced Complexity Modeling in Geomorphology”, section 5.
155 Hartmann, “Effective Field Theories, Reductionism and Sci-
entific Explanation”, section 3.2.2.
156 Winther, “Fisherian and Wrightian Perspectives in Evolutionary
Genetics and Model-Mediated Imposition of Theoretical Assump-
tions”.
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A consequence of the potential for failure to describe the
mechanisms of the world is that we may have only limited
confidence in claims that play explanatory roles, unless it
is recognized that the claims are only to be read as claims
within models rather than as claims about the world.
Having raised this concern about claims within models, we
should recognize that it can sometimes be overcome. It
may be overcome for any one of three reasons. The first
reason is that sometimes the distance from straightforward
description that researchers can be confident does not
misrepresent the world is short enough that there is little
cause for concern. The second reason is that a model may
set out a mechanism, and researchers may have reason
to think that what is set out does closely represent the
relevant mechanism in the world. The third reason is that
when several models are integrated with one another, or
when models are integrated with experimental work or
with mechanistic explanations, this may indicate that the
models in question should be seen as describing the world
accurately, or at least as coming close to doing so.157
Accurate description of the world would be a likely reason
why descriptions of different types or from different points
of view should fit together.
We shall now turn to the question of distance from the
world in the social sciences. The fact that the phenomena
studied can often be described in everyday terms makes it
easy to suppose that models explain the world directly, but
caution is required. We should take seriously the scope to
reconceptualize which is suggested by Milton Friedman’s
argument that economists should neither want nor expect
explanatory models to represent the world accurately, even
157 Green, “When One Model is Not Enough: Combining Epistemic
Tools in Systems Biology”; Brigandt, “Systems Biology and the Integ-
ration of Mechanistic Explanation and Mathematical Explanation”.
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if we do not agree with his argument.158
Concerns about the risks of reading claims to explain
and claims that play explanatory roles as relating to the
world rather than to models should therefore be just as
strong in the social sciences as in the natural sciences.
The widespread and successful use of models to advance
disciplines does not show that the models in question
give accurate pictures of the world. They may present
credible worlds, they may be analogies, or they may be
open formulae that are at some remove from making definite
claims about the world.159
Even when such doubts are assuaged, we should not assume
that models give anything approaching full representations
of the world. Even in the natural sciences, models can give
representations of the structure of the world that are only
partial.160 We may expect representations to be even more
markedly partial in the social sciences. Even those who
adopt a pretty positive view of models in the social sciences
still acknowledge that models involve a distancing from the
world, for example by idealizing in order to isolate factors
that are of particular interest.161
We only urge caution, not rejection. It is perfectly possible
to make a case that a model shows how the world works.
One way to make such a case would be to show that
the model could be integrated with other models or with
158 Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics”.
159 Sugden, “Credible Worlds, Capacities and Mechanisms”; Gilboa,
Postlewaite, Samuelson and Schmeidler, “Economic Models as Ana-
logies”; Alexandrova and Northcott, “Progress in Economics: Lessons
from the Spectrum Auctions”, section 4.
160 Da Costa and French, Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary
Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning, pages 48-52.
161 Mäki, “MISSing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible
Surrogate Systems”.
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survey or experimental work. And even if a model does
misrepresent the world, it is not clear that the model is
thereby debarred from being explanatory.162 There are ways
to be explanatory that do not require accurate description
of the mechanisms at work in the world.163 To the extent
that the issue is felt to be a pressing one, it is sometimes
possible to close the gap between models and the world
by using narratives.164 And some claims that are made
on the strength of work using models, for example claims
about how the values of variables are related to one another
in general and not merely in observed cases, may be
claims to which it is perfectly proper to assent even if the
models do not reflect how the world works. One possible
source of reassurance would be to show that claims held
up under variations of the model’s potentially unrealistic
assumptions.165
Finally, we can gain reassurance about claims that are based
on modelling from the fact that there is plenty of scope for
the systematic validation of models and for their critical
appraisal.166
162 For some arguments on this point see Reiss, Philosophy of
Economics: A Contemporary Introduction, chapter 7, pages 127-141.
163 Sugden, “How Fictional Accounts Can Explain”.
164 Morgan,“Models, Stories and the Economic World”, section 5.
165 Kuorikoski, Lehtinen and Marchionni, “Economic Modelling as
Robustness Analysis”.
166 On validation in biology see Haefner, Modeling Biological
Systems: Principles and Applications, chapter 8. Some examples of
criteria that can be used in appraisal in the context of the social
sciences are given in de Marchi, Computational and Mathematical
Modeling in the Social Sciences, pages xx-xxi. There is an extended
discussion of the appraisal of models in political science in Morton,
Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal
Models in Political Science, chapters 4 to 8 and section 9.1. For an
example of testing a model see Clark, “Residential Preferences and





Simulations are sometimes used to obtain results from
models, either because equations are too intractable to
solve analytically or because simulation is a way to make
a model as faithful as possible to the world. Simulations
play important roles in both the natural and the social
sciences. To take just a few examples, chemists simulate
ensembles of molecules in order to work out their behaviour,
meteorologists simulate the atmosphere, oceans and land
masses in order to predict the weather, and social scientists
simulate groups of people in order to work out how
they might behave.167 This last example is one in which
simulation is a way to make a model as faithful as possible
to the world. The world to be modelled is a population of
autonomous agents who will behave as they individually
see fit, so the best approach is to construct a model that
comprises simulated agents and then run simulations in
which they decide individually what to do.
The use of simulations raises epistemological issues that
have been debated extensively.168 We shall not enter into
wide epistemological debate here. We shall however note
that the use of simulations, like the use of models generally,
involves work with something that is not the world about
which claims are made. The crucial issue for our main
question is therefore the same as with models generally.
When claims to explain and claims that play explanatory
roles are made following work with simulations, how
167 Cramer, Essentials of Computational Chemistry: Theories and
Models, chapter 3; Randall et al.,“Climate Models and Their
Evaluation”; Gilbert, Agent-Based Models; Helbing (ed.), Social Self-
Organization: Agent-Based Simulations and Experiments to Study
Emergent Social Behavior.
168 For an introduction with references see Parker, “Computer
Simulation”.
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boldly or modestly should those claims be read? Are the
simulations close enough to the world in relevant respects
to allow the making of claims to explain what goes on in
the world, or to credit claims with roles in explaining what
goes on in the world?
The concern comes into sharp focus when we take note of
the view that simulations can themselves be arguments that
certain results will be observed in the world.169 A simulation
might be an argument for a conclusion to the effect that
given a situation of the type for which the simulation
was designed, and given the specific facts of that situation
(corresponding to initial values in the simulation), certain
results would transpire. But whether the simulation would
provide evidence of how the world would achieve those
results would depend on whether the simulation’s algorithm
appropriately represented the workings of the world. (This
question of how results would be achieved is separate from
the question of whether they would be achieved. Even
if a simulation made correct predictions every time, its
algorithm might still misrepresent the workings of the
world.) The sophistication of work on simulation methods,
and the care that is taken to consider the appropriateness of
models, give some reassurance.170 But researchers’ primary
concern may be that simulations should yield correct
predictions. Any concern that the algorithms used should
correctly represent the workings of the world may then be
an instrumental one: accurate representation may give the
best prospects for obtaining correct predictions.
169 Beisbart, “How Can Computer Simulations Produce New Know-
ledge?”
170 The sophistication of work and the care taken can be seen
by reading papers in relevant journals, such as the Journal of




We should also recognize a special feature of a particular
type of simulation, the type in which individual steps
cannot be seen as rational. This type of simulation has
been discussed by Tyler Burge.171 What follows is mainly
a summary of his discussion. We start with simulations in
which individual steps can be seen as rational, and then
consider simulations in which this is not so.
Repeated simulations of non-rational behaviour, such as
simulations of the behaviour of simple animals, are sim-
ulations in which each step taken by the researcher is
rational. The individual runs of the simulation constitute
acts of data generation, just like acts of data collection when
measurements are taken from the world. The rationale for
those acts is perfectly well understood. The rationale for the
computations that are made using the data is also perfectly
clear.
There are other simulations in which such a grasp of the ra-
tionality of the stages is not available. These are simulations
in which natural processes of evolution are simulated in
order to discover the best solutions to problems. The picture
is one of the survival of the fittest solution, with solutions
evolving both by taking on features of other solutions
in the way that organisms inherit characteristics of their
parents, and by mutating at random. While there is rational
justification for setting up such a process, the specific steps
that take place cannot be understood as rational ones.
Individual random acts of breeding and mutation are not
in themselves rational. The steps are therefore not ones
that the researchers can justify individually by reference
to their understanding of what detailed steps it would be
rational to take in order to obtain results. They can only
justify the conduct of a sequence of steps of that nature and
171 Burge, “Epistemic Warrant: Humans and Computers”, pages
502-506.
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reliance on the final result, on the basis that the method of
simulation has been found to work well. This may limit the
extent to which researchers can explain why they should
conclude that the solution which emerges triumphant is
optimal. They may still have ample grounds for believing
that it is optimal, but their grounds are more restricted
than the grounds that are available when they can explain
the rationality of all of the steps that led to the result.172
We are unable to reach a general conclusion as to our proper
level of confidence when simulations have been used. We can
however use our catalogue of concerns to help us ask some
appropriate questions in specific cases.
Finally, we may note one point that need not detain us.
There is a mathematical question as to the extent to which
results obtained from simulations, or from the use of any
numerical methods, may not be what would have been
obtained by analytic methods. All that is necessary for our
confidence not to be reduced by that concern is for us to
have confidence that researchers will have made allowance
for such effects when formulating their claims.
172 Burge distinguishes between justification and entitlement. He
claims that in such a situation researchers may only have entitlement
to their conclusion (“Epistemic Warrant: Humans and Computers”,
pages 505-506), because justification would require having a rational
argument without the gaps that the non-rational steps would create.
But they would still be justified in affirming their conclusion, even if






We introduced the norms of disciplines in section 1.3, and
said something about their nature and about types of norm
in section 2.1.1.2. Now we shall discuss their role in giving
us confidence.
Norms govern both the conduct of research and the
appraisal of claims that are candidates for assent.1 A
single norm can have influence at both stages, because a
fundamental norm of appraisal is that appraisers should
consider whether research was conducted in accordance
with appropriate norms. They will therefore refer to specific
norms of the conduct of research. Conversely, researchers
will want their claims to have a good prospect of coming
to be accepted, so they will make sure that they observe
1 The scope for norms to play these two roles is evident from a
review of the journal Accountability in Research: Policies and Quality
Assurance. Papers in it cover both the conduct of research and the
appraisal of claims.
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the norms of conduct. A widely held desire to have the
results of work receive the assent of others can indeed lead
to the coordination of standards of work.2 Moreover, specific
norms of appraisal, such as the norm that claims should
be checked for consistency with the corpus, can also be
observed by those who intend to make claims.
Given the scope for norms to have influence at both stages,
we shall not distinguish between the uses of norms at
the two stages except when there is special reason to do
so. The influence of norms at either stage can have a
favourable effect on our confidence. Some incorrect claims
will slip through processes of appraisal, so it helps that the
observance of norms at the stage of conducting research will
reduce the number of incorrect claims that are presented for
appraisal.
We shall first review the position in disciplines low down the
scale, where deductive relationships between propositions
and relationships that are almost as strong are plentiful.
We shall then move on to disciplines higher up the scale,
where strong relationships are not so plentiful.
6.1.1 Disciplines low down the scale
6.1.1.1 Mathematics
Mathematics must as usual be treated differently from other
disciplines. It does not purport to be about the physical
world. It is a free-standing system of claims. We can set
out the main norms as follows.
2 Albert, “Methodology and Scientific Competition”.
336
6.1 Norms
∙ Claims may be made if they have been deduced from
claims that are already in the corpus.
∙ In addition, new types of mathematical object may
be introduced, so long as their properties are defined
precisely and so long as their introduction does not
allow contradictions to be deduced. Deductions that
involve those new types of object may then be made.
∙ Claims may not be made in other ways, except as
conjectures that are used to guide research. Such
conjectures may in due course come to command wide
assent, perhaps because of their fertility, their good fit
with some areas of the corpus, and the failure to find
counter-examples despite an extensive search. But
they cannot join the corpus until they have proofs.
These norms should ensure adequate control over whether
researchers assent to claims.
6.1.1.2 Other disciplines
In other disciplines that are rich in strong relationships
between propositions, the norms are more varied than in
mathematics. They may range from very general norms
such as “Researchers must record ways in which errors
might arise”, to very specific ones such as “Researchers who
use instruments to take measurements, such as colorimeters,
or who use a scale with which data are to be compared,
such as a scale that will determine radiocarbon dates, must
calibrate their instruments or scales”.3
3 Skoog, Holler and Crouch, Principles of Instrumental Analysis,
chapter 1, section 1D; Pollard, “Measuring the Passage of Time:
Achievements and Challenges in Archaeological Dating”, pages 152-
154.
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There may also be norms that the presence or absence of
specific signs should be considered before making claims.
For example, if a causal claim looks worth considering,
it may be important to consider the consistency of the
connection between the supposed cause and the supposed
effect under different conditions, and the plausibility of
possible mechanisms through which the connection could
operate.4
Positive support for claims
The norms of any discipline will only allow researchers
to make or assent to a claim if it has adequate positive
support and there are no strong reasons to doubt it. What
types and levels of support for claims are adequate will
depend on the norms of the discipline, but if deductive
relationships between propositions and relationships that
are almost as strong are plentiful, those norms are likely to
require support to be set out in arguments that primarily
rely on such strong relationships. (The support may come
from new evidence. There is no suggestion that new claims
must be deduced or come close to being deduced from the
existing corpus alone.)
References to positive support might sound dangerous in
the light of Karl Popper’s argument that theories can only
be falsified, not verified, so that the most positive thing
4 The examples are numbers 2 and 6 from the list of nine given
by Bradford Hill: Hill, “The Environment and Disease: Association
or Causation?”, pages 296-297 and 298. Hill was however careful to
regard them as viewpoints from which questions of causation could
be considered, rather than as strict rules (page 299). Indeed, he
expressly noted that failure to identify a plausible mechanism should
not disqualify a causal claim (page 298). For a discussion of Hill’s
proposals in the context of more recent thought see Joffe, “Causality
and Evidence Discovery in Epidemiology”.
338
6.1 Norms
that may be said about them is that they are corroborated
by their having withstood attempts to show that they are
wrong.5 This is a convenient point at which to explore the
justification for thinking in terms of positive support, and
indeed support that can be enough to make it legitimate
simply to conclude that certain claims are correct.
We can render the notion of positive support legitimate in
the context of the natural sciences by taking into account
the context within which pieces of work are done. There
is usually a vast background that both supplies theoretical
resources and allows the immediate problem to be defined.
For example, if the question is that of how disordered
segments affect the lifespans of proteins, there is a vast
biochemical background that sets out the roles of proteins,
how they are structured, why their lifespans are important,
how disorder is to be quantified, what mechanisms of
influence are plausible, and how instruments and procedures
can be used to obtain information.6 A consequence is that
evidence can show that some claims should straightfor-
wardly be regarded as correct. The background makes two
different contributions to making this possible. The first
contribution is that it allows the establishment of probative
links from evidence to claims. The second contribution is
that it narrows down the options for claims that are worthy
of consideration. It may do so sufficiently to answer the
multiplicity-of-causes objection to the use of eliminative-
causal reasoning, the objection that while all options but
one of those considered may be eliminated, other options
may not have been considered.7 There is a remote risk that
5 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, chapter 10.
6 The example comes from van der Lee et al., “Intrinsically
Disordered Segments Affect Protein Half-Life in the Cell and during
Evolution”.
7 Achinstein, Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the
Philosophy of Science, chapter 11, section 3, subsection B.
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the background corpus is incorrect in some relevant way, but
that is not enough to make it illegitimate for researchers to
say that some claims have been shown to be correct. Nor is
it enough to reduce our confidence in accepted claims.
Some claims may be established on the basis of crucial
experiments that decide between rival claims. Here an
additional concern arises. Can claims be tested in isolation?
Pierre Duhem argued that it was not really possible to test
an isolated hypothesis. The need to make and interpret
observations and to work out their implications means that
tests rely on taking a whole theoretical background for
granted.8 More recently, Willard Van Orman Quine used his
image of a fabric of belief to claim that no statement was an
island. When there is tension between different statements,
for example, when a statement of an observation conflicts
with a statement of the relevant prediction of a theory,
there is at least some scope to choose what adjustments
to make in order to resolve the tension. (Quine wrote of
contact between experiences and statements, rather than
between statements of experience and other statements, but
in the current context nothing turns on that distinction.)
If the theory is far away from the edge of the fabric, and
much else in other parts of the fabric depends on it, it is
unlikely that one would discard the theory. One might then
consider adjustments to statements in parts of the fabric
that lay between the theory and the observation, including
statements that embodied information on how to interpret
observations. This flexibility is however not only a way to
preserve theories. For Quine, no statement in the fabric was
safe from challenge. Even laws of logic might be changed if
that were the best way to resolve enormous tensions.9
8 Duhem, La Théorie physique. Son objet et sa structure, part 2,
chapter 6, sections 1 and 2.
9 For Quine’s whole approach see Quine, “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism”, section 6. Quine went much further than Duhem. For an
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Such concerns make it hard to see any experiment as
crucial in the strict sense of being absolutely decisive. An
experiment might appear to favour one claim and refute
another, but there would seem to be scope to make wider
adjustments in order to avoid refuting the second claim.
Data would apparently not dictate what to do: theories
would seem to be underdetermined by data.
One response to this concern would be to draw attention to
an implicit norm in the natural sciences that choices which
would require widespread changes to the corpus should not
be made without very good reason. The standard set by this
norm is not often met. A variant on that response would
be to borrow Hasok Chang’s point that researchers get
considerable guidance on how to advance their disciplines
from the systems of practice of their disciplines.10 A second
response would be to dispute the legitimate extent of the
concerns that would make it hard to see any experiments as
crucial. This can be done. For example, Jody Azzouni has
argued that sciences enjoy a degree of autonomy from one
another because they need to have their specific methods,
methods that are not to be derived from theories which
might be woven together to form the fabric as a whole.11 A
consequence of this autonomy is that not all of the fabric is
exposed to change at once. A third response would be to say
that the interplay between general claims and experimental
evidence was more complicated than portrayed by the
outline of a range of positions that can easily but dangerously be run
together under the single banner of holism see Moulines, “The Ways
of Holism”, particularly sections 1 and 2.
10 Chang, Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism and Pluralism, section
4.1.1. Chang’s view on this point is connected to his views on truth, in
particular his use of truth5, described in section 4.3.1, and to his views
on knowledge and realism, but his point can be borrowed whether or
not one follows him on those matters.
11 Azzouni, Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science, part 1,
section 3.
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traditional picture of deducing a consequence of a claim
and then performing an experiment. The traditional role
for crucial experiments might not need to be performed.
Such a line of argument might for example be based on
the error-statistical approach that Deborah Mayo has put
forward, although exactly how much work that approach
could do is debated.12
The first two responses would only make it conceivable that
experiments should be crucial in the strict sense of being
absolutely decisive. Neither of those two responses would
exclude the possibility of the results of experiments still
leaving researchers with choices to make. If that happened,
researchers might turn to norms that theories with certain
characteristics should be preferred, but they might not get
enough help from norms to decide between rival theories.
Milena Ivanova argues that we cannot expect consideration
of the virtues of theories, virtues such as simplicity,
explanatory power and fertility, to allow researchers to
make conclusive choices between theories, partly because
researchers do not have settled ways to measure the extents
to which theories exhibit such virtues, and partly because
there is no settled ranking of virtues by their importance.13
12 See the papers in Mayo and Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference:
Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the
Objectivity and Rationality of Science, and particularly chapter 1:
Mayo, “Learning from Error, Severe Testing, and the Growth of
Theoretical Knowledge”; chapter 2: Chalmers and Mayo, “The Life of
Theory in the New Experimentalism”; chapter 4: Worrall and Mayo,
“Theory Confirmation and Novel Evidence”.
13 Ivanova, “Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory
Choice?”, section 3. Ivanova goes on to use rival theories of quantum
mechanics as an example, in sections 3.1 and 3.2. For an argument
that we cannot expect the problem of choice between theories to be
solved by a requirement for researchers to exhibit the bon sens (good
sense) that Duhem identified (La Théorie physique. Son objet et sa
structure, part 2, chapter 6, section 10), either in the form of the
quality that he identified or in any one of a range of forms offered
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There is the further question of whether the possibility that
choices may be left open should adversely affect our confid-
ence. The extent of underdetermination of theory by data
is a contested question, and we shall not settle it here. We
shall merely note that if there were specific areas in which
the risk were serious, that would reduce our confidence, and
that there are arguments that underdetermination is not
particularly widespread.14
by other authors, see Ivanova and Paternotte, “Theory Choice, Good
Sense and Social Consensus”. The authors go on to offer their own
interpretation of good sense as “choosing a theory so as to smooth
the scientific consensus building process” (page 1124), and they argue
that this interpretation might allow the exemplification of good sense
to help research communities to come to agree which theories to choose
(pages 1125-1127). But as the authors freely admit, several difficulties
would remain (pages 1127-1130). Moreover, an interpretation of good
sense as the promotion of consensus might mean that the application
of good sense could only be seen as a way to eliminate disputes, rather
than as a way to make correct choices between theories.
For some more optimistic views on virtues and underdetermin-
ation see Axtell, “Bridging a Fault Line: On Underdetermination
and the Ampliative Adequacy of Competing Theories”; Tulodziecki,
“Epistemic Virtues and the Success of Science”, sections 4 and 5.
Finally, there are arguments that researchers will in fact tend to
favour theories that explain a wide range of phenomena, that explain
phenomena in detail and that are elegant: Diamond, “Science as
a Rational Enterprise”. Whether such preferences are conducive to
making correct choices between theories is a separate question. There
are results in formal epistemology that encourage a preference for
simple theories, as we shall see in section 8.3.5.4. But those results
show that such a preference will promote efficiency. They do not show
that simple theories are correct.
14 Two fairly recent discussions of the question of underdetermin-
ation are Bonk, Underdetermination: An Essay on Evidence and
the Limits of Natural Knowledge, which concentrates on analysis
of the notion of underdetermination and on connections with other
philosophical debates, and Norton, “Must Evidence Underdetermine
Theory?”, which sets out reasons to think that the arguments
for general underdetermination, as distinct from arguments for its
occasional appearance, are too weak to establish their conclusions.
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Despite the risk that evidence, the corpus and norms may
not always suffice to reach conclusions, those resources do
allow researchers to make use of evidence, and particularly
experimental evidence, in ways that allow claims to be
given very strong support. But it is only possible to
obtain strong support if evidence is obtained and used
appropriately. As well as general norms, the natural sciences
abound in specific rules that dictate how experiments and
other exercises in gathering data should be designed and
conducted, and how data should be analysed. Instruments
must be calibrated, supplies of chemicals must be checked
for purity, possible extraneous influences must be excluded,
control groups must be used, and analyses of data must
use appropriate statistical tests. What matters for our
confidence is that the norms should be both clear and strict.
The intent of general norms like “Record ways in which
errors might arise” is clear, but they are made strict in
their application by being filled out with specific norms
like “Compute and report the probabilities of different
types of error, given the size of the sample you have
taken”. By and large, the norms of design, conduct and
analysis are strict, even if they are not all codified for each
discipline but are largely embodied in the understanding of
experienced researchers and evidenced by the descriptions
of work done that are included in published papers. It also
helps that many methods are highly technical, making it
obvious they will not give useful results unless they are
used with great attention to detail. And it is reassuring that
when experimental protocols are debated, those debates are
conducted in such technical terms that only experts could
hold their own.15 Finally, the tests of statistical significance
that must be used are well-established.
15 For an example of such a debate see Mann, “Analyses of
Protein S Function” and the response, Hackeng, Seré and Rosing,
“Misconceptions About Protein-S Multimers”.
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A further reason for optimism is that many norms have been
used over long periods of time, and in different contexts. If
they were ineffective, researchers would have noticed. And
norms can themselves evolve in response to an appreciation
of their worth, as for example did norms of how to conduct
trials of medical treatments once randomized controlled
trials were introduced and then became commonplace.16 It
is however easier to see specific norms as open to evolution
than it is to see very general norms as open to evolution, at
least if we hope to see a course of evolution that we can be
confident will represent rational progress. One way to see
general norms as open to evolution would be to link changes
in methods to changes in the aims of scientific work. But the
idea of changes in aims is controversial, to say the least.17
Finally, the fact that methods and reasonably specific
norms may well evolve should not undermine our con-
fidence, at least not in any way that could be made
precise enough to allow detailed investigation. The history
of science strongly suggests that some of the methods and
16 Stolberg, Norman and Trop, “Randomized Controlled Trials”,
page 1539. A further stage of evolution, still in progress, is to develop
the fresh thinking that may be needed about the use of randomized
controlled trials to establish what will work in the population at
large. Cartwright and Munro, in their paper “The Limitations of
Randomized Controlled Trials in Predicting Effectiveness”, go so far
as to propose a move away from the traditional notion of external
validity. But it may not be necessary to go so far. It is perfectly
possible to identify specific reasons why there might be difficulties:
Dekkers, von Elm, Algra, Romijn and Vandenbroucke, “How to Assess
the External Validity of Therapeutic Trials: A Conceptual Approach”;
Rothwell, “Commentary: External Validity of Results of Randomized
Trials: Disentangling a Complex Concept”. The identification of
specific reasons why there might be difficulties should help researchers
to work out appropriate responses.
17 The connection with changes in aims is made in Laudan, Beyond
Positivism and Relativism: Theory, Method, and Evidence, chapters 7
to 9. Laudan discusses the controversy in chapter 9.
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norms currently in use will in due course be found wanting.
But there is no way to tell which methods and norms will
be affected, or how serious the impact will be. We have
here a general worry comparable to concerns about the risk
of transformation of disciplines that we set to one side in
section 1.1.5.3.
6.1.2 Disciplines higher up the scale
When we turn to disciplines in which deductive rela-
tionships and relationships that are almost as strong are
not plentiful, we again find that assent to claims is only
expected if the claims have adequate positive support
and there are no strong reasons to doubt them. What
support is adequate will depend on the norms of the
discipline. But those norms will need to differ from the
norms that are appropriate when deductive and near-
deductive relationships are plentiful. If researchers insisted
that support had to be set out in arguments that primarily
relied on relationships between propositions which were
deductive or almost as strong, their disciplines would be
severely impoverished. They must therefore use alternative
norms that are still strict enough to impose adequate
control over assent to claims. We shall now consider some
norms.
6.1.2.1 Evidence and argument
Norms of evidence and argument are largely given in the
form of descriptions of methods that can be used to get as
much as possible out of evidence, while still limiting oneself
to claims that are well-supported. We gave some examples
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of texts that describe methods and warn against pitfalls in
section 2.1.1.2.
Norms of evidence cover how evidence should be gathered
in order to ensure that what is gathered is authentic, that
evidence is not corrupted in the process of gathering it,
and that evidence which might undermine claims is likely
to be found. They may also cover how evidence should be
analysed. Norms of argument cover such matters as what
forms of argument are acceptable, how much evidence is
needed to establish given types of claim, what makes a case
strong enough to discard existing accepted claims, and how
objections to a claim may legitimately be refuted. Examples
of norms of evidence and argument, given by describing
methods to use, can easily be found in the social sciences.18
Norms given in the same way are also common in historical
studies.19
We must however acknowledge that as we go up the
scale of disciplines, we find fewer agreed prescriptions that
dictate which methods are acceptable and which are not.
In particular, there are fewer norms that govern arguments
for general claims, even if there remain plenty of norms
that govern the analysis of evidence. We can find proposals
for norms at an intermediate level, for example norms that
govern the making of claims that some writers influenced
18 For examples in sociology see Elliott, Using Narrative in Social
Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. For examples of
norms in the study of international relations that are particularly
concerned with ways to minimize bias in the selection of sources and
ways to compensate for biases that may have affected the contents
of secondary sources see Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative
Historical Analysis in the Study of International Relations”.
19 For examples in archaeology see Roskams, Excavation; Odell,
Lithic Analysis; Martin, Harrod and Pérez, Bioarchaeology: An
Integrated Approach to Working With Human Remains. For examples
in history see Howell and Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An
Introduction to Historical Methods.
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others, but such proposed norms may be neither universally
acknowledged nor very widely observed.20
The mere lack of a complete set of agreed norms for one
stage in the process of making and assenting to claims need
not in itself be disturbing. We may be more concerned when
there is open dispute over norms. There is for example a
debate in social science about the relative merits of different
ways of working. On one side there is a classic text that
advocates extending the rigorous forms of reasoning that
are customarily associated with quantitative work to all
kinds of work.21 On the other side, there are those who
do not disparage those forms of reasoning, but who argue
that they cannot always achieve as much as they promise
and that room must be made for other ways of working.22
When we observe debates of this nature, our confidence in
claims that have come to be accepted under sets of norms
which are not the strictest among the sets in contention
must be reduced at least a little, because it is clear that
some researchers, supporters of the strictest set, have found
fault with sets of norms that are less strict.
6.1.2.2 Psycho-social understandings
There is a norm, not often made explicit, that researchers
should not endorse an account of the thoughts and conduct
of individual human beings unless it comports with an
appropriate psycho-social understanding (which may not be
20 For the example of norms to govern claims of influence see
Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method, pages 75-
76.
21 King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research.




an understanding currently in everyday use, and which may
include an allowance for occasional inexplicable conduct).
An account that covers the deliberate conduct of human
beings will only be satisfactory if it does so comport. If it
does not, there will be no justification for seeing conduct
as connected with circumstances. It is a psycho-social
understanding that supplies the human world’s equivalent
of a mechanism. Geoffrey Elton made a similar norm
explicit when he required historians to stand back from their
completed accounts and ask whether those accounts were
plausible, although his norm was not limited to occasions
on which individuals would have thought about what to do
and decided on actions.23
If mere compatibility with a psycho-social understanding
that was acceptable to readers was all that was demanded,
the norm would not be much of a constraint. Authors who
wanted to be taken seriously would not be likely to write
accounts that exhibited incompatibility, for example by
having people react adversely to good news. But there is
a stronger sense in which an account may comport with a
psycho-social understanding. An account comports in this
sense when application of the psycho-social understanding
to the initial facts makes the subsequent conduct that the
account narrates seem not merely possible, but a natural
result of the initial position. (The adjective “natural” is
meant to capture the idea that the conduct flows smoothly,
without any feeling that more explanation is needed. It is
not meant to suggest that the conduct should appear to
have been inevitable.) It is not compulsory for accounts to
comport with psycho-social understandings in this way, but
it is a good sign when they do.
23 Elton, The Practice of History, page 78 (page 86 of the first
edition).
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It can take some effort to show how an account does
comport with an appropriate psycho-social understanding
in this strong sense. Take for example Callum Brown’s
explanation of the negative and positive reactions to Mar-
garet Knight’s 1955 radio broadcasts favourable to scientific
humanism, an explanation that proceeds by supplying the
context of a resurgence of Christian culture.24 The account
succeeds because the reader can appreciate how both the
wartime engendering of a pro-Christian climate and the
cultural puritanism that went with the austerity of the later
1940s would make a resurgence of Christian culture natural,
giving encouragement to those who opposed the broadcasts
to express their opposition, and how the existence of a
specifically cultural revival, rather than an upsurge in belief,
would leave space for those who supported the broadcasts to
voice their support – an opportunity they would be likely
to take, given the propensity of people to say what they
think when there are no obstacles to doing so. Elements
drawn from a psycho-social understanding would include
the propositions that a war can incline people to seek
solace in religion, that enforced austerity can engender a
belief that austerity and puritanism are admirable, and that
people can adopt a culture that is derived from a system of
beliefs without necessarily regarding the beliefs as true. In
practice such considerations are taken as read, and it would
be painful to spell them out on each occasion. But even if
unexpressed, they would still play their roles.
6.1.2.3 The norm of avoiding tension
One norm that is worth singling out is the norm of avoiding
tension. If a new claim is presented for consideration,
24 Brown, “‘The Unholy Mrs Knight’ and the BBC: Secular
Humanism and the Threat to the ‘Christian Nation’, c.1945-60”.
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researchers should consider whether it is in harmony with
claims that are already in the corpus. At the very least,
a new claim should not directly conflict with any claims in
the corpus, and it should ideally fit in well. Researchers may
refuse to assent to a new claim simply because it would not
be in harmony with the corpus, so that assenting to it would
create tension. But they may sometimes decide that they
really ought to assent to the new claim or something very
like it. They may then go back and forth between the new
claim and the contents of the corpus, making adjustments
to both, until there is little or no remaining tension either
within the old corpus or between its members and the final
version of the new claim.
Adjustments to the corpus are especially likely to be a
realistic option in disciplines that are high up the scale, for
three reasons. The first reason is that claims in the corpus
which interpret evidence rather than merely reporting it
are unlikely to have the very strong support that comes
from being connected to other well-established claims by
relationships that are deductive or almost as strong. The
evidential threshold for making a change to a claim that is
at some distance from claims that merely report evidence
is therefore relatively low. (This does not mean that it is
low in absolute terms. It would still be a radical step to
discard well-established claims, so new claims that would
require such a step are likely to be scrutinized carefully.)
The second reason is that the relative paucity of very
strong relationships between propositions means that it
is often possible to change some claims without having
to make large-scale changes elsewhere in the corpus. The
cost of making a change is then relatively low. The third
reason is that new claims often fit more or less well with
the existing corpus, rather than simply fitting perfectly
or being inconsistent with it. There is therefore scope to
exercise judgement as to what adjustments to make and
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how extensive the adjustments should be, both adjustments
to the existing corpus and adjustments to new claims. It
may well be possible to limit adjustments so that they are
palatable.
Reflective equilibrium
The process of making adjustments in order to reduce
or eliminate tension is an example of the process of
reaching reflective equilibrium. This process can be made
the centrepiece of a whole epistemology, as Catherine Elgin
has done.25 We shall not go that far, but we shall find it
worthwhile to explore the notion a little.
The connection between reflective equilibrium and the
reduction or elimination of tension is clearest if we use
Willard Van Orman Quine’s image of a fabric of belief,
the image that we mentioned in section 6.1.1.2.26 Tensions
may arise in the fabric when new evidence conflicts with
claims that are already incorporated in the fabric, or when
consequences of existing claims are worked out and are
found to conflict with one another. Then researchers need
to work out what adjustments to make, and they may have
a choice. Such a choice will be guided by considerations
like the norms that long-established claims should not
be overthrown on a whim and that disruption should be
limited by avoiding changes that would have far-reaching
implications, but such guidance may not suffice to eliminate
choice. There may be times when researchers should discard
long-established claims or tolerate widespread disruption.
Reaching reflective equilibrium may require striking a
balance between competing considerations, and the result
may not be entirely satisfactory. We should also note that
25 Elgin, Considered Judgment, especially chapter 4.
26 Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, section 6.
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choice is most likely to arise in disciplines in which deductive
and near-deductive relationships between propositions are
not plentiful, because a shortage of very strong relationships
makes it harder than it would otherwise be for existing
corpora to constrain options tightly or to allow experiments
or other procedures to be crucial. When it is a question of
whether evidence and other considerations are on the whole
strong enough to lead researchers to a particular conclusion,
judgement must be exercised and choice therefore arises.
There is a considerable body of formal epistemological work
on how sets of beliefs should be revised in the face of new
evidence, some of it specifically on how new claims should
be considered in the light of existing information.27 But
while our confidence may well be increased by awareness
that researchers observe the guidance that such work gives,
the guidance is at too high a level of generality, and is
too dependent for its implementation on the possession of
systematic lists of beliefs, for it to tell researchers precisely
what to do.
6.2 Formative concepts
6.2.1 The notion of a formative concept
Formative concepts are the concepts that have a significant
effect on how researchers approach the objects of study in
a discipline. They may be, but need not be, basic in the
sense of standing at the bottom of hierarchies of concepts
27 Fuhrmann, “Theories of Belief Change”; Bovens and Hartmann,
“Belief Expansion, Contextual Fit, and the Reliability of Information
Sources”.
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that are built up by successive stages of definition of the
corresponding terms.
Some concepts are clearly formative, for example the
concept of energy in physics, the concept of evolution in
biology, the concept of utility in economics, the concept
of toleration in political studies and the concept of
industrialization in the history of certain times and places.
On the other hand, a great many concepts pick out detailed
features of objects of study and are unlikely to be formative.
Examples include concepts of different arrangements of
leaves on plant stems (such as alternate and whorled)
in biology, the concept of settlement risk as between
counterparties in economics, the concept of tactical voting
in political studies and the concept of sumptuary regulation
in the history of legal systems. There are also concepts that
may or may not be accorded formative roles, depending
on the preferences of researchers. We shall consider some
examples shortly.
Whether a concept is formative depends partly on the
discipline. A concept may fail to be formative in a broad
discipline, but may still be formative in a narrow discipline.
Concepts of different arrangements of leaves might be
formative in the study of the morphology of plants, the
concept of settlement risk might be formative in the study
of risk in financial markets, the concept of tactical voting
might be formative in the study of voting systems, and the
concept of sumptuary regulation might be formative in the
study of class distinctions.
Our reference to the use of different concepts as formative
does not mean we contemplate different choices that are
incommensurable in the strong sense of leaving researchers
unable to debate their choices. There will be agreement
on the use of some formative concepts and on many
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detailed features of the objects of study. There will also be
substantial agreement on the background to the relevant
discipline. This background may be supplied by a larger
discipline that encompasses the relevant discipline, by
adjacent disciplines, or by a shared general understanding
of the world. We do not need to argue against Donald
Davidson’s opposition to the idea of radically different
conceptual schemes.28
6.2.2 Choice
We shall now give some examples of concepts that
researchers may choose to allow to be formative. Not
every researcher in the relevant discipline need allow these
concepts to shape her approach to the objects of study.
Researchers who allow some concepts to be formative
may argue that their preferred concepts must shape every
researcher’s approach in order to make progress. But
others will work productively without letting the concepts
in question shape their approaches. This is enough to
show that allowing the concepts to be formative is indeed
optional.
The examples we give are drawn from disciplines that range
from biology upward on the scale. This should not surprise
us. All sorts of choices are more limited low down the scale
than high up the scale. We should also not suppose that a
given opportunity to choose will remain open indefinitely. It
may be that after some years of successful experiment with
new formative concepts, the new concepts will displace older
ones.
28 Davidson, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. Davidson
notes the need for agreement on pages 196-197.
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Our first example of choice comes from the study of
organisms. This study may be shaped by the concept of
the forms of parts, by the concept of the functions of parts
or by the concept of the development of organisms, leading
to different types of explanation of the characteristics of
organisms.29 Another biological example is the option to
give the concept of information a central role.30
Evolutionary biologists may shape their approach by using
the concept of developmental constraint, or they may prefer
to give the concept of evolvability a formative role. (Their
approach is of course shaped by many other concepts as
well.) This is an example of a choice that was open in the
recent past, but that may be closing in favour of evolvability,
or perhaps mutating into a new way to shape the approach
of evolutionary biologists.31
Economists and game theorists may think of their objects
of study as entities that optimize, maximize and reach
equilibria. Alternatively they may use concepts such as
those of aspiration to some level of profit and 𝜖-Nash
equilibrium, in order to think of their objects of study as
merely working toward outcomes that are regarded as good
enough.32
29 Winther, “Parts and Theories in Compositional Biology”, pages
479-494.
30 Artmann, “Biological Information”; Griffiths and Stotz, Genetics
and Philosophy: An Introduction, chapter 6.
31 Hendrikse, Parsons and Hallgrímsson, “Evolvability as the
Proper Focus of Evolutionary Developmental Biology”, argues for
the importance of evolvability. For a nuanced view of the shift to
evolvability and of that concept’s functions within the discipline
see Brigandt, “From Developmental Constraint to Evolvability: How
Concepts Figure in Explanation and Disciplinary Identity”. For a
survey of the field see Larson, “Concepts in Character Macroevolution:
Adaptation, Homology, and Evolvability”.
32 Thinking in terms of aspiration can expose surprising con-
sequences, such as a tendency to collusion: Dixon, “Keeping up with
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Those who work on international relations may take on the
approach of world-systems theory, and base their work on
the concept of a single worldwide economic system within
which states have various roles. Alternatively they may base
their work on the concept of the individual state and its
abilities, and refer to an overall system to explain how those
abilities may be limited.33
Historians may choose to use the concept of class struggle
to shape their approach to particular periods of history.
The existence of a choice as to whether to do so in at least
some historical work can be demonstrated most strikingly
by noting that the concept has been used to shape a study
of ancient Greek history, while that period is also often
studied without recourse to the concept.34
Suppose that the use of certain concepts to play formative
roles is optional. Then a choice of some concepts rather than
others will guide researchers to develop their discipline in
certain ways rather than other equally feasible ways, and to
reach conclusions of certain types rather than other types.
We need to explore the consequences for our confidence. We
shall concentrate on this question of effects on confidence,
and shall leave to one side the question of motives for
choosing particular concepts. One very strong motive can
be that the choice of new concepts opens up whole new
vistas of study, as for example when new developments in
anthropology allowed the history of witchcraft to be studied
in new ways, or when modern economic theory allowed
the Joneses: Competition and the Evolution of Collusion”. On 𝜖-
Nash equilibria see Shoham and Leyton-Brown, Multiagent Systems:
Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations, section 3.4.7.
33 Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Rela-
tions Theory”, introduction and sections 1 and 2.
34 De Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World:
from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests.
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better studies of the history of industrialization.35 We shall
however make some remarks on the advantages of there
being a range of different approaches within disciplines in
section 6.3.
We shall first look at the extent of choice in the natural
sciences and implications for our confidence, before moving
on to the social sciences and the humanities. We shall
leave mathematics to one side. Mathematics is, as so often,
a special case because it is not tied to the nature of
the physical world. Mathematicians can in principle define
whatever entities they choose, so long as the definitions
do not allow contradictions to be deduced. They will
however find themselves more constrained if their task is
to develop mathematical tools that will be useful in the
natural sciences.
6.2.3 The natural sciences
While there are sometimes choices to be made in the natural
sciences, this is not the norm. On the whole, there are
certain concepts that work and others that do not. We shall
now explore reasons for this lack of choice.
We must start by considering choices of accounts of topics.
Once we have considered choices of accounts, we shall
consider choices of concepts to play formative roles.
6.2.3.1 Choices of accounts
In the natural sciences, the accounts of primary interest
are those that make general claims, rather than giving
35 Evans, In Defence of History, page 83.
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accounts of events at particular times and places. In our
discussion here, “accounts” will mean accounts that make
general claims, and particularly accounts that are elaborate
enough to amount to theories.
Researchers in the natural sciences are generally delighted
to have little or no choice of accounts of given topics. They
are keen to identify the single correct account of each topic
from among rival accounts. This goal may seem out of reach
when controversies endure for years. And researchers can
never be sure that currently accepted accounts will continue
to hold sway against all contenders, even though it may
turn out that they do hold sway permanently. But they
still pursue the goal assiduously.
This does not mean that researchers must seek to eliminate
all but one of several accounts that formulate their claims
about the world in different terms without conflicting with
one another.36 The use of different formulations may help
people to understand what the accounts say. A range of
formulations may also help to suggest a wider range of new
lines of enquiry than a single formulation would suggest.
Researchers do sometimes eliminate formulations, either
because they are too cumbersome to be useful or because
they lack explanatory power, but there is no general rule
that all but one of several non-conflicting formulations must
be eliminated. Researchers should however aim to eliminate
all but one of several conflicting accounts, whether they
predict different phenomena or conflict at some conceptual
level.
36 There are for example several different formulations of quantum
mechanics that can be used: Styer et al., “Nine Formulations of
Quantum Mechanics”.
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6.2.3.2 Choices of concepts
When concepts play formative roles, they influence the
ways in which researchers think. This means that if there
is a choice of concepts to play formative roles, there will
be choices of accounts. Some of those choices might well
be between accounts that conflicted with one another. We
must therefore consider reasons why there might be choices
between conflicting accounts.
One reason why there might be choices of accounts is
that the evidence might be inadequate to decide between
accounts that made different claims about phenomena.
For example, there are rival non-supersymmetric and
supersymmetric theories in physics that cannot be tested
until particle colliders of sufficient power are built.37 A
concept that plays a formative role in the supersymmetric
approach but not in the non-supersymmetric approach is
the concept of superspace.
Faced with a lack of evidence to decide such questions, our
confidence in accepted claims would naturally be reduced.
But researchers should themselves hold back, and should
not assent to the dubious claims without more evidence. So
long as they held back, the question of our confidence would
not arise.
Our worries should however go wider than that. If different
choices of concepts to be given formative roles would
lead to conflicting theories, between which it would not
37 Lykken and Spiropulu, “Supersymmetry and the Crisis in
Physics”. At the time of writing the question has not been finally
settled, but progress has been made and more progress may be
expected. The example has the special feature that supersymmetry
is not tested in its full generality. Bounds are set on the masses of




currently be possible to decide, we might reasonably be
concerned that formative use of any of the concepts would
be dangerous, even in other areas where no conflicting
theories were in contention. If some concepts were in danger
of being ruled out of their formative roles once more
evidence became available in the areas in which there were
conflicting theories because formative use of the concepts
lent too much support to theories that had to be discarded,
we would have to contemplate the possibility that any or
all of the concepts currently in formative roles would have
to be displaced from those roles. This risk would place in
doubt the status of work elsewhere that reflected formative
use of those concepts.
Another reason why there might be choices of accounts is
that the natures of the evidence, of possible accounts and
of the links between evidence and accounts might be such
that there was automatically scope to choose concepts to
play formative roles and then use them to give accounts
that handled the evidence in different ways. We would be
back to the concern about the underdetermination of theory
by data that we discussed in section 6.1.1.2. But as we noted
there, underdetermination may not be widespread.
We may add that close inspection of some examples
of choices of concepts shows that a combination of the
accumulation of evidence and careful attention to how it
is best handled can leave less scope for choices of concepts
to be given formative roles than one might have expected,
even in natural sciences that are reasonably high up the
scale. One good example is that of levels of selection in
evolution. Researchers are arguably not free to give different
accounts based on the different formative concepts of genic,
individual and group selection.38 Another example is that
38 Okasha, Evolution and the Levels of Selection, especially sections
4.3, 5.5.1 and 5.7.
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of motivation. There are many concepts of motivation at
the disposal of those who formulate theories of how brains
guide behaviour, but the concepts are not all on a par.39
6.2.4 Social sciences and humanities
We shall now consider why choices of formative concepts
are wider high up the scale of disciplines than low down the
scale, before considering some constraints on choices and
some implications for our confidence.
6.2.4.1 The scope for choice
As we noted in section 6.2.3.2, a choice of formative
concepts requires scope to give different accounts of the
same topics. We must therefore start by considering that
scope.
In the social sciences and the humanities, it is perfectly
possible for several different accounts of a topic to remain
in play indefinitely. They may well not conflict with one
another. Then researchers need not feel any pressure to
decide between them. Rather, there may be a range of
accounts that can all be endorsed and that in combination
can give a fuller understanding than any one of them could
on its own – a possibility that we noted in section 2.1.2.1.
One way to arrive at different accounts of a topic is to accord
formative roles to different concepts. One example is the use
of different concepts of neighbourhoods and of processes
of their change in sociological analyses.40 Another example
39 Berridge, “Motivation Concepts in Behavioral Neuroscience”.
40 Schwirian, “Models of Neighborhood Change”.
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is the choice of whether to use Marxist concepts, such as
those of language as practical consciousness and social class,
in the analysis of periods of history. Their use can have a
marked influence on both the selection of evidence and the
fashioning of accounts.41
This freedom to have several accounts, formulated in ways
that reflect decisions to accord formative roles to different
concepts, does not spring directly from lack of evidence.
Rather, it springs from the natures of higher disciplines.
We remarked in section 5.3.2 that mechanisms that may
be identified in the social sciences and the humanities
are such that it is not feasible even to gesture at
intelligible relationships between those mechanisms and
what fundamental physics would say went on in the world.
We may extend this point beyond the identification of
mechanisms to other types of description of the world.
Descriptions given in the social sciences and the humanities
are not to be translated into physical descriptions, except
when description is limited to matters such as the physical
locations of people and objects, the flows of rivers and the
energy needs of factories.
It is therefore no surprise that any sense that there might
be a single right way to describe the world in physical terms
should not feed through into a sense that there might be
a single right way to describe the world in the terms of
any of the social sciences or the humanities. The claims of
physics, chemistry and biology must not be contradicted in
the social sciences or the humanities, but that is not much
of a constraint.
41 Blackledge, Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History,
chapter 1.
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Nor is the evidence as viewed by researchers in higher
disciplines a particularly independent constraint on what
those researchers conclude. The reading of it is all too
easily shaped by the approaches that researchers choose.
Evidence is read in the light of theory in all disciplines,
but the constraints on possible readings are tighter in lower
disciplines because pervasive claims narrow the acceptable
ranges of readings. For example, physics in general can tell
physicists in narrow fields how their instruments must be
regarded as working, and can insist that they draw certain
conclusions from what their instruments tell them.
Finally, the lack of expectation of translatability into
physical descriptions confers freedom to devise concepts
that would have little or no prospect of being related
easily to physical concepts, and this will broaden the range
of concepts that may be chosen. Researchers may prefer
concepts that can be related to the concepts of biology in
order to give accounts that explain by relating human ways
of life to human biology, and they may prefer such concepts
even without being sociobiologists, but they do not have
to prefer such concepts. Such a preference can easily be
outweighed by a preference for concepts that make it easy
to give explanatory accounts within the terms of the social
sciences or the humanities.
Although the freedom to keep several accounts in play does
not spring directly from lack of evidence, there is an indirect
connection. In historical disciplines, evidence is patchy
because of the state of the record. In those social sciences
in which surveys are conducted and data are collected to
order, it is not easy to be sure that the evidence obtained
is exactly what it would need to be in order to answer
questions decisively. This is partly because of the proneness
of human objects of study to act for reasons that are hard to
discern, and partly because the most interesting questions
364
6.2 Formative concepts
for researchers are often not ones that are easily formulated
in ways that would allow researchers to say which results
from surveys would imply which answers to those questions.
Disciplines have developed to allow themselves to thrive
despite such difficulties. Claims are debated in ways that
do not rely solely on tests of the kind that would be used in
the natural sciences. Nonetheless, the fact that encounters
with evidence are less forceful in higher disciplines than in
lower ones contributes to greater freedom to have a range
of accounts in play, and hence to greater freedom to choose
concepts to play formative roles.
6.2.4.2 Constraints on choices
While researchers in the social sciences and the humanities
may have choices as to which concepts play formative roles,
their choices are constrained. A choice must lead researchers
to formulate coherent sets of accounts of different topics.
And if the relevant discipline is concerned with the conduct
of individuals, the choice must allow researchers to draw on
a psycho-social understanding.
The need for coherence
Individual accounts of different topics must not only be
coherent within themselves. They must also cohere with one
another. This requirement is stronger than a requirement
to avoid outright contradiction, and it constrains choices of
concepts to play formative roles.
Choices are constrained because a choice of concepts should
make it possible to give accounts of different topics within a
discipline, such that those accounts would form a coherent
set. The accounts should fit together in a structure, or
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overlap in a patchwork, so that between them they give
a set of accounts of a wide range of phenomena which has
at least some degree of unity. Moreover, the way in which
the accounts work together should itself reveal something
about the world and should invite researchers to make new
connections. For example, in economics, accounts of supply
and demand at the level of individual products and accounts
of labour markets and capital markets fit together to explain
how businesses may come into being, prosper, or fail, and
an understanding of all of these things can contribute to a
theory of whole economies and of the effects of government
policies. Not all concepts that might play formative roles
would allow researchers to give coherent sets of accounts in
a satisfactorily straightforward way. For example, a Marxist
concept of the values of products as given by the labour
used to make them makes it difficult to give a coherent
view of the economy. Defences have been offered, but they
are suspiciously convoluted.42
Psycho-social understandings
If a discipline is concerned with human conduct at the level
of identified individuals, the concepts that researchers use
must allow them to draw on a psycho-social understanding.
Human beings, when considered as thinkers and agents,
are so complicated that it is necessary to draw on such an
understanding in order to have any hope of making sense of
their conduct. Concepts that play formative roles therefore
need to bear reasonably straightforward relationships to the
concepts that are used in everyday life.
42 Examples of defences can be found in Freeman, Kliman and




The point does not apply directly to the statistical study of
aggregates of human beings, but description in terms that
allow connections to be made to the conduct of individuals,
as conceived by applying psycho-social understandings, is
still important. It matters because it is very helpful if
mechanisms can be proposed to explain how results for
aggregates arise, and the identification of mechanisms is
likely to rely on an understanding of how typical individuals
(and some atypical individuals) would conduct themselves
in given circumstances.
The concepts that researchers use can most easily allow
them to draw on a psycho-social understanding if they
are concepts used in everyday life or refinements of such
concepts. This is indeed what we often, but not always,
see. Historical accounts are shot through with references to
the motives of people and with explanations of how the
pressures under which they lived and worked influenced
their decisions. Sociology builds on everyday concepts
such as those of communication, isolation, the family and
ritual, all of which play formative roles by setting out
some basic categories that can be used to make sense of
human conduct. Economics starts with the familiar idea
that people have desires and act so as to fulfil those
desires – again, an idea so fundamental that it shapes
our everyday understanding of human conduct. That basic
idea then recurs all over the discipline, even when the
analysis gets decidedly technical. For example, a discussion
of financial markets can explain the existence and the
pricing of different instruments, and the existence of various
portfolios, in terms of people’s desires for financial reward,
inclinations to seize opportunities, and concerns about
uncertainty.43
43 Bailey, The Economics of Financial Markets, especially chapters
1, 4 and 5.
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Having said all that, it is perfectly possible for technical
concepts that are not derived from everyday psycho-social
understandings to be helpful and even necessary, both when
giving accounts of individuals and when giving accounts of
aggregates. The concepts of a status set, of ethnocentrism
and of cultural capital are examples.44 Once the contents
of such concepts are given, it is often easy to describe the
corresponding thoughts and conduct of people in everyday
terms, but the concepts are not themselves borrowed from
everyday life.
Beyond such concepts, there are two more technical types of
concept. The first type comprises concepts that relate dir-
ectly to the conduct of individuals or aggregates, but are not
to be explained in everyday terms without first explaining a
considerable theoretical background. Economics abounds in
concepts of this type.45 The second type comprises concepts
that relate rather less directly to the conduct of specific
individuals or aggregates, but that nonetheless shape the
approach of researchers. An example is provided by the twin
concepts of structure and agency in the social sciences.
6.2.4.3 Implications for our confidence
The phenomenon of different ways to approach the objects
of study of a discipline, ways that are tied to choices of
concepts to play formative roles, must make us concerned
about the correctness of accepted claims. It may be that a
claim will only have visible support if one adopts a certain
44 Examples of technical concepts can easily be gleaned from the
glossaries of textbooks, for example the glossary in Giddens and
Sutton, Sociology, pages 1051-1074. The examples given here come
from that source.




approach to the objects of study. Other approaches may
render the support invisible.
The extent of choice of concepts to play formative roles
in higher disciplines is not negligible. To that extent, our
confidence may be reduced. But choice is not unlimited.
In particular, researchers are constrained by the need for
coherence and the need to be able to make use of a psycho-
social understanding.
We may conclude that while we should be aware that there
are choices of formative concepts, this need not have a
serious adverse effect on our confidence.
6.3 Pluralism
The question of choice of formative concepts shades into
the question of pluralism more generally. “Pluralism” is
an umbrella term for a range of lines of thought in the
philosophy of academic disciplines. These lines of thought
variously argue that the existence of choices of approach
and of claims to make is inevitable, that it is beneficial
because the challenge of answering the advocates of other
choices is a route to progress, or that it is beneficial because
an ensemble of accounts, and in particular an ensemble of
explanations, confers greater understanding of the world
than a single account or a single explanation.46
We shall concentrate on the extent of the benefits of
pluralism. We shall also limit ourselves to pluralism in the
sense of there being a range of different approaches within a
46 For some positions that can be brought under the umbrella of
pluralism and some issues that arise see Kellert, Longino and Waters
(eds.), Scientific Pluralism.
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given discipline, and there being different claims that may
be made when different approaches are used. It may be
convenient to see the availability of different approaches as
arising out of the availability of choices as to which concepts
to give formative roles, but this is not necessary. It may
be more straightforward to specify approaches simply by
describing methods.47 And advocates of some claims may
oppose other claims either because they think the other
claims are mistaken, or because they think those other
claims miss the point.
We shall give the notion of different approaches generous
scope. Differences of fundamental approach, such as the
difference between approaches to social sciences that derive
inspiration from the natural sciences and those that
emphasize social construction and interpretation, come
within our scope. But we shall not set the bounds of the
notion of pluralism any wider than this. In particular, we
shall not consider whether there is scope for the happy long-
term coexistence of claims that contradict one another. Nor
shall we slide from pluralism to relativism in any other way.
Those who argue that the existence of a contest between
approaches or between claims is beneficial because the
challenge of answering the advocates of other choices is a
route to progress are clearly correct.48 A related consider-
47 Moses and Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies
in Social and Political Research, chapter 1, makes a case for a plur-
alism of sets of methods. The authors call these sets methodologies,
but they also make a connection with formative concepts on page 1
by drawing attention to how choices of methods are influenced by how
researchers understand the world.
48 For a detailed study of how debates can advance toward
consensus, the benefits of debate and the conditions for those benefits
to be realized in full see Betz, Debate Dynamics: How Controversy
Improves our Beliefs. For a case study that shows how disagreement
can be productive see de Cruz and de Smedt, “The Value of Epistemic
Disagreement in Scientific Practice: The Case of Homo floresiensis”.
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ation is that it can be useful to keep in play approaches
and views that may have value, and that may uncover
difficulties with the current consensus, even when those
approaches and views are rejected by most researchers. A
healthy contest in which there may be challenges to claims
or to the routes by which claims were reached, or even an
environment in which non-mainstream views remain in play,
can only give us reassurance about claims that survive and
remain mainstream. There is an argument that pluralism
is particularly important in relation to policy work that
may have economic implications, so that economic interests
may bias the work, and in relation to work that may have
commercial applications, so that full details of the work
are not made public.49 More broadly, contests between
views open the way to the formation of rival factions of
researchers, the existence of which David Hull has argued to
be an important facilitator of the development of science.50
Having made this case for pluralism, we should add that
challenges to established claims must be well-grounded.
There is no merit in attacking claims by proposing
approaches or claims that no competent researcher would
take seriously. There is such a thing as failure to understand,
The authors note that disagreement can encourage a search for
new evidence, can make researchers think again about the evidence
they already have and about their assumptions, and can reduce
confirmation bias (section 5). In another paper, the same authors
add that disagreement helps to counteract systematic bias, such as
bias induced by inherited theories, and to promote progress: de Cruz
and de Smedt, “Evolved Cognitive Biases and the Epistemic Status
of Scientific Beliefs”, section 6. Their modelling of the effects of
disagreement has however been criticized as too optimistic: Vaesen
and Houkes, “Modelling the Truth of Scientific Beliefs with Cultural
Evolutionary Theory”.
49 Lefevere and Schliesser, “Private Epistemic Virtue, Public Vices:
Moral Responsibility in the Policy Sciences”, section 14.3.
50 Hull, Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social
and Conceptual Development of Science, page 26.
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and this failure is sometimes exhibited by external critics.
We should also note that the benefits mentioned in the
preceding paragraph arise out of there being a contest. They
do not arise directly out of there being a choice to be made,
even though the fact that there is a choice is what gives
rise to a contest. While it is healthy to challenge approaches
and claims, researchers should not pretend that options are
wider than they really are, merely in order to generate an
artificial contest.
Those who argue that the existence of choices of approach
or of claims to make is beneficial because an ensemble of
accounts can confer greater understanding of the world
than a single account also have a point. It is however
most likely to be a strong point from biology upward on
the scale of disciplines. Lower down the scale researchers
tend to have few things to say about each object of study,
and they therefore have the scope to arrive at single
comprehensive accounts. From certain types of biology
upward on the scale, the complicated nature of the objects
of study makes it impossible to give single comprehensive
accounts. Researchers need ensembles of accounts in order
to capture enough of the detail of the objects of study,
but to do so in chunks that are individually manageable
and comprehensible. They may also need ensembles of
accounts in order to answer questions that have been posed
in particular ways. For example, a question may be posed
about the evolution of some feature of some given animal.
The fact that the question has been posed in that way
may require a response at the level of organisms, but the
response may then need to be filled out both by reference
to processes at smaller-scale levels and by reference to
demands made by the animal’s environment.
Even when ensembles are needed, the integration of
different accounts is a worthwhile goal, and a goal that
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may be perfectly achievable given an appropriate concept
of integration.51 Aspirations to integration, and even more
to unification, must however be tempered by the need to
take account of the different presuppositions and scopes of
different approaches to the same topic, and the different
questions that are posed under different approaches.52 As
we noted in section 2.1.2.1, in higher disciplines it is likely
to be appropriate to see several accounts as all helping to
fill out a picture, rather than seeing them as presenting
different facets of some fully integrated single account.
The mere fact that different questions can be asked about
the same phenomenon can itself lead to the production of
an ensemble of accounts, with all of them providing helpful
context for each one. For example, there are different ways
to ask why the French Revolution occurred: why did it
occur in 1789 rather than 1750, why did revolutions of
that general type occur, and why did it occur given the
conditions that prevailed in 1789? The first two questions
call for explanatory accounts in terms of large-scale social,
economic and political features of societies, while the last
one calls for an explanatory account in terms of which
individuals took which actions and when (although such
an account could also be offered as a supplement to the
main account in response to the first question).53
51 Mitchell and Dietrich, “Integration without Unification: An
Argument for Pluralism in the Biological Sciences”; Mitchell, Un-
simple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy, chapter 6; Brigandt,
“Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of
Explanatory Integration in Biology”.
52 See for example Longino, “Theoretical Pluralism and the
Scientific Study of Behavior”.
53 Van Bouwel and Weber, “A Pragmatist Defense of Non-
Relativistic Explanatory Pluralism in History and Social Science”,
pages 179-181.
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In relation to our confidence, the main thing to be said
about ensembles is that their use may deepen researchers’
understanding and may thereby allow them to subject
individual claims to additional scrutiny. Researchers can
ask whether an individual claim makes sense in all of the
contexts provided by the different accounts that make up an
ensemble. If a claim survives such a test, that provides some
support for it. And failure would rightly deter researchers
from assenting to the claim.
Some philosophers of pluralism are unduly positive about
the existence of rival claims or rival approaches, and come
close to seeing a lack of agreement as good in itself. Some
think that we should extend to academic disciplines Chantal
Mouffe’s thought that if democracy is to thrive, contest
must be embraced in the form of “agonistic pluralism”,
rather than being eliminated.54 Our interest in correctness,
as set out in section 1.1.2, means we cannot support the
idea that it would be unfortunate to reach agreement on
specific questions of approach or on which claims to make,
so that erstwhile options came to be excluded, even though
we recognize that contests have their benefits.
Our interest in correctness and our inability to see
agreement as unfortunate also lead us to have reservations
about some aspects of the strong case that Hasok Chang
makes for pluralism, despite the fact that his case sets
out many undeniable advantages and despite the fact
that he demarcates pluralism sharply from relativism. The
reservations spring from the fact that his “active normative
epistemic pluralism” is a pluralism of “systems of practice”.
That would appear to be harmless, but what he says about
54 Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, pages 98-105. For a discussion
of the benefits of an extension to academic disciplines see van Bouwel,
“The Problem With(out) Consensus: The Scientific Consensus,
Deliberative Democracy and Agonistic Pluralism”, pages 135-137.
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the history of work on the chemical composition of water
leads us to think that keeping systems of practice alive
to the extent that he envisages would involve retaining as
options (although not as options that anyone should choose)
substantive claims which are not merely out of fashion for
the time being, but should plainly be discarded for ever.55
We shall return to the usefulness of ranges of views in
section 9.2.4.
55 Chang makes his case in Is Water H2O? Evidence, Realism
and Pluralism, chapter 5. He demarcates pluralism from relativism
in section 5.1.3, explains his pluralism’s name in section 5.2.1, and







We must distinguish between experiments that researchers
set up in order to yield evidence, and sources that provide
evidence but were not created to do so. Some disciplines,
particularly within the natural sciences, rely heavily on
experiments. In the humanities, sources are far more
significant than experiments. The social sciences are an
intermediate case in which surveys have special relevance
– and we shall have reason to regard survey data as
similar to sources. But disciplines do sometimes obtain
evidence in ways that are more usually associated with
other disciplines. Sources can play roles in the natural
sciences, for example when the fossil record is used in
evolutionary biology. And experiments are used in the social
sciences.
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An experiment can be devised to answer a particular
question, or to gather evidence for some other well-specified
purpose. If an experiment is well-designed, the experimenter
can expect that the precise question posed will be answered,
or that the evidence gathered will be well-suited to the
purpose. (Not all experiments give direct answers to
particular questions, such as the question of whether the
occurrence of one phenomenon causes the occurrence of
another. The world as studied by disciplines from biology
upward can easily be too complex for that, and in particular
it can be impossible to separate out the contributions of a
number of different causes to the production of some effect.1
There are also, in all experimental disciplines, experiments
that are conducted in order to explore phenomena before
formulating any claims that could be tested.2)
By contrast, sources must be taken as they are. They were
created for purposes other than current research, and they
may not be well-suited to answering researchers’ questions.
Researchers who rely on sources must ask whether they
have understood the evidence correctly. The state of the
evidence may have been influenced by many factors other
than the ones that interest them, including factors of which
they are unaware.
This is not to say that sources are always a dubious form
of evidence. Some disciplines, such as history, are built
around their use and are therefore perfectly adapted to
their limitations. Even when that is not so, sources can
be of great value. And it is sometimes possible to see
processes that have led to the generation of source data as
having some of the qualities of well-designed experiments.
It may be possible to say that certain effects resulted from
1 Mitchell, Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy,
chapter 4.
2 Arabatzis, “Experiment”, pages 197-198.
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specific changes in the environment, either because the
environment was otherwise almost completely stable, or
because it is possible to analyse data in ways that in effect
retrospectively create control groups.3
Survey data may be obtained for current purposes, but
they are generally obtained in environments that are not
controlled by experimenters. We shall therefore treat the use
of survey data under the heading of sources, in section 7.3.2.
The considerations that may lead us to have special
concerns about the use of sources also apply, to a lesser
extent, when researchers use experimental results that were
obtained for purposes other than current ones. Such results
may have been obtained under carefully controlled condi-
tions, and awareness of precisely how they were obtained
certainly assists in their interpretation, so difficulties are
on the whole less than they would be with sources derived
directly from the uncontrolled world. But there may still be
concerns about influences that may have been irrelevant to
the purposes of the original experimenters but that may be
undesirable in the context of current re-use of the results.
It is therefore sometimes appropriate to regard secondhand
experimental results as sources.
7.2 Experiments
Experiments are standard in most disciplines low down
the scale, but they can also be used reasonably high
up the scale. For example, although evolutionary biology
depends heavily on pre-existing sources, it can also use
experiments on organisms that run through generations
3 Morgan, “Nature’s Experiments and Natural Experiments in the
Social Sciences”.
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rapidly enough to allow evolution to be observed in the
laboratory.4 Evolutionary biology also draws on results
that have been established experimentally in other areas
of biology and in chemistry. Moving up into the social
sciences, political science now makes considerable use of
experiments in which people are assigned to groups, and are
then subjected to various stimuli to measure their responses
or are asked various questions.5
Experiments do not need to have been performed for
the purposes of a current piece of work. If results derive
from earlier experiments that were conducted according to
modern standards they may be used, although there is the
point mentioned above that it may be appropriate to treat
such secondhand results as if they were sources. If on the
other hand earlier experiments were conducted according to
standards that would now be regarded as lax, their results
may have to be ignored altogether. There is a grey area of
results obtained from experiments that would not now be
regarded as entirely satisfactory, but that were not so badly
conducted as to render their results useless.
There are norms that lay down how experiments should
be designed and conducted, as we noted in section 2.1.1.2.
In the natural sciences in particular, papers that report
new research are expected to set out how experiments
were conducted, so as to reassure readers that norms were
observed. And papers may have to be retracted if it is
later found that there was some problem with the ways
in which experiments were conducted, whether or not there
was deliberate malpractice.6 There is however reason for
4 Buckling, Maclean, Brockhurst and Colegrave, “The Beagle in a
Bottle”.
5 Examples may be found in the Journal of Experimental Political
Science.




optimism. Only a small fraction of published papers are
retracted, and retraction can be for any one of several
reasons, not just because of problems with the ways in
which experiments were conducted.7 On the other hand
there is an argument that failure to abide by norms can
very easily go undetected, for a variety of reasons that
are connected with the availability of resources and the
sociology of disciplines.8 And there is evidence that in at
least one discipline, psychology, there is quite widespread
use of research practices that are at least questionable,
whether or not they are fatal to the reliability of results.9
In the social sciences, and sometimes in the natural sciences,
there are arguments to be had about the extent to which
experiments can allow researchers to make claims about the
world outside the context of the experiments. The degree
of simplification and isolation involved in experiments
can be such as to require great care when moving from
experimental results to claims about the wider world.10
Doubts about whether enough care has been taken may
limit our confidence in claims about the world that come to
be accepted on the basis of experiments.
Given that there are risks associated with experiments, we
may only have full confidence in claims when enough work
has been done to lay to rest any doubts about the quality
of experiments and about the safety of their interpretation
as providing information about the world. Whether this
7 Grieneisen and Zhang. “A Comprehensive Survey of Retracted
Articles from the Scholarly Literature”.
8 Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, section 3; Fanelli,
“How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research? A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis of Survey Data”.
9 John, Loewenstein and Prelec, “Measuring the Prevalence of
Questionable Research Practices With Incentives for Truth Telling”.
10 For the case of economics see Guala, The Methodology of
Experimental Economics, chapters 7 to 9.
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strict standard is in fact met will depend on the conduct of
researchers. We shall consider that issue and related issues
in sections 9.4 and 9.6.
7.3 Sources
7.3.1 The interpretation of sources
Sources come in many different forms. They include
documents, works of art, and everyday material artefacts.
In this section, we shall consider the interpretation of
individual sources. We shall include under this heading work
on sets of sources, the members of which are compared and
contrasted to throw light on one another and to allow overall
pictures to be painted, rather than to aggregate information
about them in a statistical manner. In section 7.3.2, we shall
consider the use of results obtained from systematic surveys
of populations.
Issues in the interpretation of individual sources can arise at
several levels, from the immediate reading of evidence up
to high-level interpretation.11 Moreover, different theories
and principles may need to be brought to bear at different
stages of interpretation.12
11 For examples of interpretation at different levels, including
a basic level that is very close to sources which might at first
glance appear to be quite straightforward to read, such as Roman
inscriptions, see Morley, Writing Ancient History, pages 69-92.
12 See for example the discussion of the role of middle-range theories
in archaeology in Kosso, Knowing the Past: Philosophical Issues of
History and Archaeology, chapter 3. (As Kosso explains on pages 61-
64, middle-range theories are not theories of middling generality, but
theories of any type when they are used to help archaeologists to
understand how the archaeological record was formed.)
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We must distinguish between sources that were, when
produced, intended to convey information to someone, and
those that were not intended to do so. For example, written
documents were mostly intended to convey information,
while items of undecorated pottery were mostly not
intended to do so.13
7.3.1.1 Sources intended to convey information
We shall now set out some of the complexities that can arise
in the interpretation of sources that were intended to convey
information. We shall return to this topic in the context of
explanation by the identification of attributed meanings in
section 8.3.4.
Researchers must discern the intentions of the creator
of a source. He or she might have intended to inform,
entertain, mislead or convince.14 Researchers’ grasp of the
intentions of the creator will depend on their more general
understanding of the society within which the source was
created, the individual creator, and the people close to him
or her.
Researchers must also consider the limitations of the
creator. Was he or she in a good position to achieve
the intended purpose? For example, if the source gives
an account of some events, was the creator well-informed
enough to be reliable?
13 For remarks on the significance of a distinction between historical
and archaeological sources that draws a boundary which lies close
to our boundary between sources that were and sources that were
not intended to convey information see Kosso, Knowing the Past:
Philosophical Issues of History and Archaeology, pages 29-33.
14 For an example of the difficulties of working out an author’s
intentions see Dodd, “Was Thomas Favent a Political Pamphleteer?
Faction and Politics in Later Fourteenth-Century London”.
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The creator of a source will have acted on the basis of
his or her understanding of the position of the intended
recipients: what they would have already believed, what
they might have wanted, how they might have been
influenced, and so on. In order to understand what the
creator intended, researchers must therefore grasp how the
creator understood the intended recipients. And the first
step toward discerning the creator’s understanding will be
to discern the actual position of the intended recipients.
There will also be conventions of writing to consider. The
effects of such conventions might have been well-understood
at the time, but those effects may not be at all obvious to
modern readers. Good examples of some of the difficulties of
interpretation that can arise are supplied by letters and by
histories written long ago that were, at the time of writing,
secondhand reports of events, and that were sometimes
written with purposes that would not be shared by modern
historians, but that are now among the available sources
that are closest to the events.15
While complexities of interpretation most obviously arise in
connection with old sources, they can also arise when recent
sources are used. For example, they arise when historians
seek to make use of films, whether the films were made
to inform or to entertain. A skilled historian may be able
to use a film of any type to glean information about the
context in which it was made, as well as using documentary
films to obtain information about the events filmed. Some
of the complexities, and the potential of film as a source if
correctly used, are indicated by the work of Marc Ferro.16
15 Schulte and von Tippelskirch (eds.), Reading, Interpreting and
Historicizing: Letters as Historical Sources; Given-Wilson, Chronicles:
The Writing of History in Medieval England, especially chapters 1
and 3; Pitcher, Writing Ancient History: An Introduction to Classical
Historiography.
16 Ferro, Cinéma et Histoire.
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The difficulties created by such complexities are by no
means insuperable. In particular, sources are not inter-
preted in isolation. There are often several sources, perhaps
of several different types, that can be used together. The
ensemble of sources as a whole can then provide assistance
in the interpretation of the sources individually. The
complexities are also not news to researchers. The history of
hermeneutics, particularly from the time of Schleiermacher
onward, attests to the deep thought that has gone into the
question of how to interpret sources. But it is important
to be aware that the interpretation of sources is not at all
straightforward.
7.3.1.2 Other sources
When a source was not intended by its creator to convey
information, some of the complexities of interpretation that
we have just noted do not arise. But researchers may still
need to consider intentions that lay behind the making of
artefacts or behind the making of them in certain ways
(for example, by decorating them), and how the artefacts
were used. Questions of intention and use only fail to
arise in connection with natural remains that were neither
deliberately created nor deliberately used, either by human
beings or by animals with the mental capacity to act
deliberately.
While the interpretation of sources that were not intended
to convey information is in one way easier, because some
or all questions of intention and use do not arise, it is in
another way harder. There is no message that is manifestly
conveyed by such sources. Researchers have no obvious
starting point for their quest to extract information from
the sources.
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This does not however leave them with no way to begin. The
existing corpus is of immense importance. With artefacts,
researchers are likely to draw heavily on the corpus to tell
them about societies and everyday life at the relevant time
and place. With other sources, such as fossils, researchers
will have not only the existing record of sources, but also
theories that set out how sources arose and what features of
them will indicate their dates, their relationships to other
sources of the same general type, and so on. There is also
the assistance in the interpretation of individual sources
that can be obtained from the whole ensemble of sources,
which may be of several different types.
Despite such forms of assistance, interpretation can still
be difficult. Difficulties are especially great when sources
are sparse. Archaeological remains present particular dif-
ficulties, partly because of the sparseness of sources and
partly because the thoughts that lay behind decisions to
create particular artefacts or to use natural resources in
particular ways have often left no direct traces. It is not
surprising that there has been considerable debate over
proper approaches to archaeological work and over the
reliability of conclusions that may be reached.17 When there
are debates about how interpretations should be made and
about what a discipline can achieve, we may be glad that
the issues are exposed rather than ignored. But the very
fact that there are such issues may reduce our confidence in
accepted claims, unless they enjoy the assent not merely of
the members of one school of thought but of the members
of all or most schools of thought.
17 For different approaches to the recovery of cultural meaning from
material culture see Hodder and Hutson, Reading the Past: Current
Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology. For a broad review of
debates over what archaeology can achieve and how the legitimate




7.3.1.3 Interpretation to facilitate explanation
We must consider the possibility that sources will be
interpreted in certain ways with a view to making it easier
to give explanatory accounts.
There is a modest form of interpretation in which clues in
the sources are combined with a general understanding of
how things are likely to have been, in order to support the
addition of details that are not in the sources. The aim is
to fill out the context, and thereby allow the sources to be
interpreted as supporting a satisfactory narrative. A work of
political history, for example, must tell a compelling story
of events if it is to be worth reading. The story must be
faithful to the evidence, or at least to any evidence the
veracity of which there is no good reason to doubt, but
historians may need to add details that are not directly
supported by specific pieces of evidence in order to complete
the story. They do not do anything so crude as asserting
that particular meetings took place when there is no direct
evidence that they did. Rather, they do things like assert
that given that people were in certain situations, they
must have thought, intended or discussed certain things.
Such claims can play important roles in explaining the
course of events. One example is Robin Lane Fox’s claim,
in relation to the plot against Alexander in 330 BC, that
the plotters “must have discussed the future before they
acted” and “would have had plans for a replacement”. These
are worthwhile additions to the narrative, because they
support the delineation of a plausible (but not certain) role
of Philotas that would help to make sense of the course of
events.18 Another example, in which a desire to make sense
of events leads a historian to regard the only direct evidence
for an event as misleading, is Edgar Feuchtwanger’s view
18 Lane Fox, Alexander the Great, pages 286-288.
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that when Bismarck met Wilhelm I in September 1862,
he must have already known about Wilhelm’s threat to
abdicate and must have worked out his approach on that
basis.19
Such additions of plausible detail can be allowed because
it is expected that historical events which are described in
terms of the activities of individuals will be explicable by
reference to a general understanding of how people tend
to think and act. It is an assumption of any everyday
understanding of human beings that their conduct is usually
intelligible. That assumption is justified by experience. And
the addition of plausible details greatly facilitates the giving
of explanations. Moreover, reputable writers signal the fact
that details are being added by using phrases like “We may
suppose that”, or “It must have been that”. The addition of
plausible details must however be tightly controlled. It has
been argued that microhistorians, with their focus on the
lives, the characters and the thoughts of individuals, can be
overly inclined to go beyond the evidence.20
A larger-scale form of interpretation takes place when
researchers decide to read evidence in the light of some
manifestly optional formative concepts, in order to facilitate
the giving of explanations. For example, Pierre Bourdieu’s
analysis of the relationships between patterns of aesthetic
taste and patterns of class depends on his use of a notion of
capital that is divided into economic and cultural capital. It
is important that the latter is regarded as a form of capital,
similar to the former in respects such as the scope to inherit
19 Feuchtwanger, Bismarck: A Political History, pages 80-81. The
direct evidence in question is the account of the meeting in Bismarck’s
own reminiscences. Relevant extracts from those reminiscences are
given in Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life, pages 178-179.




it.21 Another example is provided by an interpretation by
Christopher Tilley of Swedish archaeological remains in
the light of a social model of power relations, the use of
which brings some optional formative concepts into play.
Tilley first sets out the model, then analyses the pieces
of evidence in their own right, identifying links between
bodies of evidence of different types, and finally interprets
the evidence in the light of the model. He argues that
the identification of links not only supports the chosen
interpretation, but is also needed to allow the evidence
to be interpreted at all.22 This role for links between
bodies of evidence of different types does create a more
subtle structure than one in which evidence is simply
interpreted under the influence of some optional formative
concepts. If the links were established in a way that was
manifestly independent of the choice of formative concepts,
the interpretation of the evidence would be a good deal less
under the influence of that choice than it would otherwise
be. But in practice it is very likely that the identification
of such links will be heavily influenced by the choice of
formative concepts, and confirmation that the right kinds
of link have been identified will come from the successful
application of those concepts.
Researchers may make this kind of choice of ways to read
evidence, not for the disreputable reason that they want
to justify their formative concepts even at the cost of
using biased interpretations of evidence, but for the more
respectable reason that it allows them to make effective
use of their conceptual resources. To read evidence in a
21 Bourdieu, La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, espe-
cially chapters 1 and 2.
22 Tilley, “Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Middle
Neolithic of Southern Sweden”. Tilley comments on the relationship
between the finding of links and the interpretation of the evidence on
page 144.
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particular way under the influence of optional formative
concepts need not be to distort evidence. It may be to
discover good and worthwhile explanations of phenomena
by bringing some formative concepts to bear. The reading
of evidence in this way does however mean that success in
giving explanatory accounts cannot give much in the way
of confirmation that the formative concepts really ought to
be used.
The risk that sources will be interpreted inappropriately
in order to allow explanatory accounts to be given may
reduce our confidence. The surest protection is, as so often,
critical scrutiny by other researchers. We shall now note
some varieties of scrutiny.
7.3.1.4 Scrutiny of the use of sources
Scrutiny will involve checking that researchers investigated
the authenticity of sources, dated sources as accurately as
possible, examined with particular care sources that were
not typical of their supposed times and places of origin, and
considered whether sources might have become corrupted in
the period since their creation or in the process of extracting
them for investigation.
There are other types of scrutiny which relate more to the
ways in which researchers use sources to support claims
than to whether researchers have made checks on the
sources themselves.
One type of scrutiny is to check the extent to which sources
can be corroborated. The corroboration may come from
other sources of the same general type, for example when
there are several apparently independent accounts of the
same event. And the lack of such corroboration for accounts
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of events that one would expect to have been notorious
can cast doubt on slender sources, especially if they are
not quite contemporary, are not eye-witness reports, or
are hard to reconcile with other evidence. For example,
Martin Luther’s nailing of his 95 Theses to the church
door has been doubted on such grounds.23 Alternatively,
corroboration may come from work of a different type, as
when archaeologists experiment with flintknapping in order
to support or test readings of remains.24
Another type of scrutiny is to challenge specific interpret-
ations by giving alternative ways to read the sources. In
particular, the use of written sources that directly encour-
age certain views of events can be challenged if researchers
appear to have assented to the encouraged views too
readily.25 This kind of search for alternative interpretations
is the first line of defence against the interpretation of
sources in ways that are unjustified but are encouraged
by their making it easy to give explanatory accounts, or
by their giving support to views that researchers already
favour. It does however always require going back to the
primary sources. Scrutiny based solely on secondary sources
would fail to detect biases that had been incorporated when
23 Iserloh, Luthers Thesenanschlag. Tatsache oder Legende? For
the lack of corroboration see pages 19-24. For the limitations of the
critical source see pages 17-18. For the difficulty of reconciliation
with other evidence, in this case letters Luther wrote to bishops, see
page 16. What did or did not happen is still disputed, even though
additional evidence has since come to light: Ott and Treu (eds.),
Luthers Thesenanschlag – Faktum oder Fiktion.
24 Carr and Bradbury, “Flake Debris and Flintknapping Experi-
mentation”. The relationship between work within the discipline being
practised (such as archaeology) and information obtained from work
done in supporting disciplines (such as the physical and chemical
analysis of artefacts) can be complex: Jones, Archaeological Theory
and Scientific Practice, especially chapters 4 and 5.
25 An example of such criticism is Kessler, “Power, Not Progress:
An Alternative Reading of L’Hôpital’s Legal Reforms”.
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they were written.26
Finally, to return to formative concepts, the use of optional
formative concepts when interpreting sources should of
course be scrutinized. But in addition, the formative
concepts themselves should be exposed to criticism. If they
are found wanting, explanations that they facilitate may
need to be discarded. For example, Bourdieu’s concept of
cultural capital has been heavily criticized in its role as an
explanation of a supposed lack of the social mobility that
one might expect to result from an educational system.27
7.3.2 Surveys
We shall now turn to issues that relate to the systematic
collection and analysis of data from a population. These
issues arise in connection with field research, such as the
observation of animals in the wild or the use of sociological
surveys. They also arise in work in the humanities, such as
the analysis of a wide range of texts in order to identify
trends in the development of the relevant language, or the
use of surveys of people’s views on carefully constructed
scenarios in order to put philosophers’ intuitions to the
test.28
26 Some of the dangers of doing research on the strength of
secondary sources are set out in Lustick, “History, Historiography,
and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of
Selection Bias”. Lustick writes with reference to the original carrying
out of research, but the dangers he identifies extend to the scrutiny
of research that has been done by others.
27 Goldthorpe, “‘Cultural Capital’: Some Critical Observations”.
28 For an example of the analysis of texts see Acerbi, Lampos,
Garnett and Bentley, “The Expression of Emotions in 20th Century




It might seem that a survey was a form of experiment,
one that could determine the values of some variables
in a population in a way that could answer a precise
question because the questions put to the population
could be chosen to serve the researchers’ purposes. (We
include in the category of surveys both surveys of the
views of human beings and surveys of animals, plants,
geological formations and so on where questions are put
to members of the population not by speaking to them,
but by taking measurements in other ways.) But when we
are concerned with the confidence we may have in claims
that are based on sets of data obtained from surveys, it is
appropriate for us to regard those sets of data as closer to
sources than to the results of experiments. The use of pre-
existing populations with their own characteristics means
that researchers must be less confident that responses to
interrogation have the significance they would need to have
in order to answer the researchers’ questions than they
might be if data had been collected in artificially created
experimental environments.29
We must also distinguish primary data, collected by
researchers for their specific purposes, from secondary data,
taken from established databases. (Work in a third category,
literature that reports researchers’ interpretations, is not
a source of data at all, except to the extent that it
contains reports of data that can be read in isolation
from the interpretations.) Secondary data may have been
collected carefully, following well-designed procedures that
researchers can study to confirm that the data should
be suitable for their purposes. Established databases may
include far more data than individual research teams could
29 For a discussion of how the uncontrolled nature of pre-existing
populations can make it difficult to reach conclusions about causes
and effects see Przeworski, “Is the Science of Comparative Politics
Possible?”.
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collect. But there remains the question of whether data
taken from a database that has been compiled to suit a wide
variety of purposes will be ideally suited to the purposes of a
specific project.30 It is not only the way in which basic data
were recorded that may give rise to concern. The ways in
which items of data have been categorized and linked in the
database may fail to represent some members of the relevant
population or the relationships between them adequately.31
This may lead to errors when a survey involves picking out
members with certain characteristics and studying them.
Finally, not all data are of types that facilitate statistical
analysis. In particular, human responses to questions that
are not forced into the mould of choices between prescribed
options can be difficult to analyse.
7.3.2.1 The design and conduct of research
Projects to collect and analyse data must be designed and
conducted carefully. In surveys of people, questions to put
to the population must be devised so as to elicit the required
information, they must be written and used in ways that
will not introduce bias, and results must be collected in
ways that will lead to accurate reports. When data are
obtained by surveying a population, whether of people or
other entities, without speaking to its members, comparable
precautions must be taken. In either case, analyses must be
conducted in ways that impose strict requirements on what
must be shown in order to draw conclusions. Methods of
analysis should also, so far as possible, negate the effects of
30 For some issues that arise with the use of secondary data see
Schutt, Investigating the Social World: The Process and Practice of
Research, chapter 14; St. Martin and Pavlovskaya, “Secondary Data”.
31 Brown and Simpson, “The Curious Identity of Michael Field and
its Implications for Humanities Research with the Semantic Web”.
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any biases that may have been introduced at earlier stages
despite all the precautions that were taken.
We can gain reassurance from the fact that disciplines which
use surveys have well-developed methods, the use of which
helps to ensure that work is done properly. Methods to
use are set out in comprehensive manuals.32 In addition,
there are special methods that can help researchers who face
special challenges.33 If we can see that established methods
have been used, that should increase our confidence in the
claims made.
7.3.2.2 Data mining
Data mining is a relatively new way to use survey results or
other sources of substantial quantities of data. Researchers
start by identifying some entity, such as an ecosystem,
an economy or a political community, or some source
of data, such as a sequence of experiments or a body
of literary texts. They then collect and analyse large
quantities of data, and use the data to identify patterns
that may be regarded as significant and worthy of further
investigation, to develop models of the parts of the world
that gave rise to the data, or to test hypotheses. Some
very sophisticated techniques have been developed, and the
computational resources that are needed to make full use
32 Examples are Coe (ed.), Geological Field Techniques; Karban,
Huntzinger and Pearse, How To Do Ecology: A Concise Handbook;
Bryman, Social Research Methods.
33 For an example of a method to ensure that parts of a population
are not accidentally excluded from a sample see Landry and Shen,
“Reaching Migrants in Survey Research: The Use of the Global
Positioning System to Reduce Coverage Bias in China”. For examples
of methods to perform analyses when samples may be statistically
unsatisfactory see Fu, Winship and Mare, “Sample Selection Bias
Models”.
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of those techniques, including not only programs that find
patterns but also data visualization software and workflow
management systems, are now readily available.34 Much
of the development of data mining techniques has been
driven by the desire of commercial enterprises to predict
which people would be potential customers, who would
be likely to repay loans on time, and so on, rather than
by the needs of academia. Textbooks in particular often
reflect such commercial concerns. But even though the
ultimate objectives of commercial work differ from those of
academic work, they have the same intermediate objectives
of identifying patterns and testing hypotheses.
When this kind of work is done, we may have concerns
about the degree of support that is enjoyed by the claims
that result. The main concern is that patterns found may
not really support claims that are made, and that models
developed may not appropriately represent the world. There
are several points to consider.
The first point is this. A large body of data may contain
patterns that could support many different conclusions,
simply because the body of data is large. It is quite
likely that some associations or other will arise by chance.
Researchers who go to the data in pursuit of interesting
patterns in general are therefore likely to find something or
34 Textbooks include Nisbet, Elder and Miner, Handbook of Stat-
istical Analysis and Data Mining Applications; Tufféry, Data Mining
and Statistics for Decision Making. One can gain an impression of
the possibilities by browsing the journal Data Mining and Knowledge
Discovery. For a discussion of data mining in ecology see Hochachka
et al., “Data-Mining Discovery of Pattern and Process in Ecological
Systems”. For examples of the use of data mining in some other
disciplines see Monroe, Colaresi and Quinn, “Fightin’ Words: Lexical
Feature Selection and Evaluation for Identifying the Content of
Political Conflict”; Pumfrey, Rayson and Mariani, “Experiments in
17th Century English: Manual versus Automatic Conceptual History”.
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other, even if there is no good reason to regard what they
find as significant.35
The second point is this. Initial inspection of data may
disclose some pattern that suggests a likely conclusion
or a likely model. Researchers may be inclined to look
favourably on that conclusion or model before examining
its level of support, and may then concentrate on the
support it gets from the data while disregarding any lack of
evidence that the pattern is really significant. We therefore
need to pay attention to how researchers initially approach
data. Tools of visualization that help researchers to spot
patterns are in common use.36 It is also possible to give the
researcher’s eye for an interesting pattern an express role
not merely at the start, but in the progressive exploration
of the data in pursuit of ever more sophisticated and
interesting conclusions.37 But the fact that a pattern strikes
researchers as interesting does not show that it is of any real
significance.
The third point is that we must be concerned about
the ways in which hypotheses are tested when data have
suggested the hypotheses. It is generally unsound to use the
data that suggest a hypothesis to test it, although there
are special methods that can sometimes be used.38 It is
therefore important to regard hypotheses as tested only if
they have been tested on independent data or appropriate
corrections have been made. Claims that cannot be tested
35 Smith and Ebrahim, “Data Dredging, Bias, or Confounding:
They Can All Get You into the BMJ and the Friday Papers”.
36 Fox and Hendler, “Changing the Equation on Scientific Data
Visualization”.
37 Yu, Yurovsky and Xu, “Visual Data Mining: An Exploratory
Approach to Analyzing Temporal Patterns of Eye Movements”, page
38.
38 Maxwell and Delaney, Designing Experiments and Analyzing
Data: A Model Comparison Perspective, pages 200-201 and 213-221.
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in this way, perhaps because of a lack of independent data
or because the usual corrective measures are inappropriate,
may be of interest, but we should not have confidence in
them unless alternative precautions have been taken.39
There is a general response to our main concern, and also to
the other concerns that we shall mention below. This is that
users of data mining are aware of its perils.40 Users are also
aware of precautions that can be taken. So when we consider
the confidence we should have, we should either look in
detail at the precautions taken or, less demandingly but
more practically, consider whether the relevant academic
climate is such as to enforce the taking of appropriate
precautions.
A second concern, closely related to the main concern, is
that there are several methods that could be used to process
the same data. This may give rise to a suspicion that if
different methods had been used, the conclusions drawn
might have been markedly different. There is even a worry
that incentives to researchers, such as career incentives
that make it particularly desirable to obtain exciting
new results, may encourage them to choose methods on
grounds other than a disinterested desire to advance their
understanding of the world. This worry can arise in many
types of work, but it is particularly significant in the context
39 One such precaution is proposed in White, “A Reality Check for
Data Snooping”.
40 There is for example a catalogue of leading mistakes in Nisbet,
Elder and Miner, Handbook of Statistical Analysis and Data Mining
Applications, chapter 20. This catalogue is written in the context of
data mining with a view to prediction, often for commercial purposes,
but the mistakes still translate to more academic contexts, although
the descriptions of some of the mistakes would need to be adapted
and some additional mistakes would need to be added. For problems
that can arise when data mining is used in econometric modelling see




of data mining because of the wide choice of methods,
the sophisticated nature of analyses, and the scope to
decide which data to use and which to exclude.41 One
response to this concern, to give in addition to the general
response to concerns noted above, is to point out that the
results of computations that use different methods can be
compared, with discrepancies performing the valuable role
of casting doubt on results or on their significance. Another
response is that new methods are introduced in order to
make data mining more effective, and that they can be
demonstrated to be improvements on old methods in certain
circumstances.42
A third concern is that if data mining is used to develop a
pre-existing model, for example to fix parameters, there is
a danger that the choice of the model will reflect inherited
prejudice rather than a fresh look at the evidence. There is
the general response to concerns noted above, and there
is also the more specific response that models can be
tested and improved in recognized ways.43 (This response
is relevant to any general concern about claims which are
based on models that result from data mining, as well as to
this specific concern.) Another specific response is to say
that data mining can be used in stages, with an initial
model’s being very general so that not much prejudice
is incorporated, and the model’s then being made more
specific at each stage in response to data.44
41 Glaeser, “Researcher Incentives and Empirical Methods”.
42 Examples are given in Grimmer, “An Introduction to Bayesian
Inference via Variational Approximations”; Stockwell, “Improving
Ecological Niche Models by Data Mining Large Environmental
Datasets for Surrogate Models”.
43 Nisbet, Elder and Miner, Handbook of Statistical Analysis and
Data Mining Applications, chapter 13.







Accounts and the claims they contain do not drop from the
sky. They are created by human beings. In this chapter we
shall consider ways in which researchers may work their
way from evidence or other starting points to accounts
or specific claims. In chapter 9, we shall consider ways
in which researchers work, whether independently or with
one another, when they produce accounts, make claims and
decide whether to assent to claims.
We shall sometimes speak of routes to accounts, and
sometimes of routes to the claims that would be embedded
in accounts. We shall favour the former way of speaking
when the route is one that is most naturally seen as leading
primarily to accounts as wholes. We shall favour the latter
way of speaking when the route is one that can easily
be seen as leading directly to individual claims. The first
route we shall consider, the deductive route, is of this latter
type. The second route, the good explanation route, is more
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naturally seen as taking researchers from evidence to whole
accounts.
8.2 The deductive route
Claims are sometimes deduced from evidence or other
starting points. We shall call this the deductive route
to claims. We shall extend the term to cover arguments
that are close to being deductive, as when some of the
relevant links between propositions are not quite deductive.
We shall do so both because arguments that are close to
being deductive can confer almost as much confidence as
arguments that are properly deductive, and because some
of the issues that arise in relation to use of the deductive
route extend to the use of arguments that are close to being
deductive.
In mathematics, the starting points are not pieces of
evidence obtained from the world but axioms, established
results and the contents of established or new definitions.
Results must standardly be deduced from these starting
points. And relationships between propositions that are not
deductive, but are merely almost as strong, are not normally
used in argument.
In the natural sciences, the deductive route can play a
significant role. For example, data from experiments in
physics are used to deduce narrow ranges for the values of
fundamental constants, and x-ray diffraction patterns are
used to deduce the structures of crystals. But the relevant
relationships between propositions will often only approach
being deductive in their strength. There may be some
modest scope for the starting points of a piece of reasoning
to be correct without the conclusion’s being correct.
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We need to consider concerns in three areas: the quality
of evidence, the validity of arguments and the role of the
existing corpus. Throughout this section, we shall take it
that the relevant arguments for claims have already been
set out, and are to be read forward from starting points to
conclusions.
8.2.1 The quality of evidence
If claims follow deductively from evidence, and the evidence
is not misleading, we should have great confidence in the
claims.
Confidence that evidence does not mislead is however a
strong requirement. There might be bias in the presentation
of evidence which obscured the fact that the correctness of
some of the premises of a deduction was not beyond reas-
onable doubt, especially in higher disciplines where there
are plenty of ways to present evidence. And undiscovered
evidence, or evidence that had not been studied thoroughly,
might have cast doubt on the premises. The higher up the
scale we go, the more likely it is that this will be a serious
risk. There may very well be a large body of potentially
relevant evidence, and it may not have been catalogued and
studied systematically.
8.2.2 The validity of arguments
In this section we shall consider the quality of arguments in
themselves, rather than the quality of their starting points.
Our concern is with validity, not soundness. Our comments
will extend to arguments that use relationships between
propositions which are not quite deductive. The notion
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of validity does not strictly apply to such arguments, but
they can still be better or worse. And the controls we shall
mention that may detect invalid arguments are also useful
as controls over arguments that are not quite deductive.
When a deduction of a claim from evidence conforms to
the definition of a proof that is laid down by logicians,
with all steps laid out, there is no need to think about
controls over the steps in the argument. The argument is
simply valid. But even in mathematics, it is very rare for an
argument to be set out with such complete formality, with
no line being written unless it is an axiom, a theorem, or
something that some precise rules of deduction allow given
the contents of preceding lines. Proofs are in practice a good
deal less formal than that, as we noted in sections 3.5.2.2
and 4.2.1. In the natural sciences, even more informality is
to be expected. When there is any degree of informality,
it is important to consider whether there are adequate
controls over the quality of arguments. Is it likely that
invalid arguments, and arguments that fall short of the
corresponding standard for work that is not quite deductive,
will be disallowed?
We can gain some reassurance from the dialogical con-
ception of deduction. This conception sees a deduction
as a dialogue between a proponent who tries to establish
a conclusion on the basis of certain premises, and an
opponent who tries to show that the premises do not compel
the conclusion. We are to imagine a particularly awkward
opponent, who is always looking for a way to agree to the
premises but reject the conclusion. If the proponent only
makes moves that are permitted by the rules of deduction,
she will be safe. The opponent will not be able to attack her
argument, for example by showing that there are counter-
examples to what she claims are deductive steps. But if
the proponent makes moves that go beyond what the rules
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of deduction permit, an attack will succeed and she will
fail to establish the argument’s conclusion. So the rules of
deduction become rules that determine which sequences of
moves by the proponent will make her win the game, and
which sequences will make her lose the game.1
We do not need to use the dialogical conception when a
deduction meets the logician’s standard of presentation,
spelling out every step in the argument and every premise.
In such a case, there is simply a fact of the matter that
a sequence of formulae which meets the highest possible
standard has been written down. At least, there is such a
fact of the matter given the prior choice of a logical system.
And our concern here is with what may be done given such
a prior choice. We are not concerned with results about
logical systems that may be obtained by investigating the
general properties of games and of possible sequences of
moves, important though those results may be in other
contexts.
The dialogical conception comes into its own when the
logician’s standard is not met to perfection, and that is
when we need reassurance. The conception can reassure
us if it leads us to see the process of writing deductions
as one that builds in a search for flaws. We must however
acknowledge that this does not give any guarantee that the
search for flaws will be as aggressive as it could be. The
reassurance we gain is therefore limited.
Mathematical practice provides examples of expectations
and conduct that reflect the dialogical conception. When an
important new result is announced, mathematicians want
to enter into dialogue with the person or people who wrote
1 Dutilh Novaes, “A Dialogical Account of Deductive Reasoning
as a Case Study for how Culture Shapes Cognition”, pages 461-463;
Krabbe, “Arguments, Proofs, and Dialogues”, sections 3.5 and 3.6.
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the purported proof, so as to understand it and challenge
any apparent weaknesses. They are not likely to assent to
the new result until after this process has been completed.
We can see an example of what happens when this process
does not take place by looking at initial reactions to
Shinichi Mochizuki’s purported proof of the abc conjecture,
announced in 2012. The proof was very long and complex,
and it used novel concepts. Despite this, Mochizuki was
initially reluctant to enter into dialogue about his purported
proof, so the normal dialogical procedure was not followed.2
This left mathematicians not quite sure what to make of his
work. As at the time of writing, there is still no agreement
as to whether the abc conjecture has been proved.
The focus of work on the dialogical conception has been
largely on the proofs of mathematics, but the conception
can be extended to arguments in the natural sciences,
whether they are deductive or only come close to being
deductive. The conception would however need some modi-
fication. In mathematics, the rules of deduction give a clear
understanding of exactly when an opponent may object to
a move. In the natural sciences, the rules of argument are
not so completely formalized. There is therefore scope for it
to be indeterminate whether a given objection would defeat
a proponent.
Another control comes from insistence that everything that
is needed to evaluate an argument should be set out for
readers to consider. We shall give an illustration drawn from
mathematics, and then note that the position in the natural
sciences is not quite so good.
2 Chen, “The Paradox of the Proof”. A workshop was however
held at Kyoto University in March 2015. Mochizuki also plans to
participate by Skype in a workshop in Oxford in December 2015:
Clay Mathematics Institute, IUT Theory of Shinichi Mochizuki.
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The mathematical illustration is given by Kenny Easwaran,
in his discussion of the reasons why mathematicians do
not regard arguments which merely make it very probable
that given results are correct as proofs of those results.3
Easwaran argues that mathematicians are not generally
content with proofs of results unless they are given all the
material they would need to convince themselves that the
results were correct. If a proof were merely probabilistic,
they would typically need more information than was given,
or even than could be given. They might for example need to
know that the values on which the result was tested were
selected at random. But even if the method of selection
were set out and would manifestly yield a random selection,
they would be unable to verify that the method had in fact
generated the values used because if it were used again,
it would generate different values. Readers would then
have to take it on trust that the procedure had generated
the values given. That trust might well be justified. Most
mathematicians are perfectly honest, and most would not
try to carry out some procedure, such as the selection of
test values at random, without first ensuring that they had
the skills to do so properly. But mathematicians are not
inclined to rely on the testimony of others, even honest
researchers, without seeing the underlying evidence. This
is the important point here. The norm at work is that
everything should be available for each reader of a paper
to check. There is a separate norm in mathematics that
conclusions should ideally be rendered certain rather than
merely probable, but Easwaran’s example is essentially
about the need to present all the evidence, and only
incidentally about conclusions’ merely being probable.4
3 Easwaran, “Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability”.
4 Work in mathematics that renders conclusions merely probable
can however be useful. It can for example bring patterns to light
or suggest approaches to proof: Borwein and Bailey, Mathematics by
Experiment: Plausible Reasoning in the 21st Century, pages 2-3.
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The norm of giving the readers of papers enough in-
formation that they need not take anything on trust is
not applied quite so strictly in the natural sciences. It
is standard in the natural sciences not to want to re-run
every experiment that supports a result, and papers need
not give enough information to make it feasible to re-run
experiments in exactly the same form as was originally
used. But reasonably detailed descriptions of work done are
still expected, so that people who read papers can consider
whether the work done might have been inadequate in any
way.5
8.2.3 The role of the existing corpus
When the deductive route is used, the existing corpus of
the relevant discipline is typically a vital source of premises.
Arguments would be most unlikely to be deductive, or to
approach being deductive, without premises taken from
that source. We must consider whether our confidence
should be affected by this reliance on the corpus.
Mathematics must be treated separately from other dis-
ciplines. It is built on the axioms and the definitions
of identified entities that mathematicians have chosen.
Theorems are secure in the sense that there is no point in
questioning the ultimate starting points of their deduction,
the axioms and definitions, because those starting points
were chosen freely. (We here set to one side the concern
that axioms might not be quite right for entities that
were grasped independently, a concern that we noted in
section 4.2.3.3, because it would always be possible to say
5 For a discussion of differences between mathematics and other
disciplines see Easwaran, “Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability”,
section 4.
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that axioms which were not quite right for those entities
were right for other, invented, entities.) The one exception
is that it may be worth asking whether foundations are
inconsistent, but that is hardly ever a serious worry. Apart
from that risk, there is no scope for nervousness that
researchers may be working against the background of the
wrong corpus. They simply have the corpus that they have
chosen by virtue of choosing axioms and definitions. There
may be specific mistakes in mathematics that have so far
gone unnoticed, but they are not to be corrected by paying
more attention to the external world.
In disciplines other than mathematics, researchers also need
to use the corpus in order to make progress. But they
are exposed to the risk that elements drawn from the
corpus may not accurately represent the world. To take
an example from physics in which the risk has been made
explicit, quantum electrodynamics and the standard model
provide vital support for measurements of the fine-structure
constant, but physics might move beyond those theories in
ways that would undermine the measurements.6 Such risks
may be small, but they do exist.
We must therefore ask whether premises that are drawn
from the corpus are adequately supported. If we cannot
be confident that they are adequately supported, our
confidence in claims that are reached by the deductive route
must be diminished. Premises drawn from the corpus will
be adequately supported, to the extent that the process
by which they came to be accepted was itself adequately
controlled. That is, we must look at the state of the relevant
discipline as a whole.
6 Hanneke, Fogwell and Gabrielse, “New Measurement of the
Electron Magnetic Moment and the Fine Structure Constant”. The
authors spell out their assumption that the standard model will not
be superseded on page 120801-4.
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8.3 The good explanation route
Very often, researchers find that while some claims may be
deduced from evidence and the corpus, or may be reached
from evidence and the corpus by reasoning that is close to
deductive, those claims are not numerous enough to give a
satisfactory account of a topic. Even if they are numerous
enough, accounts of a topic which can be obtained in that
way may not be the best accounts, for example the ones
that have the greatest explanatory power. Researchers may
therefore need to search more widely.
We shall now consider the route to accounts that involves a
search for accounts which give good explanations, followed
by the endorsement of accounts when the explanations
found are good enough. We shall call this the good
explanation route. The route encompasses abduction. And
we shall use the word “explanation” for any explanatory
account.
The search for good explanations is primarily important
because researchers want to enlarge and improve the
corpus of each discipline. But it has a special relevance
in the context of our main question. If researchers search
assiduously for good explanations, so that they do not
just regard as good the first explanations they find but
compare explanations and discard the comparatively poor
ones, and if they are also strict in their appraisal of the
quality of explanations, there is at least some reason to
think that explanations which pass muster do reflect a
correct understanding of the workings of the world. That
should increase our confidence in the corresponding claims
to explain and in claims that play explanatory roles.
We shall consider the notion of a good explanation, the
use of the good explanation route to support claims within
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explanantia, the process of search for good explanations,
special issues that arise when researchers identify meanings
that people studied attributed to items within their own
experience, and controls over use of the good explanation
route.
8.3.1 The notion of a good explanation
Those who seek to identify good explanations must have an
idea of what makes an explanation a good one.
In the disciplines in which explanations take the form of
theories that are applied on occasions when phenomena
arise, that is, in the natural sciences and some of the social
sciences, it is possible to draw on work that has been
done to identify the qualities of a good theory. Identified
virtues include those of empirical fit and adequacy, explan-
atory power, internal consistency and coherence, simplicity,
consonance with wider theory, being the best available
theory, fertility, the ability to unify different domains, and
durability as the relevant discipline advances.7
We may extend the fruits of this kind of work to disciplines
in which explanations do not routinely take the form of
theories. We may speak of the qualities of explaining a
great deal (or at least of being of a type of explanation that
has wide application), of fitting very well with the existing
corpus, and in some disciplines of fitting very well with an
existing psycho-social understanding, where in both cases
goodness of fit goes beyond mere consistency and extends
to some degree of integration.
7 This catalogue of virtues is taken from McMullin, “The Virtues
of a Good Theory”, pages 564-569.
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In disciplines at all points on the scale, we may also regard
the ability of an explanation to account for a wide variety
of different and apparently independent pieces of evidence
as a good sign. The phenomenon of a wide variety of pieces
of evidence all pointing to the same conclusion is generally
termed “consilience”. One form of their pointing in the same
direction is a single explanation’s accounting for all of them:
the factual correctness of the explanans is the conclusion to
which they point, albeit not by entailing that conclusion.
There is an argument made by Laura Snyder that the
selection of an explanation on the basis of consilience
differs from inference to the best explanation because the
explanation originates in a different way. She argues that a
relevant causal law emerges from the specific cases covered,
rather than being identified separately and then applied to
cases in order to bring them under a single law.8 Snyder
makes this point by reference to causal laws, but it is of
more general application. It may also apply to distinguish
the use of consilience from other forms of inference to
good explanations generally, and not merely from inference
to the best explanation. We need not however identify a
separate route to explanatory accounts. Rather, we can see
the search for consilience as one tool in the search for good
explanations, and the occurrence of consilience as a source
of confidence in the results of such searches.9
There is a related phenomenon that can give confidence
and that is picked out and discussed in the social sciences.
This is the phenomenon of successful triangulation. Trian-
gulation involves the use of different methods, investigators,
theories or sources to study the same phenomenon. If the
same results are obtained in different ways, that can give
8 Snyder, “Consilience, Confirmation, and Realism”, page 134.
9 An example that shows how consilience can be important is
Forber and Griffith, “Historical Reconstruction: Gaining Epistemic
Access to the Deep Past”.
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confidence in those results, whereas different results would
cast doubt on some or all of the results.10 Triangulation
is not specific to searches for good explanations, but
it is relevant to such searches. The results that are of
particular interest in the context of such searches are
those which show causal or other connections between
phenomena. Since such connections are generally inferred
rather than being manifest in the unanalysed evidence,
successful triangulation, identifying the connections from
several points of view, can be particularly reassuring. (As
it happens, the role of triangulation in validating results is
less in favour than it has been in the past.11 But this is for
reasons connected with theoretical conceptions of the social
sciences. There is no reason why triangulation should not
retain its practical role as a source of confidence.)
Triangulation can also play a role in the natural sciences,
when the same phenomenon is studied by different groups of
researchers or using different methods. Again, success comes
when the same results are obtained. There is also scope to
distinguish a variant that has been called multiple derivab-
ility, which involves approaching phenomena using methods
that are based on different scientific backgrounds.12
We should not expect fully defined tests of goodness of
explanation to be decisive in any discipline. Explanations
that are good enough to get discussed are likely to pass the
obvious tests that could be applied mechanically. There will
then be a need for expert judgement to assess their relative
merits.
10 Rothbauer, “Triangulation”.
11 Moran-Ellis et al., “Triangulation and Integration: Processes,
Claims and Implications”, pages 47-49.
12 Nederbragt, “Multiple Derivability and the Reliability and
Stabilization of Theories”, section 5.2.
413
8 Routes to Accounts
8.3.2 Supporting claims
One use of the good explanation route is to support claims
within explanantia. This use is commonly characterized as
inference to the best explanation, also known as abduction,
in its epistemological use to support claims rather than in
its heuristic use to guide the search for explanations.13
The special feature of such reasoning is that there is
inadequate support for claims within an explanans which is
independent of the fact that the explanation is a good one.
The quality of the explanation is taken to support at least
the significant claims within the explanans. The demand
for a single best explanation that is often made is a strict
version of the condition we noted in section 5.1.2.2, that a
claim can only derive support from playing an explanatory
role or roles if the explanations of a given phenomenon in
which it does so are better than explanations in which it
does not do so. But it is also possible to apply some more
relaxed version of the condition, for example a version which
makes it enough to find a number of explanations that are
on the whole better than explanations in which a claim to
be supported plays no explanatory role. As we noted in
section 5.1.2.2, scope to apply a relaxed version is more
likely to arise when a claim to be supported is a claim of
particular fact than when it is a general claim.
This source of pressure to pick out explanations that are
especially good is absent when claims within explanantia
are already established. And even in a discipline within
which inference to the best explanation, or to several
explanations that are better than others, is used to support
claims within explanantia, it can still be acceptable to
use other explanations of a given phenomenon for other
13 For this distinction between uses see Iranzo, “Abduction and
Inference to the Best Explanation”, section 2.
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purposes. Having said that, a large number of explanations
of a given phenomenon could give rise to concern. It would
be likely that some of them would miss the point, or would
be too weak to be worth considering. Thus at least some
pressure to pick out explanations that are especially good
can arise when the task is to support claims to explain. In
disciplines low down the scale, where there is a desire to find
single explanations, pressure is especially likely to arise in
this way.
8.3.3 The search for good explanations
Searches for good explanations need to proceed appropri-
ately. We shall now consider the need to search widely,
the need for searches to be guided and the possible
recharacterization of evidence, before commenting briefly
on inductive argument.
8.3.3.1 The need to search widely
The search for explanations must be wide enough to
bring an appropriate range of candidate explanations into
consideration. The candidates all need to be considered,
even if some of them only merit very brief consideration and
can be discarded quickly. There are several reasons why this
is so.
The first and most obvious reason is that if researchers do
not search widely, or do not consider some of the candidates
they find, they may fail to endorse some explanations,
and thereby fail to accept some claims to explain and
claims within explanantia, when they could have done so.
Opportunities to expand the corpus would then be missed.
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Another reason, which relates more directly to our concern
with confidence, is that if candidates are not found or are
excluded from consideration, some of the candidates that
are considered may appear to be especially good when
in fact they are no better than some of those that are
not found or are excluded. It is true that goodness and
exceptional goodness are different things. An explanation
may be good, whether or not it is exceptionally good. To
that extent a failure to consider other explanations might
not seem to matter, especially when it is acceptable and
perhaps even beneficial to make use of several explanations
at once, for example in order to give a full picture. But the
mere fact that an explanation is distinguished among those
considered will encourage researchers to endorse it. A failure
to consider explanations that should have been considered,
whether because not enough effort was made to find them
or because they were rejected out of hand, may therefore
cast doubt on some decisions to endorse other explanations.
A third reason, which is closely related to the second one,
is this. Even in a discipline in which several explanations
of the same phenomenon are welcome, not just any
explanation is good enough to support its claim to explain.
Some candidates may be so much better than others that
the worse candidates should be regarded as missing the
point. Then researchers should not assent to the claims to
explain of the worse candidates, because those candidates
could not be seen as representing the world appropriately.
The degree of support for claims that played explanatory
roles within the worse candidates would in turn be put in
question. A wide search is needed because researchers can
only see that candidates miss the point if they also have in
front of them candidates that hit the point.
Finally, when the task is to support a claim within an
explanans, a wide search is essential because if a search
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has not been wide, the fact that candidates in which the
claim plays explanatory roles are better than those which
have been found and in which it does not do so will
not carry much weight if there might be some undetected
good explanations in which the claim did not play any
explanatory roles.
This last risk presented by a failure to search widely might
appear to be insuperable. A wide search might reduce
the risk of wrongly identifying some explanations as good
enough relative to all possible explanations, but however
widely researchers searched, there might always be some
other explanations of high quality they had missed.
This problem of unconceived alternatives has been dis-
cussed extensively, although much of the discussion has
concerned the prospects for scientific realism rather than
the confidence we might have in accepted claims.14 There
are however two reasons why we should not be greatly
troubled, whichever side of the philosophical argument
about realism we may favour.
The first reason, which is only relevant on occasion, is that it
is possible for evidence itself to count against the existence
of a wide range of alternatives. Some evidence, particularly
evidence of the repeated predictive success of a theory, may
be such that it would be most unlikely to arise if there were
many alternatives.15
14 Stanford, Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the
Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (Stanford sets out the problem
in chapter 2); Chakravartty, “What You Don’t Know Can’t Hurt You:
Realism and the Unconceived”; Egg, “Expanding Our Grasp: Causal
Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives”.
15 Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger, “The No Alternatives Argu-
ment”.
417
8 Routes to Accounts
The second reason, which is of more general application,
is that we resolved in section 1.1.5.3 not to concern
ourselves with unspecified and large-scale risks. At least
some instances of the problem of unconceived alternatives,
and most of the instances that might have a dramatic
impact on the status of accepted claims, can be regarded as
examples of the unspecified and large-scale risks that may
be disregarded when our concern is with the confidence we
may sensibly have for the time being.
We shall return to the problem of unconceived altern-
atives, and note an additional source of reassurance, in
section 8.3.5.3.
8.3.3.2 The need for searches to be guided
Although searches for candidate explanations must range
widely, it would be very inefficient to manufacture candid-
ates in an unconstrained way. A great deal of effort would
be expended, both in manufacturing them and in appraising
them, only to find that most of them were not much good. It
is therefore important to the efficient conduct of a discipline
that searches should be guided. Both the existing corpus
and paradigms are important.
The existing corpus
The existing corpus can limit the options for explanation.
An explanation that is inconsistent with claims in the
corpus is ruled out unless the evidence is strong enough to
persuade researchers to renounce or revise the relevant parts
of the corpus. But in disciplines low down the scale, in which
there are many relationships between propositions that
are either deductive or almost as strong, the corpus does
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more than exclude certain explanations. An explanation is
expected to make connections with the corpus, where those
connections are expressed in strong relationships between
propositions. Existing concepts used in the discipline and
existing laws need to be put to work. The result can be
a substantial narrowing of the options. That narrowing
makes the task of appraising candidates easier than it
would otherwise be, although at the small risk that good
explanations may be overlooked simply because of their lack
of integration with the corpus.
In disciplines higher up the scale, where strong relationships
between propositions are less common, the corpus cannot
play this direct role in limiting options to the same extent.
Researchers can make up for the reduced extent to which it
can play this role by searching for explanations that make
many connections of a looser nature with elements in the
corpus.
Whether enough connections are made is however a
matter of judgement. It might be feared that there would
be a natural inclination to exercise judgement in ways
that would lead researchers to concentrate on candidates
that were especially easy to relate to the corpus. Then
researchers might not give due weight to hints in the
evidence that new and unfamiliar lines of thought would be
appropriate. We must acknowledge the risk, but we should
not underestimate the capacity of researchers to avoid the
trap. While their starting points can strongly influence what
they find, the evidence can lead them to consider claims
that they had not even had in mind as possibilities when
they started work.16
16 Wylie, Thinking from Things: Essays in the Philosophy of
Archaeology, page xiv. Wylie writes without specific reference to the
stage of searching for explanations, but the point does apply to that
stage.
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It is not only large-scale theories or principles that can
be significant. Detailed results can also limit the options
for explanation. When a discipline reaches a stage in
its development at which there is a recognized need
for relatively large-scale explanatory accounts, detailed
experimental results can play precisely this limiting role.17
We shall now turn from the corpus to paradigms. We shall
consider the notion of a paradigm, the role of paradigms
in guiding searches for explanations, and the problem of
competing paradigms.
The notion of a paradigm
A paradigm is a way to approach a field of study that
leads researchers to favour certain ways to organize the
corpus, certain overall pictures of the world (pictures which
may or may not amount to theories), certain ways to
work, and certain types of finished account.18 For example,
two contrasting paradigms are the integrative approach of
systems biology and the reductionist approach of molecular
biology.19 Another example of a paradigm is the view that
social change is to be explained primarily in economic
terms. It is a matter of judgement when a general approach
17 The evolution of human cognition is a current example. See the
papers in Heyes and Frith (eds.), “New Thinking: The Evolution of
Human Cognition”.
18 A comparable notion of paradigms is given in Pocock, “The
Reconstruction of Discourse: Towards the Historiography of Political
Thought”, page 72 – although Pocock has some concerns about the
notion in the context of his own field of work. For Thomas Kuhn’s
view of the roles and the effects of paradigms in the natural sciences
see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Our notion of a
paradigm is broader than Kuhn’s, so we need not hesitate to apply it
across all disciplines.
19 For the contrast between systems biology and molecular biology
see Noble, The Music of Life: Biology Beyond the Genome, pages x-xi.
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is sufficiently well-defined and stable to be regarded as
a paradigm. One might for example regard the emphasis
of Fernand Braudel on the longue durée rather than on
individual historical events as a paradigm, but think that
the tradition of the Annales school of historians more
generally was too ill-defined and too mutable over the
history of the school to count as a specific paradigm.20
There is a hazy boundary between examples of two
paradigms leading to different approaches to the same
topics, and examples of different approaches leading to
the study of different topics. We can take three examples
from the study of history. The first example is that
of treating cultural dispositions and constructs either as
arising out of social structures, or as having independent
lives and efficacy.21 This is an example of two paradigms for
treatment of the same topics. The second example is that
of historians discussing nineteenth-century British political
thought either in terms of the history of political theory,
or in terms of the history of social science.22 This would
probably, but not indisputably, represent two paradigms for
treatment of the same topic. The third example is that of
choosing to write a political history or a social history of a
given country or period. That would be a choice between
two topics. By contrast, a choice of whether to seek political
or social explanations of some phenomenon that was already
specified in detail would be a choice between two paradigms
for treatment of the same topic.
20 For Braudel see Clark, “The Annales Historians”. For the
school as a whole see Burguière, L’École des Annales. Une histoire
intellectuelle.
21Cabrera, Postsocial History: An Introduction, chapter 1, section
1.
22 Collini, Winch and Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A
Study in Nineteenth-Century Intellectual History, pages 7-12. The two
approaches are singled out on pages 9 and 10 respectively. The authors
do not wholeheartedly adopt either approach.
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Not only is the boundary between a choice of topics and a
choice of paradigms for tackling the same topic a hazy one.
It is also not always clear when a paradigm has developed
while remaining the same paradigm, and when it has been
replaced by a new paradigm. Both of these difficulties may
be illustrated by the rise of a new type of social history, the
history of a society or Gesellschaftsgeschichte, in the 1960s
and 1970s, and criticism of its first form that resulted in
the rise of the history of everyday life or Alltagsgeschichte
in the 1980s.23 Does the move from a concentration on
social structures to a concentration on the small-scale and
the everyday represent a change of topic or a change
of paradigm, and does Alltagsgeschichte represent a new
paradigm or a development of the existing paradigm of
Gesellschaftsgeschichte? Fortunately, we may simply note
such niceties.
There is also no sharp demarcation of the contents of
paradigms from the contents of corpora. Claims within a
corpus may be general enough, or sufficiently taken for
granted by researchers, that they should also be regarded
as elements in paradigms. Spyridon Orestis Palermos
has suggested that scientific theories can function rather
like language. They can extend the cognitive faculties of
researchers, while being so well-integrated into the ways
in which researchers think that they do not even notice
they are using them.24 We could regard theories like that as
having become parts of paradigms, even while they retained
23 Kocka, Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society: Business,
Labor, and Bureaucracy in Modern Germany, pages 275-279. For
more examples of the many types of history that may be written,
the choice of at least some of which would amount to the choice of
different paradigms for treatment of the same topics, see Burke (ed.),
New Perspectives on Historical Writing; Kramer and Maza (eds.), A
Companion to Western Historical Thought.
24 Palermos, Extending Cognition in Epistemology: Towards an
Individualistic Social Epistemology, section 3.4.2.2.
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their status as sets of claims within their disciplines’
corpora.
We shall not extend the notion of a paradigm to bring
within its scope the personal biases of researchers. We
should nonetheless be alert to the risk of such biases. On
the bright side, there is reason to think that the damage
done by personal bias can be reduced if researchers adhere
to appropriate standards and take appropriate care.25 And
there is always the possibility that damaging biases will be
criticized by other researchers.26
Paradigms as guides in searches
A paradigm may guide the search for candidate explana-
tions. It helps if researchers come up with candidates in
an intelligent way, so as to identify a wide enough range
of candidates while not wasting time on candidates that
have little or no hope of being good enough to be endorsed.
A paradigm can perform this role very straightforwardly. It
can shape the intellects and the imaginations of researchers.
A paradigm can give more specific guidance by steering
researchers toward explanations of particular types. For
example, there may be a distinct preference within a
discipline for explanations that identify mechanisms, and
25 McCullagh, “Bias in Historical Description, Interpretation, and
Explanation”, section 4.
26 A classic example of ferocious criticism of alleged personal bias
is Hexter, “The Burden of Proof: Christopher Hill, Change and
Continuity in Seventeenth Century England”. J. H. Hexter accused
Christopher Hill of reading sources in order to support a view he had
already selected, and noted that Hill could achieve his end because
when there is a large enough set of sources, it is possible to find sources
to support any given view. Hexter’s attack has however been criticized
in turn: Palmer, “The Burden of Proof: J. H. Hexter and Christopher
Hill”.
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that do so in ways which respect certain constraints.
That preference will be incorporated in a paradigm.27 The
presence of such influences may very well increase our
confidence in the results of work, because it will suggest that
researchers have worked under pressure to meet standards
that are imposed by the whole community of researchers.
Competing paradigms
There are sometimes several different paradigms in play in a
discipline. Academic conflicts may result. The proponents
of some explanations may not see any merit in other ex-
planations, because their proponents approach the relevant
topics in different ways.28 How should our confidence be
affected?
There will sometimes be little adverse effect. The various
paradigms may all be reasonably well-established and
reputable, and there may be no direct conflicts between
them. Then we can take any given paradigm to be
appropriate, and pose our main question about influences
on our confidence against the background of our having
done so. We discussed this option in section 1.1.4.1.
This option is not always available. There may be something
in each paradigm which implies that the use of other
paradigms would lead researchers to make incorrect claims,
rather than merely to make claims that were not worth
making. If in addition there is no decisive majority in the
27 Lindley Darden has explored this kind of influence in connection
with biology: Darden, Reasoning in Biological Discoveries: Essays on
Mechanisms, Interfield Relations, and Anomaly Resolution, section
2.6.
28 For examples of different approaches in anthropology see Kloos,
“Multiple Images of Ethnic Reality: Beyond Disagreement?”, pages
77-84.
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research community in favour of one paradigm, we may
well doubt that any paradigm has enough credibility to
give confidence that its use is a good route to correct
claims. In section 6.3, we considered the advantages of
pluralism. Here we note that a plurality of paradigms can
be unnerving. We have here a wider version of the concerns
about the implications for our confidence of choices of
formative concepts that we discussed in sections 6.2.3.2 and
6.2.4.3.
8.3.3.3 The recharacterization of evidence
One possible move in the search for explanations is to
recharacterize evidence. Different characterizations may
allow different explanations to be given. Researchers can
try characterizations, see what explanations they make
possible, judge whether the explanations are good ones,
see whether the characterizations are well-supported by
the overall context provided by all the available evidence,
the corpus of the discipline and any relevant psycho-
social understanding, and continue to make adjustments to
characterizations, explanations and their view of the overall
context until they reach the best available balance. But the
scope to recharacterize evidence varies considerably from
one discipline to another.
In disciplines that are low down the scale, such as physics
and chemistry, it is usually agreed which concepts must
be used in order to characterize evidence fully, so there
is usually little or no scope to add to what all or most
researchers agree must be said about evidence. This means
that there is usually little or no scope to change the
characterization of evidence itself. (A choice of explanations
that may be built on a given body of evidence is however
not excluded.)
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In higher disciplines, there is unlikely to be agreement on a
complete list of concepts that should be used to characterize
evidence fully, even though some concepts may be agreed
to be ones that must play roles in characterizing evidence.
This means that there is scope for different researchers to
say different things about the same evidence. To take an
example from archaeology, archaeologists may (but need
not) interpret remains semiotically, and they may do so in
various ways.29
There are however limits to the scope to recharacterize
evidence, even in disciplines that are high up the scale.
The relevant corpus, the norms of the discipline and any
relevant psycho-social understanding must all be respected,
or a good case must be made for changes to them.
8.3.3.4 The place of induction
A standard category of argument is that of induction in
the narrow sense of arguing for a proposition by noting
supportive results from a large number of cases while
there are no cases, or acceptably few cases, on the other
side. We shall not treat this as a separate route to
accounts. Induction may draw a regularity to the attention
of researchers. Then they may seek an explanation. But that
search for an explanation will normally amount to use of
the good explanation route. Observed regularities may then
offer support for the factual correctness of an explanans by
being regularities that the explanans would explain, but
by that stage, researchers would already have trodden the
route to the explanans. Moreover, work that has been done
on the nature of the inductive reasoning process, including
29 Vianello, “Can Archaeology’s ‘Ritualistic and Symbolic Arte-
facts’ Be Interpreted Semiotically?”
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work on how enumeration can be supplemented by more
sophisticated techniques, does not prevent us from taking
the view that neither induction nor any comparable process
should be treated as a separate route to accounts.30
8.3.4 Attributed meanings
We shall now consider explanations of a special type,
those which identify meanings that people who are studied
attributed to items within their own experience. The items
in question may be events, objects, social structures, social
roles, or human character traits or actions. For convenience
we shall speak as if the people studied lived in the past,
but the same approach could equally well be used when
explaining life in contemporary cultures. And we shall
stipulate that the identification of attributed meanings
requires not only their distinction from obvious alternative
meanings, but also their specification with reasonable
precision.
Explanations of this type confer Verstehen in the sense
that we set out in section 5.6.1. Verstehen in our sense
is conferred when the reader of an explanation obtains an
understanding of why things happened in the way they did
by seeing the people studied as having possessed human
points of view, just as she possesses one, and as having
been motivated by considerations of the same general
type as those that would motivate her. The reader could
then articulate her understanding to another human being
by setting out people’s circumstances, characters, desires,
worries and so on, and explaining their conduct in those
terms.
30 One example of such work is Harman and Kulkarni, Reliable
Reasoning: Induction and Statistical Learning Theory.
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The particular route to Verstehen that concerns us here
achieves the desired result through the identification by
researchers of meanings that the people studied attributed
to events, objects, social structures, social roles, and human
character traits and actions. We are concerned specifically
with meanings that researchers, being human, can directly
appreciate would have made the events, objects and so
on significant. Given that significance, and the fact that
the people studied would be seen as having possessed
human points of view, it would be immediately clear how
the presence of the events, objects and so on would have
influenced the forms of life or the specific conduct of those
people. Most non-human rational beings, on the other hand,
would not directly appreciate how the presence of the
events, objects and so on could be expected to influence
forms of life or specific conduct, because they would not see
directly the impact of the relevant attributions of meaning.
For example, human readers can make sense of a choice of
white horses to draw a Roman triumphal chariot, once it is
pointed out that Romans would attribute a specific meaning
to such fine creatures, that of an association with divinity.31
Human readers, appreciating as they do the significance of
divinity even if they have no belief in the divine, would
require no further explanation of a choice of white horses.
There would be much more to be said about the nature of
Roman ideas of divinity and about the psychological, social
and political implications of the association of a person with
the divine, but human readers would grasp the main point,
the reason for a choice of white horses, without further ado.
Most non-human rational beings, on the other hand, would
need to have the significance of divinity explained to them.
They would be in the position of Charles Taylor’s Alpha
31 Beard, The Roman Triumph, pages 233-236. While the tradition
is clear from surviving sources, the record is unfortunately not solid
on what happened on specific occasions.
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Centaurans.32
In order to confer Verstehen, attributed meanings must
be ones that resonate with current readers. Sometimes
there is a strong connection between past meanings and
currently available meanings, simply by virtue of the fact
that differences of direct relevance are not great. To return
to the example of Romans creating associations with the
divine, modern ideas of the divine differ from Roman ideas
but they are alike in the relevant way: it is clear that one
should be in awe of the divine. But sometimes there is
no such straightforward connection, or only a weak one.
There may be some commonality between past meanings
and currently available meanings, but also some significant
differences that are directly relevant. And sometimes, the
disappearance of a way of life can make attributed meanings
inaccessible.33 In such difficult cases, it may be necessary
to engage in an act of imagination, thinking oneself into
the frame of mind of people who were culturally different,
or at least into a frame of mind that is reasonably close
to their frame of mind. This is a matter of degree. When
the distance becomes too great, modern readers may find
comprehension almost as difficult as some non-human
rational beings who were not very different from human
beings might find it. And it is a delicate matter to capture
the notion of a change in frame of mind precisely. It does
not have to be seen as a change in a single frame of mind.
It can also be seen as the acquisition of a second frame of
mind without abandoning the first one.34 But given that
connections between past meanings and currently available
meanings sometimes exist, and that it is possible for readers
to adapt their frames of mind or to adopt additional ones,
we shall simply speak of the attribution of meanings by
32 Taylor, “Self-Interpreting Animals”, sections 1 and 2.1.
33 Lear, “What is a Crisis of Intelligibility?”
34 Elliott, History in the Making, pages 32-33.
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the people studied, and shall take it that the identification
of those attributed meanings allows readers to achieve
Verstehen because the meanings can resonate with them.
We single out the approach of identifying attributed
meanings because the process of identification has its own
complexities, and those complexities may lead us to have
special concerns about claims that have come to be accepted
following use of the approach. We consider this approach
under the general heading of the good explanation route
because it is a form of non-deductive search for explanations
that may be satisfactory to varying degrees.
8.3.4.1 Scope to identify meanings
The identification of meanings that people are taken to
have attributed requires careful consideration of both the
detailed evidence and the overall pictures that emerge of
the psyches and societies of the people studied.
Attributed meanings cannot be identified at will. Iden-
tifications must not be at variance with claims in the
corpus unless a good enough case can be made to change
the corpus. Identifications must also be consonant with
some psycho-social understanding that can be attributed
to the people studied. More generally, identifications are
constrained by the linguistic and historical contexts of those
people, and by what is surmised about their psychologies.
Disciplines also have norms that govern identifications,
requiring certain levels of support from evidence, although
those norms are likely to be implied by practice rather than
being explicit. Finally, general principles may be brought
to bear in the evaluation of work that has involved the
identification of attributed meanings. For example, the eval-
uators of work may examine whether some identification of
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supposedly attributed overall meaning is consistent with
the corresponding identifications of supposedly attributed
meanings of parts of the whole.
We shall now turn to the hermeneutic tradition, which can
be a source of controls over the identification of meanings.
8.3.4.2 The hermeneutic tradition
The most obvious items to which meanings have been
attributed are texts. It can be a tricky business to identify
meanings that were attributed in the past.
The interpretation of texts has been the traditional task
of hermeneutics. One focus of work within the hermeneutic
tradition has been the problem of how to establish meanings
that current researchers should attribute to texts. But her-
meneutic work also involves establishing what the authors
of texts meant and what readers at the time of writing
took them to mean. There will at that stage be an exercise
in the identification by current researchers of meanings
attributed at the time of writing. The hermeneutic tradition
can therefore be a source of controls over the current
identification of meanings that were attributed to items in
the past, both texts and other items.
We shall borrow selectively from the tradition. The ap-
proach of the part of the tradition that is relevant to our
concerns is to make sense of a text both by identifying
meanings of its parts, the words and sentences that
have meanings given by the rules and the usage of the
relevant language, and by identifying meanings of the
whole text. This part of the tradition is associated with
Herder, Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey.35 Details
35 For an account of the development of the relevant kind of
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varied considerably as between these authors, and further
variations were introduced later. We shall not however set
out to be faithful to the detail of any particular variant of
the tradition. Such fidelity is not important in relation to
our main question.
Work on a text is guided by awareness of a context. The
context includes the author’s entire body of writing, the
ways in which the relevant language was used by others at
the time and, in some versions of the tradition, the author’s
actions and non-linguistic historical context. Researchers
can go back and forth between parts of a text and the text as
a whole, repeatedly making adjustments. The identification
of a meaning of the text as a whole at the time of writing is
constrained both by reference to the latest identifications of
meanings of the parts and by reference to the wider context,
especially those elements that would indicate the author’s
psychological traits. These constraints would allow some
meanings of the whole to be identified while ruling out
other meanings. Identifications of meanings of the parts
at the time of writing are likewise constrained both by
reference to the latest identified meaning of the whole and
by reference to the wider context, especially the state of
the language at the time. These constraints allow some
meanings of the parts to be identified while ruling out
other meanings. Moreover, it is not only meanings of the
whole and of parts that can be adjusted. Researchers use
background theories, principles and views of the context
when identifying meanings, and there may be scope to make
hermeneutics in the hands of Herder see Michael Forster’s introduction
to Herder, Philosophical Writings, pages xiv-xxi. For Schleiermacher
see Hausheer, “Three Major Originators of the Concept of Verstehen:
Vico, Herder, Schleiermacher”, section 4. For Droysen see Maclean,
“Johann Gustav Droysen and the Development of Historical Her-
meneutics”. For Dilthey see Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey: A Hermeneutic
Approach to the Study of History and Culture, chapter 4; Rickman,
Wilhelm Dilthey: Pioneer of the Human Studies, chapter 10.
432
8.3 The good explanation route
adjustments to any of these. The possibility of adjusting
theories becomes more conspicuous when we transfer our
attention from texts, work on which need not require much
theoretical background (although it may do so), to the task
of making sense of non-textual remains, a task in which
theoretical background is more likely to be required.36
How researchers start their work, and what moves they
make in that work, will of course be influenced by their own
natures and intellectual contexts. Different theoreticians of
hermeneutics may take different views of the form and
extent of such influences. They therefore take different
views of the severity of the consequences of that influence
for hopes of working methodically to identify appropriate
meanings. But there is reason to be optimistic. Even if we
were to put the problem in the terms that Hans-Georg
Gadamer developed out of Martin Heidegger’s work, and
were to see researchers as always projecting meanings that
reflected expectations, there would still be ample scope
to discriminate between good and bad identifications of
meanings.37
The influence of the natures and contexts of researchers
does however give rise to a complication that affects the
appraisal of hermeneutic work. Any view of the process
36 Compare the remarks in Kosso, Knowing the Past: Philosophical
Issues of History and Archaeology, pages 67-68, on the hermeneutic
interaction between middle-range theories and evidence.
37 For the view that Gadamer developed see Gadamer, Wahrheit
und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, Band
1, Teil 2, 2.1.a.a (“Heideggers Aufdeckung der Vorstruktur des Ver-
stehens”), translated as Gadamer, Truth and Method, part 2, 2.1.a.1
(“Heidegger’s Disclosure of the Fore-Structure of Understanding”).
Gadamer’s concerns differed from those of earlier thinkers. He was
more interested in the nature of the encounter between reader and
text than in the technical task of identifying appropriate meanings.
Nonetheless, his formulation of the process is relevant to the question
of how easy it may be to identify appropriate meanings.
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that gives a prominent role to the ways in which researchers
think, whether in the way that Gadamer did or in any other
way, opens the door to a new type of adjustment, over and
above adjustment between the identifications of meanings of
parts and of the whole. This new type is adjustment of the
ways in which researchers think so as to bring those ways
into closer alignment with the ways in which the people
studied thought. This is a version of the adjustment of
one’s own frame of mind to or toward the frame of mind
of the people studied that we mentioned in section 8.3.4.
Gadamer brought such adjustments under the rubric of
Horizontverschmelzung, the fusion of horizons (the horizons
of the researcher and of the people studied).38 Adjustment
of this type is not only a way to allow attributed meanings
to resonate with modern readers. It can also play a valuable
role in making it possible to arrive at an appropriate
identification of attributed meanings. Researchers might
however accidentally adopt a way of thought that was not in
fact close to the ways in which the people studied thought,
but that made it easy to argue for an identification of
meanings that was plausible because everything seemed to
fit together well. Controls over the process of identification
are therefore vital.
Fortunately, controls are available. The hermeneutic tra-
dition can be exploited as a source of controls over the
identification of meanings that were in the past attributed
to items generally, and not just to texts. We have already
noted that identifications are constrained by linguistic and
historical contexts, and by surmises about the psychologies
of the people studied. Such contexts and surmises matter
in relation to items generally, in much the same way that
38 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophis-
chen Hermeneutik, Band 1, Teil 2, 2.1.d (“Das Prinzip der Wirkungs-
geschichte”), translated as Gadamer, Truth and Method, part 2, 2.1.b.4
(“The Principle of History of Effect (Wirkungsgeschichte)”).
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they matter in relation to texts. The tradition also supplies
a model for thinking systematically about different types
and levels of work, about objectivity, and about circularity
in reasoning.39
8.3.4.3 Items other than texts
We shall now give two examples of the identification of
meanings attributed to items other than texts. One relates
to physical objects, and the other to a social role.
It has been argued that identities, in the sense that could be
associated with magical powers, may have been attributed
to late bronze age and early iron age weapons, changing the
social significance of the relevant weapons and explaining
any abnormally lengthy preservation of some weapons
(although as it happens, evidence of lengthy preservation is
not generally available).40 The argument rests not only on
comparable attributions of identity in myths, which indicate
elements in the overall psyches of those who made and used
the weapons, but also on a careful examination of marks
on weapons that have survived. A context of thought and
detailed features of artefacts are therefore brought together
to support the identification of attributed meanings.
An understanding of how, in the high middle ages, knightly
status was heavily invested with the meaning of prowess in
combat can play a role in painting a comprehensible picture
of patterns of violence at the time, and in making sense
of the reactions of contemporaries. As with the previous
example, it cannot be assumed that the status was invested
with this meaning. The evidence must be studied closely. A
study of the details of texts that set out the deeds of both
39 Seebohm, Hermeneutics. Method and Methodology, chapter 6.
40 Pearce, “The Spirit of the Sword and Spear”.
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real and fictional characters can show that the status was
invested with the meaning. A study of the context provided
by other beliefs and by the institutions of church and state
shows how this could have happened, and also helps to make
sense of the detailed evidence.41
In these examples we see interplay between information
about details and descriptions of the context that is given
by the psyches and the societies of the people studied. We
do not see quite the same pattern as we may see when
hermeneuticists work on texts. This is because when we
move away from texts, we move away from parts and wholes
having meanings of the same general kind. There may
indeed be nothing that corresponds to a whole text made up
of meaningful parts. Instead there may be only one or more
events, objects, social structures, social roles, character
traits or actions to which some meanings are thought to
have been attributed, items which resemble parts of a text
in that they are not themselves made up of meaningful
parts, and the context that constrains identifications of
attributed meanings. The process is then one of reaching
reflective equilibrium between identifications of attributed
meanings and descriptions of the context. But although the
picture may have fewer strata than would be normal in
work on texts, the forms of control over identifications of
attributed meanings that the hermeneutic tradition offers
can still do useful work. (An alternative would be to regard
the context as corresponding to a whole text, but again the
parts and the whole would not have meanings of the same
kind, and there would still be fewer strata than when there
were parts of a text, a whole text and a context.)
41 Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe. Chapter 7
sets out the association with prowess, and Kaeuper makes the case
that there was a strong association in real life as well as in literature
from page 139 onward. Chapters 3 to 6 set out the context.
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There is one condition we have already mentioned, and
to which we now return in order to note that it is not a
very demanding condition. We can turn to the hermeneutic
tradition to the extent that it sets itself the task of
identifying what the authors of texts meant and what
readers at the time of writing took them to mean, that is, to
the extent that it sets itself the task of identifying meanings
that were in the past attributed to texts. There are other
hermeneutic tasks, in particular the task of working out
what a text should mean to the modern reader, and working
out what meaning a text might have in isolation from
authorial intention or the ways in which readers at the
time of writing might have taken it. Since our interest is in
researchers who identify the meanings that human beings
attributed to events, objects, and so on, the tasks of the
tradition need to include the task of working out what
texts meant to their authors and to readers when they
were written. Fortunately that task is included, at least in
a form that suffices for our purposes. We need not make
the controversial claim that authorial intention determines
anything that should be regarded as the one true meaning
of a text.42 Nor need we make the implausible claim that
researchers could routinely determine authors’ intentions
precisely and beyond argument.
The condition does however mean that we should not
draw on every type of hermeneutic work. For example, the
identification of latent Sinnstrukturen and objective Bedeu-
tungsstrukturen that is the task of Ulrich Oevermann’s
objective hermeneutics differs from the type of work that
interests us here.43
42 Two papers that outline some of the issues and that may serve
as introductions to the controversy are García Landa, “Authorial
Intention in Literary Hermeneutics: On Two American Theories”;
Weberman, “Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, Non-Intentionalism and the
Underdeterminedness of Aesthetic Properties”.
43 Oevermann, “Manifest der objektiv hermeneutischen Sozi-
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8.3.4.4 The risk of incorrect specification
We shall now turn to what might go wrong when attributed
meanings are identified. We shall be particularly concerned
with the risk that meanings which may be identified
correctly to the extent of distinguishing them from obvious
alternatives may nonetheless be specified incorrectly. We
shall mention specification separately from identification to
emphasize this, even though we have stipulated that iden-
tification requires specification with reasonable precision.
The meanings that modern researchers seek to identify
and specify will typically have been attributed through
processes that rendered the meanings less than perfectly
stable. The people concerned will have attributed meanings
in a whole complex pattern that may have evolved as
time passed, with changes to some attributions of meaning
affecting other attributions. And the attitudes of the
people concerned may also have changed. Moreover, the
specification of meanings is far from being governed by a
well-defined algorithm, even in the highly-developed and
reflective discipline of anthropology. Some of the difficulties
that arise when seeking to make sense of other societies
have been set out, for example in the work of Charles
Taylor.44 But even if the difficulties are well-understood,
they have not been dissolved. We may be concerned that
the difficulties might lead to incorrect specification.
There is good reason to be concerned. Differences between
the conceptual schemes of researchers and those of the
alforschung”, item 1 (“Latente Sinnstrukturen und objective Bedeu-
tungsstrukturen statt subjektiver Dispositionen”). The terms could
be translated as “latent sense-structures” and “objective meaning-
structures”.
44 Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man”; Taylor,
“Understanding and Ethnocentricity”.
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people being studied can make it easy to specify meanings
wrongly, because concepts used by researchers may be
inappropriate. The difficulty of correcting for conceptual
differences is evidenced by the fact that anthropologists
need to take great care when identifying and giving content
to concepts that would be appropriate to an emic approach,
an approach that sought to reflect the ways of thought
of the people studied.45 There is also a risk that the
language of researchers may not have the words to indicate
accurately the contents of some concepts, contents that were
perfectly clear to the people studied, and that researchers
may therefore either misrepresent the contents or conclude,
wrongly, that they were more or less indeterminate.46 Such
deficiencies of language may leave researchers unable to
specify attributed meanings accurately. A further risk arises
in connection with concepts that the people studied used
to attribute meaning and value but that suffered from
incoherence. Researchers may deny the incoherence in the
interests of doing supposed justice to the people studied,
and may thereby misunderstand both the concepts and the
culture.47
45 For the emic approach, and the contrasting etic approach that
seeks to identify and give content to cross-cultural concepts, see
Barnard, “Emic and Etic”; Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis
and Sam, Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications,
pages 23-24 (of the third edition; pages 291-292 in the second edition).
The latter text notes the benefit of using a careful iterative approach.
For difficulties in making use of concepts that would be appropriate to
an etic approach and in grasping concepts that would be appropriate
to an emic approach see Helfrich, “Beyond the Dilemma of Cross-
Cultural Psychology: Resolving the Tension between Etic and Emic
Approaches”, pages 133-138.
46 For an example in relation to the interpretation of texts see
the discussion of the concept of virtù as used by Machiavelli and his
contemporaries in Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding
Method, pages 48-49.
47 Gellner, “Concepts and Society”, sections 15 to 17.
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Such concerns should not drive us to regard the task
of identifying and specifying attributed meanings as im-
possible. There may always be a risk of mistakes, but the
incidence and the magnitude of errors may be reduced
to tolerable levels. In particular, a careful study of the
history of concepts can expose areas of risk and can help to
bridge the gap between past and present.48 We may have a
conception of reduction to tolerable levels even if we do not
believe that there is any objectively perfect specification of
attributed meanings by reference to which errors could be
measured. One can get close enough to a hazy target. To put
optimism in another (and not equivalent) way, it is possible
to say something determinate even if there is no prospect
of an end to debate over attributed meanings.49 Moreover,
since our concern is only that of whether researchers can
identify and specify attributed meanings with reasonable
success, we need not engage in debates as to appropriate
forms of hermeneutics, debates such as those in which Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas and Paul Ricœur have
engaged.50 We only borrow from the hermeneutic tradition.
We do not embrace the whole of it, or even the whole of
one strand within it.
Given the reasons to be concerned, our confidence in
claims that have been reached through the identification
of attributed meanings is likely to be heavily influenced
by our view of the efficacy of controls over such work. Is
enough attention paid to the need for consistency between
meanings supposedly attributed to wholes and parts or to
48 Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History”, especially the
final section, “On the Theory of Begriffsgeschichte and of Social
History”.
49 This point is made in relation to authors’ intended meanings of
texts in Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume 1, Regarding Method,
page 124.
50 For an introduction to those debates see Schmidt, Understanding
Hermeneutics, chapter 7.
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different items? Is a careful enough study of the history of
concepts made? What other controls are there? Do all of the
controls together reduce the risk of mistakes to a tolerably
low level? There is no general rule that will answer such
questions. We must exercise judgement when we consider
how much confidence to have.
Finally, such concerns do not extend to all disciplines. The
hermeneutic approach to interpretation has no place in
most of the natural sciences, so our concerns do not extend
to them. It is perfectly possible to make a case for the role
of interpretation in the natural sciences, but that requires a
notion of interpretation which turns out to allow the natural
sciences to keep their distance from work of a hermeneutic
nature, even though there might be roles for procedures
that were analogous to those of hermeneutics.51
8.3.5 Controls
Controls matter in relation to all ways of using the
good explanation route, not merely those that involve
the identification of attributed meanings. We shall now
examine controls, the application of which may support our
confidence both in claims to explain and in claims that play
explanatory roles. We shall consider scrutiny, decisions that
researchers must take, controls that relate specifically to
arguments that some explanations are better than others,
and contributions that formal epistemology might make.
51 Such a case for the role of interpretation is made in Faye,
“Interpretation in the Natural Sciences”.
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8.3.5.1 Scrutiny
Our confidence in claims that come to be accepted
following use of the good explanation route depends on
the satisfaction of several conditions, some of which emerge
from our earlier remarks. The corpus and paradigms must
limit the options appropriately, but they must not lead
researchers to exclude candidate explanations for inappro-
priate reasons. Researchers must be imaginative in thinking
of possible explanations. Identifications of meanings that
were attributed by people who are studied must be made
with due caution. And researchers’ judgements as to which
explanations are particularly good must be sound.
An important control that can promote satisfaction of these
conditions is the scrutiny that work receives from other
researchers. This scrutiny can take two forms.
The first form is direct responses to specific pieces of work.
If a claim that an explanation is a good one is found not to
be based on work of sufficient quality, other researchers may
make that fact known. This is part of the normal process of
academic work, either before publication through a system
of peer review or in open discussion after publication.
The relationship of such scrutiny to satisfaction of the
conditions for us to have a high level of confidence is
sometimes direct and sometimes indirect. It is likely to be
direct in relation to conditions that concern the acquisition
and the basic analysis of evidence, such as the conditions
that experiments must be conducted properly and that
the use of statistical tests must recognize the scope for
various types of error. It is likely to be indirect in relation
to conditions that concern the psychological processes of
researchers, such as the conditions that researchers must
be imaginative enough, that they must identify attributed
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meanings in a sensible way, and that they must exercise
sound judgement. Any deficiencies in these latter respects
would be identified indirectly through reviewers pointing
out gaps in processes of reasoning, or proposing other
explanantia for the evidence.
The second form that scrutiny can take is work on the
explanatory capacities of common forms of analysis of the
objects of study. Such work can prevent the inappropriate
use of those forms of analysis to produce explanations. For
example, an economic model may be argued to be unable to
explain phenomena of certain types, such as asset-pricing
anomalies or the effects of certain shocks on vacancies and
unemployment.52 To take an example from behavioural
science, it has been argued that game theory, supplemented
by other-regarding preferences, cannot be used to explain
a certain significant behaviour, even though situations in
which that behaviour arises can perfectly well be modelled
in a way that makes it easy to call on the resources of game
theory.53
8.3.5.2 The element of decision
We must ask whether there are adequate controls over the
decisions that researchers take when they use the good
explanation route, and whether those controls suffice to
reduce the risk of a certain type of circularity to a tolerably
low level. There are two types of decision that should
concern us, decisions as to how to approach phenomena
and decisions as to whether to assent to claims.
52 Lewellen and Nagel, “The Conditional CAPM Does Not Explain
Asset-Pricing Anomalies”; Shimer, “The Cyclical Behavior of Equi-
librium Unemployment and Vacancies”.
53 Colman, “Love is not Enough: Other-Regarding Preferences
Cannot Explain Payoff Dominance in Game Theory”.
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Decisions as to how to approach phenomena
Researchers will decide to approach phenomena in certain
ways. For example, they may approach some economic
phenomena by considering large-scale economic forces or
by considering choices made by individuals. Or they may
choose any one of a wide range of approaches to social
phenomena, for example taking quantitative measurements,
searching for causal relationships, focusing on institutions,
focusing on culture, seeing people as social creatures of
habit, seeing them as rational pursuers of their individual
interests, or starting with detailed descriptions of phenom-
ena in the words of members of the relevant societies.54
We should not suppose that researchers find such decisions
already made for them by the unvarnished facts of the
world. If we were to follow Helen Longino’s approach we
would see researchers as having real choices, even if they
did not notice that they were making choices. Longino
sees researchers as selecting ways to characterize objects
of study, where there are several options and researchers
choose on the basis of the questions they want to answer.
Since researchers are undoubtedly free to choose those
questions, they have a certain freedom to choose how to
characterize objects of study: they do not simply discover
54 The wide range of approaches in the social sciences and the scope
for a choice of approach to influence research are indicated by Della
Porta and Keating (eds.), Approaches and Methodologies in the Social
Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective. To take a narrower field, the range
of qualitative approaches to the psychological analysis of what people
say and how they say it is illustrated by Willig and Stainton-Rogers
(eds.), The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research in Psychology,
chapters 4 to 9 (chapter 4: Wilkinson and Kitzinger, “Conversation
Analysis”; chapter 5: Wiggins and Potter, “Discursive Psychology”;
chapter 6: Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine, “Foucauldian Discourse
Analysis”; chapter 7: Frosh and Saville Young, “Psychoanalytic
Approaches to Qualitative Psychology”; chapter 8: Stephenson and
Kippax, “Memory Work”; chapter 9: Hiles and Čermák, “Narrative
Psychology”.)
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that they must be characterized in certain ways.55 Decisions
as to how to characterize objects of study may very well
influence how researchers appraise explanations, and may
therefore influence their judgements as to the quality of
explanations of phenomena. And there is no guarantee
that such influences will be in the direction of making
judgements more accurate.
Concern about this type of decision merges into concern
about a certain type of circularity. Once researchers have
decided to approach some phenomena in a certain way,
so that they handle the evidence in a certain way, that
will steer them toward favouring some explanations over
others, even though some of the other explanations would
have appeared to be equally good if the researchers had
decided to approach the phenomena in a different way
and had therefore handled the evidence differently. The
favourable verdicts that researchers reach on the preferred
explanations are then likely to fortify them in their decision
to approach the phenomena in the chosen way, completing
the circle. At the extreme, a whole discipline might be
built around approaching phenomena in certain ways, and
researchers might exclude from their discipline anything
that was not effectively handled using those approaches.56
The failing need not be as grave as that of deciding what
to believe and then finding a route to the desired beliefs,
because researchers may decide to approach phenomena
in a particular way without first considering where that
will lead. But there is a risk of unreasonably disregarding
some explanations because initial decisions did not put
researchers in a good position to see their merits. This
55 Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in
Scientific Inquiry, page 100.
56 De Langhe, “Mainstream Economics: Searching Where the Light
is”, pages 140-142.
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matters, because some unjustly neglected explanations
might have been good enough to cast doubt on the worth of
those that were favoured. The goodness of some neglected
explanations might have shown, or at least suggested, that
the favoured ones missed the point.
Cladistics will illustrate the importance of approaching
phenomena in an appropriate way. The objective is to create
family trees of the members of sets of species, on the basis of
shared features that are regarded as derived from common
ancestors. The species in a given set are the phenomena,
and a family tree may serve as an explanation of their
existence. The first stage is to group species according to
certain shared features, and a choice of types of feature is a
choice of how to approach the phenomena that will directly
affect how researchers handle the evidence. If features that
are not in fact good indicators of shared ancestry are
chosen, any family tree that is constructed is likely to be
inaccurate. A tree may appear to explain the existence
of the observed species, but it will not in fact do so.
Strict controls are therefore needed, especially given that
researchers will come from traditions and fields of expertise
which will incline them to make certain choices of features
to identify. Fortunately, it is possible to identify controls.57
57 The danger of making incorrect choices, and some controls, are
discussed in Winther, “Character Analysis in Cladistics: Abstraction,
Reification, and the Search for Objectivity”. There does however
remain some controversy about cladistics, and the safe course would
be to take seriously what Winther says about the need for controls
and their existence without committing oneself to his terminology
of objectivity. On a more specific note, two controls that Winther
discusses are of wider interest than the others. The first one is
the requirement to identify causal structures that underlie observed
features of organisms. The second one is the requirement to share
and evaluate information across disciplinary boundaries. Winther
discusses these controls on pages 151-152.
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Cladistics is a rather specialized example. It would be
reassuring to identify controls of general application that
could reduce to a tolerable level the risk that researchers
might miss good explanations because of prior decisions
on how to approach phenomena, whether prior decisions of
local application or commitments to large-scale paradigms.
We can identify one control. This is the diversity of
outlook that can be found among researchers in some
disciplines. Diversity gives a reasonable prospect that a
wide range of ways to approach phenomena will be kept
in play. This reduces the risk that explanations that should
be considered will be overlooked because of decisions to
approach phenomena in certain ways.
Diversity is not equally useful as a control in all disciplines.
In disciplines that are low down the scale, such as physics
and chemistry, the heterodox may be ostracized. Higher
up the scale, diversity of outlook is more readily accepted.
In economics, proponents of some approaches that are not
perceived as mainstream and that may be critical of the
prevailing orthodoxy can come to influence the evolution
of mainstream economic thought.58 There is indeed a
view that heterodoxy can quite easily give rise to new
orthodoxy.59 And it is perfectly acceptable for a historian
to be conservative or Marxist, or to adopt any one of a
wide range of other positions.60 There is also scope for
new approaches to lead to fresh thinking about topics,
thereby subjecting existing explanations to fresh scrutiny.
58 Colander, Holt and Rosser, “The Changing Face of Mainstream
Economics”.
59 Davis, “The Turn in Recent Economics and Return of Ortho-
doxy”.
60 For current prospects for Marxist approaches see Wickham (ed.),
Marxist History-Writing for the Twenty-First Century. Conservative
historians form a less easily definable school of thought than Marxists,
and the label may fit individuals to widely varying degrees.
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For example, new approaches to the study of history have
developed in recent decades, leading to the wider adoption
of perspectives other than those of the home continents
of historians, an increase in the amount of work that is
done outside the traditional framework of nation states,
and increasing interest in the perspectives of people outside
politically and economically dominant groups.61
Another danger is that researchers may think they have
given a comprehensive explanation of some phenomenon
when they have in fact given an explanation that is limited
by their choice of approach. Helen Longino’s discussion of
different ways to approach the question of the influences
that lead some people to exhibit certain types of behaviour
brings out this risk.62 She points out that while it is
tempting to think that research can identify the causes of
various sorts of behaviour, approaches that rely on genetics,
on the study of social and environmental factors, on
developmental systems theory and on neurology investigate
different specific questions. They may for example invest-
igate the extent to which genes affect behaviour, how the
environment affects behaviour, how behaviour is expressed
in individuals, and whether specific neural structures are
associated with given types of behaviour. Such work may
not answer big questions, such as the question of which
factors are most significant as causes of human aggression.63
The writers of newspapers and scripts for broadcast are the
61 Sachsenmaier, Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories
and Approaches in a Connected World, chapter 2.
62 Longino, “Evidence in the Sciences of Behavior”. There is a
more extensive discussion of work on human behaviour in Longino,
Studying Human Behavior: How Scientists Investigate Aggression and
Sexuality. See also the much earlier discussion of research on sex
differences, of assumptions made in that research and of influences
on that research in Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and
Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, chapters 6 and 7.
63 Longino, “Evidence in the Sciences of Behavior”, page 254.
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people most likely to overstate the breadth of conclusions
from research, and it would be unwise for anyone to set
much store by newspaper and broadcast reports of claims
in academic fields. But it is also possible for researchers
to forget that they may have provided only contributions
in the general area that is covered by some big question,
such as the question of the causes of aggressive behaviour,
rather than providing answers, or even partial answers,
to the big question itself. They may then overstate the
significance of their work. The diversity of ways in which
work may be done in the general area that is covered by a
given big question is a useful reminder of this danger. But
it may have to operate as a reminder to us just as often
as to researchers themselves, because those who engage at
a technical level with each researcher’s work will tend to
approach the relevant topic using the same general methods
as the researcher.
Decisions as to whether to assent to claims
The second type of decision that should concern us is this.
Once there are some candidate explanations laid out for
consideration, researchers must decide which explanations
are good enough to be endorsed, leading to assent both to
their claims to explain and to at least some of the claims in
their explanantia. Reassurance as to the quality of decisions
may come from the skill and experience of researchers, and
from researchers’ patterns of thought being shaped by their
awareness of a corpus that has itself been well-tested.64
Such considerations do not give complete reassurance, but
no better source of reassurance is available.
64 The point about researchers’ judgement being guided by a
background is made in Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation,
pages 157-159, in the context of ranking explanations to identify the
best one.
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8.3.5.3 Identifying the better explanations
When researchers support claims that play explanatory
roles by asserting that explanations in which they play those
roles are better than explanations in which they have no
such roles, special concerns arise.
One problem is that while some explanations might be the
best ones out of those seriously considered, there might be
other explanations that were inappropriately denied serious
consideration, perhaps because of decisions to approach
phenomena in certain ways, and yet other explanations
that did not even come to the attention of researchers –
the problem of unconceived alternatives that we noted in
section 8.3.3.1. Here we must rely on researchers’ disciplined
and intelligent use of imagination and, in some disciplines,
on researchers’ diversity of outlook. In regard to the former,
Peter Lipton pointed out that researchers do not blindly
generate possible explanations. Their awareness of existing
work helps them to come up with explanations that are
likely to be worth considering.65 It does not however
follow that the problem of unconceived alternatives can be
entirely solved by pointing to the role of existing accepted
claims. Researchers might focus on the areas where good
explanations were most likely to be found, and intensive
work on those areas might turn up most of the candidates
worth considering. But there would remain the risk that
there were worthy candidates in other areas.66
65 Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, pages 150-151.
Lipton’s argument may be compared with our remarks in sec-
tion 8.3.3.2 on guidance provided by the corpus and paradigms.
66 Compare the argument in Stanford, Exceeding Our Grasp:
Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, pages
40-41.
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Another problem is that there might be something amiss
in the order of preference between explanations. An
explanation that is identified as superior to others may
not in fact be superior, even among the explanations that
are seriously considered. Here, Lipton offered a piece of
reassurance that we noted in section 8.3.5.2. Explanations
are ranked by reference to an existing background of
theories.67 If the theories have themselves been thoroughly
tested and have proved their worth, it is likely that rankings
will be at least approximately correct.
8.3.5.4 Formal epistemology
There is a large body of work that formalizes processes
of belief formation and revision. This work sits within the
discipline of formal epistemology, with its sub-disciplines of
computational epistemology and epistemic utility theory.
The work has applications in several of the areas that
interest us, but its relevance to our main question is greatest
in connection with use of the good explanation route. Its
relevance in this connection springs from the fact that when
researchers work toward accounts by non-deductive means,
they must juggle uncertainties.
Formal epistemology will not address all concerns. Its pre-
cisely specified results mostly relate to idealized situations
that are purged of the messiness of real research. Such
results also mostly relate to disciplines in which hypotheses
and claims are quantitative. It is no accident that examples
are often drawn from physics. We cannot expect that
67 Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation, pages 157-159.
Lipton’s concern is not merely to establish that rankings of explana-
tions are likely to be satisfactory, but that if they are satisfactory, that
makes probable at least the approximate correctness of the relevant
background.
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precisely specified results in formal epistemology would
often be straightforwardly usable in the humanities or the
social sciences. There will even be quite a lot of work
in the natural sciences in which it would be hard simply
to use such results. Nonetheless, it is worth asking how
results in formal epistemology might be brought to bear
in order to control use of the good explanation route. We
shall first make some remarks on the possibilities, then
reflect on reasoning that it would not be practical to
formalize sufficiently to make full use of the power of formal
epistemology.
Norms
Work in formal epistemology can show the advantages of
certain norms. For example, epistemic utility theory can
be used to vindicate compliance with norms of probability
theory. These norms constrain the assignments of credences
across ranges of possibilities, and also show how to update
credences when new evidence comes to light.68
We should not however hope to get all or even most of
the reassurance we might like simply from the fact that
claims have come to be accepted in compliance with norms
that can be justified formally. Norms of probability theory
are too general to give us much reassurance in the face of
the scope for errors of types that are specific to disciplines.
And there are times when the presence of formally definable
properties does not in itself give us much reassurance.
For example, it can be argued that the formally defined
coherence of a set of hypotheses need not in itself be a sign
that the members of the set are correct. Empirical work
may be needed to see whether there is a general connection
68 Pettigrew, “Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences”.
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between coherence and correctness.69 But on the optimistic
side it can be argued that under certain conditions, an
increase in the coherence of a body of evidence when
a hypothesis is assumed does contribute to confirmation
of the hypothesis.70 Having said that, much depends on
how confirmation is measured. There is an argument that
in one model of confirmation, coherence between pieces
of evidence (as distinct from coherence between evidence
and a hypothesis) is not in itself an additional source of
confirmation.71
Explanatory power
Researchers have a sense of explanatory power, and they
may use that sense to rank explanations in order of prefer-
ence. If they support claims by arguing that explanations
in which those claims play explanatory roles are better
than explanations in which they have no such roles, such
rankings can have a direct effect on whether claims get
to join the corpus. It would therefore be helpful to have
rankings controlled by measures of explanatory power.
Work on such measures is at an early stage. It is so far
limited to laying down conditions on quantitative measures
of explanatory power, and it is not even clear that the
most appropriate measures for all disciplines would have
69 Morgan, “Achinstein and Whewell on Theoretical Coherence”.
70 Wheeler and Scheines, “Causation, Association and Confirma-
tion”. There is also the argument in Thagard, The Cognitive Science
of Science: Explanation, Discovery, and Conceptual Change, chapter
6, that “coherence of the right kind leads to approximate truth” (page
81). In Thagard’s view, coherence is of the right kind when researchers
not only find a theory that best explains the evidence, but can also
explain why the theory works (pages 91-99).
71 Shogenji, “The Role of Coherence of Evidence in the Non-
Dynamic Model of Confirmation”.
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to meet those conditions. It is also unclear that it would
ever be practical to apply such measures to the variegated
and complex explanations that are given in practice. But
at least a start has been made.72
The identification of causes
The identification of causes is central to the construction
of many explanations. One method that can be used to
control identification is the method of graphical causal
models, which are directed acyclic graphs that relate
different variables. When probabilities for different values
of variables conditional on the values of other variables
are included, Bayesian and other probabilistic methods
can be used, and the graphs are often called Bayesian
nets. Graphical causal models can also help to identify
confounding variables and sources of bias, thereby helping
researchers to avoid mistakes. There are other methods that
can be more suited to particular tasks, and that can likewise
impose discipline on reasoning.73
Researchers should however not read too much into the
deliverances of such methods. As we noted in section 5.3.2,
72 Conditions that a measure should satisfy, and a measure that
satisfies them, are set out in Schupbach and Sprenger, “The Logic of
Explanatory Power”.
73 For an introduction to a range of techniques and their uses see
Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Several methods
are discussed in Morgan (ed.), Handbook of Causal Analysis for
Social Research. For the method of structural equation modelling see
Kline, Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. Some
methods are compared in the context of epidemiology in Greenland
and Brumback, “An Overview of Relations among Causal Modelling
Methods”. For some reservations about the capabilities of techniques
that use directed acyclic graphs, against the background of a broad
welcome for their use, see Kincaid, “Mechanisms, Causal Modeling,
and the Limitations of Traditional Multiple Regression”.
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it is possible to identify a relationship between two variables
where the relationship has predictive power, without
thereby showing that variations in the value of one variable
cause variations in the value of the other. Thus we may
be denied the favourable effects on our confidence that
would go with the identification of causal relationships. It
is therefore important to distinguish between the giving of
causal explanations through the identification of apparent
(but possibly illusory) structures of causes and effects,
identifications that can be made by using directed acyclic
graphs and comparable methods, and the justification of
causal claims, which would require further work. There is
also scope to change the nature of the problem by adopting
a theory of causation that would allow causal relationships
to be inferred from mathematical relationships.74 We would
however then need to consider whether the identification of
causal relationships under such a conception would have
favourable effects on our confidence that were comparable
to the favourable effects of the identification of causal
relationships under a more traditional conception.
Suppose that claims to explain that relate to causal
explanations have come to be accepted. If the causal
connections that are identified have been inferred using a
method that formalizes the process of identification and is
generally recognized to be sound, and if the causal claims
have also been substantiated by other means, such as by
the use of process tracing to set out detailed paths through
which causes would have their effects, that should increase
our confidence in the claims to explain.75
74 Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explan-
ation, chapter 7.
75 For process tracing see Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal
Inference”; Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social
Sciences”.
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There can of course be difficulties both in identifying all the
variables that should feature as nodes in graphical causal
models, and in quantifying probabilities. And it can be
computationally demanding to establish the correct model
from data, so it may be necessary to use special approaches
that sometimes restrict the range of options considered.
But despite such difficulties, graphical causal models have
come to find application in both the natural and the social
sciences.76
Efficiency
An important theme in computational epistemology is the
efficiency of ways to arrive at claims that are correct or close
to correct. Some methods are more efficient than others at
leading researchers to converge on correct claims. Inefficient
ways to converge on correct claims might lead them to
perfectly good results in the end, but it would be odd to
choose those ways when efficient ways were available.
We can go further. The use of efficient methods can in itself
give confidence in accepted claims. If methods are efficient,
that should limit the time it takes researchers to arrive at
claims that are correct or close to correct. Then if work
on identifying claims to make has gone on for a reasonable
time, there is a good prospect that claims put forward for
assent are by and large correct or close to correct. That
should in turn reduce the number of claims that come to
be accepted despite being far from correct, given that some
76 For an example from biology which uses partially directed
acyclic graphs see Le et al., “Inferring microRNA-mRNA Causal
Regulatory Relationships from Expression Data”. The paper mentions
computational challenges in sections 2.3, 2.4 and 4. For an example
from economics see Li, Woodard and Leatham, “Causality among
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: A Directed Acyclic
Graph Approach”.
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proportion of claims made that are far from correct will
come to be accepted.
A particularly interesting line of enquiry has concerned
the value of a preference for simple theories and models.
Experience has lent some support to this preference, despite
the lack of any guarantee that nature will be simple in
any given respect. Some of the most successful theories
and models have been very simple and elegant. Even when
nature is complex, use of a simple approximation may
confer more predictive power than use of an attempted full
representation of nature’s complexity, because it is difficult
to estimate large numbers of adjustable parameters accur-
ately on the basis of limited data that will contain some
noise.77 Computational epistemology offers an additional
reason to prefer simple theories and models, at least in the
context of reasoning from a growing body of evidence to
a general conclusion. The new reason is that a preference
for simplicity tends to make progress toward correct claims
more efficient than it would otherwise be, with fewer false
moves that need to be retracted. The idea can made precise
for idealized research problems by stating Ockham efficiency
theorems.78
Computer programs
A great deal of work has been done on getting computers
to reason in ways that would allow them to solve problems
77 Forster and Sober, “How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified,
or Less Ad Hoc Theories will Provide More Accurate Predictions”,
section 2.
78 A straightforward account is given in Kelly, “Simplicity, Truth,
and the Unending Game of Science”. A more technical presentation
is given in Kelly, “Simplicity, Truth, and Probability”. An extension
to stochastic methods is given in Kelly and Mayo-Wilson, “Ockham
Efficiency Theorem for Stochastic Empirical Methods”.
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of the types with which human researchers are confronted,
whether or not by getting them to think in ways that are
similar to human ways. Work has for example been done
on how to get computers to reason abductively, to reason
about intentions, and to prove mathematical theorems by
thinking like human mathematicians.79
Such work is not yet at the stage at which its results
could control the work of human researchers to any great
extent by telling them that they ought to reason in
the same ways as the most efficient computer programs.
But we may expect that in due course this work will
become a valuable control over the reasoning of researchers,
especially when they use non-deductive routes to accounts.
Moreover, the very act of writing computer programs that
can do this kind of work helps researchers to describe
some processes of reasoning and understand the limits of
those processes. To the extent that human researchers use
the same or comparable processes, this may lead to a
better appreciation of ways in which results obtained by
human researchers may sometimes need to be subjected to
especially stringent checks.
Reasoning that is not in practice formalizable
There is a great deal of reasoning that it is not practical
to formalize sufficiently to use results drawn from formal
epistemology in ways that would make full use of their
power. The complicated nature of the entities that are
studied in the humanities and the social sciences, and the
79 The wide scope of such work is indicated by the papers in Artikis,
Craven, Çiçekli, Sadighi and Stathis (eds.), Logic Programs, Norms
and Action: Essays in Honor of Marek J. Sergot on the Occasion of
His 60th Birthday. A program to prove theorems by thinking like
human mathematicians is described in Ganesalingam and Gowers, “A
Fully Automatic Problem Solver With Human-Style Output”.
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limited scope for quantification in those disciplines, together
mean that researchers must use processes of reasoning that
do not conform to ideal standards of logic and probability
theory. Even within the natural sciences, researchers can
fall short of ideal standards. Don Fallis points out that
scientists do not in fact reason solely in the ways that
Bayesian theory would prescribe, and goes on to argue that
they should not reason solely in those ways.80 And if natural
scientists do not adhere strictly to Bayesian requirements,
we can hardly expect social scientists or researchers in the
humanities to do so. Moreover, given that a leading reason
for researchers not being strictly Bayesian is the difficulty
of quantifying degrees of belief and working out how to
compute revised degrees, it is not likely that researchers in
any discipline could adhere strictly to a Dempster-Shafer
approach either. We may likewise have reservations about
the extent to which proposed formal logics of abduction
could adequately represent how researchers thought about
real problems.81 Similarly, it is hard to see real researchers
as being in a position to ensure that they always follow the
prescriptions of the AGM theory of belief change, or of any
development of that theory.82
Inability to be purely Bayesian does not however mean that
Bayesian methods have no roles to play. We have already
noted the scope to use graphical causal models, which can
take a Bayesian form. And there are plenty of other ways
in which Bayesian methods can be used in both the natural
and the social sciences.83
80 Fallis, “Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of
Experiments”.
81 An example of such a logic is given in Meheus and Batens, “A
Formal Logic for Abductive Reasoning”.
82 For the AGM theory and some ways to develop it see Fuhrmann,
“Theories of Belief Change”.
83 For examples see the chapters in O’Hagan and West (eds.), The
Oxford Handbook of Applied Bayesian Analysis.
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There is also scope to work with Bayesian methods when
it is not possible to give precise likelihoods.84 In addition,
the AGM theory of belief change and developments of it
show how to map out options and their relative merits sys-
tematically. And ranking theory, which orders alternative
claims according to degrees of belief or disbelief in them,
also offers a way to regiment reasoning.85 But sometimes
there will not even be enough agreement among researchers
about imprecise likelihoods, about all of the beliefs and
relationships of implication that must be identified in order
to apply theories of belief change rigorously, or about the
degrees of belief or of disbelief that must be identified in
order to follow the prescriptions of ranking theory. Then
our confidence in accepted claims may be reduced, simply
because researchers’ processes of reasoning may not have
been very tightly controlled.
Given the difficulty of regimenting some processes of
reasoning, we may expect that researchers will sometimes
use processes that are intermediate between those that
conform to the ideals identified in formal epistemology and
those that we use to solve problems in everyday life, where
we simplify enormously and focus on one or two salient
considerations. In the absence of complete regimentation
it is perfectly rational to do so, and doing so confers
the enormous benefit that it allows work to be produced.
The temptation to use processes of reasoning that have
quite a lot in common with everyday processes is likely
to be greatest in disciplines high up the scale, so we shall
concentrate on them.
Everyday processes can be just as good as more sophist-
icated processes, as shown by the work of Gerd Giger-
84 Hawthorne, “Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, section 5.
85 Spohn, The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical
Applications.
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enzer and Daniel Goldstein.86 But the examples given by
Gigerenzer and Goldstein are of simple choices that are
made by reference to simple rules. The historian or the
sociologist, trying to make sense of a mass of evidence
and well aware of the complicated nature of the objects
of study, would not appear to be confronted with such
simple choices. Nor would a historian or a sociologist be
likely to rely on anything as simple as picking out features
of a situation to make central to explanations by reference
to a single indicator of importance, by analogy with the
cue-ranking system that is used at stage 2 of the “take the
best” algorithm. Nor would she be likely to engage in one-
reason decision making, in which decisions on what to say
would be made for a single reason rather than by weighing
up several reasons.87 Nonetheless, we can expect certain
features of everyday reasoning to be carried across to the
practice of academic disciplines. Researchers will have a
sense of which signs commonly indicate that a factor in
a situation will have explanatory importance, and they will
pay special attention to factors that exhibit those signs.
Researchers who work with copious sources will also have
to be selective in their consideration of evidence, so that
some factors which might have influenced their decisions as
to what to say will simply be ignored.
The effect on our confidence will depend on our view of
the judgement of researchers as to indicators of explanatory
importance, and on our view of their judgement as to what
to ignore. The better their judgement appears to be, the
greater confidence we may have in their decisions on which
claims to make and on whether to assent to claims.
86 Gigerenzer and Goldstein, “Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way:
Models of Bounded Rationality”.
87 For “take the best” see Gigerenzer and Goldstein, “Reasoning the
Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality”, pages 653-654.
For one-reason decision making see pages 662-663.
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8.3.6 Conclusion
Use of the good explanation route, endorsing explanations
when they are good enough, is not guaranteed to give
us confidence in the corresponding claims to explain or
in claims that are supported by their playing explanatory
roles. Searches for candidate explanations may not be wide
enough, paradigms may misdirect searches, scrutiny may
be inadequate, and the necessity of using processes of
reasoning that cannot be fully regimented within any of
the frameworks offered by formal epistemology raises the
prospect of accidentally using processes that are defective
in respects that matter. Nonetheless, the good explanation
route does work. The willingness of researchers to endorse
explanations because they consider them to be good has
led disciplines to flourish. And an important reason is
likely to be that any one researcher’s decision to endorse
an explanation is open to scrutiny by others. We shall





9.1 The complexity of the world
We have made many references to how disciplines are
practised and to their norms. In this chapter, we shall turn
to researchers in their own right. We shall consider both
individual researchers and the communities within which
they work.
The world is very complex, and there is much to discover.
There are several implications for the work of researchers.
We shall list them here, and discuss them in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
Researchers must work in groups of various degrees of
cohesion and permanence. We shall consider the effect of
this on levels of support for claims that researchers make
and to which they assent. Even if we had reason to think
that the effects of ways of working would be minimal in the
long term, because researchers would eventually converge
on the same claims and all claims that were not well-
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supported would eventually be exposed as such, the short
term would still matter because currently perceived levels
of support for accepted claims should affect our current
confidence. (See section 9.2.)
There is likely to be a great deal of work that is relevant
to the work of any given researcher or group of researchers,
but that has not been done by that researcher or group.
Researchers and groups must obtain information from
others, and hence must rely on testimony. (See section 9.3.)
The need to rely on testimony gives a special role to the
independent appraisal of researchers’ work. Such appraisal
can reassure researchers that they can sensibly rely on
testimony that is obtained from publications. Appraisal
is formalized in systems such as peer review. We shall
consider what degree of control such systems provide. (See
section 9.4.)
New technologies affect both the management of informa-
tion and the ways in which researchers can work together.
We shall consider how such developments affect researchers’
ability to avoid over-estimating levels of support that claims
enjoy. (See section 9.5.)
The division of labour that the complexity of the world
requires leads to demands that researchers should possess
certain epistemic virtues in order that others may rely on
their work. We shall consider the roles of various virtues.
(See section 9.6.)
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9.2.1 The importance of groups
The complexity of the world means that in many fields,
progress can only be made by groups of individuals who
between them have the right expertise. There are other
benefits of work in groups beyond simply making it possible
to conduct research. These include improvements in the
quality of work, making it more likely that researchers will
be aware of relevant work already done, and the provision
of effective training for new researchers.1 It is not surprising
that work in groups has grown in importance in recent
decades, whether or not such benefits explain all of the
development of work in groups.2
It is also possible to argue for the importance of work in
groups, and more broadly in disciplinary communities, on
grounds of principle, rather than merely by noting practical
benefits. Helen Longino has done so. She sees it as vital for
researchers not to work alone, but to interact with others
in order to neutralize the potential influence of personal
idiosyncrasies. She thereby comes to see work in groups not
as an optional variant on some more fundamental process
of observation and reasoning by an individual, but as an
independently valid way to work.3 This is an important
1 Wray, “The Epistemic Significance of Collaborative Research”,
pages 156-158.
2 For the growth in importance see Wuchty, Jones and Uzzi, “The
Increasing Dominance of Teams in Production of Knowledge”. For a
discussion of possible explanations of the development of patterns of
work in groups see Wray, “The Epistemic Significance of Collaborative
Research”, sections 4 and 5.
3 Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, pages 106-107. See also the
earlier exploration of science as a social practice within which values
play a critical role in Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values
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line of thought, but we shall not pursue it here since it is
evident that work in groups is in any case the norm in many
disciplines. We must answer our main question in the light
of that fact, regardless of the reasons why it has become
the norm.
The workings of groups have become an important theme
in epistemology in recent years, with the study of group
cognition, of epistemic group agents, and of the nature of
evidence (whether evidence gathered by a single group or
by agents who cannot be regarded as unified in a single
group).4 But work in groups has been central to many
disciplines for a long time. While new epistemological work
will undoubtedly come to illuminate some of the issues that
concern us, the issues themselves and their significance for
our main question can be set out without waiting for that
work to reach conclusions that might aspire to finality.
The fact that work is done in groups may affect both
the process of making and assenting to claims and our
confidence. Our confidence may be affected because groups
are a powerful tool for the imposition of norms, the
sharing of ideas, and the imposition of orthodoxy. We shall
discuss these influences in sections 9.2.2, 9.2.3 and 9.2.4
respectively. The influences may affect solitary researchers
as well as members of groups, because even a solitary
researcher is heir to a tradition of thought and is aware
of current work by others.
and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry, chapters 3 to 5.
4 Theiner, Allen and Goldstone, “Recognizing Group Cognition”;
de Ridder, “Epistemic Dependence and Collective Scientific Know-
ledge”; Palermos and Pritchard, “Extended Knowledge and Social
Epistemology”; Kerr and Gelfert, “The ‘Extendedness’ of Scientific
Evidence”.
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9.2.2 The imposition of norms
The observance of norms is essential to the production of
worthwhile work. Fortunately, it is perfectly possible for
norms to be imposed. The imposition may not be felt
because researchers may have internalized the norms, so
that the existence of the apparatus of imposition would only
be recognized through counterfactuals: if a researcher were
to violate the norms, there would be an effective response.
At the most general level, imposition may take the form
of making sure that everyone respects the culture of the
discipline as a whole, with norms being an important part
of that culture. The importance of such a culture has
been emphasized by Markus Arnold. He speaks of the
Wissenschaftskultur of a discipline, a discipline-culture that
encompasses traditions, practices, ethical norms, and the
correct use of methods of communication. He explores the
ways in which such a culture can hold a discipline together,
keep it on track and influence its direction, and a range of
social and intellectual implications of the particular cultures
that disciplines possess.5
At a more specific level, those who work together may
enforce observance of detailed technical norms, for example
by pointing out occasions on which instruments may have
been used carelessly or conclusions may have been drawn
without the benefit of results from a suitable control group.
Finally there is the norm that researchers should work and
interact in ways that help to make collaboration effective,
so that the benefits of division of labour and of the sharing
of expertise can be reaped. Some of these ways have been
5 Arnold, “Disziplin und Initiation: Die kulturellen Praktiken der
Wissenschaft”.
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set out by Paul Thagard.6
9.2.2.1 Accountability
There is a disadvantage to work in groups that bears
directly on the quality of work done. There may be a loss
of individual accountability, reflecting the fact that work
done can very easily, and arguably correctly, be seen as the
work of a collective agent rather than as the sum of pieces
of work done by individuals.
There are some obvious dangers. An error may be hard
to attribute to an individual; the work of some members
of a group may accidentally be used by other members of
the group in ways that are inappropriate because the users
are unaware of all relevant technicalities, while no-one may
reasonably be blamed for such accidents; and when one
member of a group is challenged, he or she may find it
all too easy to disclaim responsibility for mistakes made by
other, perhaps unidentified, members of the group.
There is also scope for a subtle perverse incentive, which
has been identified by K. Brad Wray. Members of a group
may try to stop the group from recognizing problems with
the work it has done, lest they as individuals be blamed.7
Then published results may be inadequately supported by
evidence, and that very fact may be hidden from the reader
because defects in the work done will not be acknowledged
publicly.
6 Thagard, “How to Collaborate: Procedural Knowledge in the
Cooperative Development of Science”. Thagard is concerned with
collaborative relationships generally, including but not limited to work
in research groups.
7 Wray, “Scientific Authorship in the Age of Collaborative
Research”, section 4.
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Given that these risks exist, it is particularly important for
members of a group not to let standards slip. They must
individually consider whether they abide by all relevant
norms and whether they exhibit all relevant epistemic
virtues. They must not just assume that everything is in
order, merely because that is the optimistic view of the
group as a whole.
9.2.3 The sharing of ideas
The sharing of ideas is likely to be straightforwardly
beneficial. Different members of a group will have different
skills, will be aware of different existing claims within the
corpus, and will have different ways of looking at problems.
Progress will therefore be promoted, and some errors will be
detected quickly. The same may be said about the sharing
of ideas of groups as wholes with other groups.
Personal contact can be important in itself. It might
seem that ideas could be shared by writing and reading
papers just as effectively as by working alongside other
people. That may sometimes be so, but it is not always
so. In particular, skill in the use of techniques may best
be acquired by working alongside other researchers, even
though the techniques can be made explicit in papers and
are to that extent unlike skills that cannot sensibly be made
explicit, such as the skill of riding a bicycle. An example of
a skill that is best acquired by working alongside others
is the skill of using Feynman diagrams.8 There is also
a possibility that is intermediate between reading about
methods and working alongside experienced researchers,
8 Kaiser, Drawing Theories Apart: The Dispersion of Feynman
Diagrams in Postwar Physics, pages 167-169.
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which is to watch videos of experimental procedures that
have been published online.9
Turning to general abilities, while skills of assimilating new
information, seeing relationships between pieces of inform-
ation, making new inferences and appraising accounts can
be developed to some extent by studying accounts that are
already current, they are also largely developed by practice
alongside others who are already highly skilled. And it is
controversial whether what is learnt when such skills are
acquired could be reduced to propositional information.10
It might seem that the benefits discussed here would relate
only to the rate at which new claims could be reached, so
that there would be little or no relevance to the question
of control over the acceptance of claims. But in fact there
would be considerable relevance to that question, in two
ways. First, a wide range of skills, wide awareness of the
contents of the corpus and the use of a range of different
ways of looking at problems all contribute to the devising
of tough tests of claims. Second, if claims are generated
quickly, that can increase the incidence of rivalry between
claims. Any claim with a rival is put under pressure, and
that is likely to make the testing of claims more effective
than it would otherwise be.
We should however consider the ways in which consensus
may be reached when disagreement has emerged, or when
some researchers in a group have not formed opinions
9 Videos are for example published in the Journal of Visualized
Experiments, http://www.jove.com.
10 Newman, “EMU and Inference: What the Explanatory Model
of Scientific Understanding Ignores”, is a recent paper that takes a
position on the controversy. Sections 5 to 7 of that paper set out
several skills, with particular importance being attached to the skill
of forging links between pieces of information by making inferences of
certain types.
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of their own. There is a risk that an eventual consensus
may be unduly influenced by members of a group whose
prestige outruns their expertise. One reassuring point
here is that mathematical modelling of the process of
reaching consensus suggests that so long as an appropriate
balance of mutual respect is preserved, members of a
group collectively give equal weight to different members’
views.11 Another reassuring point is that under certain
conditions, there will be progress toward a consensus that
is at least approximately correct.12 Moreover, such results
can be extended to reasonably complex situations, and in
ways that illustrate the benefits of exchanges of views in
promoting convergence on a correct consensus.13
Such results are however obtained for mathematical ideal-
izations that simplify real-world situations. The need to
pay attention to this point is underlined by the existence
of tempting and seemingly intuitive extensions of such
11 Hartmann, Martini and Sprenger, “Consensual Decision-Making
Among Epistemic Peers”, sections 3 and 6. For further discussion
of the importance of the weighting of views and how weights
might sensibly be established see Martini, “Consensus Formation in
Networked Groups”.
12 Hegselmann and Krause, “Truth and Cognitive Division of
Labour: First Steps Towards a Computer Aided Social Epistemology”;
Hegselmann and Krause, “Deliberative Exchange, Truth, and Cognit-
ive Division of Labour: A Low-Resolution Modeling Approach”. There
is substantial overlap between these two papers, and the second one
is later, but the papers listed in the following note refer to the first
one.
13 Douven and Riegler, “Extending the Hegselmann-Krause Model
I”; Riegler and Douven, “Extending the Hegselmann-Krause Model
II”; Riegler and Douven, “Extending the Hegselmann-Krause Model
III: From Single Beliefs to Complex Belief States”. The last paper notes
the interesting result that when epistemic agents exchange views with
one another and give some weight to one another’s views, this can
actually slow down their progress toward getting reasonably close to
correctness, even though such interaction may help them to get closer
to correctness in the end than they otherwise would (section 5).
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results that turn out to be incorrect.14 Moreover, there is
an argument that the most popular model of the process
of reaching consensus, the Lehrer-Wagner model, is not a
good model when the goal is to reach correct answers to
factual questions.15 This is however not an argument that
conclusions reached in ways that fitted the model would
be incorrect. It is only an argument that epistemologists
should construct a better model.
9.2.4 The imposition of orthodoxy
Work in groups can be a route by which the orthodoxy of
a research community comes to be imposed on individuals,
through pressure to conform. The imposition of orthodoxy
has its advantages. People cannot work together unless their
approaches have a good deal in common. The imposition
of orthodoxy can also help to bring eccentric members of
groups to work in agreed ways, instead of wasting everyone’s
time by working in ways that are unlikely to be productive.
Despite these advantages, there is a trade-off to make.
Agreement on how to work and agreement that certain
claims should be regarded as well-established facilitate
not only work in groups, but also the specialization of
members of groups. They therefore allow great increases in
productivity. But there may be a significant loss of diversity
of approach.16 There can be two adverse effects. (These
adverse effects may arise whatever the source of the loss
14 Kurz and Rambau, “On the Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture in
Opinion Dynamics”, sections 1 and 5.
15 Martini, Sprenger and Colyvan, “Resolving Disagreement
Through Mutual Respect”.
16 De Langhe, “The Division of Labour in Science: The Tradeoff
Between Specialisation and Diversity”.
472
9.2 Work in groups
of diversity. But agreement of the type that facilitates work
in groups is an obvious source.)
The first adverse effect is that work that would in fact
be productive, but that would not fit in with mainstream
beliefs or ways of working, may be met with hostility
or at best neglected. Examples can be given. When Dan
Schechtman reached his conclusions on quasicrystals in the
early 1980s, there was extensive hostility and the head of
his group asked him to leave. (The hostility did however
abate once his results were replicated.)17 If we go back to
the early and middle decades of the twentieth century, the
long and hard road to general assent to continental drift
serves as an example of how the grip of existing views on
appropriate methods, and not merely views on theories, can
delay recognition of the merits of new ideas.18
This adverse effect may reduce our confidence in claims that
are already accepted, even though it relates to the difficulty
of getting general assent to new claims. If there is openness
to new claims which might challenge existing claims, that
can increase our confidence in accepted claims. Either they
17 Jha, “Dan Schechtman: ‘Linus Pauling Said I Was Talking
Nonsense’”. For other examples see Campanario, “Rejecting and
Resisting Nobel Class Discoveries: Accounts by Nobel Laureates”.
Campanario’s paper is based on rejections of papers by journals. He
acknowledges (on page 558) that not all rejections are to be explained
by inappropriate resistance, although many rejections may well be so
explained.
18 Oreskes, The Rejection of Continental Drift: Theory and Method
in American Earth Science. Oreskes argues that some earth scientists
rejected continental drift because it did not fit with their beliefs about
how earth science should be conducted (page 6). The beliefs about how
to work were however beliefs with substantive content. In particular
there was the uniformitarian belief that while the Earth might change
in detail, large-scale patterns remained constant. This was, for the
earth scientists concerned, a belief about how to work, not just a
factual claim (pages 178-179).
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will have been exposed to challenges and survived, or they
will have escaped challenge despite not being protected
by hostility to new claims. Conversely, hostility to new
claims can reduce our confidence generally because we may
fear that claims already accepted are unduly protected.
A special form of this danger relates to ways of working
rather than specific claims. If there is too much conformity
of thought, researchers may neglect new approaches that
would uncover new claims which might challenge existing
accepted claims. There is a valuable role for mavericks who,
while not necessarily rejecting currently accepted claims,
are keen to try new approaches that others neglect.19
The second adverse effect of a loss of diversity is that
diversity has advantages in debate. Diversity of view can
keep up the pressure to justify orthodox positions. It can
strengthen orthodox positions if they really are correct,
demolish them if they are incorrect, or contribute to the
formulation of new positions that combine correct elements
drawn from both orthodox and heterodox views. Arguments
for the existence of this benefit of diversity may draw
on the work of John Stuart Mill.20 In addition, dissent
can highlight data and insights that would otherwise be
neglected.21
We do however return to a version of the trade-off
that we mentioned above. Conformity to standard basic
assumptions and standard ways to think about the world
allows great increases in productivity, and those increases
19 Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division
of Cognitive Labor”. Some of the arguments in that paper have
however been criticized: Alexander, Himmelreich and Thompson,
“Epistemic Landscapes, Optimal Search and the Division of Cognitive
Labor”.
20 Mill, On Liberty, chapter 2.
21 Solomon, “Groupthink versus The Wisdom of Crowds: The Social
Epistemology of Deliberation and Dissent”, Abstract and section 3.
474
9.2 Work in groups
will be unavailable if a community of researchers is largely
made up of open dissenters. But those who dissent privately
while being outward conformists will not make debate
benefit from diversity. It is possible to reach the strange
position in which many researchers privately dissent from
the reigning assumptions and approaches, while there is still
an official consensus that those assumptions and approaches
are correct. Such a consensus is preserved at least partly
because the existence of some consensus or other greatly
increases productivity. But eventually, the public consensus
may very well break.22
To the extent that we are concerned about a loss of diversity,
we may derive some reassurance from any evidence that
researchers consciously try to take seriously the points
of view of others who disagree with them, whether the
others work within their groups or elsewhere.23 We can
also gain reassurance from studies which suggest that
willingness to take note of what others say helps individuals
to reach correct conclusions (so long as the probability
that a person consulted will be correct exceeds 0.5), that a
reduction in social influence on individual opinion without
its elimination can be counterproductive (so that a high
level of social influence is not necessarily a bad thing),
and that only temporary diversity of views on any given
question is needed.24
There is another risk to consider. New claims may come
to be accepted without adequate support because of
22 De Langhe, “To Specialize or to Innovate: An Internalist Account
of Pluralistic Ignorance in Economics”.
23 Compare the duties of toleration that are discussed in Straßer,
Šešelja and Wieland, “Withstanding Tensions: Scientific Disagreement
and Epistemic Tolerance”, sections 5.2 and 6.
24 For the first two points see Zollman, “Social Structure and
the Effects of Conformity”. For the third point see Zollman, “The
Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity”.
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groupthink.25 The members of a group may be concerned
to promote harmony. Ready assent to ideas put forward
by members is likely to lead to harmony, while challenge
may all too easily lead to conflict. Groupthink arises when
the desire for harmony predominates. To the extent that
claims avoid challenge within groups, our confidence must
be reduced unless it is clear that claims are challenged by
researchers outside the groups that make them. But that
source of reassurance may be unavailable. A topic may be
so specialized that only one group investigates it in depth.
We should not suppose that groupthink is always a
serious problem. Researchers can be perfectly capable of
maintaining a critical stance toward the work of their
colleagues. There is even some evidence that members of
a group who identify strongly with the group may be
more inclined than other members to break a consensus
by pointing out problems.26
Finally, even when there is no evidence of damage from
the unjustified exclusion of alternative views or from group-
think, there is another concern. The fact that researchers
in a group have worked together successfully and have
fully and freely concurred in the group’s conclusions does
not show that there is a fully informed consensus on all
points. A group can function perfectly well, even when each
individual researcher only has a limited understanding of
the topic and the work done.27 The boost to our confidence
that would be given by there being a fully informed
consensus on all points may therefore be unavailable.
25 For a recent survey of work on groupthink see Rose, “Diverse
Perspectives on the Groupthink Theory – A Literary Review”.
26 Packer, “Avoiding Groupthink: Whereas Weakly Identified
Members Remain Silent, Strongly Identified Members Dissent About
Collective Problems”.
27 Andersen, “Joint Acceptance and Scientific Change: A Case
Study”.
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9.3 Reliance on testimony
The need to make use of information obtained by others is
the need to rely on testimony. This need arises both within
groups and across a discipline’s community as a whole.
Within groups, researchers make use of results obtained
by other members of the group. Across a discipline’s
community, researchers cite the work of others in order
to make their own arguments. It would be impractical
for researchers to check all of the work on which they
relied. And work may well lie outside the areas of expertise
of researchers who rely on it. If the testimony of other
researchers might be unreliable and the unreliability might
go unnoticed, that could undermine control both over the
making of claims and over researchers’ decisions on whether
to assent to them.
We may consider how to regard testimony in academic
disciplines. On the one hand research is supposed to
concentrate on finding out how the world is, independently
of the psychological states of researchers. This makes it very
tempting to regard each piece of testimony as something
to be evaluated on its own merits by reference to what
it claims and the evidence for those claims. That view
would have much in common with the statement view
of testimony which Jennifer Lackey has put forward in
relation to testimony generally.28 On the other hand there
are views that emphasize the social aspect of testimony,
and that do so in ways that seem to make this emphasis
directly relevant when researchers must put their trust in
the expertise of others. Sanford Goldberg sees the process
of forming beliefs on the basis of testimony as not limited
to what goes on in the mind of the person who receives
28 Lackey, Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Know-
ledge, chapter 3.
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testimony, but as including what goes on in the mind of
the testifier.29 Benjamin McMyler takes an equally social
view of testimony.30 McMyler’s approach is, as he sets out,
particularly relevant to the provision of testimony without
the argument that would allow the audience to bypass the
role of the testifier and consider the argument directly.31
This failure of the testifier to provide an argument has
similar effects to those of the inability of researchers to
appraise arguments when they have to rely on testimony
from outside their own areas of expertise.
Our enquiry does not require us to decide on the proper
view of testimony. But we do need to recognize the
importance of both the view of testimony that emphasizes
its content and the view that emphasizes the social aspect.
On the one hand, testimony that is not well-supported by
detailed argument should be disregarded, both because it is
inherently suspect and because any researcher who borrows
results but has some doubts about what they mean or about
their reliability can only have those doubts assuaged by
considering how the results were obtained and what the
support for them might be, or at least taking advice on
those points from suitable experts. On the other hand,
reliance on testimony without studying the arguments that
support its content does need to be reasonably safe, because
in practice testimony will often have to be used without
careful study.
We mention testimony here by way of introduction to the
following sections, in which we discuss how some practices of
researchers, the tools available to them and their standards
29 Goldberg, Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology, page
80.
30 McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority, chapter 2. See
in particular McMyler’s comments on the speaker’s acceptance of
epistemic responsibility on pages 68-70.
31 McMyler, Testimony, Trust, and Authority, pages 58-59.
478
9.3 Reliance on testimony
of conduct may affect our confidence. Sometimes these
factors bear directly on the quality of fresh work. But
sometimes the influence that matters is on the quality
of work done in the past, where testimony derived from
that work supports fresh claims. We must ask whether the
process by which those supporting claims originally came
to be accepted was sufficiently well-controlled.
A third case arises when the influence that matters is on the
use that current researchers make of testimony. We must ask
whether they are careful enough about reliance on claims
that came to be accepted in the past. If they just assume
that work done in the past was of a high enough standard,
and if testimony derived from that earlier work plays a
significant role in making the case for fresh claims, that may
reduce our confidence in the fresh claims. Our confidence
should also be reduced by any evidence of carelessness in the
selection of sources of testimony, for example by evidence
of the selection of testifiers without careful consideration of
their expertise.32
32 There are some formal results on the effects of different ways to
select sources of testimony, for example by reference to expertise or
by reference to ease of access to sources: Mayo-Wilson, “Reliability
of Testimonial Norms in Scientific Communities”. But these results
apply to idealized situations, they concentrate on the accuracy of the
information immediately obtained rather than on the effects on work
that uses it (although the use of inaccurate testimony is obviously
likely to have a bad effect on work that uses it), and they do not
decisively favour one way of selecting sources over all others. We
shall therefore limit ourselves to the general point that carelessness is
disturbing.
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9.4 Independent appraisal
9.4.1 Appraisal as a control
A vital control over assent to claims is that claims should
be appraised by researchers who were not involved in
making them. Such appraisal may take place before or after
publication. Before publication, there is peer review. After
publication, appraisal may range from comments on blogs,
through book reviews and papers that respond to other
papers, right up to detailed technical studies of exactly how
work was carried out.33 Appraisal at any stage may involve
the consideration of several aspects of a piece of work,
including relationships to background literature, the type
of study, specific methods used, statistical computations,
and possible commercial influences.34
Criticism is an essential part of appraisal, and there are
conditions for criticism to be effective. Conditions may
be formulated in various ways. One formulation has been
provided by Helen Longino. She sets out and elaborates on
the need for suitable venues for debate, for responsiveness
to criticism (which she calls uptake of criticism), for public
standards, and for an equality of authority that is tempered
by respect for manifest differences of talent and expertise.35
33 For an example of a detailed technical study see European
Food Safety Authority, “Final Review of the Séralini et al. (2012a)
Publication on a 2-Year Rodent Feeding Study with Glyphosate
Formulations and GM Maize NK603 as Published Online on 19
September 2012 in Food and Chemical Toxicology”, and particularly
the Annex.
34 For an outline of the range of ways in which a paper may be
investigated, set in the context of medicine but to a large extent
generalizable to other disciplines, see Greenhalgh, How to Read a
Paper: The Basics of Evidence-Based Medicine.
35 Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, pages 129-134. We may
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But even when such conditions are satisfied, we may still
have some concerns.
The first concern is that independence is a matter of degree.
Even the harshest critic of a piece of work must share
some presuppositions of the discipline, and probably most
of them, in order to engage with the work productively.
Fortunately, a revolt against the main presuppositions of a
discipline is only rarely a source of progress.
A second concern is that appraisal may be influenced by
rhetoric in the work being appraised or in the general
context within which contentious points are debated, so
that appraisal does not conform to the ideal of a wholly
detached consideration of the evidence and the argument.
The dangers are obvious in disciplines such as history,
but the phenomenon can arise as low down the scale of
disciplines as evolutionary biology.36
A third concern is that many pieces of work are never fully
appraised. A claim may not be of immediate significance,
and researchers who might appraise it may have more
important uses for their time and energy. It may then come
to be accepted by default, especially if it is contained in a
paper by a reputable author that is published in a reputable
journal. Others may then come to rely on the claim. It
may be examined more carefully if it is to be used in some
important work, but that cannot be guaranteed. It may
even be used in several pieces of work, which are then
used in other pieces of work, without the track back to
compare these conditions with ones that have been developed by
Roger Cooke for arriving at a rational consensus between experts,
although Cooke’s conditions tend to be cited in connection with
special tasks, such as the appraisal of risk: Boumans, “Model-Based
Consensus”, section 3.3.
36 Barahona and Cachón, “The Rhetorical Dimension of Stephen
Jay Gould’s Work”.
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the original work’s being noted in papers that are at two or
more removes from it. There is therefore a risk that claims
which originally came to be accepted by default, and which
may have come to be accepted without adequate support,
will play roles in the processes by which several members of
the corpus come to be accepted. Then the support for those
claims may also be inadequate.37 And if claims can get into
the corpus without adequate support, it is likely that some
incorrect claims will get in.
A fourth concern is the possible detrimental effect of
multiple independent testing in areas of research that are
popular. It may seem odd to be concerned about too much
testing for an effect, but the problem is that if there are
many tests for an effect that does not really exist, there is
a reasonable probability that some tests will give positive
results by chance. If the negative results do not get much
attention, the positive results may be taken to show that
the effect is real.38
It is unfortunately easy for negative results not to get much
attention. It can be difficult to get journals to publish
reports of null results, that is, reports of the absence of
interesting outcomes of experiments. If there are several
studies of the same phenomenon, and only the ones with
interesting outcomes get published, the overall effect will
be a false impression of the likelihood of certain outcomes.
37 Compare the remarks of William Kingdon Clifford on the
dangers of passing on to posterity beliefs that have not been examined
carefully enough: Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”, section 1, pages 168-
172.
38 Pfeiffer and Hoffmann, “Large-Scale Assessment of the Effect of
Popularity on the Reliability of Research”. For issues that arise when
multiple studies are reported together (for example, studies of the
same phenomenon conducted in different ways or tests of a range of
hypotheses), see Schimmack, “The Ironic Effect of Significant Results
on the Credibility of Multiple-Study Articles”.
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Even a meta-analysis of studies can miss this. There are
methods to estimate biases against publishing reports of
null results and to try to correct for their effects, but
the problem remains a real one. It has been recognized as
serious enough to justify the creation of journals that make
a point of publishing reports of null results.39
Two controls operate around the time of publication and
help to reduce the risk that claims will come to be accepted
without proper appraisal. The first control is the traditional
form of peer review before publication. The second one
is open comment, which may take place either before or
after publication. We shall now consider the effectiveness of
these controls, before noting the control that is provided by
attempts to repeat work that has been reported.
9.4.2 Traditional peer review
Traditional peer review performs two functions. It checks
the quality of work that is submitted for publication against
a standard. It also chooses between works that meet the
standard, so as to allocate the limited number of places
that are available for peer-reviewed publication.
In practice, the second function can easily come to subsume
the first. The number of opportunities to publish peer-
39 For a study of this type of bias see Dwan et al., “Systematic
Review of the Empirical Evidence of Study Publication Bias and
Outcome Reporting Bias”. For examples of methods to detect bias
and to estimate its effects see Pfeiffer, Bertram and Ioannidis,
“Quantifying Selective Reporting and the Proteus Phenomenon
for Multiple Datasets with Similar Bias”; Simonsohn, Nelson and
Simmons, “p-Curve and Effect Size: Correcting for Publication Bias
Using Only Significant Results”. For examples of journals that make a
point of publishing reports of null results see the All Results Journals,
http://www.arjournals.com/.
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reviewed work falls well below the number of pieces of work
that meet the standard. This is to be expected. In any given
area of work, there will only be a modest pool of people
who are competent to review the latest research, and those
potential reviewers will also need to spend time on their own
work. (This constraint is however not so severe if journal
editors and publishers are content for peer review to be
conducted inadequately. We shall shortly come to a reason
why they might be content for that to happen.)
An editor will therefore apply a preliminary check to
submissions, and may decide not to send for review a
substantial proportion of them. The survivors will go to
review, and the reviewers will send their comments back
to the editor. The editor will then decide which pieces of
work not only meet the standard that reviewers impose, but
are also important enough to merit places in the relevant
journal. There may be additional stages before a final
decision is made. A common additional stage is to ask for
a piece of work to be revised and resubmitted.
We should bear in mind that there is both a constraint
based on a standard and additional rationing. Only the
constraint that work must meet a standard is directly
relevant to our confidence. But there are two ways in which
additional rationing can be indirectly relevant.
The first way is this. Competitive pressures can encourage
researchers to make their results seem more exciting than is
justified by the work they have done, so as to increase the
probability that their papers will be published in prestigious
journals.40 If any such tendency is not controlled by rigorous
appraisal, exaggerated claims may come to be published,
and may then come to be accepted at least partly because
they have been published in peer-reviewed journals.
40 McCook, “Is Peer Review Broken?”
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The second way is this. If researchers only take much note
of work that is published in peer-reviewed journals, and if
work gets excluded even though it meets the appropriate
standard, then work that would have helped researchers
to discover problems with other work may go unnoticed
because it did not get published in that way. The other
work may then not be subjected to sufficiently searching
criticism.
We should also ask whether peer review in fact ensures
that claims which are contained in work that is endorsed
by reviewers do enjoy adequate support. It would be too
much to expect that nothing should slip through, but we
may reasonably ask that the process should usually detect
and eliminate claims which do not enjoy adequate support.
There are some grounds for concern. Reviewers do not
appear to spend much time looking at papers, and when
two or more reviewers report on the same paper, their views
can be markedly different.41 Those open-access models
of publishing in which authors pay fees to have papers
published have also given rise to concern because journals
have financial incentives not to reject papers, although
some of the journals in which this seems to be likely to
lead to the publication of work of poor quality do give
additional indications of being disreputable.42 Subscription-
based journals may also publish papers they should not
publish. They too have a financial incentive, in their case
an incentive to accumulate a large stock of published papers
so as to increase their income from subscriptions and from
fees for access to individual papers.43 Here we have a reason
41 Seidl, Schmidt and Grösche, “The Performance of Peer Review
and a Beauty Contest of Referee Processes of Economics Journals”,
sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.
42 Bohannon, “Who’s Afraid of Peer Review?”
43 Eisen, “I Confess, I Wrote the Arsenic DNA Paper to Expose
Flaws in Peer-Review at Subscription Based Journals”.
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why journal editors and publishers might be content for peer
review to be conducted inadequately.
Finally, a traditional protection against one type of failing
is not as strong as one might hope, and recent developments
have made it even weaker than it used to be. The failing
in question is failure to be sufficiently critical of work by
prestigious researchers. The protection, which is in any
case not always used, is that the authors of papers are not
identified to reviewers.
This protection has never been very strong because many
areas of work are so specialized that it is easy for a reviewer
to tell who has written a paper. And the protection has
been weakened by the modern tendency for authors to
release drafts, with the authors’ names on them, in advance
of submission for formal publication. Researchers who are
competent to review papers will have read many of the
drafts in their field, so if they are asked to review a paper
with the author’s name hidden, they may very well know
immediately the identity of the author. One remedy is
for reviewers who identify authors to declare when they
have connections with those authors that might influence
their judgement, such as their having had close working
relationships with the authors in the past. But we cannot
be confident that reviewers will always do so.
We have set out some reasons to be concerned as to whether
traditional peer review is as good a control of quality as
might be desired. But there are remedies. One remedy is
to publish reviewers’ reports and authors’ responses, so
as to increase the likelihood that the relevant community
of researchers will notice if there is anything amiss. This
approach has for example been implemented by Biology




discuss next, where the limitations of individual reviewers
are counterbalanced by the fact that comments may be
made by many people.
9.4.3 Open comment
It is now very easy to make work available online, whether
in draft or in its final form, and to invite comment on it. The
invitation may be limited to a select group of researchers,
or it may extend to anyone who may be interested. The
boundary between the periods before and after publication,
and the boundary between official and unofficial comments,
boundaries which used to be perfectly clear, may both
become blurred. We shall give the name “open comment”
to all such new ways of working, regardless of whether a
select group or the public at large is invited to comment.
Infrastructure that facilitates open comment is now well-
established in several disciplines. Repositories for preprints
of papers include the arXiv for mathematics and certain
natural sciences, and the Social Science Research Net-
work.45 These sites give contact details for authors, so
people can write directly to authors rather than making
comments public. Another option is to publish work
and then publish comments alongside the papers. An
example is MediaCommons Press. It offers this facility for
documents in media studies, ranging from short reports
to books, and uses software that allows comments to be
linked directly to specific paragraphs of uploaded texts.46
There are also systems for recording comments on papers
that have been published or placed in online repositories
45 http://arxiv.org/; http://ssrn.com/.
46 http://mcpress.media-commons.org/. MediaCommons Press is
not a journal in the traditional sense of an entity that publishes a
steady stream of papers. Instead, it publishes documents sporadically.
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elsewhere. Examples are Naboj Dynamical Peer Review and
PubPeer, although some reviews on such sites are one-line
comments rather than worthwhile analyses of the papers
reviewed.47 Another tool is SelectedPapers.net, which works
with existing social networks.48
The spread of this way of working, involving more people
and linking comments to the work commented on, should
increase the probability that when a claim is not well-
supported, someone will notice and will leave a record of the
problem in a place where others are likely to find it. This
may in turn deter attempts to publish claims that are not
well-supported.49 Open comment can also allow work to be
appraised very quickly and efficiently, as with the appraisal
of Vinay Deolalikar’s putative proof that the complexity
class P did not equal the class NP.50
Having said that, comments will only give rise to an
effective control if they are found. Not all comments will be
conveniently linked to the work in question. Anyone who
wants to rely on claims made in order to make further
progress should seek out comments on those claims, even
if they were made in blog posts or in other places that are
not covered by citation indices. This concern is likely to
grow with the increasing academic use of blogs and other
social media.51 Fortunately, search engines give a reasonable
prospect that comments will be found.
47 http://www.naboj.com/; http://pubpeer.com/.
48 http://docs.selectedpapers.net/.
49 Koop and Pöschl, “Systems: An Open, Two-Stage Peer-Review
Journal”.
50 Rehmeyer, “Crowdsourcing Peer Review”.
51 Krugman, “The Facebooking of Economics”; Nentwich and
König, “Academia Goes Facebook? The Potential of Social Network
Sites in the Scholarly Realm”; Puschmann, “(Micro)Blogging Science?




We have noted that traditional peer review rations pub-
lication. It need not do so, but rationing is an unsurprising
consequence of the fact that resources are limited, combined
with the fact that review precedes publication. Fortunately,
new models of publishing that fit well with open comment
also minimize rationing. There are repositories and journals
that publish before review. There is also a variant in which
papers are only published after review, but without any rule
that papers must be particularly important. This variant
is exemplified by the journals PLOS ONE and Scientific
Reports.52 Developments that reduce rationing may help to
get reports of null results published. They are not however
guaranteed to do so, nor to ensure that null results are
presented in an unvarnished fashion. There is evidence that
the motives of some researchers play a part in some non-
publication or misleading publication.53
9.4.4 Repeated work
The ultimate form of independent appraisal of other
researchers’ work is to do the work again and see whether
the results are the same. This is a costly exercise, so
it is only performed for a modest proportion of pieces
of work. We may have considerable confidence in claims
that have been substantiated in this way, so long as we
can be sure both that the work was done in the same
way by independent researchers, and that all attempts
to replicate a given result were registered in advance.
Advance registration counters the risk of several attempts at
replication being made, and only the successful ones being
52 Guédon, “Sustaining the ‘Great Conversation’: The Future of
Scholarly and Scientific Journals”, pages 103-104.
53 Couzin-Frankel, “The Power of Negative Thinking”.
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reported.54 But interpretation of the results of attempts to
replicate work can be a complex business. Success does not
prove that claims made on the strength of earlier work were
correct, nor does failure prove that they were incorrect.55
9.5 New technologies
New technologies have made a great difference to the
conduct of research. These technologies can be classified
under two broad headings, with a grey area at the boundary.
The first class comprises technologies that make it easier
for researchers to manage information and find what they
need, and to work in groups that are large, geographically
dispersed or open to new members without formal processes
of recruitment. Technologies in this class have their uses in
many disciplines.
The second class comprises technologies that have given re-
searchers new ways to acquire and analyse data. These tech-
nologies include sensitive detectors of particles, telescopes
with great reach, tools to measure activity in human brains,
tools to analyse the composition of historical artefacts, and
techniques which make available the computational power
that is needed to analyse large bodies of data or carry
out demanding computations. Technologies in this class
tend to be specific to particular disciplines or to a few
disciplines. (One exception, applicable to many disciplines,
is the provision of computational power.)
54 For a discussion of the value of attempted replication and of
the need for controls see Nosek and Lakens, “Registered Reports: A
Method to Increase the Credibility of Published Results”.
55 Open Science Collaboration, “Estimating the Reproducibility of
Psychological Science”, Discussion section.
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We shall limit our attention to the effects of technologies
in the first class. Technologies in the second class are
enormously important, but most of them are highly
specialized. We shall also limit ourselves to mentioning some
leading technologies that are already well-established. New
technologies are developing rapidly, and there are several
institutes at work in the area.56
9.5.1 The management of information
In many disciplines, there has been a huge expansion of
the literature in recent decades. Researchers cannot hope
to read everything that is published in their fields unless
their fields are defined very narrowly indeed. And those
who only read the literature in their own narrow fields may
miss relevant information from other fields. They might
then over-estimate the levels of support that claims enjoyed,
because some of the missed material might have cast doubt
on some claims or on the value of support of certain types.
Fortunately, help is at hand. Citation indices help research-
ers to track down comments on published work, so that
they can find both objections to claims made and responses
to those objections.57 There are also computerized tools
to conduct searches that are not limited to citations, from
general-purpose web search engines to specialized tools that
56 Examples are the Oxford e-Research Centre, http://www.oerc.
ox.ac.uk/; the Oxford e-Social Science Project, http://microsites.oii.
ox.ac.uk/oess/; the King’s College London Centre for e-Research,
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/groups/cerch/index.aspx; the Uni-
versity of Auckland Centre for eResearch, http://www.eresearch.
auckland.ac.nz/en/centre-for-eresearch.html; the Maryland Institute
for Technology in the Humanities, http://mith.umd.edu/.
57 Several citation indices covering disciplines in the natural
sciences, the social sciences and the humanities are brought together
at Web of Science, http://wokinfo.com/.
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are tailored to the needs of particular disciplines and that
use sophisticated techniques to produce the most useful
results.58 Such aids reduce the risk of wrongly assenting
to claims because of a failure to find relevant literature. A
further development is the standardization of terminology
in specific fields, so as to make it easier to unify databases
and to find and share information. An example is Gene
Ontology, which seeks to standardize the terminology used
to describe gene products.59
Another development is the growth of specialized wikis,
written and edited by many contributors. Pages in a wiki
cover specific topics or methods. A page may set out claims,
summarize other points that are made in the literature, and
give links both to other wiki pages and to the literature.60
Wikis are undoubtedly useful. They can both supply
information directly and help researchers to navigate the
literature. But we must ask whether there is enough control
over what gets posted on them to ensure that claims
that are not well-supported, and recommendations to use
methods that are not in fact reliable, will be eliminated
quickly. The concern arises not merely in connection with
specific pieces of information, errors in which may easily
be corrected one by one, but also in connection with the
overall views of topics that are presented. It has been
argued that wikis can be a very useful way to bring
58 An example of a specialized search tool is GoPubMed, http:
//www.gopubmed.org/web/gopubmed/. GoPubMed uses background
knowledge of concepts and of how they are linked in order to search
more intelligently than would otherwise be possible: http://help.
gopubmed.com/.
59 http://geneontology.org/.
60 Examples of specialized wikis are the nLab, http://ncatlab.org/,
in mathematics; OpenWetWare, http://openwetware.org/, in biology;
Glottopedia, http://www.glottopedia.org/, in linguistics.
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together different perspectives on topics.61 But openness
to different perspectives naturally raises concerns, both
about the appropriateness of the perspectives and about
the correctness of specific claims that are made from those
perspectives.
The standard control in wikis is one that does not at first
sight look like much of a control. It is that anyone, or
anyone drawn from a large group, can edit entries. Anyone
who thinks that material is incorrect can change it. If a
claim is made with no reference to support, anyone can
add “Citation needed”. The record of all changes is often
public, and there is often a discussion area for each page
where contentious issues can be debated. So long as enough
researchers are interested in improving a specialized wiki,
and so long as all participants act sensibly, not pursuing
editing wars in which the same changes are made back
and forth several times, we may reasonably hope that
most of the contents of the wiki at any given time will be
academically respectable.
This is however only a hope. Studies of reliability have
been done, but they have concentrated on Wikipedia rather
than on specialized wikis.62 An assessment of specialized
wikis would be a substantial task. Disciplines and their
cultures are so diverse that it would be necessary to test
wikis in specific disciplines, rather than testing a few wikis
and basing a general conclusion as to reliability across
disciplines on that sample. Moreover, systematic tests of
61 Bauer, “Multivocality and ‘Wikiality’: The Epistemology and
Ethics of a Pragmatic Archaeology”.
62 For an example of an assessment of Wikipedia on a topic
that would mostly attract the attention of specialists see Halsted,
“Accuracy and Quality in Historical Representation: Wikipedia,
Textbooks and the Investiture Controversy”. This study found some
inaccuracies in the relevant Wikipedia article, but also praised the
article for completeness.
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any given wiki would be needed to give a high level of
reassurance. It would not be enough merely to check that
there were plenty of active expert readers who could detect
and correct errors. That would not be enough because
the normal indicators that a reader can use to assess the
reliability of material, such as the authority of authors,
whether material is written in the style that is typical of
experts, and the correctness of other material on topics
about which the reader is well-informed, may not be as
effective in relation to wiki articles as they would be in
relation to more traditional material.63 There is however
evidence to support the reassuring claim that academic
users of the world wide web assess the quality of the
information that is presented to them.64
There are other controls. Some wikis limit editing rights to
people who have been approved.65 There are also sites that
move some distance away from the standard wiki model
by peer-reviewing articles and amendments to them before
publication.66
There is also a control that does not bear directly on the
contents of wikis but that limits the risk that inadequacies
in those contents will come to infect the body of scholarly
literature, and will hence lead to claims being regarded
as better supported than they really are. This control is
that it is not generally considered acceptable to cite a wiki
article in support of a claim. It is perfectly acceptable
63 Magnus, “On Trusting Wikipedia”. Although this paper relates
to Wikipedia, the concerns expressed arise to some extent in relation
to specialized wikis.
64 Rieh, “Judgment of Information Quality and Cognitive Author-
ity in the Web”. This study relates to the web generally, rather than
to wikis in particular.
65 OpenWetWare is an example:
http://openwetware.org/wiki/OpenWetWare:How_to_join.
66 Scholarpedia does this: http://www.scholarpedia.org/.
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to find material by following up citations in wikis. If the
cited material is checked at first hand, it can then be cited
in support of new claims. But references to wiki articles
themselves are not expected to appear in footnotes. One
reason why wiki articles should not be cited is that material
in them is generally derived from other published sources.
Researchers should go back to those sources, and sometimes
to sources on which they in turn were based, rather than
relying on the summaries and interpretations of sources that
appear in wiki articles. Another reason why wiki articles
should not be cited is that their texts are sometimes subject
to frequent change. Someone who cited a wiki article could
specify the time at which she read it, but although it might
be possible for readers of the citation to view the article as
it stood at that time, that would be an extra task and one
that might not always be feasible.
9.5.2 Large, dispersed and open groups
New technologies facilitate work in groups that may be
large, geographically dispersed, or open to new members
who can join without any formal process of recruitment.
We shall count as members all people who contribute
to a group’s work. Some groups have formal processes
of recruitment, some have members who meet certain
membership criteria but who come and go as they please,
and some throw membership open to the public (who will
also come and go as they please).
We may identify three main types of contribution of new
technologies to facilitating work in large, dispersed and
open groups.
The first type of contribution is that the Internet and online
storage make it easy to make material available around
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the world. The material may be textual or numerical data,
scanned copies of documents, or photographs of artefacts
or natural phenomena.
The second type of contribution is that blogs and online fora
can be used to invite people to contribute to the solution of
problems. In one form of this type of work, contributions to
separate aspects of a problem are invited. The definitions
of different aspects of a problem may be quite loose at the
start, and may change as people contribute their thoughts.
Such a project may have a central manager who will
periodically summarize progress to date and start a new
thread of discussion which takes account of that progress.
The leading example is Polymath, which was originated by
Timothy Gowers and which has tackled several different
mathematical problems.67 In another form of this type of
work a single problem, such as that of how to analyse large
amounts of data efficiently, may be offered to the world at
large, perhaps with some incentive to contribute ideas. The
results can be impressive.68
The third type of contribution is this. When a project
involves producing a collective statement that sets out
the work done and the results, distributed version control
systems such as Git make it easy for members of a group
to add their contributions and their editorial changes to
a developing statement without having to seek permission
from other members, and to do so with confidence that all
changes will be tracked, conflicting changes will largely be
avoided, and any conflicts that do arise will be resolved.69 A
67 http://polymathprojects.org/; Gowers and Nielsen, “Massively
Collaborative Mathematics”.
68 Lakhani et al., “Prize-Based Contests Can Provide Solutions to
Computational Biology Problems”.
69 For information on Git see http://git-scm.com/. An example
of its use is the writing of a book on homotopy type theory
by a large group of mathematicians in a short space of time:
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variant is to set up a wiki with appropriate initial articles
and categories of articles, and then invite either selected
researchers or the community at large to add information
and edit articles. At some point the contents of the wiki will
represent a collective statement of the work done and the
results.70
Both version control systems and wikis can also be used to
facilitate work by different people on different aspects of a
problem. That is, these technologies can make contributions
of the second type mentioned above.
In section 9.2.4, we discussed some of the risks that arise
out of the scope for groups to impose orthodoxy. Work that
would be productive but would not fit in with mainstream
beliefs or ways of working may be met with hostility
or neglected, diversity in debate may be reduced, and
groupthink may arise. We may ask about the effects of
groups being large, geographically dispersed, or open to
new members who may join without any formal process
of recruitment.
The risks should be reduced. The larger a group, the greater
the range of points of view its members should have. The
more geographically dispersed a group, the less likely it
is that people will express agreement against their better
judgement: it is less important to keep the peace with
colleagues when one does not work in the same building.
And openness to new members presents an opportunity for
dissident voices to challenge orthodoxy.
Univalent Foundations Program, Homotopy Type Theory: Univalent
Foundations of Mathematics. For the process of writing the book see
Bauer, “The HoTT Book”.
70 For examples of the use of wikis in research see Bauer,
“Multivocality and ‘Wikiality’: The Epistemology and Ethics of a
Pragmatic Archaeology”, pages 189-193.
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One theme that runs through use of the technologies
discussed here is that of openness. Openness to anyone
who wishes to participate in a research project is not an
inevitable accompaniment to use of these technologies, but
their use does facilitate that openness. These technologies
also facilitate a different type of openness, that of allowing
the methods developed and the data obtained in one project
to be used in other projects. Moreover, methods, data and
results from a project can be organized in a single useful
bundle, a Research Object.71
The growth of openness is having a significant impact on
the conduct of some disciplines, in particular some of the
natural sciences.72 There is a view that, particularly in the
natural sciences, the impact is enough to justify identifying
and naming a whole new way of working. The term “Science
2.0” has come into use as a name for work that involves
large amounts of data, the open exchange of interim results
long before final conclusions are ready to be published, and
large-scale collaboration.73
Openness in all of its forms should increase our confidence
in accepted claims, both because work is exposed to a wide
range of contributors and potential critics, and because
researchers who can borrow data and methods from others
can make faster progress with their own work, obtaining
new results that may expose defects in previously accepted
claims or in the support for them.
71 For an example see Hettne et al.,“Structuring Research Methods
and Data with the Research Object Model: Genomics Workflows as a
Case Study”.
72 Bartling and Friesike (eds.), Opening Science: The Evolving
Guide on How the Internet is Changing Research, Collaboration and
Scholarly Publishing; Royal Society Science Policy Centre, Science as
an Open Enterprise: Final Report.
73 Bartling and Friesike, “Towards Another Scientific Revolution”;




9.6.1 The need for epistemic virtues
If researchers exercise epistemic virtues, that will increase
both their effectiveness and our confidence. In addition, it
will help to make it safe for other researchers to rely on
their work. It is essential that other researchers can do so
with confidence, and this requires trust between researchers.
Evidence of epistemic virtue can play an important role in
supporting the necessary trust.
There is therefore ample reason to explore the epistemology
of testimony and the role of trust in that epistemology. The
connection has long been recognized in the philosophical
literature.74 But that is not the approach we shall take here.
The task set by our main question is not to construct an
epistemology, in the sense of a theory that would specify
conditions for people to have knowledge. Instead we shall
identify particular virtues, the exercise of which can give
reassurance as to the correctness of claims.
Since our task is not to construct an epistemology, not
even a virtue epistemology, we shall not be concerned
with the distinction between virtue reliabilism and virtue
responsibilism. We shall draw on both approaches. Our
concern with what will in fact allow us to have confidence
might seem to align us largely with reliabilism, but on the
other hand virtues such as completeness, which requires not
disregarding inconvenient data, can be seen as a character
trait of the kind that interests responsibilists.
Our concern with what works means that we shall only
consider a virtue to be exercised if it is exercised in a way
74 Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, section 1.
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that has a good prospect of being effective. Good intentions
are not enough. Having said that, we shall regard a virtue
as exercised when the intention and the necessary skill
are both present, even if some other circumstance leads a
researcher to make or assent to an incorrect claim. We also
do not deny the importance of values, which are simply
held rather than exercised, as psychological supports for
the possession of virtues.75
Finally, while it is natural to think of epistemic virtues as
being exercised by individuals, they can also be exercised
by groups of researchers. A group as a whole might be par-
ticularly careful about considering all relevant information,
or it might be particularly imaginative, while the group’s
possession of such virtues might not appropriately be seen
as merely comprising possession of the virtues by members
of the group.76 We shall not remark on this possibility at
each stage, but each reference to the exercise of an epistemic
virtue should be read as including its exercise by a group.
We shall now consider some virtues that are particularly
important in relation to each of the making of claims,
the use of imagination and the appraisal of claims, before
concluding with a note on virtues and the integrity of
research.
9.6.2 The making of claims
One essential virtue is accuracy. If researchers measure the
values of variables, or carry out surveys, or record the texts
75 For how values can be mapped, their legitimate roles in research,
and the risks that arise when values influence the appraisal of
claims inappropriately, see Thagard, The Cognitive Science of Science:
Explanation, Discovery, and Conceptual Change, chapter 17.
76 Lahroodi, “Collective Epistemic Virtues”.
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or the physical features of manuscripts, they must note
down what they find, and only what they find.
A related virtue is completeness. If researchers take several
measurements they must note down all of them, and not
ignore or regard as unimportant ones they did not expect
or that do not support their pet theories. If a measurement
is strange, researchers may mark it for further investigation
in case it resulted from an error, but they should not simply
ignore it or decide without good reason that it should not be
given its full weight. The importance of giving due weight
to measurements that do not support a theory is illustrated
by a study that was claimed to demonstrate the so-called
memory of water. The team regarded positive results more
favourably than negative results, and this was one of the
concerns that others had about their work.77
In some disciplines, there are systematic approaches to the
collection of evidence. For example, there are systems to use
when recording archaeological excavations, and systematic
approaches to the conduct and recording of interviews
in the social sciences.78 The existence of such detailed
guidance can make it relatively easy to demonstrate that
the virtue of completeness has been exercised. But where
detailed guidance is not available, researchers must use their
judgement as to what should be recorded and what should
be given weight. It may then be less clear whether work
done is complete, or indeed whether there is a well-defined
standard of completeness to be met.
If either of the two virtues of accuracy and completeness is
not exercised, claims that are not well-supported can all
77 Maddox, Randi and Stewart, “‘High-Dilution’ Experiments a
Delusion”, page 290.
78 Museum of London Archaeology Service, Archaeological Site
Manual; Bryman, Social Research Methods, chapter 20.
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too easily be made. We must therefore be concerned as
to whether failures to exercise these virtues are generally
detected. It is not just a matter of detecting deliberate
failure, although there are cases of that.79 Cases in which
the intention to be virtuous is present, but the skill that
is necessary to make the intention effective is lacking, also
give rise to a serious risk that claims will be made when
they should not be made.
We cannot measure the extent of failures to exercise the
virtues of accuracy and completeness with any precision.
We can gain some reassurance from the fact that researchers
are a critical breed, and are likely to ask questions about
any startling claims. On the other hand, if a claim is
humdrum, and if it raises no questions about established
results, inadequacies in work done to support it may
go unnoticed. We may also be concerned that limits on
resources, sociological factors, and varying understandings
of what amounts to misconduct may all lead to inadequacies
not coming to the notice of the research community.80 If
inadequacies can go unnoticed, that will to some extent
disable the control of demanding adequate support for
claims before assenting to them. Then, given that some
incorrect claims will be made, some incorrect claims will
come to be accepted.
Moving on to arguments that take readers from the evidence
that is reported to the claims for which a publication argues,
the links from evidence to claims need to be strong, either
individually or collectively. Researchers need to exercise
the virtue of sound reasoning. It might be thought that
79 Martinson, Anderson and de Vries, “Scientists Behaving Badly”;
Fanelli, “How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research? A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Survey Data”.
80 Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge”, section 3; Fanelli,
“How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research? A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis of Survey Data”, Discussion section.
502
9.6 Epistemic virtues
others would routinely check whether reasoning was sound
by working through published arguments. But researchers
may well lack the time needed to check all the steps in
arguments. Moreover, the acceptability of steps in a chain
of reasoning may be a matter of judgement. And when
there is scope to exercise judgement, skilful presentation
can make some steps more appealing to the reader than
they would otherwise be.81 It does not however follow
that rhetoric should be excluded from the presentation of
research. In some disciplines, it plays too central a role to
be eliminated.82
There is an over-arching virtue, the exercise of which
would require all three of accuracy, completeness and sound
reasoning. This is the virtue of only making claims when
one both has enough evidence and understands why the
evidence suffices. The most forthright injunction to exercise
this virtue was issued by William Kingdon Clifford, in the
words, “To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for
any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence”.83
The adoption of an attitude as severe as Clifford’s would
reduce the number of claims that were put forward without
adequate support. Given that the support for claims is
not always fully checked, that would in itself reduce the
number of claims that came to be accepted without their
having adequate support. And where checks were made,
the adoption of Clifford’s attitude would help because it
would mean demanding to see the support for claims,
a demand that can often expose incorrect claims. But
Clifford’s attitude could also impede progress, because it
could make researchers too reluctant to make claims.
81 Barahona and Cachón, “The Rhetorical Dimension of Stephen
Jay Gould’s Work”.
82 Its pervasive role in economics is set out in McCloskey, The
Rhetoric of Economics.
83 Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”, section 1, page 175.
503
9 Creators of Accounts
This is an area in which researchers must exercise judge-
ment, guided by the norms of their discipline. It would be
pointless for researchers to take Clifford’s attitude to such
an extreme that their disciplines could not be advanced,
but unacceptable to violate Clifford’s injunction without
making it clear what had been done. A convention in some
disciplines is to provide a reference whenever a piece of
information is directly substantiated by a source, so that
the absence of a reference indicates that there is no direct
support, and to use phrases like “We may assume that” and
“He must have appreciated that”, to signal any claim that
is a reasonable supposition rather than being based directly
on evidence.
A related concern arises out of the use of reasoning that is
far from deductive. If the path from evidence to a claim
would not force anyone who acknowledged the evidence
to assent to the claim, it might be thought that assent
to the claim would violate Clifford’s injunction, at least
under a strict reading of the requirement for sufficient
evidence. Researchers must again exercise judgement. Some
non-deductive steps may be perfectly acceptable so long as
their non-deductive nature is obvious to the reader, but
other steps may be unacceptable.
The acceptance of reasonable suppositions that are clearly
signalled, and of reasoning that is far from deductive, should
not however be allowed to develop into permission to make
suppositions or to reason loosely in ways that are guided
by a desire to reach conclusions which have been selected
in advance. That practice is always an epistemic vice.
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9.6.3 The use of imagination
Researchers’ use of imagination must display two virtues if
it is to reduce the risk that incorrect claims will come to be
accepted. Imagination must be lively, and it must also be
disciplined. We can see the roles that these virtues play by
considering the course of work on a problem, from initial
ideas to the testing of conclusions.
When researchers seek possible answers to their questions,
or possible new questions, or possible ways to appraise
claims, it is helpful to give imagination free rein. There is
no need to hold back for fear of error, because researchers
will subsequently reflect on the fruits of their imagining.
Having said that, imagination can usefully be guided.
In experimental disciplines, the guidance provided by
recognized ways to design and conduct experiments can be
vital, opening up possibilities while limiting the scope to
stray down byways that are unlikely to be productive.84
And any period of speculation must be followed by a
period of sober reflection. This need for sober reflection is
not limited to the consideration of claims that might be
made. It also extends to the consideration of work that
might be done to answer questions or to appraise claims
that have already been made. Researchers should direct
their limited resources intelligently, not pursuing avenues
of exploration that might in principle be useful but only
at disproportionate cost. This virtue is identified by Adam
Morton as “experiment-shopping”.85
84 The notion of a recognized way to design and conduct experi-
ments can be broadened to the notion of an experimental system, a
whole context of work to which Hans-Jörg Rheinberger gives a central
role: Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing
Proteins in the Test Tube, pages 19-21 and 24-28.
85 Morton, “Acting to Know: A Virtue of Experimentation”, section
4.
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When researchers have identified candidate claims that
are worth taking seriously and move on to appraise the
candidates, imagination is again needed, but it must be
very disciplined. Researchers might for example need to
test a claim that the unobserved occurrence of some
phenomenon C explained the observed occurrence of some
other phenomenon E, when there might for all they knew
have been an unobserved occurrence of D instead of C which
might equally well have led to E. Disciplined imagination
would be needed in order to identify all the likely observable
consequences of C and of D. It would also be needed in
order to appraise the plausibility of situations in which
C might occur without E’s occurring.86 Researchers also
need disciplined imagination to guide their search for any
evidence that might conflict with claims. They must think
of the right places in which to look, or the right experiments
to conduct.
In some parts of the natural sciences, tests of some types
follow established patterns. A new drug, for example, must
be tested using a randomized controlled trial, with samples
that are large enough to allow statistical conclusions to
be drawn. But researchers need to be aware of reasons
why standard tests might be insufficient. Lively imagination
should help researchers to think of circumstances in which
additional tests would be needed.
In disciplines that are relatively high up the scale, and
particularly in the humanities, there are often not enough
standard tests to use. It may even be inappropriate to
think in terms of all tests being devised in advance
86 For the workings of the imagination in relevant types of
reasoning, albeit with examples that are mostly drawn from everyday
life rather than from academic work, see Byrne, The Rational
Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality, chapters 2, 5
and 6. For a range of roles of imagination and of thought experiments
see De Mey, “Imagination’s Grip on Science”.
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and then applied. Rather, the process of appraisal may
involve inventing tests after the event, making connections
with other information in order to assess arguments, and
sometimes coming up with alternative interpretations of
the evidence. Whether or not tests devised in advance
predominate, a lively imagination is essential in order to
have a good prospect of weeding out incorrect claims.
The initial search for possible claims and consideration of
their prima facie plausibility might be regarded as falling
within the context of discovery, while the appraisal of
claims might be regarded as falling within the context
of justification. But that distinction between contexts is
contentious. Even if it is accepted, it is more complex
than it might at first seem to be.87 And the proper use
of imagination at an early stage can contribute to the
justification of claims. We shall consider two ways in which
it can contribute. The first one relates to the fallibility of
processes for appraising claims, and the second one relates
to the desirability of considering a wide range of candidate
explanations of phenomena.
A consequence of the fallibility of appraisal processes is that
we should attach significance to how claims come to be
made. We should do so because if claims are made following
sound reasoning, that should increase the proportion of
claims that are correct. That should in turn reduce the
extent to which deficiencies in appraisal would lead to the
acceptance of incorrect claims, given that some proportion
87 Schickore and Steinle (eds.), Revisiting Discovery and Justi-
fication: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context
Distinction, particularly chapter 2: Howard, “Lost Wanderers in the
Forest of Knowledge: Some Thoughts on the Discovery-Justification
Distinction”; chapter 10: Nickles, “Heuristic Appraisal: Context
of Discovery or Justification?”; chapter 13: Arabatzis, “On the
Inextricability of the Context of Discovery and the Context of
Justification”.
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of incorrect claims will slip through the process of appraisal.
In particular, the imaginative steps that are taken to move
from evidence to claims can be significant. If those steps
are the work of researchers with disciplined imaginations,
that should reduce the proportion of incorrect claims. A
disciplined imagination is one that keeps in mind the
existing corpus and the types of reasoning that have been
found to be successful in the past, and that does not
drift off into vague musings.88 If on the other hand claims
are reached by taking imaginative steps that amount to
undisciplined jumping to conclusions, that would be likely
to increase the proportion of incorrect claims. That would
in turn put pressure on the process of appraisal, having an
adverse effect on our confidence.
Turning to ranges of candidate explanations, we discussed
the desirability of researchers considering an appropriate
range of candidates in section 8.3.3.1. If researchers tackling
a given question have lively imaginations that they use
appropriately, they will think of a wide range of candidates.
That can in turn lend support to their decisions to endorse
certain explanations. It can do this because it can lessen
the risk that the candidates found will appear to be of
high quality merely because not enough candidates have
been considered. (Remember that an explanation that is
satisfactory in itself may be suspected of missing the
point if other explanations are much better.) This can
in turn lend support to the associated claims to explain,
and to claims that play explanatory roles. The use of
imagination to identify an appropriate range of candidates
is particularly important when claims within explanantia
88 Timothy Williamson has noted the importance of disciplining the
imagination by insisting on rigorous and precise thought: Williamson,
The Philosophy of Philosophy, page 289. He writes in relation to work
in analytic philosophy, but the point extends to other disciplines.
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are to be supported, because of the condition we introduced
in section 5.1.2.2 that the relevant explanations should be
better than others.
9.6.4 The appraisal of claims
We shall now discuss other epistemic virtues in the context
of the appraisal of claims, virtues that researchers should
exercise if they are to make sound judgements as to whether
to assent to claims.
It is important for researchers to be free of certain
prejudices. They should not be influenced by their personal
views as to the attractiveness or unattractiveness of certain
ways of working (as opposed to being influenced by well-
founded judgements that certain methods are reliable while
others are unreliable). Nor should they be influenced by
views as to the abilities of other researchers which do not
reflect those researchers’ true merits.
Inappropriate views on individual researchers can obviously
affect the appraisal of specific pieces of work. This risk is a
major reason why there is a tradition that peer reviewers
should not know the authors of papers – a protection that
is of limited effectiveness, as we noted in section 9.4.2.
There may also be systematic biases against whole classes of
people or in favour of other classes. The main effect of such
systematic biases may well be at the stage of allocating
resources to particular lines of work rather than at the
stage of appraising results.89 But if resources are allocated
inappropriately, the damage may extend beyond a failure
to do potentially valuable new work. The scope to use new
89 Wray, “Evaluating Scientists: Examining the Effects of Sexism
and Nepotism”.
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work to challenge other claims may be lost too, so that
claims may survive when they should be discarded.
It can be difficult to detect prejudices as to ways of
working. A personal opinion that is not widely shared
should certainly be regarded with suspicion. But there may
also be prejudices that are not recognized as such, simply
because they have taken hold over the years and are very
widely shared. These prejudices may lead researchers to
reject claims out of hand because they arise out of work
done in non-standard ways, when the claims should in fact
be given serious consideration and should sometimes come
to be accepted. Indeed, novel approaches can themselves
be a source of considerable progress. Researchers who
adopt particular ethical or political positions, such as a
commitment to certain feminist values, or who are for
any other reason sensitive to long-standing biases in the
approach to objects of study, may be well-placed to advance
their disciplines by rejecting traditional assumptions and
looking at the evidence afresh.90
It is therefore important for those who appraise the work
of others to be alert to the possibility that their own
assumptions might lead them to make mistakes. But this
does not mean that standards should be relaxed. The fruits
of novel approaches must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny,
just like the fruits of any other research. It is also important
to restrict the roles that ethical and social values of any
sort may play, and in particular to prevent inappropriate
influence on the design of studies or on decisions as to
whether to make or assent to claims.91 (We here comment
specifically on the roles of values that are fundamentally
90 There are examples in Kourany, “Replacing the Ideal of Value-
Free Science”; Wylie and Nelson, “Coming to Terms with the Values of
Science: Insights from Feminist Science Studies Scholarship”, section
3.2.
91 Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, chapter 5.
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ethical or social. The case for imposing restrictions does not
extend to values that are fundamentally epistemic, such as
a commitment to observe norms of evidence and argument,
nor to norms of evidence and argument themselves, for
example a norm that a null hypothesis is only to be rejected
on the basis of 𝑝 < 0.05, or a norm that simple theories
are to be investigated to see whether they are satisfactory
before resorting to complex theories.92 We also do not here
consider personal goals, such as the goal of advancing one’s
career. We shall touch on personal goals in section 9.6.5.)
There are also some entrenched preferences that play
valuable roles in making disciplines productive. An example
would be a preference for working in ways that have been
found regularly to lead to conclusions which have then
been substantiated in other ways. Another example would
be a preference for allocating resources to research that
was defined in detail by reference to the existing corpus,
whether as building on that corpus or in opposition to it.
The unfunded heretic who ignores the corpus, and who then
rails against the prejudice of the establishment, may fully
deserve his neglect. It is therefore not right to deprecate any
preference that looks as though it might be a prejudice.
We can only ask that researchers and those who allocate
resources should be aware of their preferences and of the
risk of baleful effects.
Another virtue to exercise is that of sound judgement in the
choice of standards and methods of appraisal. In large parts
of the natural sciences, judgement may be supported by
detailed guidance. The required types of test of claims, and
the levels of statistical significance that must be displayed
There is however scope to argue that Douglas is still too generous in
allowing values to have influence.
92 For the scope to separate social and epistemic values see Doppelt,
“Values in Science”.
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in order for those tests to be passed, are fixed by the
norms of disciplines. Higher up the scale of disciplines,
there is less guidance on methods to use. Moreover, the
available methods of appraisal are often not tests that make
use of notions of statistical significance. Judgement must
therefore be exercised when determining whether claims
meet satisfactory standards.
The exercise of judgement in choosing methods of appraisal
and in deciding whether claims meet satisfactory standards
does not amount to a relaxation of standards in some
disciplines, or when appraising some claims. Disciplines are
different, and claims made within them need to be appraised
in different ways. We should not see standards that are
commonly applied in the social sciences or the humanities as
relaxed versions of standards that are applied in the natural
sciences, but as different standards. (There is however some
overlap, as when tests of statistical significance are used in
the social sciences or the humanities.)
This observation does not deny natural scientists the
opportunity to say that their accepted claims have been
appraised more rigorously than accepted claims in the social
sciences or the humanities, and hence to say that their
accepted claims enjoy stronger support. But the reason
why there is less support for accepted claims in the social
sciences and the humanities is not that those claims can
only pass the tests that are used in the natural sciences
when the bar is lowered. The reason is that those tests
often cannot be used. Moreover, these reflections give us
no reason to think that researchers cannot tell when they
should or should not assent to claims in the social sciences
or the humanities.
Neither the tailoring of tests to disciplines nor the exercise
of judgement in the appraisal of claims should be seen
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as amounting to the invocation of contextualism, subject-
sensitive invariantism or any comparable position that
introduces more flexibility into attributions of knowledge
than has been traditional in epistemology.93 Such novel
epistemological views have been developed in order to
analyse the concept of knowledge, but there would be
an easy extension to the question of whether researchers
should assent to claims. One might for example say that
whether researchers should assent to a claim should depend
on contextual features such as whether the claim would
play an important role, perhaps in providing support
for other claims or perhaps in organizing the corpus, so
that the stakes were high. (We run together a variety
of epistemological views. That would not be appropriate
if we were concerned with the conditions for attributing
knowledge. The positions differ in ways that are important
in that context. But in our context, the thing that matters is
the degree of flexibility that is introduced, where flexibility
reflects the attachment of importance to non-traditional
factors.)
There is good reason to distinguish both the tailoring of
tests and the exercise of judgement in the appraisal of
claims from the invocation of such novel epistemological
views. In academic disciplines the task is to decide whether
to assent to claims, primarily for the sake of enlarging the
corpus rather than with a view to any practical application
of claims. There should therefore be less temptation than
in practical life to allow standards to be influenced by
factors that are made relevant by the needs and interests
of the people involved, such as the level of the stakes. In
academic disciplines, needs and interests should not vary
to anything like the extent that they vary in practical
93 For a map of some of these positions see Greco, Achieving
Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity,
chapter 7, part 2, section 2.
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life. The interest should be a stable one, in assenting
to claims that are correct and rejecting claims that are
incorrect. It is noteworthy that arguments which make room
for contextualism, and which make its appeal perfectly
comprehensible, focus on needs and interests. In so doing
they put in question any view that contextualism ought to
apply in the context of academic disciplines.94
Having argued against the relevance of such novel epi-
stemological views to academic disciplines, we should ac-
knowledge that an important claim with wide implications
probably will receive more scrutiny than a claim that will
not play any central role. That does not however mean that
researchers should assent to minor claims more readily than
major claims. We should also acknowledge that desires for
prestige and funding may tempt researchers to relax their
standards in order to make claims that are significant or
94 One example of a focus on needs and interests is Hannon,
“The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism”. Hannon has a
broad conception of relevant factors, covering not only the immediate
interests of someone who may or may not have knowledge but also
facts about the relevant epistemic community (pages 912-913). This
might be expected to make Hannon’s argument easy to extend to
academic disciplines, where the needs of the community take priority
over those of the individual. But this cannot overcome the difficulty
that needs and interests do not vary in academic disciplines to the
extent that they vary in practical life.
Another paper, which discusses pragmatic encroachment in general,
is Fantl and McGrath, “Pragmatic Encroachment: It’s Not Just About
Knowledge”. At first the paper seems to be about to make a case for
pragmatic encroachment on warrant for belief which is independent
of a context of practical action. Positions called fallibilism and purism
are both formulated without reference to action (page 29; purism is
opposed to pragmatic encroachment). But the authors go on to argue
their case by reference to situations in which the rationality of action
is central.
We should however note that possible applications to academic
disciplines are not discussed in either paper, so no views on that point
should be attributed to the authors.
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that can justify doing further work. But what does happen
may not be what should happen.
Contextualism as one of the novel epistemological views
that are in question here is to be distinguished from
contextualism in the sense of the view that the significance
of evidence depends on background assumptions. That sort
of contextualism has considerable relevance to the picture
painted in this work. It is also easily accommodated in that
picture, in the form of recognition that the existing corpus
is essential to the conduct of new research.95
9.6.5 The integrity of research
Communities of researchers in many disciplines are under
pressure to secure shares of limited resources. There can
also be commercial interests, both in the publication or
non-publication of certain results and in the promotion of
particular types of work that may lead to commercially
viable products. In such an environment, there are constant
threats to the integrity of the overall process of research.
Commercial interests give rise to obvious risks.96 But there
are also some less obvious risks, and any damage done may
not be immediately apparent. For example, professional
esteem may be allocated on grounds other than merit, and
this can happen without anyone’s consciously engaging in
manifestly unethical behaviour.97 To take another example,
95 This relevant form of contextualism is discussed in Longino,
“What’s So Great about an Objective Concept of Evidence?”.
96 Brown, “The Community of Science R○”; Adam, “Promoting
Disinterestedness or Making Use of Bias? Interests and Moral
Obligation in Commercialized Research”, pages 242-243 and 246.
97 Brennan and Pettit, “The Hidden Economy of Esteem”, sections
4 to 6.
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publishers of journals may encourage authors to include
irrelevant citations in their papers so as to improve the
impact factors of the journals that published the works
cited, and this may unjustifiably improve the citation
records of the authors cited.98
The virtues of individual researchers are one line of defence,
alongside the constant threat of public criticism of distorted
work. And there is a virtue that is specific to this context,
the virtue of keeping to the rules, such as rules that
require the disclosure of interests or that require refusal
to work under conditions that would limit access to data
or the ability to analyse data or publish conclusions.99 But
while the virtues of individuals are important as a line of
defence, their direct relevance to our main question is very
largely covered by what we have already said. We covered
virtues as a defence against the falsification or the selective
reporting of results in section 9.6.2. The misallocation
of resources and the over-valuation of work have a more
indirect bearing on our confidence in the claims that emerge
from whatever work is done. If misallocation and over-
valuation become serious, work that should be done in order
to test claims which are already accepted, perhaps using
methods that were not available when the claims first came
to be accepted, may not get done.
There is also a very general concern, indirectly relevant
to our main question, that if there is any slippage in any
standard, researchers may cease to see the point of rigorous
adherence to high standards. Then standards that mattered
directly to our confidence might come to be ignored. But
such a general concern should not lead to a demand that
98 Wilhite and Fong, “Coercive Citation in Academic Publishing”.
99 One set of rules is International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors, Recommendations for the Conduct, Reporting, Editing, and
Publication of Scholarly Work in Medical Journals.
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all researchers should be dedicated solely to the progress of
their disciplines and should lack personal ambition. The
desire to receive credit for work done and hence to be
esteemed by one’s colleagues need not obstruct progress.100
There are even potential benefits of researchers’ being
guided by personal goals, such as a desire for professional
success when they choose which projects to pursue or a
desire for wealth when they work on the application of the
results of research.101 Individuals matter, as well as research
groups and communities.
100 Goldman and Shaked, “An Economic Model of Scientific Activity
and Truth Acquisition”.
101 Thagard, The Cognitive Science of Science: Explanation, Dis-
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